Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Wedbush Securities, Inc. (Wedbush) was a securities broker-dealer firm that provided financial planning and investment products through its financial advisors. It classified its California financial advisors as exempt under the administrative exemption to California wage-and-hour law; the administrative exemption only applied if an employee earned a monthly “salary” equivalent to at least twice the state minimum wage. Wedbush pays its financial advisors on a commission-only basis. It uses a computer program to track the trades they make in a given month and then calculates the compensation owed based on what commission tier the employee met that month. The higher the employee’s total monthly gross product sales, the higher the percentage used to calculate the employee’s monthly commission payment. The central issue in this case is whether the Wedbush compensation model meets that administrative exemption requirement. The Court of Appeal determined the compensation plan based solely on commissions, with recoverable advances on future commissions, did not qualify as a “salary” for purposes of this exemption. Since the trial court found the employees in question were exempt and entered judgment for the employer, the Court reversed and remanded this matter for further proceedings. View "Semprini v. Wedbush Securities, Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review of the final decision of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (the FMSCA) determining that Sorreda Transport, LLC's business safety rating was unsatisfactory, holding that the the FMSCA's findings and conclusions were supported by substantial evidence in the record and its decision denying Sorreda's petition for review was not arbitrary or capricious.After the FMSCA, an agency within the United States Department of Transportation that regulates the trucking industry, used a notice informing Sorreda of its proposed unsatisfactory rating, Sorreda appealed. The FMSCA issued a final order denying Sorreda's petition for administrative review. Sorreda then filed a timely petition for review in the First Circuit. The First Circuit denied the petition, holding that the FMSCA's findings were supported by substantial evidence and that its determination that Sorreda's business safety rating was unsatisfactory was neither arbitrary nor capricious under the applicable regulations. View "Sorreda Transport, LLC v. United States Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

Dr. Hessami was the Chief of Pharmacy at a West Virginia VA Medical Center when the first curative therapies for Hepatitis C Virus infection (HCV) entered the market. The Center struggled to provide patients with access to the enormously expensive but life-saving new therapies. The Regional Veteran Integrated Service Network funded and provided treatment guidelines for administration of HCV therapies. Hessami was familiar with HCV treatment guidelines, monitored all purchases of HCV medications, and provided information to the VISN. Hessami repeatedly raised concerns about the prescribing practices of one physician, asserting that treatment decisions were unnecessarily exposing patients to increased risk of adverse drug reactions and side effects, and overspending the Center’s HCV funds. Hessami claims that her comments were met with hostile, derogatory statements. A pharmacy employee accused Hessami of misconduct. Hessami was suspended and later demoted. The Merit Systems Protection Board dismissed her claim that she had been accused of wrongdoing and punished in reprisal for her protected disclosures regarding the agency’s spending.The Federal Circuit vacated. When determining whether an appellant has non-frivolously alleged that she disclosed information that she reasonably believed evidenced misconduct under the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act, 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8), the Board’s inquiry should be limited to evaluating whether the appellant has alleged sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. The Board erroneously relied on the testimony of agency witnesses in dismissing Hessami’s appeal. View "Hessami v. Merit Systems Protection Board" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court reversing the order of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) affirming the revocation of Respondent's driver's license for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), holding that the circuit court erred.The arresting officer in this case did not attend the OAH hearing. In affirming the revocation, the OAH relied on the officer's DUI information sheet. The circuit court reversed, holding that the Division of Motor Vehicle's (DMV) records, including the DUI information sheet, should not have been admitted into evidence and considered by the OAH. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the OAH was statutorily obligated to receive the DMV's file, including the arresting officer's DUI information sheet, into evidence, and the circuit court's ruling to the contrary was clearly erroneous; and (2) the circuit court erred in ruling that the DMV had the burden of securing the arresting officer's attendance at the OAH hearing. View "Frazier v. Fouch" on Justia Law

Ge Vue was an asset-protection worker at the Walmart in Eagle River, Alaska in 2016. On February 3, he was shot in the back and face with a pellet gun when he and another asset-protection worker tried to stop three juveniles from taking a cart full of merchandise they had not paid for. No pellets penetrated his back, but one pellet penetrated the skin near his right eye and came to rest in his right orbit, or eye socket, near his optic nerve. He underwent surgery for the injury, and received treatment for post-traumatic stress disorder. His employer contended that he was not disabled by the psychological injury and, after an ophthalmologist retained by the employer questioned specific pain-related medical care, the employer controverted that treatment. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board granted the worker’s claim for medical care, found the employer had not unfairly or frivolously controverted benefits, and denied the worker’s request for disability during periods of time when his eye doctors said he had the physical capacity to perform asset-protection work. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission affirmed the Board’s decision. Vue appealed,, making arguments related to disability and the standard for finding an unfair or frivolous controversion. The Alaska Supreme Court reversed the Commission’s decision, and remanded with instructions to remand to the Board for calculation of benefits and penalty owed to the worker. View "Vue v. Walmart Associates, Inc." on Justia Law

