Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Army Corps of Engineers issued a request for proposals. NIKA bid but was not awarded a contract. NIKA made a timely request for debriefing. The Corps sent NIKA a written debriefing and alerted NIKA of the right to submit additional questions. NIKA did not submit additional questions. NIKA filed a protest at the Government Accountability Office (GAO) six days after the written debriefing. Under 31 U.S.C. 3553(d), bid protests filed at the GAO invoke an automatic stay of procurement during the pendency of the protest if the federal agency awarding the contract receives notice within five days of debriefing. GAO denied the stay as untimely.NIKA filed suit, citing 10 U.S.C. 2305(b)(5)(B)(vii), which states that “[t]he debriefing shall include . . . an opportunity for a disappointed offeror to submit, within two business days after receiving a post-award debriefing, additional questions related to the debriefing.” The Claims Court instituted the stay. The bid protest concluded and the stay has ended.The Federal Circuit reversed, first holding that the issue was not moot, being capable of repetition but evading review. The text of 31 U.S.C. 3553(d) indicates that when no additional questions are submitted, the “debriefing date” is the date upon which the party receives its debriefing. The five-day period begins on the debriefing date, rather than two days later. Because NIKA did not file at the GAO within the five-day period, it did not timely invoke the stay. View "NIKA Technologies, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

For many years, attorney Conn obtained social security benefits for his clients by submitting fraudulent reports and bribing an Administrative Law Judge. After the government discovered this fraud, the SSA decided to redetermine whether each of Conn’s 1,500 claimants was actually eligible for disability benefits. The SSA held hearings and allowed the claimants to submit evidence but categorically excluded medical reports created by the doctors with whom Conn had conspired because it had “reason to believe” fraud was involved in the creation of the reports (42 U.S.C. 1383(e)(7)(A)(ii))). The claimants were not permitted to challenge that finding. After the denials of their claims, 57 plaintiffs filed suit.The Sixth Circuit held that the exclusion of the reports violated the Due Process Clause and the APA. On remand, the district courts concluded that remand to the SSA was proper because “the Commissioner erred in some respect in reaching the decision to deny benefits.”The Sixth Circuit affirmed the subsequent denial of the plaintiffs’ motions for attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act. The government’s position in the litigation was “substantially justified,” in light of the precedent cited by the government, the rationale for the decision, and the fact that district courts across the country have split on this issue. The case involved numerous issues of first impression. Despite the fact that the government’s arguments were rejected, a reasonable person could have believed them to be correct. View "Wireman v. Commissioner of Social Security" on Justia Law

In 1992, Salinas began seeking disability benefits under the Railroad Retirement Act (RRA) based on serious injuries he suffered during his 15-year railroad career. He was granted benefits after his fourth application in 2013. He timely sought reconsideration of the amount and start date. After reconsideration was denied, he filed an administrative appeal, arguing that his third application, filed in 2006, should be reopened because the U.S. Railroad Retirement Board had not considered certain medical records. The Board affirmed the denial of the request to reopen because it was not made “[w]ithin four years” of the 2006 decision. The Fifth Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction.The Supreme Court reversed. The Board’s refusal to reopen a prior benefits determination is subject to judicial review as a "final decision of the Board.” The decision was the “terminal event” in the Board’s administrative review process. Salinas’ only remaining recourse was to seek judicial review. A reopening decision is one “by which rights or obligations have been determined, or from which legal consequences will flow.” Any ambiguity in the meaning of “any final decision” must be resolved in Salinas’ favor under the “strong presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action.” The Board could decline to offer reopening but, having chosen to provide it, the Board may not avoid the plain text of 45 U.S.C. 355(f ). View "Salinas v. Railroad Retirement Board" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the Sex Offender Registry Board ordering John Doe to register as a level three offender, holding that the Board's decision was not arbitrary or capricious and was supported by substantial evidence.On appeal, Doe argued that the Board should be required to prove new sex offenses by clear and convincing evidence and that the Board's decision was improper because it was not based on new information and the hearing was not held within a reasonable time. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed, holding (1) subsidiary facts, including new sex offenses, need be proved by a preponderance of the evidence, and regardless, there was clear and convincing evidence supporting the level three upward reclassification; and (2) because the Board initiated the reclassification process shortly after receiving information of the new sex offense charges, and because the delays in reaching a final decision were not unreasonable, the Board's decision was proper. View "Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Board" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against ATS, a red light camera vendor, alleging three counts of unjust enrichment after ATS charged plaintiff a fee for processing his payment of a traffic ticket issued through an ATS red light photo enforcement system used in the City of North Miami Beach.The Eleventh Circuit certified the following questions to the Supreme Court of Florida: (1) Did ATS violate Florida law when it imposed a five percent fee on individuals who chose to pay their red light traffic ticket with a credit card? In particular: a. Does the challenged fee constitute a "commission from any revenue collected from violations detected through the use of a traffic infraction detector" under Fla. Stat. 316.0083(1)(b)(4)? b. Was the fee assessed under Chapter 318 and therefore subject to section 318.121's surcharge prohibition? c. Was ATS a "money transmitter" that was required to be licensed under Fla. Stat. 560.204(1)? (2) If there was a violation of a Florida statute, can that violation support a claim for unjust enrichment? In particular: a. Does plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim fail because the statutes at issue provide no private right of action? b. Does plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim fail because he received adequate consideration in exchange for the challenged fee when he took advantage of the privilege of using his credit card to pay the penalty? View "Pincus v. American Traffic Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

