Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Various statutory provisions and regulations require the DOD to maintain a publicly accessible website containing all decisions rendered by its Discharge Review Boards and Boards for Correction of Military/Naval Records. When the DOD was alerted in 2019 that some posted decisions contained personally identifiable information, it temporarily removed all decisions from the website. Since then, the DOD has slowly been redacting and restoring the decisions to the site.NVLSP filed suit against the DOD and the Secretaries of the military departments to require them to fulfill the statutory mandate of publishing all decisions and to do so promptly. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss, ruling that NVLSP lacked Article III standing to bring the action and that the DoD's conduct was not judicially reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act.The Fourth Circuit affirmed, concluding that although NVLSP has standing to bring this action, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. In this case, NVLSP challenges defendants' ongoing actions in maintaining and managing the website, not any final agency action understood as a discrete agency determination of rights and obligations, as necessary to give a court subject matter jurisdiction under the APA. View "National Veterans Legal Services Program v. Department of Defense" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission that Appellant was not entitled to a wage-loss award in addition to his impairment rating because Area Agency on Aging of Southeast Arkansas (AAA) extended to him a bona fide offer of employment, holding that substantial evidence did not support the Commission's decision.Appellant was driving an AAA van that overturned, injuring Appellant. An ALJ determined that Appellant was entitled to a sixty percent wage-loss award and that Appellees made no bona fide job offer of employment because the position and wages were not clear. The Commission reversed, concluding that any wage-loss award was precluded because AAA made a bona fide and reasonable obtainable job offer. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that AAA did not meet its burden to prove that Appellant was offered employment at wages equal to or greater than his average weekly wage at the time of the accident. View "Calhoun v. Area Agency on Aging of Southeast Arkansas" on Justia Law

Calumet City held a referendum proposing that candidates could not seek the office of mayor while simultaneously holding an elected, paid state office. Before the outcome of the referendum was certified, Representative Jones of the 29th District of the General Assembly filed nomination papers seeking the office of mayor. The referendum was later certified as adopted. The day after certification, objectors brought suit to bar Jones from appearing on the February 2021 ballot in light of the newly passed referendum. The Municipal Officers Electoral Board for the City of Calumet City sustained the objection and removed Jones from the ballot. The circuit court of Cook County affirmed, directing that Jones’s name appear on the ballot but that all his votes be impounded or suppressed. The appellate court summarily reversed and ordered that Jones appear on the ballot.The Illinois Supreme Court stayed the appellate court order and subsequently reversed in favor of Jones. The referendum became effective on November 24, 2020, the date the election was certified. Because Jones filed his nomination papers on November 16, 2020, he was legally qualified to run for mayor at that time. His nomination papers were not defective at that time. View "Jones v. Municipal Officers Electoral Board for the City of Calumet City" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court reversing the judgment of the Department of Public Safety ordering Appellee's commercial driving privileges to be disqualified for one year, holding that commercial driver's license (CDL) disqualification under S.D. Codified Laws 32-12A-36(4) applies when a vehicle is used as a means to possess a felony quantity of marijuana.The Department disqualified Appellee's commercial driving privileges for one year pursuant to 32-12A-36(4) because he had been convicted of a felony committed in a vehicle by a CDL holder. The circuit court reversed Appellee's CDL disqualification, holding that the statute requires that a vehicle was an "instrumentality" of the felony. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the Department's decision, holding (1) possession of a felony quantity of marijuana in a vehicle is "using a...vehicle in the commission of any felony" under section 13-21A-36(4); (2) the circuit court erred by holding that section 13-21A-36(4) was unconstitutionally vague; and (3) there was sufficient evidence to support the Department's disqualification of Appellee's CDL privileges. View "Ibrahim v. Department Of Public Safety" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court affirming the decision of the Department of Labor and Regulation denying Steven Billman's application for permanent total disability benefits, holding that the Department's determination that Billman was not obviously unemployable was clearly erroneous.During his employment, Billman suffered a work-related injury that required the amputation of his left leg just below the knee. The Department denied Billman's application for benefits, finding that Billman was not obviously unemployable and that he failed to conduct a reasonable job search. The circuit court affirmed the Department's findings. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Billman established that he was obviously unemployable, and therefore, he was entitled to odd-lot disability benefits. View "Billman v. Clarke Machine, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a peremptory writ of mandamus compelling with Ohio Department of Commerce and the Ohio Medical Marijuana Control Program (collectively, the Department) to approve or deny Fire Rock, Ltd.'s application to expand its marijuana cultivation area, holding that Fire Rock was entitled to the writ.Fire Rock submitted an application requesting approval to expand its Akron-based cultivation facility. When the Department took no action on the expansion request, Fire Rock filed a complaint for writ of mandamus ordering the Department to approve or deny Fire Rock's application. The Supreme Court granted a peremptory writ, holding (1) Ohio law does not prohibit a cultivator like Fire Rock from submitting an expansion application on its own initiative; (2) the Department had a clear legal duty to act on Fire Rock's application, and Fire Rock had a clear legal right to that relief; and (3) Fire Rock lacked an adequate remedy at law. View "State ex rel. Fire Rock, Ltd. v. Ohio Department of Commerce" on Justia Law

