Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Workforce Safety and Insurance (“WSI”) appealed a district court judgment affirming an administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”) order that affirmed WSI’s April 2018 order awarding permanent impairment benefits to Jason Tolman and that reversed WSI’s July 2018 order denying benefits for his depression and anxiety conditions. In September 2014, Tolman was injured when he was driving a tanker truck and involved in a single vehicle roll-over accident. WSI accepted his claim for benefits. In April 2018, WSI issued an order awarding Tolman $4,905 in permanent impairment benefits based on a determination that he had sustained a 16 percent impairment of the whole body. In July 2018, WSI issued an order denying benefits in connection with his depression and anxiety, deciding these conditions were not caused by his physical injury and existed before the work injury. Tolman requested an administrative hearing on the orders, and a hearing was held before an independent ALJ in April 2019. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the ALJ erred in applying N.D.C.C. 65-01-02(10)(a)(6) and concluding Tolman established his depression and anxiety conditions were compensable. The Court affirmed that part of the ALJ’s order affirming WSI’s April 2018 order; but reversed that part of the ALJ’s order reversing WSI’s July 2018 order, and reinstated WSI’s July 2018 order. View "WSI v. Tolman" on Justia Law

Darl Hehn appealed a district court order denying his petition for discharge from civil commitment as a sexually dangerous individual. Because the North Dakota Supreme Court determined the district court failed to make sufficient findings, the case was remanded for the court make specific findings. View "Matter of Hehn" on Justia Law

RFM-TREI Jefferson Apartments, LLC; RFM-TREI Lincoln Apartments, LLC; Dickinson Homestay, LLC; and Lodgepros Dickinson, LLC (together “the Taxpayers”) appealed district court judgments affirming the Stark County Board of Commissioners’ (“the Board”) denials of their applications for tax abatements or refunds. The Taxpayers collectively owned two apartment complexes and two hotels located in the City of Dickinson. The Taxpayers filed applications for abatement or refund of their 2016 property taxes. The Taxpayers’ opinions of value for each property differed from the City’s valuations by a range of roughly $1.8 million to $20.3 million. After holding a hearing, the City recommended the Board deny each application. The Board indeed denied the abatement applications in four separate written decisions. Using the same language in each, the Board concluded the assessor’s valuations were not “in error, invalid, inequitable, unjust, or arrived at in an arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable manner.” The decisions also explained the Board did not believe the Taxpayers provided “sufficient enough information relating to the subject properties, or the local market for competing properties, to lead us to the same value conclusions requested by the applicant.” The district court affirmed each denial in separate, written orders and judgments. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the Board acted arbitrarily and unreasonably in adopting assessments exceeding the true and full value of the property. The Court reversed the district court judgments and the Board’s decisions denying the Taxpayers’ abatement applications. The matters were remanded for a new hearing to determine the “true and full value” of the properties and reconsideration of the abatement applications. View "RFM-TREI Jefferson Apartments v. Stark County Board of Comm'rs" on Justia Law

