Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court approving the Dodge County Board of Adjustment's grant of variance for a 4-H pigpen built in violation of county setback requirements, holding that competent evidence supported the district court's factual findings and that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion in approving the variance.The variance was based on, within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. 23-168.03(1)(c), peculiar and exceptional practical difficulties or exceptional and undue hardships. In affirming the Board's decision to grant a variance, the district court found that the Board's decision was reasonable, well considered, and within the Board's discretion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not make an error of law or abuse its discretion in determining that the narrowness or shape of the property resulted in sufficient hardship to justify upholding the Board's decision to grant the variance. View "Dolezal-Soukup v. Dodge County Board of Adjustment" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court finding that E. Jane Egan lacked standing to challenge the Lancaster County Board of Commissioners' issuance of a special use permit allowing Randy Essink to construct and operate a poultry production facility on land within the county's agricultural zoning district and that the permit was appropriately issued, holding that the district court did not err.Egan and Janis Howlett challenged the Board's decision in the district court, asserting that the proposed poultry production facility would lead to adverse effects on the environment, properly values, public health, and local infrastructure. The district court affirmed the issuance of the special use permit, concluding that Egan did not have standing and that the permit was appropriately issued. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by failing to find that Egan had standing and finding that the special use permit was properly approved. View "Egan v. County of Lancaster" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' decision reversing Defendant-doctor's convictions on the ground that the trial court should have granted Defendant's motion to suppress incriminating answers he gave during a medical board investigation, holding that the State may use incriminating answers given by a doctor during a medical board investigation in a subsequent criminal prosecution of the doctor.Defendant was convicted of three third-degree misdemeanor counts of sexual imposition. The court of appeals reversed the denial of Defendant's motion to suppress statements he had made to the medical board investigator as having been illegally compelled in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a medical license is a property right, the threatened loss of which is a form of coercion that can compromise the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination; (2) for coercion to be sufficient to warrant the suppression of statements made during a medical board investigative interview, the person making the statements must subjectively believe that asserting the privilege against self-incrimination could cause the loss of the person's medical license, and that belief must be objectively reasonable; and (3) Defendant's belief that he could lose his medical license if he refused to truthfully answer questions posed by the medical-board investigator was not objectively reasonable. View "State v. Gideon" on Justia Law

Consolidated cases involved constitutional challenges to amendments to Michigan's Election Law. The Michigan Supreme Court determined the challenges did not present a justiciable controversy. A few months after the amendments took effect, the Michigan Attorney General issued a written opinion that they violated the state and federal Constitutions. Plaintiffs, League of Women Voters of Michigan (LWV), Michiganders for Fair and Transparent Elections (MFTE), Henry Mayers, Valeriya Epshteyn, and Barry Rubin (collectively, the LWV plaintiffs), sued the Secretary of State, seeking a declaratory judgment that the amendments were unconstitutional along the same lines as the Attorney General suggested. LWV was described in the complaint as a nonpartisan group focused on voting and democratic rights. The individual plaintiffs were Michigan voters and MFTE was a ballot-question committee that, at the time the complaint was filed, intended to circulate petitions to amend the Constitution. A few weeks after the LWV plaintiffs brought their action, the Legislature also filed suit against the Secretary of State, requesting a declaratory judgment that the amendments were constitutional. The Michigan Supreme Court granted the Legislature’s motion to intervene, and held the Legislature had standing to appeal when the Attorney General abandons her role in defending a statute against constitutional attack in court. Then the Supreme Court concluded that case was moot as to the lead plaintiff, MFTE, because it no longer pursued its ballot initiative. As no other plaintiff had standing to pursue the appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the lower-court decisions. Finally, in light of this analysis, the Court affirmed on alternative grounds the Court of Appeals’ holding that the Legislature had no standing in its case against the Secretary of State, Docket No. 160908. Accordingly, both cases were remanded back to the trial court for dismissal. View "League of Women Voters of Michigan v. Secy. of State" on Justia Law