There is no conflict between the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the Bail Reform Act (BRA) that prevents DHS from civilly detaining a criminal defendant after she has been granted pretrial release pursuant to the BRA.As a preliminary matter, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court's December order is appealable under the BRA, 18 U.S.C. 3145 and 3731. The court explained that the September release order released defendant from criminal detention under the BRA and, considered by itself, the court would lack jurisdiction over the September release order because it was issued by a magistrate judge and not a district court. However, the December order was the district court's affirmation of the September release order in response to defendant's motion to clarify her release status.On the merits, the court concluded that the district court correctly rejected the applicability of 8 U.S.C. 1226(e) and 1252(g) in its December order, explaining it was "not attempting to review or set aside any decision or action to commence removal proceedings" but was instead "attempting to enforce the Magistrate Judge's [September release] Order." The court considered decisions by six other circuits that have addressed the issue and concluded that pretrial release under the BRA does not preclude pre-removal detention under the INA. The court explained that, fundamentally, the BRA and INA concern separate grants of Executive authority and govern independent criminal and civil proceedings. The court concluded that the remaining claims lacked merit and vacated the district court's December order precluding ICE from detaining defendant pending completion of her criminal proceedings. View "United States v. Baltazar-Sebastian" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying Petitioner's request to reopen removal proceedings based on changed country circumstances, holding that the BIA's failure to assess whether certain changes were sufficient was arbitrary and capricious.Petitioner, a native and citizen of Albania, applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, arguing that he and his family had been persecuted due to Petitioner's support of the Democratic Party in Albania and that the family had a well-founded fear of future persecution. An immigration judge denied relief, and the BIA affirmed. Petitioner later asked the BIA to reopen his case on the ground that government corruption had deteriorated in Albania. The BIA denied the request. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the BIA "exercised its judgment in an arbitrary, capricious, or irrational manner." View "Lucaj v. Wilkinson" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit denied petitions for review of the Service's incidental take statement and biological opinion in connection with the construction and operation of a liquefied natural gas terminal in south Texas (the Annova project). The court held that the Service complied with its obligations under the Endangered Species Act in authorizing the harm or harassment of one ocelot or jaguarundi and in determining that the proposed project was not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of either cat.In this case, the incidental take statement is not arbitrary and capricious because it clearly specifies the anticipated take and specifies the amount or extent of the anticipated take. Furthermore, the reinitiation trigger is clear and enforceable. Finally, the failure to include the reasonable and prudent measures word-for-word in the terms and conditions does not render the incidental take statement arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. The court explained that the no-jeopardy conclusion is not arbitrary and capricious where the Service's conclusion was reached after evaluating both the direct and indirect effects of an action on the cats. The court rejected petitioners' challenge to the opinion's mitigation measures, namely the conservation of acreage, as arbitrary and capricious. View "Sierra Club v. Department of Interior" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit denied petitions for review of the Service's incidental take statement and biological opinion in connection with the construction and operation of a liquefied natural gas terminal in south Texas (the Rio Grande project). The court held that the Service complied with its obligations under the Endangered Species Act in authorizing the harm or harassment of one ocelot or jaguarundi and in determining that the proposed project was not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of either cat.In this case, the incidental take statement is not arbitrary and capricious because it clearly specifies the anticipated take and specifies the amount or extent of the anticipated take. Furthermore, the reinitiation trigger is clear and enforceable. Finally, the failure to include the reasonable and prudent measures word-for-word in the terms and conditions does not render the incidental take statement arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. The court explained that the no-jeopardy conclusion is not arbitrary and capricious where the Service's conclusion was reached after evaluating both the direct and indirect effects of an action on the cats. View "Sierra Club v. Department of Interior" on Justia Law