Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Ghanian native and citizen, petitioner Joachim Addo appealed when his application for asylum was denied by an immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals. Petitioner was the son of the chief of the Challa tribe. For several years the Challa have been in a land dispute with another tribe, the Atwode. The Atwode tribe was larger than the Challa, but the Challa controlled more land in the Nkwanta district, and in the past they often leased land to the Atwode. Starting in 2005 the Atwode began violating the lease terms and customs. Petitioner’s father instructed the Challa to stop leasing land to the Atwode, and he took the Atwode to court over the land disputes, winning every case. The Atwode responded with violence against the Challa and vowed to eliminate Petitioner’s father and family. This led to several violent incidents perpetrated by the Atwode against Petitioner and other members of his family. Shortly after these attacks, Petitioner and his father agreed that, for his own safety, Petitioner would relinquish his position as heir-apparent to the Challa chiefdom and would move from Nkwanta to Accra, the capital of Ghana. But this did not stop the Atwode, and harassment continued. In January 2017 Petitioner entered the United States. He expressed a fear of returning to Ghana and was granted a credible-fear interview. An asylum officer determined that Petitioner was credible and referred his case to adjudication. At a hearing in June 2017 the IJ determined that Petitioner was removable. Petitioner indicated, however, that he wished to apply for asylum, so the IJ scheduled a hearing to consider the asylum claim. Petitioner filed an application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. In the briefs on his petition for review by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, Petitioner challenged the denial of asylum and withholding of removal, arguing that substantial evidence did not support the BIA’s determination that he could successfully avoid future persecution by relocating within Ghana. The Court agreed with Petitioner that the decision on his ability to safely relocate was unsupported by substantial evidence. The petition was granted and the matter remanded to the BIA for further proceedings. View "Addo v. Barr" on Justia Law

In this workers' compensation case, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the compensation court granting Donna Parks compensation for chronic pain and aggravation of her mental health issues, both caused by a work-related low-back injury, holding that there was no merit to Hy-Vee Inc.'s arguments on appeal.Parks incurred a work-related injury in 2008 while employed by Hy-Vee and was granted compensation for her low-back injury. In 2017, the compensation court entered a further award granting Parks compensation for chronic pain and aggravation of her mental health issues caused by the low-back injury. Thereafter, the court modified the further award upon Parks' motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the compensation court's further award was not based on legal error; (2) the record supported the court's findings of fact, upon which the further award was based; and (3) the compensation court did not abuse its powers in modifying the further award. View "Parks v. Hy-Vee, Inc." on Justia Law