Each holiday season, Jackson County, Indiana has a lighted Christmas display on the lawn of its historic courthouse. The display comprises a nativity scene, Santa Claus in his sleigh, a reindeer, carolers, and large candy-striped poles. The display has gone up each year since 2003 when the Ministerial Association purchased it; the secular Lion’s Club maintains and installs it. The County supplies electricity for the display. There is evidence that the courthouse had similar displays before 2003. Woodring, a Jackson County resident, sued, arguing that the nativity scene violates the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. The district court permanently enjoined the County from displaying the nativity scene in its current arrangement.The Seventh Circuit reversed. Woodring has standing to sue, but the nativity scene complies with the Establishment Clause. The district court applied the “purpose” and “endorsement” tests that grew out of the Supreme Court’s 1971 "Lemon" decision but the Court’s 2019 "American Legion" decision requires the use of a different, more historical framework. The nativity scene fits within a long national tradition of using the nativity scene in broader holiday displays to celebrate the origins of Christmas—a public holiday. A governmental practice with historical support may be unconstitutional if it is intolerant or discriminatory toward differing views but Woodring supplied no good reason why the County’s nativity scene does not fit within the historical tradition outlined in Lynch. View "Woodring v. Jackson County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellee Warehouse Market subleased a commercial building from defendant Pinnacle Management, Inc. The building was on federally restricted Indian land. Subsequently, defendant-appellant, Oklahoma Tax Commission (OTC) and the Muscogee (Creek) Nation Office of Tax Commission (Tribe) both sought to collect sales tax from Warehouse Market. Warehouse Market filed an interpleader action in an attempt to have the court determine which entity to pay. However, the trial court dismissed the Tribe because it had no jurisdiction over it because of the Tribe's sovereign immunity. The trial court then determined that the OTC could not be entitled to the sales tax unless and until the dispute between the OTC and the Tribe was resolved in another forum or tribunal. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that because the substance of Warehouse Market's action/request for relief was a tax protest, exhaustion of administrative remedies was a jurisdictional prerequisite to seeking relief in the trial court. View "Warehouse Market v. Oklahoma ex rel. Ok. Tax Comm." on Justia Law

In a case brought in the Colorado Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, Governor Jared Polis sought a declaration he was not a proper named defendant in a suit challenging the implementation of Colorado law and policy by the Colorado Department of Corrections (“CDOC”), an executive agency over which he had ultimate authority. The underlying suit challenged the treatment of transgender women in CDOC custody. The named plaintiffs representing the class were seven transgender women who were confined in CDOC correctional facilities. Plaintiffs’ amended complaint named the Governor, the CDOC, the CDOC Executive Director, and multiple current and former CDOC employees as defendants. The amended complaint alleged Defendants’ policies and practices discriminated against transgender women by refusing to recognize them as women and thus subjecting them to unreasonable risks of violence, failing to provide necessary accommodations, and offering inadequate medical and mental health care. The Governor argued that after the Supreme Court's decision in Developmental Pathways v. Ritter, 178 P.3d 524 (Colo. 2008), he should have no longer been named as a defendant if there was an identifiable agency, official, or employee responsible for administering a challenged law. Here, he argued the CDOC and its employees were the only appropriate defendants. To this, the Supreme Court disagreed: Developmental Pathways did not alter the longstanding rule that the Governor was an appropriate defendant in cases involving “his constitutional responsibility to uphold the laws of the state and to oversee Colorado’s executive agencies.” View "In re Raven v. Polis" on Justia Law

Petitioner Conservation Law Foundation (CLF) appealed an order of the New Hampshire Waste Management Council (Council) denying CLF’s appeal of a permit, issued by the New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services (DES), which authorized the expansion of a landfill owned by respondent Waste Management of New Hampshire, Inc. (WMNH). CLF argued the Council erred in: (1) determining DES acted reasonably in granting the permit despite finding that a condition therein was ambiguous; and (2) premising its decision on the occurrence of future negotiations between DES and WMNH to resolve the ambiguity. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed, finding the permit’s ambiguities did not render the Council’s decision unlawful. View "Appeal of Conservation Law Foundation" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs are a non-profit organization “dedicated to improving the care, quality of life, and choices for California’s long-term care customers,” residents and former residents of facilities managed by CVSC, and the estates of formers residents at the defendant's facility. The defendant is licensed by the California Department of Public Health (CDPH) to operate or manage a skilled nursing facility (SNF). The defendant had an agreement with CVSC, a corporation engaged in the nursing home business as a management company, to operate the SNF. This Management Services Agreement is allegedly representative of similar agreements executed by CVSC to operate other California SNFs. The plaintiffs asserted that state law requires that an SNF be operated and managed by the entity that holds the license to operate the SNF, not by a management company.The trial court held that approval of unlicensed management companies to operate licensed SNFs does not violate state or federal law. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the management agreements are illegal because the licensee (not an unlicensed management company) must operate and manage the SNF. The operation of a SNF by an unlicensed management company does not diminish the continuing responsibility of a licensee to its SNF. View "California Advocates for Nursing Home Reform v. Aragon" on Justia Law