Benjamin Suelzle appealed a district court judgment affirming a Department of Transportation hearing officer’s decision revoking his driving privileges for two years. Suelzle argued the hearing officer erred: (1) by finding the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to arrest under N.D.C.C. 39-08-01; (2) by admitting a supplemental report and notice form; and (3) by failing to exclude evidence of his test refusal because he was not given a valid implied consent advisory. Specifically, he contended he could not be lawfully arrested under N.D.C.C. 39-08-01 because the alleged actual physical control occurred on the grassy yard of his private residence, which was an improved private residential lot and not a place to which the public has access. The hearing officer rejected Suelzle’s argument that his vehicle was located on private property to which the officer could have no reasonable grounds to believe the public would have a right of access for vehicular use. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded after review of the Department hearing and district court record that although there was evidence in the record that Suelzle drove under the influence on areas where the public had a right of access before parking on his lawn, he was not charged with driving under the influence. He was charged only with actual physical control of his pickup where it was ultimately parked on his residential grass lawn. The hearing officer’s finding was based on a misapplication of law, and it was not supported by evidence in the record sufficient to show the location of the actual physical control offense was within the scope of N.D.C.C. 39-08-01. The district court's judgment affirming the hearing officer's revocation of Suelzle's driving privileges was reversed. View "Suelzle v. NDDOT" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated a portion of the court of appeals opinion affirming the judgment of the trial court denying Appellant's petition for judicial review of the summary judgment granted by the State Employees' Appeals Commission (SEAC) against Appellant on his claim that his alleged protected activity was related to his termination, holding that the court of appeals reached too broad a conclusion to resolve the issue in this case.Appellant appealed his termination, claiming he was a protected whistleblower. SEAC dismissed the complaint, but the superior court reversed. On remand, SEAC granted summary judgment in favor of Appellant's employer. Appellant sought judicial review, claiming that most of his employer's arguments were barred by the law-of-the-case doctrine. The trial court denied the petition, concluding that the law-of-the-case doctrine did not apply. The court of appeals affirmed, agreeing that the law-of-the-case doctrine did not apply but going further to find that the law-of-the-case doctrine "is applicable only when an appellate court determines a legal issue, not a trial court." The Supreme Court vacated that portion of the court of appeals' opinion and otherwise affirmed, holding that the court of appeals need not have reached so broad a conclusion to resolve the issue. View "Brown v. Indiana Department of Environmental Management" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit declined to enjoin the North Carolina State Board of Elections's extension of its deadline for the receipt of absentee ballots for the ongoing general election. The court explained that the only issue it must address now is plaintiffs' request for an emergency injunction pending appeal regarding a single aspect of the procedures that the district court below refused to enjoin: an extension of the deadline for the receipt of mail-in ballots. The court explained that the change is simply an extension from three to nine days after Election Day for a timely ballot to be received and counted.Because plaintiffs have not established a likelihood of success on the merits of their equal protection claim—and because, in any event, Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1 (2006), and Andino v. Middleton, No. 20A55, 2020 WL 5887393 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2020), require that the court not intervene at this late stage—the court declined to enter an injunction pending appeal. The court also held that plaintiffs lack standing to raise their Elections Clause challenge. Even if they did not lack standing, the Pullman abstention doctrine strongly counsels the court against exercising jurisdiction over that claim. The court further held that all suggestions from the state courts point to the conclusion that the Board properly exercised its legislative delegation of authority, and there is no irreparable harm from a ballot extension. Finally, the balance of the equities is influenced heavily by Purcell and tilts against federal court intervention at this late stage, and Andino establishes that the appropriate status-quo framework is the status quo created by the state's actions, not by later federal court interventions. View "Wise v. Circosta" on Justia Law

