Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit granted Petitioner's petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) denial of his motion to reopen his removal proceedings and to remand to the immigration judge (IJ) for further consideration, holding that the BIA abused its discretion.Petitioner sought reconsideration due to the fact that he had been placed on a waiting list by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) for a U-1 nonimmigrant visa pursuant to the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (VTVPA), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(U). In denying Petitioner's motion to reopen his removal proceedings, the BIA gave two reasons for its denial. The First Circuit reversed and remanded the case, holding that the BIA abused its discretion because it failed to render a reasoned decision that accords with its own precedent and policies and failed to consider the position of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement. View "Benitez v. Wilkinson" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal, based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, of Axon's action alleging that the FTC's administrative enforcement process violated the company's constitutional rights. In this case, the FTC investigated and filed an administrative complaint challenging Axon's acquisition of a competitor, demanding that Axon spin-off its newly acquired company and provide it with Axon's own intellectual property. The district court dismissed the complaint after determining that the FTC's statutory scheme requires Axon to raise its constitutional challenge first in the administrative proceeding.The panel held that the Supreme Court's Thunder Basin trilogy of cases mandates dismissal. The panel explained that the structure of the Federal Trade Commission Act suggests that Congress impliedly barred jurisdiction in district court and required parties to move forward first in the agency proceeding. Because the FTC statutory scheme ultimately allows Axon to present its constitutional challenges to a federal court of appeals after the administrative proceeding, the panel concluded that Axon has not suffered any cognizable harm. Therefore, the panel joined every other circuit that has addressed a similar issue in ruling that Congress impliedly stripped the district court of jurisdiction. View "Axon Enterprise, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit amended its certification order, in an appeal raising issues pertaining to Nevada state water law. The panel certified to the Supreme Court of Nevada the following questions: 1) Does the public trust doctrine apply to rights already adjudicated and settled under the doctrine of prior appropriation and, if so, to what extent? 2) If the public trust doctrine applies and allows for reallocation of rights settled under the doctrine of prior appropriation, does the abrogation of such adjudicated or vested rights constitute a “taking” under the Nevada Constitution requiring payment of just compensation? View "Mineral Country v. United States" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal concluding that William Palmer was entitled to release from all forms of custody, including parole supervision, holding that to the extent Palmer's continued incarceration at some point became constitutionally excessive, that alone did not justify ending his parole under the current statutory scheme.Palmer first sought release on parole in 1995. The Board of Parole Hearings denied parole. Palmer continued to seek release. After the Board's tenth denial, Palmer filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging that the thirty years he had served on a life sentence for an aggravated kidnapping committed when he was a juvenile was constitutionally excessive. The Board subsequently ordered Palmer released on parole. Ruling on Palmer's writ, the court of appeals concluded that Palmer's now-completed term of imprisonment had become unconstitutional and ended his parole. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, in the absence of any persuasive argument from Palmer that his parole term had become constitutionally excessive, his parole remained valid. View "In re Palmer" on Justia Law

Roger Leishman, an openly gay man, began employment with the Washington Attorney General’s office (AGO) as chief legal advisor to Western Washington University in 2015. Shortly after starting work, Leishman began exhibiting serious trichotillomania, anxiety, and other symptoms he disclosed to his employer. He would later be diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, which was also disclosed to his employer. In January 2016, Leishman learned he did not receive a raise given to other assistant attorney generals, due to complaints his supervisor made about his conduct at work. Leishman contended his supervisor’s complaints were based on homophobic beliefs. Leishman made a formal request for reasonable accommodation of his disability, which the AGO denied. Leishman drafted a discrimination complaint. In response, the supervisor denied making the comments, accused Leishman of faking his disability, and refused to support his then-pending accommodation request. The AGO retained Ogden Murphy Wallace, PLLC (OMW) to conduct an independent investigation into Leishman’s discrimination complaint and his supervisor’s allegations. The OMW report concluded Leishman did not establish discrimination against him based on sexual orientation, and his conduct during a meeting with his supervisor violated expected standards of conduct for his position. The AGO thereafter terminated Leishman’s employment effective June, 2016. Leishman filed suit against the AGO. The parties reached a settlement agreement in which Leishman agreed to release his claims against the State and its officers. However, he also sued OMW, alleging the firm was not acting as the AGO’s agent, and his claims against the OMW were not barred by the settlement. The trial court granted OMW’s motion for judgment on the pleadings; the Court of Appeal reversed. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, and reinstated the trial court’s judgment. View "Leishman v. Ogden Murphy Wallace, PLLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court finding that certain rent-to-own leases were subject to the special excise tax on short-term rentals of tangible personal property levied by Ark. Code Ann. 26-63-301(b), holding that the circuit court did not err.At issue was the assessment of short-term rental tax on transactions between Appellant, Rent-A-Center East, Inc., and its customers. The Arkansas Department of Finance (DFA) and Administration issued a notice of proposed assessment to Appellant for short-term rental tax, compensating-use tax, and interest. The proposed assessment was upheld. Appellant then filed a complaint seeking judicial relief from the tax assessment, alleging that DFA wrongly classified the rental-purchase-agreement transactions as "leases" or "rentals." The circuit court granted summary judgment for DFA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the transactions at issue were taxable short-term leases and not nontaxable long-term leases. View "Rent-A-Center East, Inc. v. Walther" on Justia Law

