Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Administrative Hearing Commission (AHC) determining that SEBA, LLC was liable for unpaid state sales tax, statutory interest, and a five percent addition to tax owed as assessed by the director of revenue, holding that the AHC's decision was supported by substantial and competent evidence on the record.The AHC determined that SEBA was liable for unpaid sales tax in the amount of $38,540, minus the sales tax assessed on $26,567 in income generated from SEBA's exempt sales to three organizations the auditor initially included. The AHC found SEBA liable for five percent statutory interest because it was was negligent in reporting its taxable sales. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that substantial and competent evidence supported the AHC's decision. View "SEBA, LLC v. Director of Revenue" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit's review centered on whether a father's adopted child could qualify as his "legitimate" child for the purposes of section 1010(b)(1)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act when the child was not his biological child. Mr. Schreiber and his wife were U.S. citizens living in Kansas. In 2012, Mrs. Schreiber's niece moved from her native South Korea to Kansas to live with the Schriebers and attend high school. In 2014, the Schreibers adopted the niece under Kansas law with the consent of the child's parents. Kansas issued the child a new birth certificate listing the Schreibers as her parents. In 2015, Mr. Schreiber filed a petition to have his adopted child classified as his "child" for the purposes of the Act. The Board of Immigration Appeals determined legitimization only applied to a parent's biological children. The Tenth Circuit concluded the BIA correctly interpreted the Act's plain meaning, and thus, did not err in ruling that a parent's non-biological child could not be his "legitimized" child within the meaning of the Act. Furthermore, the Court concluded the district court properly declined to review Mr. Schreiber's "late-blooming" gender-discrimination challenge to the BIA's final agency action. View "Schreiber v. Cuccinelli" on Justia Law

North Dakota Governor Doug Burgum petitioned the State Supreme Court to exercise its original jurisdiction and issue declarations and a writ of mandamus concerning who appoints the replacement after the pre-election death of a candidate for an office in the Legislative Assembly. Four candidates appeared on the 2020 general election ballot for two available seats for the office of State Representative for District Eight. The prior officeholder died in October 2020, twenty-nine days before the election, and after ballots were printed and early voting had begun. The North Dakota Secretary of State requested an advisory opinion from the state Attorney General on what to do about votes cast for the deceased candidate. The Attorney General responded stating that the North Dakota legislative assembly would follow the procedure codified in N.D.C.C. 16.1-13-10: "Upon the application of state law and the ‘American’ rule, it is my opinion that this would be the appropriate method to fill a vacancy." Election day totals showed Dave Nehring received the most votes and David Andahl received the second most votes. In accordance with the Attorney General's Opinion, the election results were certified but no certificate of election was issued to Andahl because of his death. Officials for the District Eight Republican Committee announced their intention to appoint an individual to fill the office. Kathrin Volochenko received the third most votes. She intervened in this case and claimed no vacancy in office would exist because she was elected to the office. On December 1, 2020, Nehring was set to fill one of the seats because he received the most votes. Andahl received the second most votes, and he presumably would have filled the other seat but died and will not do so. Therefore, as a matter of law, a vacancy would exist on December 1, 2020. When a vacancy in office occurs, the Governor’s constitutional authority to fill it is contingent upon there being “no other method” provided by law. A governor does not have authority to fill a legislative branch vacancy unless the gap-filling authority of N.D. Const. art. V, section 8 permits it. The Supreme Court declared a vacancy in office would exist on December 1, 2020, and the Governor did not have statutory or constitutional authority to make an appointment to fill the vacancy in this case. "He has not established a clear legal right to performance of the acts he seeks. Therefore, a writ of mandamus is not warranted. We deny the requested relief." View "Burgum v. Jaeger, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the court of claims ordering, subject to certain redactions, the public release of a video from an exterior courthouse security camera that captured the shooting of a judge, holding that the video was not exempt from release as a public record.The court of claims determined that competent evidence had not been presented to establish that the video was a "security record" under Ohio Rev. Code 149.433(A)(1) and was therefore exempt from release. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the video was a security record that was exempt from public disclosure. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the surveillance video did not fall squarely within the security-record exemption. View "Welsh-Huggins v. Jefferson County Prosecutor's Office" on Justia Law

The en banc court held that 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(23) does not give Medicaid patients a right to challenge, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, a State's determination that a health care provider is not "qualified" within the meaning of section 1396a(a)(23). The en banc court vacated the preliminary injunction issued by the district court prohibiting the termination of the Providers' Medicaid provider agreements.The Providers provide family planning and other health services to Medicaid patients, and each of the Providers is a member of Planned Parenthood. This case stemmed from a pro-life organization's release of video recordings of conversations at Planned Parenthood (PP) Gulf Coast headquarters. The videos depict two individuals posing as representatives from a fetal tissue procurement company discussing the possibility of a research partnership with PP Gulf Coast. The release of the videos prompted congressional investigations, which ultimately led to the OIG sending each Provider a Notice of Termination of its respective Medicaid provider agreement. The Providers and Individual Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that the terminations violated rights conferred by section 1396a(a)(23) and sought relief under section 1983.The en banc court held that the Individual Plaintiffs may not bring a section 1983 suit to contest the State's determination that the Providers were not "qualified" providers within the meaning of section 1396a(a)(23). The en banc court rested its decision primarily on two independent bases: (1) the Supreme Court's decision in O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773 (1980), and (2) the text and structure of section 1396a(a)(23), which does not unambiguously provide that a Medicaid patient may contest a State's determination that a particular provider is not "qualified." Rather, the court held that whether a provider is "qualified" within the meaning of section 1396a(a)(23) is a matter to be resolved between the State (or the federal government) and the provider. In so holding, the en banc court overruled Planned Parenthood of Gulf Coast, Inc. v. Gee, 862 F.3d 445 (5th Cir. 2017), which held that a state agency or actor cannot legitimately find that a Medicaid provider is not "qualified" unless under state or federal law the provider would be unqualified to provide treatment or services to the general public, including Medicaid patients who paid for the care or services with private funds. View "Planned Parenthood of Greater Texas Family Planning and Preventative Health Services, Inc. v. Kauffman" on Justia Law

