Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) petitioned the New Hampshire Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition to prevent a circuit court from joining DCYF as a party to an ongoing guardianship case and from ordering the agency to provide services for the benefit of private litigants. This petition arose from a guardianship case involving an ongoing dispute between the father of a three-year-old child and the child’s guardians, who were the child’s maternal grandparents. The father alleged the child’s guardians were willfully interfering with his rights to unsupervised parenting time and notice of his child’s medical appointments as established by previous court orders. The circuit court credited the father’s allegations and expressed concern that the case “has not progressed” since the last hearing in September 2018. The trial court was ordered to provide services on a weekly basis to father, and joined DCYF as a party to the case. DCYF contended the circuit court lacked the authority to join the agency to the private case because no statute authorized the circuit court to do so. The Supreme Court agreed and, accordingly, granted DCYF’s petition for a writ of prohibition. View "Petition of New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a mandamus action in the district court, seeking an order to compel USCIS officials to travel to federal prison in order to administer the oath of citizenship to him. Plaintiff alleged that USCIS unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed the administration of his oath under section 706(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claim under 28 U.S.C. 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim for relief and denial of his subsequent motion for reconsideration. Contrary to defendant's contention, the district court did consider defendant's APA claim before dismissing it. The district court dismissed after determining that his section 706(1) claim could not proceed. The court explained that when plaintiff appears before USCIS officials, they must administer the oath to him. But the manner in which USCIS administers the oath, including where within the United States that administration occurs, is left to the agency's discretion. In this case, plaintiff cannot show a clear right to relief and thus he is not entitled to a writ of mandamus. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff leave to amend the complaint. View "Mendoza-Tarango v. Flores" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's ruling granting summary judgment to Park County Environmental Council and Greater Yellowstone Coalition and an order of vacatur of the challenged exploration license in this case, holding that the district court erred in part.Lucky Minerals, Inc. submitted an exploration application seeking authorization to conduct exploration activities within its privately-owned patented mine claim block. The Montana Department of Environmental Quality granted the exploration license. The district court voided Lucky's exploration license, concluding that the 2011 Montana Environmental Policy Act amendments were unconstitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court did not err by vacating the exploration license and finding Mont. Code Ann. 75-1-206(6)(c) and (d) in violation of the Legislature's constitutional mandate to provide remedies adequate to prevent proscribed environmental harms under Mont. Const. Art. II, 3 and IX, 1. View "Park County Environmental Council v. Montana Department of Environmental Quality" on Justia Law

The National Organization of Veterans’ Advocates (NOVA), sought review under 38 U.S.C. 502. The Knee Joint Stability Rule, promulgated in 2018 and set forth in the Veterans Affairs Adjudication Procedures Manual, assigns a joint instability rating under Diagnostic Code (DC) 5257, 38 C.F.R. 4.71a, based on the amount of movement that occurs within the joint. The Knee Replacement Rule provides that evaluation under DC 5055, 38 C.F.R. 4.71a, is not available for partial knee replacement claims. The Replacement Rule was published in the Federal Register in 2015, stating that section 4.71a was amended to explain that “‘prosthetic replacement’ means a total, not a partial, joint replacement.” It was published in a 2016 Manual provision, which informs regional office staff that evaluation under DC 5055 is not available for partial knee replacement claims filed on or after July 16, 2015.The Federal Circuit referred the case for adjudication on the merits. NOVA has standing because it has veteran members who are adversely affected by the Rules. The Manual provision is an interpretive rule reviewable under 38 U.S.C. 502 and constitutes final agency action. The Knee Replacement Rule is a final agency action. The merits panel will determine whether the Manual provision or the Federal Register publication constitutes the reviewable agency action. The challenge is timely under the six-year statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. 2401(a); Federal Circuit Rule 15(f), establishing a 60-day time limit for bringing section 502 petitions, is invalid. View "National Organization of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. v. Secretary of Veterans' Affairs" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of mandamus filed by the South Euclid Municipal Court asking the Supreme Court to compel the City of South Euclid to comply with a funding order issued by the municipal court judge, holding that the judge was not entitled to mandamus relief.The judge in this case requested that the City allocate thirty percent more money than allocated for the previous year for the municipal court's 2019 budget. The court then issued a funding order directing the city council to allocate the full requested amount. The city council did not give the court the full amount. The municipal court subsequently filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus seeking to compel the city to comply with the judge's funding order. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the municipal court failed to establish its entitlement to a writ. View "State ex rel. Williams-Byers v. City of South Euclid" on Justia Law