This appeal involved an insurance coverage dispute arising out of water damage caused by Superstorm Sandy to properties owned by plaintiff New Jersey Transit Corporation (NJ Transit). At the time Sandy struck in October 2012, NJ Transit carried a $400 million multi-layered property insurance policy program through eleven insurers. When NJ Transit sought coverage for the water damage to its properties brought about by the storm, certain of its insurers invoked the $100 million flood sublimit in NJ Transit’s policies and declined to provide coverage up to the policy limit. NJ Transit filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment against those insurers. The trial court found that the $100 million flood sublimit did not apply to NJ Transit’s claims; it also found that the insurers had not submitted sufficient evidence to support their claims for reformation of the policies. The court accordingly entered summary judgment in favor of NJ Transit and denied the insurers’ motions for summary judgment. The Appellate Division affirmed. Finding no reversible error in the Appellate Division's judgment, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Jersey Transit Corporation v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London" on Justia Law

After garnering sufficient voter signatures to qualify, a proposed initiative entitled “Universal Childcare for San Francisco Families Initiative” was placed on the city’s June 2018 ballot as Proposition C. The initiative sought to impose an additional tax on certain commercial rents to fund early childcare and education. Approximately 51 percent of the votes cast were in favor of Proposition C. In August 2018, opponents filed suit to invalidate Proposition C on the ground that it needed a two-thirds majority vote to pass.The court of appeal affirmed summary judgment in favor of the city. While Proposition C imposes the type of tax that, if submitted to the voters by the Board of Supervisors, would need a two-thirds majority vote to pass, neither Proposition 13 nor Proposition 218 imposed such a requirement on a tax imposed by initiative. The absence of a constitutional provision expressly authorizing majority approval of local voter initiatives is immaterial. The City Charter does not impose a super-majority requirement View "Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

In 2012, Appellee Carl Sadler was injured while working as a production manager for Philadelphia Coca-Cola Company (“PCCC”). PCCC issued a notice of compensation payable, acknowledging Sadler’s injuries as a right pinky finger amputation and a low back sprain, and providing that Sadler was entitled to a weekly disability rate of $652 based upon an average weekly wage of $978. On August 13, 2013, Sadler was charged with a crime in New Jersey. Because he could not post bail, Sadler remained incarcerated for 525 days, until January 22, 2015, when he pled guilty. At sentencing, immediately after accepting Sadler’s plea, the trial court sentenced him to 525 days of incarceration, gave him credit for time served, and immediately released him from custody. Months later, Sadler filed a petition seeking review of his average weekly wage. PCCC responded with a suspension petition, contending that Sadler was not entitled to retain the benefits he received while incarcerated and asking that his benefits be adjusted to prevent him from being unjustly enriched for the amounts received during that time. The petitions were heard by a workers’ compensation judge, who concluded that PCCC was entitled to reimbursement for benefits paid to Sadler during his pre-conviction incarceration. The judge did not provide for a future credit against benefits to be paid to Sadler, but rather ordered that PCCC should petition the Supersedeas Fund for reimbursement. PCCC appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, and Sadler cross-appealed. The Board modified the workers’ compensation judge’s decision by allowing PCCC to seek a credit against Sadler’s future payments, but affirmed in all other respects. Sadler appealed to the Commonwealth Court. He maintained that his workers’ compensation benefits had been improperly suspended because he spent no time in incarceration after his conviction, as is required pursuant to the clear language of Section 306(a.1). The Commonwealth Court agreed. PCCC appealed, asking the Pennsylvania Supreme Court whether the Commonwealth Court erred in concluding it was not entitled to a reimbursement of the benefits paid to Sadler during his pre-conviction incarceration while awaiting trial. Finding no merit to PCCC's arguments, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court. View "Sadler v. WCAB (Apl of: Phila Coca-Cola Co.)" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's order upholding the Town of Newbold's denial of Petitioner's attempt to subdivide his property, holding that the Town ordinance precluding the subdivision was a permissible exercise of the Town's subdivision authority pursuant to Wis. Stat. 236.45.The Town denied Petitioner's proposed subdivision because the two resulting lots would not meet the Town's applicable minimum shoreline frontage requirement, as set forth in the Town ordinance. On appeal, Petitioner argued that the minimum shoreline frontage requirement was unenforceable because it was a shoreline zoning regulation that the Town did not have the authority to enact. The Supreme Court rejected the argument, holding that the ordinance was a permissible exercise of the Town's subdivision authority, and therefore, the Town proceeded on a correct theory of law when it denied Petitioner's request to subdivide his property. View "Anderson v. Town of Newbold" on Justia Law