Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

At the heart of this case was a highway right-of-way proposed and approved in 1908 by the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners (the Board), then purportedly abandoned in 1910. This appeal arose from a decision of the East Side Highway District, the Board’s successor-in-interest, in which it declined to validate this highway right-of-way. In 2017, Gloria Palmer, Trustee of the Palmer Family Trust (the Trust) requested that the District validate the right-of-way. This was opposed by Rande and Debra Warner, and Steffen and Allison Teichmann, over whose land the purported right-of-way traversed. The Warners sought to have the right-of-way abandoned. The Highway District initiated road validation proceedings, after which it declined to validate "Leonard Road No. 2." After this decision, the Highway District granted a motion for reconsideration and reopened the public hearing. After hearing additional evidence and public comments, the Highway District again declined to validate the purported right-of-way. The Trust petitioned the district court for judicial review. The district court affirmed the Highway District’s decision. The Trust again appealed. Finding no reversible error or abuse of discretion, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Palmer v. ESHD" on Justia Law

Delaware’s Constitution contains a political balance requirement for appointments to the state’s major courts. No more than a bare majority of judges on any of its five major courts “shall be of the same political party.” Art. IV, section 3. On three of those courts, those members not in the bare majority “shall be of the other major political party.” Adams, a Delaware lawyer and political independent, sued, claiming that those requirements violate his First Amendment right to freedom of association by making him ineligible to become a judge unless he joins a major political party.The Supreme Court held that because Adams has not shown that he was “able and ready” to apply for a judicial vacancy in the imminent future, he failed to show a “personal,” “concrete,” and “imminent” injury necessary for Article III standing. A grievance that amounts to nothing more than abstract and generalized harm to a citizen’s interest in the proper application of the law is not an “injury in fact.” Adams must at least show that he is likely to apply to become a judge in the reasonably foreseeable future if not barred because of political affiliation. Adams’ only supporting evidence is his statements that he wanted to be, and would apply to be, a judge on any of Delaware’s courts. The evidence fails to show that, when he filed suit, Adams was “able and ready” to apply for a judgeship in the reasonably foreseeable future. Adams’ statements lack supporting evidence, like efforts to determine possible judicial openings or other preparations. Adams did not apply for numerous existing judicial vacancies while he was a registered Democrat. He then read a law review article arguing that Delaware’s judicial eligibility requirements unconstitutionally excluded independents, changed his political affiliation, and filed suit. View "Carney v. Adams" on Justia Law

The appeal before the Oregon Supreme Court in this case was an attorney fee dispute arising out of an administrative rules challenge. Petitioners successfully challenged rules adopted by the Energy Facility Siting Council that amended the process for reviewing requests for amendment (RFAs) to site certificates. Petitioners sought $299,325.64 in attorney fees under ORS 183.497. The council asked the Supreme Court the court to award no fees. After review, the Supreme Court awarded petitioners $31,633 in attorney fees. "In the end, the most relevant statutory factor here in resolving the parties’ dispute is '[t]he time and labor required in the proceeding, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved in the proceeding and the skill needed to properly perform the legal services.' . . . it does require attorney time and effort to defeat even meritless arguments, like the council’s argument on this issue. Having carefully reviewed petitioners’ filing, and based on other fee petitions recently filed in this court and our experience with appellate briefing and argument as judges and lawyers, we conclude that it is reasonable to compensate petitioners for 70 hours of work for briefing the claim on judicial review and preparing a fee petition for work on that claim." View "Friends of Columbia Gorge v. Energy Fac. Siting Coun." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court denying Appellant's administrative appeal from a decision of the Rhode Island Department of Health (DOH) in favor of the DOH director, Board of Examiners in Dentistry of the DOH, and the DOH, holding that the trial justice did not err.The Board imposed sanctions upon Appellant John F. Begg, D.D.S. for violations of R.I. Gen. Laws 5-31.1-10(19), (23), and (24) and sections 25.1.1, 27.1(s), 27.1(x), and 27.1(w) of DOH's rules and regulations pertaining to dentists, dental hygienists, and dental assistants. The trial justice affirmed the Board's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the DOH had subject matter jurisdiction over the administrative proceedings; (2) the Board did not utilize the subpoena power provided to it by R.I. Gen. Laws 5-31.1-4 and 5-31.1-14 in its request for patient healthcare information, nor was it required to do so; and (3) legally competent evidence existed to support the sanctions imposed by the Board. View "Begg v. Alexander-Scott" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Wilmington Savings in an action seeking to quiet title and discharge a mortgage under New York law. Windward Bora argues that New York's six-year statute of limitations has expired as to any foreclosure action under the mortgage and Wilmington Savings argues that it is immune from this statute of limitations by virtue of its status as an assignee of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).The court joined its sister circuits in concluding that assignees of the federal government are entitled to its immunity from state statutes of limitations. These courts generally reason, and this court found persuasive, that under traditional common law principles governing assignments, "the assignee of the United States stands in the shoes of the United States and is entitled to rely on the limitations periods prescribed by federal law." Moreover, this result is warranted "because it improves the marketability of instruments held by the United States, thereby giving the United States greater flexibility in monetizing its claims." The court also concluded that Wilmington Savings is entitled to such immunity here and rejected Windward Bora's contentions to the contrary. In this case, Wilmington Savings' status as a HUD assignee offers a sufficient basis for affirming the district court's conclusion that Wilmington Savings is immune from the state limitations period. View "Windward Bora, LLC v. Wilmington Savings Fund Society" on Justia Law

