Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Rio Vista Officer Collondrez responded to a hit-and-run accident. According to an internal affairs investigation, Collondrez falsified his report, arrested a suspect without probable cause, used excessive force, applied a carotid control hold on the suspect, and failed to request medical assistance. After hearings, the city agreed to pay Collondrez $35,000. Collondrez resigned. The agreement provides that Collondrez's disciplinary reports will only be released as required by law or upon legal process issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, after written notice to Collondrez. Penal Code section 832.71 was subsequently amended to require the disclosure of police officer personnel records concerning sustained findings of dishonesty or making false reports. The city responded to media requests under the Public Records Act for records, giving Collondrez prior notice of only some of the disclosures. Media outlets reported the misconduct allegations. His then-employer, Uber, fired Collondrez. Collondrez sued.The trial court partially granted the city’s to strike the complaint under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure 425.16, finding that Collondrez had shown a probability of prevailing on his claims for breach of contract and invasion of privacy but not on claims for interference with prospective economic advantage and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court of appeal reversed in part, in favor of the city. The complaint arises from speech protected by the anti-SLAPP statute, but the trial court erred in finding Collondrez established a likelihood of prevailing two counts. View "Collondrez v. City of Rio Vista" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part the order of the Montana Water Court reversing the order of the Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC) denying Daniel and Sandra DeBuff's amended application for a beneficial water use permit, holding that the application satisfied the statutory criteria for a preliminary determination and may move forward to face objections.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) DNRC did not improperly relied upon either a geologic map or a 1987 final order in making its determination; (2) the Water Court erred by holding that DNRC's determination that the source aquifer was not discontinuous was clearly erroneous; (3) the Water Court correctly determined that DNRC's failure to consider evapotranspiration evidence provided by DeBuff was arbitrary and capricious; and (4) DNRC's determination that the water was not legally available and would have an adverse effect on senior appropriators was arbitrary and capricious. View "Debuff v. Montana Department of Natural Resources & Conservation" on Justia Law

Petitioner Daniel Awuku-Asare appealed a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision to affirmed his removal order. Awuku-Asare entered the country on a nonimmigrant F-1 visa and could lawfully remain in the United States so long as he complied with the conditions of his visa. Relevant here, maintaining an F-1 visa status requires maintaining a full course of study at an approved educational institution. But Awuku-Asare did not comply with this full-course-of-study requirement because he was incarcerated for approximately 13 months for a crime of which he was ultimately acquitted. In an issue of first impression for the Tenth Circuit, Awuku-Asare argued that “the failure to maintain status must be attributable to the nonimmigrant to render him [removable],” and that because of circumstances beyond his control caused the lapse in his status, he was not removable. The Tenth Circuit determined the plain meaning of the relevant statute did not support Awuku-Asare's interpretation, therefore his arguments were rejected and the BIA's decision affirmed. View "Awuku-Asare v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's grant of summary judgment to the Department of Revenue and determining that Applegate-Bader Farm, LLC did not raise a claim that triggered judicial review, holding that Applegate met its threshold burden to show that there was an environmental injury.Applegate challenged the Department's decision not to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) under the Wisconsin Environmental Police Act (WEPA) when it promulgated the administrative rule set out in Wis. Admin. Code Tax 18.05(1)(d). The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's dismissal, holding that Applegate had not raised a bona fide claim because it alleged only indirect environmental effects. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) administrative agencies must consider indirect, along with direct, environmental effects of their proposed rules when deciding whether to prepare an EIS; and (2) the Department failed to comply with WEPA. View "Applegate-Bader Farm, LLC v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Kapurs invested $300,000 in KAXT-CD, a Bay Area TV station, for 42% ownership in the Seller. In 2013, over the Kapurs' objections, the Seller proceeded with a $10.1 million sale of assets to First Buyer, which applied for the station’s FCC license. The Kapurs opposed that application, arguing that arbitration concerning the sale was ongoing. The arbitrator found that the sale did not require unanimity. The Kapurs unsuccessfully appealed in California state court and pressed on at the FCC, attacking the First Buyer’s qualifications under the “public interest” standard. The FCC concluded that the Kapurs’ allegations did not warrant a hearing and approved the application. In 2017, First Buyer sold the station to TV-49, Inc. for $2 million. The Kapurs opposed TV-49’s FCC license assignment application, arguing that First Buyer lacked the qualifications to buy the “license in the first place.” They did not challenge TV-49’s qualifications. The FCC approved the application. The D.C. Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of standing. Even if the Kapurs prevailed on their claim of entitlement to a character hearing, they have not shown any likelihood that the FCC would find that First Buyer was of bad character or, even if it did, that it would order the unwinding of both sales and return of the station to the Seller. Nothing would stop the Seller from selling to someone else. View "Kapur v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the judgment of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the denial of Petitioner's application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), holding that substantial evidence did not support the BIA's decision.The immigration judge (IJ) determined that Petitioner was not a credible witness and therefore found that he had failed to establish his burden of proof with respect to his application. The BIA dismissed Petitioner's appeal, thus declining to remand the case in light of new evidence submitted for the first time on appeal. The First Circuit vacated the BIA's decision, holding that the IJ's adverse credibility finding was not supportable. View "Cuesta-Rojas v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court dismissing the underlying eminent domain action, holding that the sua sponte dismissal of this action without notice and an opportunity to be heard required reversal of the circuit court's order.In 1990, Respondent, the Wheeling Creek Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Commission, filed a condemnation proceeding against Petitioners' property. In 1991, Respondent received right of entry and Petitioners received Respondent's statement of just compensation. The matter lay dormant until 2018 when Petitioners filed a motion for further proceedings to determine just compensation. The circuit court (1) concluded that estoppel, laches, and applicable statutes of limitation or repose prevented Petitioners from resurrecting the matter; and (2) sua sponte found that Petitioners' withdrawal of Respondent's estimate of just compensation without further proceedings until now was sufficient proof of accord and satisfaction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court erred by failing to notify the parties of its intent to dispose of the matter and provide them a meaningful opportunity to respond and be heard; and (2) none of the doctrines espoused by the circuit court to preclude further prosecution prevented Petitioners from resurrecting this matter. View "Scherich v. Wheeling Creek Watershed Protection & Flood Prevention Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Petitioner's complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief seeking to prohibit Respondents from enforcing any policy restricting the use of devices to make a recording of public documents, holding that the circuit court erred.Respondents in this case were Grant County Circuit Clerk Angela Van Meter, the Grant County Circuit Clerk's Office, and the Grant County Commission. Petitioner planned to photograph several documents in the public file at the Grant County Circuit Clerk's Office, but he was instructed that he would be required to pay a one dollar fee per page for each photograph. Petitioner then brought this action. The circuit court ruled that W. Va. Code 59-1-11(b)(2) permitted the circuit clerk's office to impose the fee for photographs taken of public documents. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the clear language of the statute limits limits the imposition of the statutory per-page fee to papers made by the clerk and does not apply to photographs taken by an individual member of the public. View "Smith v. Van Meter" on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania Department of General Services (DGS) solicited bids for a Shenango Township Youth Development Center, closed since 2013. HIRA, a consultant for Islamic educational groups, submitted the highest bid, $400,000, planning to establish a youth intervention center and Islamic boarding school. DGS and HIRA entered into a contract. Legislators sent a letter to Governor Wolf, claiming HIRA was not in a financial position to turn the property into an economic driver, that New Jersey had revoked HIRA’s corporate status, that HIRA reported low income, that HIRA had not returned their phone calls, and that contract paperwork remained incomplete. When Governor Wolf did not act, the Legislators spoke with the press and at a community meeting where some participants made comments about Muslims. Lawrence County opened a criminal investigation into the bidding process. The Legislators tried, unsuccessfully, to pass a law divesting DGS of authority to sell the property, then tried to persuade DGS to halt the sale. Shenango Township rezoned the property.The sale fell through. DGS solicited new bids. HIRA offered $500,000; another group offered $2,000,000. Legislators promised to ensure the new purchaser secured funding. HIRA sued the officials, including the Legislators in their individual capacities, citing the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, the Pennsylvania Religious Freedom Protection Act, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied the Legislators’ motions to dismiss. The Third Circuit reversed in part. Whether HIRA alleged conduct outside the sphere of legitimate legislative activities or that violates clearly established law is a question of law over which it had jurisdiction. Some of the allegations concerned “quintessentially legislative activities” for purposes of absolute immunity. Other allegations fell “well short of showing that the rights [HIRA] seeks to vindicate here were clearly established” for purposes of qualified immunity. View "HIRA Educational Services North America v. Augustine" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc.'s request for a refund of the taxes that it paid pursuant to a Baltimore City ordinance for the privilege of selling advertising on billboards that are not located on the premises where the goods or services being advertised were offered or sold, holding that the ordinance is constitutional.Clear Channel, which was in the business of selling advertising on its billboards in Baltimore City, sought a refund from the City Director of Finances of the taxes it paid pursuant to the city ordinance at issue. Clear Channel claimed that the ordinance was unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and Article 40 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The City denied a refund, and the Maryland Tax Court affirmed. The circuit court and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ordinance survives the application of a rational basis test and, accordingly, is constitutional. View "Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Department of Finance of Baltimore City" on Justia Law