Mark Caton appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of the City of Pelham ("the City"), in his action alleging retaliatory discharge against the City. In approximately 2001, he was hired as a police officer by the City. In 2004, while he was still a police officer, Caton injured his neck when he was wrestling with a suspect. Caton did not receive treatment for his neck at the time, but the pain from the injury gradually increased. In April 2006, Caton transferred from the Police Department to the Pelham Fire Department. In 2012, Caton had a vertebrae-fusion surgery. In 2015 and 2016, Caton would have periods of excruciating pain leading to unexcused absences from work. He received reprimands and suspensions. Caton would consult with multiple doctors and pain specialists for rehabilitation therapy and pain management each time he was reinjured as a result of his work. In 2016, Caton was referred to Dr. Michelle Turnley, a physiatrist at the Workplace Occupational Health Clinic located on the campus of the University of Alabama at Birmingham ("UAB"). Dr. Turnley and Caton tell differing stories of an encounter at the UAB clinic September 2016. Caton testified that he asked Dr. Turnley for pain medication for the next time his pain became too intense, but Dr. Turnley reminded Caton that on his first visit he had not signed a pain contract and he had refused to provide a urine sample, so she declined to give him pain medication. Caton denied the doctor's account, but Dr. Turnley's clinical notes described her encounter with Caton as him being "fairly aggressive requesting pain medication... he was fairly loud and refused to leave the clinic and UAB police were called. ... He did not appear to have any functional deficits. Additionally, someone in the waiting room saw him sling the door open like he was about to 'pull it off the hinges'; therefore, obviously he has no strength deficits." In October, Dr. Turnley sent Caton a letter dropping him as a patient. By November, the City terminated Caton's employment, citing in part, the visit to Dr. Turnley's office. His unemployment application was denied because of his discharge from the City for misconduct. Caton sued, alleging procedural issues with the unemployment compensation hearing, adding a retaliatory-discharge claim. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the City, finding Caton had a full opportunity to litigate his retaliatory-discharge claim at the unemployment hearing, thus he was barred from raising it again by collateral estoppel. The Alabama Supreme Court determined application of collateral estoppel did not violate Caton's right to a trial by jury, and concurred estoppel barred his retaliatory-discharge claim against the City. "Caton does not present any other reason why the trial court's judgment should be reversed. Therefore, we affirm summary judgment in favor of the City." View "Caton v. City of Pelham" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part orders entered by the North Carolina Utilities Commission addressing applications filed by Duke Energy Progress, LLC and Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, holding that the Commission erred by rejecting an equitable sharing proposal without properly considering and making findings and conclusions concerning "all other material facts," as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. 62-133(d).Various interveners representing the utilities' consumers appealed the Commission's orders, challenging the lawfulness of the Commission's decisions concerning the extent to which the utilities were entitled to reflect costs associated with the storage and disposal of ash resulting from electricity production in coal-fired electric generating units in the cost of service used to set the utilities' North Carolina retail rates. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding that the Commission (1) did not err by allowing the inclusion of a majority to the utilities' coal ash costs in the cost of service used for establishing North Carolina retail rates and in increasing Duke Energy Carolinas' residential basic facilities charge; but (2) erred in rejecting an equitable sharing proposal without making the statutorily required findings and conclusions. View "State ex rel. Utilities Commission v. Stein" on Justia Law

Quality Choice Correctional Healthcare entered a contract with Hinds County, Mississippi to provide comprehensive medical care to inmates. Delorise Rollins was hired by Quality Choice as a nurse at the Hinds County Detention Center in Raymond and was injured in the course of her duties. At that time, Quality Choice did not carry workers’ compensation coverage. As a result, Rollins filed a petition to controvert with the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission. The Commission found that the Hinds County Sheriff’s Department (HCSD) was not Rollins’s statutory employer and denied workers’ compensation benefits. Rollins then appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission’s decision. The Mississippi Supreme Court granted Rollins’s petition for writ of certiorari, and found that because the HCSD was not Rollins' statutory employer, workers’ compensation benefits were not available. The Court therefore affirmed decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Commission. View "Rollins v. Hinds County Sheriff's Department et al." on Justia Law

Brian Carver was employed by the Jackson Police Department as a patrolman for twenty years. In 2004, Carver was involved in an officer-involved shooting in which he shot and killed a suspect. In 2011, Brian Carver applied for non-duty-related and duty-related disability benefits due to his suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder relating ot that 2004 shooting. The Public Employees’ Retirement System of Mississippi “granted [Carver] non-duty related disability benefits but denied his request for duty-related disability benefits.” The denial by PERS was affirmed by the Disability Appeals Committee, the PERS Board of Trustees, the Hinds County Circuit Court, and the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals determined that “[a] plain-language reading of [Mississippi Code S]ection 25-11-114(7)(b) clearly distinguishes mental and physical disabilities.” The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the plain language of Section 25-11-114(6) required, at the time Carver applied for benefits, a physical injury arising from an accident or traumatic event occurring in the line of duty. "Post-traumatic stress disorder may cause physiological changes to the brain and manifest in physiological symptoms; however, no physical injury occurred in the line of duty in the case sub judice. The PERS Board’s decision was not arbitrary or capricious, and it was based on substantial evidence." View "Carver v. Public Employees' Retirement System of Mississippi" on Justia Law