A series of appeals presented a question of whether the Pennsylvania Election Code required a county board of elections to disqualify mail-in or absentee ballots submitted by qualified electors who signed the declaration on their ballot’s outer envelope, but did not handwrite their name, their address, and/or a date on the ballot, where no fraud or irregularity has been alleged. Petitioner Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. (the “Campaign”) challenged the decision of multiple County Boards of Elections to count absentee and mail-in ballots. The Campaign did not contest these ballots were all timely received by the respective Boards prior to 8:00 p.m. on November 3, 2020 (election day); that they were cast and signed by qualified electors; and that there was no evidence of fraud associated with their casting. The Campaign instead contended these votes should not have been counted because the voters who submitted them failed to handwrite their name, street address or the date (or some combination of the three) on the ballot-return outer envelope. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court was "guided by well-established interpretive principles" including that where the language of a statute was unambiguous, the language would control. "In the case of ambiguity, we look to ascertain the legislative intent, and in election cases, we adhere to the overarching principle that the Election Code should be liberally construed so as to not deprive, inter alia, electors of their right to elect a candidate of their choice. . . . "Election laws will be strictly enforced to prevent fraud, but ordinarily will be construed liberally in favor of the right to vote." View "In Re: Canvass of Absentee and Mail-In Ballots" on Justia Law

Vargas began working as a mail carrier in 2005. Mail carriers must be able to carry up to 35 pounds in their shoulder bags. Vargas’s route also required shuttling mail and equipment weighing up to 75 pounds between the post office and a satellite location. Vargas sustained an on-the-job foot injury in 2008. He was diagnosed with plantar fasciitis, received treatment, submitted a successful workers’ compensation claim, and continued working. In 2011, Vargas filed an EEO complaint, raising miscellaneous workplace grievances and alleging race- and disability-related discrimination. He withdrew this complaint. Vargas’s plantar fasciitis subsequently flared up. His doctor placed him on work restrictions, March 1-22, prohibiting him from carrying more than 15 pounds. On March 14, Vargas returned to work from a vacation; he wanted his route restructured to eliminate carrying heavy loads. His superiors did not oblige and he applied for workers’ compensation. He also made daily requests for “light duty” but there was no light duty work available, so he took paid sick leave.Vargas, who is Hispanic, sued, alleging disability-based discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act, with retaliation and racial discrimination claims under Title VII. Vargas still works for the Postal Service. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment rejecting his claims. Vargas could not perform the only job available to him, with or without reasonable accommodation, and there is no evidence he was treated differently because of his race or suffered unlawful workplace retaliation. View "Vargas v. DeJoy" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that the condition restricting entry upon school grounds on certain offenders is mandatory only for parolees who have been designated a level three sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) and are serving a sentence for an offense enumerated in N.Y. Exec. Law 259-c(14).Although Petitioner's conviction did not qualify as an enumerated offense under the statute, the Board of Parole determined that, because of his level three sex offender designation, Petitioner was nevertheless subject to the mandatory condition restricting entry upon school grounds. The Appellate Division granted Petitioner's petition for habeas corpus to the extent of annulling that part of the Board's determination that found Petitioner subject to the mandatory school grounds restriction. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding than an offender must be serving a sentence for an enumerated offense and be a level three sex offender in order for the mandatory condition to apply. View "People ex rel. Negron v. Superintendent, Woodbourne Correctional Facility" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that, in these two criminal cases, there was no constitutional violation in the practice of temporarily confining level three sex offenders in correctional facilities, after the time they would otherwise be released to parole or postrelease supervision (PRS), while they remain on a waiting list for accommodation at a shelter compliant with N.Y. Exec. Law 259-c(14).New York statutes allow the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) to place a Sexual Assault Reform Act (SARA)-restricted sex offender temporarily in a residential treatment facility (RTF) until SARA-compliant housing is identified. At issue was whether the Federal Constitution allows DOCCS to place a SARA-restricted sex offender in an RTF or other correctional facility while awaiting SARA-compliant housing. The Court of Appeals held that the practice is constitutional. View "People ex rel. Johnson v. Superintendent, Adirondack Correctional Facility" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that New York statutes allow the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) to place a Sexual Assault Reform Act (SARA)-restricted sex offender temporarily in a residential treatment facility (RTF) until SARA-compliant housing is identified.Under N.Y. Penal Law 70.45(3), the board of parole may impose as a condition of postrelease supervision (PRS) that for a period not exceeding six months immediately following release from an underlying term of imprisonment the person be transferred to and participate in the programs of an residential treatment facility (RTF). N.Y. Correct. Law 73(10) authorizes the DOCCS to use any RTF as a residence for persons who are on community supervision, which includes those on PRS. The Court of Appeals held that Correction Law 73(10) authorizes DOCCS to provide temporary housing in an RTF to sex offenders subject to the mandatory condition set forth in the SARA, N.Y. Exec. Law 259-c(14), after the six-month period specified in Penal Law 70.45(3) has expired but before the offender on PRS has located compliant housing. View "People ex rel. McCurdy v. Warden, Westchester County Correctional Facility" on Justia Law