A felony complaint alleged that on seven different dates in 2014, Martinez committed a felony under Insurance Code section 1814 by entering into an agreement and having an understanding with a person incarcerated in jail, to inform and notify Martinez, a bail licensee, of the fact of an arrest in violation of California Code of Regulations, title 10, section 2076. Martinez was associated with Luna Bail Bonds.The court of appeal reversed her subsequent conviction, finding the regulation facially invalid. Section 2076 prohibits bail licensees from entering, indirectly or directly, any arrangement or understanding with specified types of people— including a “person incarcerated in a jail”—“or with any other persons” to inform or notify any bail licensee, directly or indirectly, of information pertaining to (1) an existing criminal complaint, (2) a prior, impending, or contemplated arrest, or (3) the persons involved therein, which impliedly includes arrestees and named criminals. The section is not unconstitutionally vague but is a content-based regulation, which unduly suppresses protected speech and fails to survive even intermediate judicial scrutiny. While section 2076 might indirectly deter unlawful solicitation of arrestees, an indirect effect is not enough to survive intermediate scrutiny. View "People v. Martinez" on Justia Law

The Presidio, formerly a military base, is now a National Park, within San Francisco's Golden Gate National Recreation Area. It is an exclusive federal enclave. The 1940 Buck Act (4 U.S.C. 105–110.) authorizes states and local jurisdictions to impose income taxes on activities in federal areas, or on residents of such federal areas, to the same extent and with the same effect as though such land was not a federal area. The 1996 Presidio Trust Act created a wholly-owned government corporation to manage the Presidio, exempt from certain federal laws and regulations. In 2000, section 103(c)(9) was amended to read: “The Trust and all properties administered by the Trust and all interest created under leases, concessions, permits and other agreements associated with the properties shall be exempt from all taxes and special assessments of every kind by" California, and its political subdivisions. Letterman paid the city business registration fees and gross receipts taxes. Letterman later sought refunds totaling $76,880.52, plus interest, arguing that section 103(c)(9) exempts “rents earned by subletting real property leased from the Presidio Trust.”.The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Section 103(c)(9) exempts a lessee of property in the Presidio only from the payment of property taxes; it does not purport to exempt any other party from the payment of an otherwise applicable tax other than a tax on the property itself. View "Letterman Digital Arts Ltd. v. City & County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Five Asian-American residents sued the City of Santa Clara (City) contending that at-large elections for the office of city council violated the California Voting Rights Act of 2001 (Elec. Code, 14025-14032). The trial court agreed that occurrences of racially polarized voting impaired the ability of Asian-American voters, as a result of vote dilution, to elect their preferred candidates to Santa Clara’s seven-member city council. It ordered the City to implement district-based city council elections and awarded attorney fees and costs to the plaintiffs totaling more than $3 million.The court of appeal affirmed. Racially polarized voting in five of 10 city council elections satisfied the standard for a cognizable voting rights claim, which required a showing that the majority voting bloc in Santa Clara’s electorate “usually” voted to defeat the candidate preferred by Asian-American voters. The trial court did not err in assigning more weight to certain elections and appropriately used statistical evidence to support its findings of racially polarized voting. The imposition of “race-based districts” did not violate the Equal Protection Clause nor did it impinge the City’s plenary authority as a charter city under the California Constitution to control the manner and method of electing its officers. View "Yumori-Kaku v. City of Santa Clara" on Justia Law

