Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 2006, a McVey assisted living resident fell and suffered injuries that resulted in his death. An investigation led to a homicide charge against Geness, a permanently mentally disabled McVey resident. A judge deemed Geness incompetent to stand trial and ordered him transferred to a psychiatric hospital for assessment. Approximately 10 months after his arrest, Geness was transferred to a psychiatric facility where he was deemed incompetent with a “poor” prognosis for improvement. He remained imprisoned for years, while his case remained on the court’s monthly “call of the list.” About five years after Geness’s arrest, a second competency evaluation was conducted, at the prison. It was again determined that Geness was incompetent to stand trial and unlikely to improve. A judge released him for involuntary commitment to a Long Term Structured Residence. Geness’s case remained the monthly “call of the list.” In 2015, a judge entered a nolle prosequi order. After nine years in custody without a trial, Geness was released.Geness sued the county and city, former detective Cox, and McVey under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12131, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. 1983. All defendants were dismissed except Cox. Following a remand, Geness added ADA “Title II” and Fourteenth Amendment claims against the Commonwealth and the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts (AOPC). The Third Circuit remanded for dismissal of AOPC. While Congress abrogated sovereign immunity for Title II claims, Geness has not stated a Title II claim against AOPC, which had no power over the disposition of his case. There is no allegation regarding how AOPC’s alleged failure to contact the Supreme Court connects to Geness’s disability. View "Geness v. Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts" on Justia Law

Kylie Oversen, individually and as chairwoman of the Democratic-Non-Partisan League Party of North Dakota, and Jason Anderson, as a candidate nominated by the Democratic-Non-Partisan League Party of North Dakota for the statewide elective office of North Dakota Insurance Commissioner, petitioned the North Dakota Supreme Court to exercise its original jurisdiction and issue a writ of mandamus to direct Secretary of State Alvin Jaeger to accept and certify Anderson for inclusion on the November 3, 2020 general election ballot for the office of insurance commissioner. Oversen and Anderson argued there was a vacancy on the ballot for that position and Jaeger was required to place Anderson’s name on the ballot as the nominated and endorsed Democratic-NPL party candidate for the office under N.D.C.C. 16.1-11-18(4). After review, the Supreme Court concluded Jaeger correctly applied North Dakota law by refusing to include Anderson on the general election ballot. Therefore, the Court denied the petition. View "Oversen, et al. v. Jaeger" on Justia Law

Anticipating a shortfall of revenue from previously enacted tax incentives, the 30th Alaska State Legislature attempted to offset future fiscal unpredictability by authorizing a discounted buyback of tax credits financed by bonds without pledging the “full faith and credit” of the State. Without a vote of the people, the legislature created a public corporation capable of borrowing up to $1 billion through the issuance of subject-to-appropriation bonds to purchase outstanding oil and gas exploration tax credits, with bondholders to be reimbursed solely at the discretion of future legislatures through appropriations to the new public corporation. A taxpayer filed suit, alleging, inter alia, that the legislature violated the Alaska Constitution’s state debt limitation. The superior court granted the State’s motion to dismiss, ruling that the legislation did not create “debt” for purposes of the constitutional limitation. The Alaska Supreme Court reversed, finding that this financing scheme, even if unforeseeable in the mid-twentieth century, was the kind of constitutional “debt” that the framers sought to prohibit under article IX, section 8 of the Alaska Constitution. The Supreme Court reversed the superior court's decision granting the State's motion to dismiss, and affirmed the superior court’s decision rejecting the State’s arguments under section 11. View "Forrer v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Laura Casey appealed a circuit court judgment entered against Chris "Chip" Beeker, Jr., Twinkle Andress Cavanaugh, and Jeremy Oden ("the commissioners"), in their official capacities as commissioners of the Alabama Public Service Commission ("the PSC"). In her complaint, Casey asserted that a gathering of the commissioners at a public hearing held by the PSC in November 2019 constituted a "meeting" under the Alabama Open Meetings Act, section 36-25A-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975 ("the Act"). She alleged that proper notice of the hearing was not given as required by the Act and that she was prohibited from recording the hearing in violation of the Act. The trial court, however, ruled that a "meeting" had not occurred at the hearing and that the Act therefore does not apply. Finding no reversible error, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. View "Casey v. Beeker" on Justia Law