The state filed an unverified complaint against the entities and one of their principals, asserting unfair practices and false advertising. The defendants filed an unverified “Answer” with a general denial of the complaint’s allegations and affirmative defenses. The judge struck the answer as to the entities because they failed to verify the answer as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 446 and asserted only a general denial in contravention of section 431.30(d). The court concluded that section 446(a)'s exception to the verification requirement was coextensive with the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and a corporation may not invoke that privilege. In response to a “show cause order” following the defendants’ petition for extraordinary writ relief, the court issued an order noting that the case had been reassigned. After a hearing, a new judge vacated the previous order.The court of appeal agreed that the exception applies to corporations and that the defendants could file a general denial under section 431.30(d), which requires a defendant to answer each material allegation of a verified complaint with specific admissions or denials, but allows a defendant to file a general denial if the complaint is not verified. There is no reason for deeming the state’s complaint verified. The court also noted that an order to show cause, unlike an alternative writ, does not invite the trial court to change the challenged order and that superior court judges generally may not overturn the order of another judge unless the other judge is unavailable. View "Paul Blanco's Good Car Co. Auto Group v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Frederick Meiners, III was employed as Assistant Fire Chief with the St. Tammany Parish Fire Protection District No. 4 (“District”). In early 2016, Meiners agreed to retrieve a repaired ambulance unit from Hattiesburg, but informed his supervisor, provisional fire chief Kenneth Moore, that he first had to attend a speaking engagement with a ladies’ group that would last approximately thirty minutes. At 1:08 p.m. that day, Jennifer Glorioso, the wife of Fire Equipment Operator Glorioso (hereinafter referred to as “FEO Glorioso”), photographed Meiners sitting at a table at the La Madeleine restaurant with his wife and his lawyer. She later sent a text message containing this photograph to her husband. At 2:30 p.m., District Fire Chief Brady Anderson advised Chief Moore that Meiners was not yet back from his meeting and offered to pick up the ambulance himself. Chief Moore declined Anderson’s offer. After being reassured by Meiners he was on his way back to the District, Chief Moore received a text from an unknown phone number that contained a photograph of Meiners taken at the restaurant. Chief Moore then provided a written notice of investigation to Meiners, stating that he was “initiating an investigation into an incident involving you in a matter which occurred on February 19, 2016, specifically, conflicting details regarding a speaking engagement while on duty.” The notice of investigation also stated the “persons conducting this investigation will be Corianne Green and a PMI representative.” Chief Moore then placed Meiners on administrative leave with pay. After a hearing, Meiners was terminated from his employment with the district based on his conduct on the date of the ambulance pickup. The termination was affirmed by the St. Tammany Parish Fire Protection District No. 4 Civil Service Board (“Board”). Upon review, a district court reversed and remanded, finding that untruthfulness alone, did not mandate termination, where the misconduct did not result in a detrimental effect on the efficient and orderly operation of the fire department. The Louisiana Supreme Court found the district court erred in remanding the case to the Board to impose discipline other than termination. The Court reversed judgment and reinstated the Board's decision. View "Meiners v. St. Tammany Parish Fire Protection Dist. No. 4 et al." on Justia Law

This dispute involved ad valorem taxes for the tax years 2013 through 2016. In October 2012, D90 Energy, LLC, purchased two gas wells and one saltwater disposal well. The wells were subject to ad valorem property taxation in Jefferson Davis Parish, Louisiana. Relying on a Commission regulation applicable to oil and gas wells, D90 argued that a purchase price in a valid sale is fair market value; therefore, the wells should be valued at $100,000.00 for each of these tax years. For each tax year, the Assessor rejected D90’s documentation of the sale, explaining, in part, that his office never uses the sales price as fair market value for oil and gas wells. Rather, the Assessor used valuation tables provided by the Commission, which take into account age, depth, type, and production of the wells. D90 appealed each assessment to the Commission, presenting documentary evidence and live testimony to establish the $100,000.00 purchase price for the wells and the arms-length nature of the sale. It presented additional evidence to establish that the condition and value of the wells were virtually identical for each tax year. The district court affirmed the Commission’s valuations for all four tax years. Reviewing only what was presented to the Assessor, the court of appeal reversed the district court and reinstated the Assessor’s valuation. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted D90’s writ application to determine the correctness of the assessments, the proper scope and standard of review, and the legal effect of D90’s failure to pay taxes under protest. After review, the Court determined the district court was correct in affirming the Commission, thus reversing the appellate court's judgment. View "D90 Energy, LLC v. Jefferson Davis Parish Board of Review" on Justia Law

The Appellants objected to the IRS’s attempts to collect and audit information about their marijuana-related business practices, arguing: (1) the IRS investigation was quasi-criminal, exceeded the Agency’s authority, and was being conducted for an illegitimate purpose; (2) even if the investigation had a legitimate purpose, the information sought was irrelevant; and (3) the investigation was in bad faith and constituted an abuse of process because (a) the IRS may share the information collected with federal law enforcement agents, (b) the IRS summonses are overly broad and require the creation of new reports, (c) the dispensaries had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the data they tender to state regulatory authorities, and (d) those state authorities could not provide the requested information without violating Colorado law. The Appellants further contended the district court applied the wrong standard of review when it denied motions to quash and granted motions to enforce the summonses. Relying on the reasoning outlined in Standing Akimbo, LLC v. United States, 955 F.3d 1146, 1150–69 (10th Cir. 2020), the Tenth Circuit rejected Appellants' arguments and affirmed the district court's rulings in favor of the IRS. View "Speidell v. United States" on Justia Law