In appeals consolidated for the Mississippi Supreme Court's review, the circuit court affirmed the decision of the Mississippi Gaming Commission (MGC) to deny the gaming site application of RW Development, LLC (RW). The MGC and the circuit court found that RW’s proposed gaming site failed to meet the governing statutory and regulatory requirements under Mississippi Code Section 97-33-1 (Rev. 2014) in the first instance, and 13 Mississippi Administrative Code Part 2, Rule 1.4(d) (adopted May 1, 2013), Westlaw, in the second. The Supreme Court concurred with the Commission and circuit court that: (1) in case No. 2019-SA-01813-SCT, RW failed to provide evidence that its proposed gaming site was within eight hundred feet of the MHWL; and (2) in case No. 2019-SA-01815-SCT, RW failed to establish that the mean high water line point of reference was located on RW’s premises, that RW owned or leased the land contiguous to the point of reference and its proposed gaming site, and that the land would play an integral part in RW's project. View "RW Development, LLC v. Mississippi Gaming Commission" on Justia Law

This is one of several cases involving disputes between Malaga and the agencies involved in issuing and enforcing the permits necessary for Malaga to operate its waste treatment facility. In this case, Malaga wanted a wastewater discharge permit allowing it to discharge 0.85 million gallons per day (mgd) into certain disposal ponds. Malaga seeks to set aside the trial court's decision that the permit allowed a discharge of 0.85 mgd, arguing that the permit actually limited Malaga to discharging 0.49 mgd.After noting Malaga's aggressive approach, the Court of Appeal stated that it was unclear why litigation of this type was necessary when alternative administrative procedures could have resolved this issue in a faster and more efficient manner. The court concluded that the primary issue raised in this case is sufficiently important to warrant the use of the court's discretion to hear issues that are technically moot. The court held that the verification process included in Malaga's permit constituted an improper delegation of authority from the Water Quality Board to its executive officer. However, the court did not reach the parties' remaining issues, because those issues were not part of the trial court's final judgment, were not resolved in the first instance by the trial court, and are thus insufficiently developed to determine whether they could either support the trial court's judgment or require vacating the entire permit issued. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Malaga County Water District v. Central Valley Regional Water Quality Control Board" on Justia Law

This is one of several cases involving disputes between Malaga and the agencies involved in issuing and enforcing the permits necessary for Malaga to operate its waste treatment facility. In this case, the Water Quality Board imposed penalties totaling $78,000 on Malaga for violating the water discharge requirements of its permit. Malaga contends that these penalties were inappropriately imposed for several reasons.The Court of Appeal agreed with Malaga that laches is a proper defense in administrative sanctions proceedings, and that the Water Quality Board utilized a void underground regulation when it issued the "Hearing Procedure for Administrative Civil Liability Complaint R5-2013-0527" (Hearing Procedure). The court explained that the first issue may only affect some of the penalties imposed by the Water Quality Board while the second may require a full rehearing. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the matter to the trial court to determine whether a writ should issue based on one or both of Malaga's right to present a laches defense and the Water Quality Board's use of a void underground regulation via the Hearing Procedure. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Malaga County Water District v. State Water Resources Control Board" on Justia Law

This is one of several cases involving disputes between Malaga and the agencies involved in issuing and enforcing the permits necessary for Malaga to operate its waste treatment facility. In 2016, the Water Quality Board issued an administrative civil liability complaint (ACL) to Malaga, which resulted in a civil liability penalty of more than $1 million. In proceedings before the trial court, Malaga prevailed on the theory that the hearing procedure document utilized to control the proceedings constituted an improper underground regulation.The Court of Appeal conclude that while portions of the hearing procedure constituted a void underground regulation, the trial court incorrectly remanded the matter without considering whether the use of those procedural regulations was harmless. Therefore, the court remanded the matter to the trial court to determine whether use of the void regulations was prejudicial and, if not, to resolve any further disputes in this matter. View "Malaga County Water District v. Central Valley Regional Water Quality Control Board" on Justia Law