The Antelope Valley Groundwater Cases (AVGC) proceeding litigated whether the water supply from natural and imported sources, which replenishes an alluvial basin from which numerous parties pumped water, was inadequate to meet the competing annual demands of those water producers, thereby creating an "overdraft" condition. Phelan ultimately became involved in the litigation as one of the thousands of entities and people who asserted they were entitled to draw water from the aquifer.The trial court subsequently defined the boundaries for the AVAA to determine which parties would be necessary parties to any global adjudication of water rights, and then determined that the aquifer encompassed within the AVAA boundaries (the AVAA basin) had sufficient hydrologic interconnectivity and conductivity to be defined as a single aquifer for purposes of adjudicating the competing groundwater rights claims. Settlement discussions ultimately produced an agreement among the vast majority of parties in which they settled their respective groundwater rights claims and agreed to support the contours of a proposed plan (the Physical Solution) designed to bring the AVAA basin into hydrological balance. Phelan, which provides water to its customers who are located outside the AVAA boundaries, became subject to the AVGC litigation because a significant source of its water is pumping from a well located in the AVAA basin.The Court of Appeal held that substantial evidence supports the judgment as to Phelan and Phelan was not deprived of its due process rights to present its claims. In this case, substantial evidence supports the conclusion that Physical Solution will bring the AVAA basin into balance; the trial court correctly rejected Phelan's fourth cause of action asserting it had acquired water rights as a "public use appropriator;" the phased decisional procedure did not deprive Phelan of due process; and the trial court correctly concluded that Phelan had no priority claim to return flows from native safe yield. View "Phelan Piñon Hills Community Services District v. California Water Service Co." on Justia Law

California jurors “shall be selected at random, from a source or sources inclusive of a representative cross-section of the population of the area served by the court,” Code Civil Procedure, 197(a). “The list of registered voters and the Department of Motor Vehicles’ list of licensed drivers and identification cardholders" in the area served by the court are appropriate source lists. Marin County Local Rules state that after those source lists are combined, duplicates eliminated, and disqualified individuals purged ... a master list will be produced by using the complete randomization technique.The defendant in a Marin County capital murder case sought discovery in connection with his claim that Marin County juries were not selected from a fair cross-section of the community. He sought the county’s master list of prospective jurors, citing “Pantos,” which held a court’s “master list of qualified jurors . . . is a judicial record subject to public inspection and copying.” The court denied the request, finding that Pantos was no longer good law in light of subsequent statutory developments.The court of appeal reversed, concluding Pantos is still good law, at least as to the names and zip codes appearing on master jury lists. Section 197(c)’s new prohibition on the disclosure of information furnished by the DMV does not prohibit disclosure of master or qualified jury lists as public records. Privacy rights do not preclude disclosure of the names and zip codes on those lists. View "Alfaro v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, individuals living with HIV/AIDS who have employer-sponsored health plans, and who rely on those plans to obtain prescription drugs, filed suit alleging that CVS's program violates the anti-discrimination provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the California Unruh Civil Rights Act (Unruh Act); denies them benefits to which they are entitled under the Employee Retirement Security Act (ERISA); and violates California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL). The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss.The Ninth Circuit held that Section 1557 of the ACA does not create a healthcare-specific anti-discrimination standard that allowed plaintiffs to choose standards from a menu provided by other anti-discrimination statutes. Because plaintiffs claim discrimination on the basis of their disability, to state a claim for a Section 1557 violation, they must allege facts adequate to state a claim under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Applying the section 504 framework, the panel concluded that plaintiffs adequately alleged that they were denied meaningful access to their prescription drug benefit under their employer-sponsored health plans because the program prevents them from receiving effective treatment for HIV/AIDS. Therefore, plaintiffs have stated a claim for disability discrimination under the ACA.However, plaintiffs have failed to establish a claim of disability discrimination under the ADA, because they have not plausibly alleged that their benefit plan is a place of public accommodation. Finally, the panel upheld the district court's denial of plaintiffs' claims under ERISA and their cause of action under California's Unfair Competition Law. The panel affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Doe v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) dismissing a complaint against a company that provided submetering services on the grounds that it did not have jurisdiction over the claims, holding that PUCO inappropriately applied a jurisdictional test of its own making.The PUCO's jurisdiction is provided by statute, and the PUCO generally has jurisdiction over any business that is a public utility. In dismissing the complaint in this case, the PUCO did not look to the statutory scheme to determine whether Nationwide Energy Partners, LLC, the submeterer, was a public utility. Instead, the PUCO used a test set forth in a 1992 PUCO order and recently modified by the PUCO to determine the extent of its jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the PUCO's jurisdiction is established by statute, not an agency-created test; and (2) therefore, this case is remanded for the PUCO to determine whether it has jurisdiction based upon the jurisdictional statute. View "Wingo v. Nationwide Energy Partners, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus sought by Omni Energy Group, LLC as to the Ohio Department of Natural Resources, Division of Oil and Gas Resources Management chief Eric Vendel ordering him to rule upon the validity of objections that were submitted concerning Omni's two saltwater injection well permit applications, holding that Omni was entitled to the writ.When the division chief did not render a decision on Omni's applications Omni filed a complaint against the division, Vendel, and department director Mary Mertz, sought a writ of mandamus compelling them to either issue or deny the permits. The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus, but instead of ordering Vendel immediately to render a decision on the applications, the Court ordered him to rule upon the validity of objections as required under Ohio Adm.Code 1501:9-3-06(H)(2)(c), holding (1) Omni had a clear legal right to, and Vendel had a clear legal duty to provide, a ruling on the validity of objections submitted against the applications; and (2) Omni did not suggest a basis for granting a writ of mandamus as to the division or to Mertz. View "State ex rel. Omni Energy Group, LLC v. Ohio Department of Natural Resources, Division of Oil & Gas Resources Management" on Justia Law