The Alabama Supreme Court granted certiorari review to Lance LeFleur, in his official capacity as director ("the director") of the Alabama Department of Environmental Management ("ADEM"), seeking review of the Court of Civil Appeals' decision in Smith v. LeFleur, [Ms. 2180375, October 11, 2019] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2019), in which the Court of Civil Appeals held that ADEM did not have the authority to amend Ala. Admin. Code (ADEM), Rule 335-13-4-.15, Rule 335-13-4-.22, or Rule 335- 13-4-.23 to permit the use of alternative-cover materials at landfills ("the alternative-cover-materials rules"). Appellants Ronald Smith, Latonya Gipson, and William Gipson all resided near the Stone's Throw Landfill and Arrowhead Landfills located in Tallapoosa County. Since appellants lived in their respective homes, ADEM permitted the operators of the Stone's Throw Landfill to use at least one material other than earth to cover solid waste deposited in the landfill. In their lawsuit, appellants sought a declaration that ADEM impermissibly adopted the Ala. Admin. Code (ADEM), allowing landfill operators to use alternative materials to cover solid waste in violation of the Solid Wastes and Recyclable Materials Management Act ('the SWRMMA'), Ala. Code 1975, sections 22-27-1 et seq., which, they argued, authorized the use of only earth to cover solid waste. The Court of Civil Appeals found appellants had standing to contest the alternative-cover-materials rules, and that ADEM exceeded its statutory authority. The Supreme Court concluded appellants did not present substantial evidence to establish standings. The trial court therefore properly granted the directors' motion for summary judgment, and properly denied appellants' motion for summary judgment. The Court reversed the Court of Civil Appeals which held to the contrary. View "Ex parte Alabama Department of Environmental Management." on Justia Law

Plaintiff R.L. Vallee, Inc. appealed the Environmental Division’s decision granting an Act 250 permit to the Vermont Agency of Transportation (VTrans) for a highway project involving the reconfiguration of an interstate exit. Vallee argued the court applied the incorrect standard in analyzing phosphorus discharges under Act 250 Criterion 1, and improperly evaluated the evidence of phosphorus and chloride discharges under Criterion 1. The Vermont Supreme Court found the Environmental Division applied the correct legal standard to evaluate discharges, and properly considered the evidence before it in determining that the project complies with Criterion 1. View "In re Diverging Diamond Interchange Act 250 (R.L. Vallee, Inc.)" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a consolidated cases filed by plaintiff Northern New England Telephone Operations, LLC d/b/a FairPoint Communications-NNE (FairPoint), against several New Hampshire towns and cities, asserting claims of ultra vires taxation and disproportionate taxation. As “representative municipalities” in the “test cases” established for this litigation, defendants, the Town of Durham and the Town of Hanover (Towns), appealed two superior court orders challenging: (1) the grant of summary judgment on the ultra vires ruling because they contended the agreements authorizing such use or occupation did not satisfy the requirements of RSA 72:23, I(b) (2012) (amended 2017, 2018, 2020); and (2) the superior court’s decision after trial, arguing that the court committed several errors in concluding that FairPoint was entitled to abatements of its tax assessments from the Town of Durham and the Town of Hanover for tax years 2013 and 2011 respectively. The New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed with the Towns that the superior court erred with respect to the tax on the value of FairPoint's use or occupation of municipal rights-of-way was ultra vires. FairPoint’s use or occupation of municipal rights-of-way was not pursuant to a perpetual lease that gave rise to an independently taxable property interest; FairPoint met its burden to prove it was taxed disproportionately by the Towns. Judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part and consequently abating the two tax assessments at issue. View "Northern New England Telephone Operations, LLC d/b/a FairPoint Communications - NNE v. Town of Acworth" on Justia Law

Plaintiff AMCAL Chico, LLC (AMCAL) constructed a dormitory complex that would house unmarried university students within the boundaries of defendant Chico Unified School District (the District). The District imposed school impact fees on the complex, and AMCAL filed suit seeking a refund of the fees. The trial court granted the District’s motion for summary judgment. AMCAL appealed, arguing the fees had to be refunded because: (1) the District failed to comply with Government Code section 66001; (2) the fee was an invalid special tax; and (3) the fee was an improper taking. The Court of Appeal determined the imposed fee was reasonable and complied with the Mitigation Fee Act. Therefore, the fee was not an invalid tax, nor was it a taking. View "AMCAL Chico LLC v. Chico Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Plaintiff's complaint alleging that the Washington County Court order reducing the number of townships and constable positions from fifteen positions to three was illegal because constable positions may be changed only by a direct vote of the people, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion.Plaintiff's argument for reversal centered on the legality of the county court order, challenging only the legality of the county court order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the order was legal as a matter of law and could not support a claim for relief. View "Clowers v. Edwards" on Justia Law