Cynthia Anthony, former interim president of Shelton State Community College; William Ashley, then-president of Shelton State; and Jimmy Baker, chancellor of the Alabama Community College System ("the ACCS") (collectively, "the college defendants"), appealed a circuit court judgment entered in favor of Khristy Large and Robert Pressley, current instructors at Shelton State, and Scheree Datcher, a former instructor at Shelton State (collectively, "the instructor plaintiffs"). Large and Pressley were instructors in the Office Administration Department ("OAD") at Shelton State; Datcher was an OAD instructor, now retired. Under college policy, an instructor was placed into one of three groups based on the instructor's "teaching area": Group A, Group B, or Group C. After an instructor was placed into a group, the instructor was ranked within the group for salary purposes according to criteria listed in the policy. The primary issue in this case was whether the instructor plaintiffs should be placed in Group A or Group B. In 2013, Joan Davis, then-interim president of Shelton State, concluded that Datcher and Pressley should have been reclassified from Group A to Group B, contrary to their credentialing document. Datcher and Pressley received higher salaries by being reclassified to Group B. When Large was hired to be an OAD instructor in 2013, she was also placed in Group B. In 2016, Chancellor Heinrich directed Anthony, then interim president, to review instructors' classifications to make sure they were properly classified. Anthony determined the instructor plaintiffs should have been classified as Group A, in accordance with the credentialing document. Thus, she reclassified the instructor plaintiffs to Group A, which resulted in decreased salaries. The trial court entered a judgment in favor of the instructor plaintiffs, concluding that they are properly classified in Group B under the policy and ordering that the instructor plaintiffs be placed in Group B. The trial court also awarded the instructor plaintiffs backpay for the period following Anthony's reclassification, during which they were classified as Group A instead of Group B. The Alabama Supreme Court determined the placement of OAD instructors in Group A was "plainly incorrect." Because the college defendants lacked discretion to classify the instructor plaintiffs as Group A, the claims for backpay against them in their official capacities were not barred by the doctrine of State immunity. When Anthony left her position as interim president, her successor was automatically substituted for her with respect to the official-capacity claims alleged against her; judgment should not have been entered against her. Therefore, judgment was reversed insofar as it was entered against Anthony. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "Anthony et al. v. Datcher, et al." on Justia Law

Defendants below, Sam Smith, director of the Calhoun County Department of Human Resources ("CCDHR"); Pamela McClellan, an adult-protective-services caseworker with CCDHR; and Teresa Ellis, McClellan's supervisor (referred to collectively as "petitioners"), petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to vacate its order denying their motion for a summary judgment in a wrongful-death action filed by William David Streip ("David"), as the personal representative of the estate of his sister, Jerrie Leeann Streip ("Leeann"), and to enter a summary judgment in their favor on the basis of immunity. Leeann suffered from numerous serious physical, mental, and emotional conditions since birth; those conditions were exacerbated by brain surgery in 2013. Following that surgery, Leeann was released to a nursing-home facility before being discharged into the care of her father. Leeann subsequently reported to a CCDHR social worker that her father had raped her. As a result, an adult-protective-services case was opened under Alabama's Adult Protective Services Act ("the APSA"), and McClellan was assigned as Leeann's caseworker. Upon the conclusion of the ensuing investigation, CCDHR removed Leeann from her father's care. Leeann was placed at a Leviticus Place, a boarding home where she remained for approximately one week. There were no concerns about Leeann's well being, but McClellan was notified Leann had left Leviticus Place and did not return. A body located in Birmingham was later identified as Leeann's; her cause of death remains "undetermined." After review, the Alabama Supreme Court determined petitioners established they were entitled to statutory immunity. They had a clear legal right to a summary judgment in their favor on that ground. The trial court was accordingly directed to vacate its order denying the petitioners' motion for a summary judgment and to enter a summary judgment in the petitioners' favor. View "Ex parte Sam Smith" on Justia Law

Jay Campbell, on behalf of himself and a certified class of "other persons similarly situated," appealed the grant of summary judgment on claims challenging the constitutionality of two municipal taxes adopted in 2013 by the City of Gardendale in connection with Gardendale's planned creation of a municipal school system. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded Campbell did not demonstrate that the Gardendale school taxes were rendered invalid by operation of Local Amendment 14. The Court therefore pretermitted discussion of the alternate arguments for affirmance presented by Jefferson County and Smallwood. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed. View "Campbell v. City of Gardendale" on Justia Law