The Colorado Supreme Court considered the amended recommendation of the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline (“Commission”) that now-former District Court Judge Ryan Kamada be sanctioned by public censure for violations of the Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct that occurred while he was serving as a judicial officer. The recommendation concludes that then-Judge Kamada’s conduct violated the following provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct: Canon 1, Rule 1.1(A) (requiring a judge to comply with the law), Rule 1.2 (requiring a judge to act in a manner that promotes public confidence in the judiciary), Rule 1.3 (prohibiting abuse of the prestige of judicial office); Canon 2, Rule 2.9 (prohibiting ex parte communications), Rule 2.10 (prohibiting judicial statements on pending cases); and Canon 3, (prohibiting the intentional disclosure of nonpublic judicial information). Having considered the full record, the Supreme Court concluded the Commission properly found that then-Judge Kamada violated numerous provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Had Kamada not already resigned his position, removal from office would have been an appropriate sanction for his misconduct. Because he has resigned, the Court concurred with the Commission’s recommendation that Kamada should have been publicly censured. View "In the Matter of Ryan L. Kamada" on Justia Law

CBD filed suit challenging the legality of BOEM's and FWS's actions, arguing that the agencies failed to comply adequately with the procedural requirements imposed by the National Environment Policy Act (NEPA), the Endangered Species Act (ESA), and the National Marine Fisheries Services (MMPA). Relying on a biological opinion prepared by FWS and BOEM's own environmental impact statement (EIS), BOEM's Regional Supervisor of Leasing and Plans signed a record of decision approving the Liberty project, an offshore drilling and production facility. The site of the Liberty project is governed by the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA).After determining that it had jurisdiction over CBD's claims, the Ninth Circuit vacated BOEM's approval of the Liberty project, concluding that BOEM acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to quantify the emissions resulting from foreign oil consumption in its EIS as required by NEPA, or, at least, explaining thoroughly why it cannot do so and summarizing the research upon which it relied. The panel also held that FWS violated the ESA by (1) relying upon uncertain, nonbinding mitigation measures in reaching its no-adverse-effect conclusion in its biological opinion, and (2) failing to estimate the Liberty project's amount of nonlethal take of polar bears. Because FWS's biological opinion is flawed and unlawful, the panel concluded that BOEM's reliance on FWS's opinion is arbitrary and capricious. The panel granted in part and denied in part the petition for review, remanding for further proceedings. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. Bernhardt" on Justia Law

Eseos Igiebor, a citizen and native of Nigeria, entered the United States as a visitor in 1998. He became a lawful permanent resident (“LPR”) in 2004. In 2014, he pleaded guilty to: (1) aggravated identity theft; and (2) conspiracy to commit wire fraud, mail fraud, and bank fraud. He was sentenced to ninety-six months’ imprisonment and ordered to pay restitution. The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) initiated removal proceedings against Igiebor in 2018. Igiebor conceded removability, but sought deferral of removal pursuant to the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). He asserted that due to his status as a homosexual, he would be tortured if removed to Nigeria. An immigration judge (“IJ”) concluded Igiebor’s testimony was not credible and found Igiebor failed to show it was more likely than not he would be tortured if returned to Nigeria. The Bureau of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) determined the IJ did not commit clear error in finding Igiebor not credible and, given that adverse credibility determination, the IJ correctly found Igiebor did not carry his burden of proving it was more likely than not he would be tortured if returned to Nigeria. Igiebor petitioned the Tenth Circuit for review, challenging several aspects of the BIA’s decision. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded Igiebor failed to identify any legal or factual error on the part of the BIA. Thus, the court denied Igiebor’s petition for review. View "Igiebor v. Barr" on Justia Law

In this 42 U.S.C. 1983 action, Plaintiffs, three individuals who protested against abortion, challenged Norman, Oklahoma’s disturbing-the-peace ordinance, on its face and as the City has applied it to them. The specific issue presented in this interlocutory appeal was whether the district court abused its discretion in refusing to enjoin the City from enforcing the ordinance against Plaintiffs during this litigation. The Tenth Circuit concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction because they failed to show that they were substantially likely to succeed on the merits of their claims. View "Harmon v. City of Norman, Oklahoma" on Justia Law

Harrington, a Bay Pines VA Healthcare System police officer, sent a photograph of a document contained on the secure agency server to a former VA police officer, Hooker, who was no longer employed by VA. VA had provided Hooker with a text file of the contents of that document in response to a FOIA request but did not provide the document itself. Two weeks later, Congress enacted the Department of Veterans Affairs Accountability and Whistleblower Protection Act of 2017; 38 U.S.C. 714 speeds up removal proceedings, lowers VA’s burden of proof at the Merit Systems Protection Board from a preponderance of the evidence to substantial evidence, and eliminates the MSPB’s authority to mitigate VA’s imposed penalty. The VA brought a removal action under section 714, alleging misconduct by sending the photograph, and issued a decision removing Harrington. The MSPB found that substantial evidence supported the charge of misconduct and did not review the appropriateness of the severity of the penalty.The Federal Circuit vacated. Section 714 does not apply to proceedings instituted based on conduct occurring before its enactment. The proper interpretation of section 714 requires the MSPB to review the entire decision below, including the choice of penalty. View "Harrington v. Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law