At the heart of this case was governmental jurisdiction over one percent of state- and privately owned land within the Grand Teton National Park’s exterior boundaries - collectively called “inholdings.” In consolidated appeals, the Tenth Circuit was tasked with resolving administrative challenges to two actions taken by Defendant-Appellee National Park Service (“NPS”) regarding the management of wildlife on the Park’s inholdings. Appellants challenged NPS’s 2014 determination that 36 C.F.R. 2.2 - a wildlife regulation that prohibited hunting in national parks - did not apply to the Park’s inholdings, based on what NPS had concluded was its lack of jurisdiction over wildlife management on those lands. The Appellants contended the NPS did possess such jurisdiction, and that its determination otherwise was contrary to law and arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (the “APA”). The second agency action was challenged only by appellant Conservation Association, concerning the Joint Elk Reduction Program - a plan under the joint auspices of NPS and the State of Wyoming, aimed at controlling the Park's elk-herd population. The district court rejected both challenges to the two NPS actions, finding as an initial matter, that Appellants possessed standing to challenge both actions, but they failed to show that either of the contested actions was contrary to law or arbitrary and capricious, and therefore affirmed NPS’s actions in full. After review, the Tenth Circuit held: (1) NPS’s determination that 36 C.F.R. 2.2 did not apply to Park inholdings was not contrary to law or arbitrary and capricious; and (2) the Conservation Association lacked standing to challenge NPS’s approval of the 2015 Elk Reduction Program. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court with respect to NPS’s section 2.2 determination. Furthermore, the Court dismissed the portion of the appeal pertaining to NPS’s approval of the 2015 Elk Reduction Program, and remanded with instructions to the district court to vacate that portion of the judgment, and dismiss the Conservation Association’s claim thereof without prejudice. View "Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. Dept. of Interior" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of a local zoning court of appeals approving homeowners' variance request, holding that, pursuant to Wis. Stat. 62.23(7)(e)10., certiorari review of the board's decision is triggered when a written copy of the decision is filed in the board's office.The homeowners in this case petitioned the Village of Williams Bay Extraterritorial Zoning Board of Appeals for a variance request. The Board unanimously approved the variance. Plaintiff, the homeowners' neighbor, filed for a writ of certiorari within thirty days after the Board orally voted to grant the variance but before the Board issued and filed a written copy of its decision. The circuit court affirmed the Board's decision. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether the court of appeals properly determined what constitutes the "triggering event" for purposes of appealing the Board's decision on a writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an aggrieved party's right to certiorari review is triggered when a written copy of a zoning board of appeals' decision is filed in the office of the board; (2) the Board's written decision and approved minutes were properly included in the certiorari record; and (3) the Board acted under the correct theory of law. View "Moreschi v. Village of Williams Bay" on Justia Law

In 1990, as the result of a dispute involving concerns about affordable housing for clients of plaintiff Legal Aid Society of San Mateo County (LAS), plaintiff City of Redwood City (Redwood City), the former redevelopment agency (RDA) formed by Redwood City, and LAS entered into an agreement. Pursuant to the agreement, the former RDA agreed to deposit $11,917,200 in tax increment funds into the Low and Moderate Income Housing Fund (LMI Housing Fund) it maintained pursuant to the requirements of the Community Redevelopment Law (CRL) to be used as housing funds consistent with the CRL. In 2011, faced with a state fiscal emergency, the California Legislature enacted the Dissolution Law, dissolving RDAs, eliminating tax increment financing, and transferring property taxes, including unencumbered funds in Low and Moderate Income Housing Funds, back to local governments and schools. Following the enactment of the Dissolution Law, plaintiffs’ position was that the $10,272,916 then on deposit in the LMI Housing Fund specifically attributable to the 1990 agreement, constituted an encumbered housing asset and thus was not subject to remit to the county auditor-controller. However, defendant Department of Finance (DOF) concluded these funds were unencumbered and directed the funds be remitted. Plaintiffs each filed writ petitions and complaints against DOF asserting that the funds were encumbered assets under the 1990 agreement and various provisions of the Dissolution Law and the CRL. The trial court denied the petitions, concluding that the subject funds were unencumbered, were not enforceable obligations within the meaning of the Dissolution Law, and were available for distribution to the local taxing entities. Plaintiffs separately appealed and the Court of Appeal granted plaintiffs’ motion to consolidate the appeals. Together plaintiffs asserted: (1) the 1990 agreement constituted an enforceable obligation; and (2) the $10,272,916 on deposit pursuant to the agreement could not be transferred to the taxing entities because the funds “are legally restricted as to purpose” within the meaning of Health & Safety Code section 34179.5 (c)(5)(B) and “are legally or contractually dedicated or restricted for the funding of an enforceable obligation” within the meaning of section 34179.5 (c)(5)(D). After review, the Court of Appeal agreed with plaintiffs and reversed. View "Legal Aid Society of San Mateo v. Dept. of Finance" on Justia Law