During the coronavirus pandemic, Illinois Governor Pritzker issued executive orders designed to limit the virus’s opportunities to spread, similar to orders in other states. Executive Order 2020‐43 (EO43, June 26, 2020), imposing a 50-person cap on gatherings, states: This Executive Order does not limit the free exercise of religion. To protect the health and safety of faith leaders, staff, congregants, and visitors, religious organizations and houses of worship are encouraged to consult and follow the recommended practices and guidelines from the Illinois Department of Public Health.... the safest practices ... are to provide services online, in a drive‐in format, or outdoors (and consistent with social distancing requirements and guidance regarding wearing face coverings), and to limit indoor services to 10 people. Religious organizations are encouraged to take steps to ensure social distancing, the use of face coverings, and implementation of other public health measures. Emergency and governmental functions enjoy the same exemption.The Republican Party challenged the “favored” treatment of religion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of injunctive relief. Because the exercise of religion involves more than simple speech, the equivalency urged by the Republicans between political speech and religious exercise is a false one. If there were a problem with the religious exercise carve‐out, the state would be entitled to return to a regime in which even religious gatherings are subject to the mandatory cap. View "Illinois Republican Party v. J. B. Pritzker" on Justia Law

The Mississippi Supreme Court accepted this case on certiorari review from the Court of Appeals. Shaun Seals worked for the Pearl River Resort; he alleged he was terminated for reasons relating to a work-related injury. Donna Brolick, Pearl River Resort’s director of employment compliance, was called as a witness at the hearing before an administrative judge (AJ). Brolick testified that she was previously vice president of human resources at Pearl River Resort at the time Seals’s position was phased out and he was let go in January of 2013. Brolick further testified that in 2012 the resort changed its management. Multiple upper-level positions were eliminated or consolidated. Seals’s position as director of transportation was one of several positions that were eliminated. The Workers' Compensation Commission reversed the AJ’s order. The Commission found that Seals had reached maximum medical improvement on November 13, 2015, but failed to prove any permanent disability or loss of wage-earning capacity for two reasons. The Commission found that Seals was let go for unrelated economic reasons, noting his receipt of severance pay and other benefits as well as the testimony and evidence adduced by the Resort. Seals appealed the Commission's decision to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court held the Commission was correct in its assessment of the date of maximum medical improvement but that the Commission erred by finding Seals failed to prove any loss of wage-earning capacity. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the decision of the Commission and directed the Commission to calculate Seals’s loss of wage-earning capacity and to award corresponding compensation. The Resort petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted. The Supreme Court adopted "the well-reasoned analysis of the opinion concerning maximum medical improvement," but was "constrained to reverse the Court of Appeals’ majority regarding loss of wage-earning capacity. Sufficient evidence supported the Commission’s decision that Seals had not suffered loss of wage-earning capacity." The Commission's decision was reinstated in toto. View "Seals v. Pearl River Resort & Casino" on Justia Law

On January 18, 2019, the plaintiffs went with Covington Catholic High School classmates to Washington, D.C. to attend the March for Life. They later gathered near the Lincoln Memorial to await buses to return to Kentucky. Following interaction with other groups, Native American activist Phillips approached them, beating a drum and chanting. A video of this interaction was posted online and went viral. Some of the students were displaying the “Make America Great Again” campaign slogan; some were performing the “tomahawk” chop; one student is standing close to Phillips. The plaintiffs complained of online harassment in response to the video’s dissemination. Representative Debra Haaland, a Native American, on her official Congressional Twitter account, posted: “This Veteran [Phillips] put his life on the line for our country. The students’ display of blatant hate, disrespect, and intolerance is a signal of how common decency has decayed under this administration.” She later sent a tweet from her campaign Twitter account that linked to an interview with Phillips, in which he stated that the students were chanting “build that wall.” Senator Elizabeth Warren sent a tweet from her official Senate Twitter account, stating “Omaha elder and Vietnam War veteran Nathan Phillips endured hateful taunts with dignity and strength."The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit as barred by sovereign immunity, 28 U.S.C. 2679(b)(1). Members of Congress routinely broadcast their views on current events; the statements were made within the scope of their employment. The United States was properly substituted as the defendant and the court correctly dismissed Senator Warren and Representative Haaland from the suit. That the United States has not waived its immunity to libel suits is irrelevant. Plaintiffs may pursue their claims against the remaining defendants in state court. View "Does v. Haaland" on Justia Law