Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

PSBA is a non-profit association created by Pennsylvania’s school districts. Campbell energetically used Pennsylvania's Right to Know Law (RTKL) to obtain records from PSBA’s constituent school districts. In 2017, Campell sent RTKL requests to public school agencies, seeking contact information for district employees and union representatives. PSBA’s attorney advised member districts that they were required to release publicly-available information, but they did not have to provide private data and that they could simply make the results “available for pickup.” When Campbell received copies of PSBA’s legal guidance, he established a web page entitled “PSBA Horror,” mocking PSBA's Executive Director. PSBA’s counsel threatened to sue Campbell for defamation. Campbell submitted another, 17-page, RTKL request, seeking 27 types of documentation regarding the districts' relationship with PSBA.PSBA sued Campbell, alleging defamation, tortious interference with contractual relations, and abuse of process. Campbell then filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit, alleging that PSBA’s state suit was motivated by an improper desire to retaliate against him for proper RTKL requests, violating his First Amendment rights. The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Campell’s suit. Campbell’s RTKL requests and PSBA’s state tort claims were both protected under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which shields constitutionally-protected conduct from civil liability, absent certain exceptions. The district court erred in requiring a heightened burden of proof on PSBA’s motives in bringing its state court tort claims but Campbell’s civil rights claim would fail under any standard of proof. View "Campbell v. Pennsylvania School Boards Association" on Justia Law

Sierra Club sought review of the EPA’s approval of new Pennsylvania National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) to govern pollution output at coal-burning power plants, as required by the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7408(a). Sierra Club argued that the standards wrongly claim to reduce pollution output at Pennsylvania’s most advanced plants while simply rubber-stamping an average of current pollution output as its supposed new gold standard and criticized the proposal’s minimum temperature threshold—a measure that allows plants to nearly quintuple their pollution output when operating below 600 degrees Fahrenheit—as unsupported and unsupportable given the technical record before the agency. Sierra Club claims that the approved standards lack enforceable reporting regulations.The Third Circuit remanded to the EPA, finding that “the regulatory regime which springs forth from these three defining characteristics is neither supported by adequate facts nor by reasoning found in the administrative record.” Given the EPA’s concession that technological advances may allow for a more environmentally friendly standard than the one approved, reliance on a study that is more than 25 years old is neither a persuasive nor reasonable basis for adopting the standard it approved. The EPA is able neither to offer a reasonable justification for failing to require a stricter standard nor to justify the standard it endorsed. View "Sierra Club v. United States Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the petition filed by Representative Geraldine Thompson seeking to invalidate Governor Ron DeSantis's appointment of Judge Renatha Francis to fill a vacancy in office on the Supreme Court, holding that there was no legal justification for the Court to require a replacement appointment from a new list of candidates rather than the one already before the Governor.In her petition, Thompson argued that the Florida Constitution required Judge Francis to have been a member of the Florida Bar for at least ten years at the time of the appointment, which Judge Francis was not. As a remedy, Thompson asked the Supreme Court to invalidate the appointment, require the judicial nominating commission to certify a new list of candidates, and order the Governor to appoint someone from the new list. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding (1) the Governor did not exceed his authority in making the appointment; and (2) the remedy Thompson sought was not legally available under the circumstances, and the correct remedy - an appointment from the existing list of eligible nominees - would be contrary to Thompson's stated objectives in filing this case. View "Thompson v. DeSantis" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit denied a motion brought by unions representing uniformed New York City officers to stay, pending appeal the district court's July 29, 2020 order modifying the district court's July 22, 2020 order such that the order no longer applies to non-party NYCLU. This dispute arose out of the action of the New York legislature repealing section 50-a of the State's Civil Rights Law, which had shielded from public disclosure personnel records of various uniformed officers including police officers. The court stated that the effect of the modification is to permit the NYCLU publicly to disclose information concerning disciplinary records of approximately 81,000 New York City police officers, records alleged to contain unsubstantiated and nonfinal allegations.The court held that the district court properly excluded the NYCLU from the disclosure prohibition under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2)(C) because it was not "in active concert" with a party bound by a TRO or a preliminary injunction. The court explained that the NYCLU could not be "in active concert" with such a party because it lawfully gained access to the information at issue before the July 22 disclosure prohibition was issued against it and obviously could not have known of a prohibition that did not then exist. Therefore, because appellants had no probability of success on the appeal from the July 29 order, the court denied the motion for a stay pending appeal, thereby terminating the emergency stay that a judge of this court had entered pending consideration of the stay motion by a three-judge panel. View "Uniformed Fire Officers Ass'n v. DeBlasio" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit certified the following questions of law to the Alabama Supreme Court under Alabama Rule of Appellate Procedure 18: (1) Can property owned by a solid waste disposal authority "belong[] to" a county or municipality for purposes of section 6-10-10? (2) If so, what factors should courts consider when making such a determination? (3) If section 6-10-10 can apply to property owned by a solid waste disposal authority, is such property "used for county or municipal purposes" when the authority has not used the property but is holding it for a future use? (4) Does Alabama continue to recognize a common law exemption from execution for property used for public purposes as described in Gardner v. Mobile & N.W.R. Co., 15 So. 271 (Ala. 1894)? (5) If so, does that exemption apply to public corporations like the Authority, and what standards should courts employ in applying this common law exemption? View "WM Mobile Bay Environmental Center, Inc. v. The City of Mobile Solid Waste Authority" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the writs of mandamus sought by Relators, Marie Nauth and the group Concerned Citizens of Medina City (CCMC), seeking an order directing members of the Medina County Board of Elections (collectively, the Board) to certify as valid forty-seven signatures that Relators say the Board invalidated as not genuine, holding that Relators did not meet their burden to show an abuse of discretion by the Board.Relators filed a referendum petition that fell forty-four signatures short of qualifying for the November 3, 2020 general election ballot. Relators then commenced this action seeking a writ of mandamus that would direct the Board to reexamine the signatures on the referendum petition and certify as valid the signatures of qualified electors that they signed the referendum petition. The Supreme Court denied the writs, holding that Relators failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the forty-seven signatures at issue were invalidated in the first place and for what reasons. View "State ex rel. Nauth v. Dirham" on Justia Law

The Department of State cannot revoke a citizen's United States passport on the ground that he concealed his identity in applying for the passport, where the citizen makes a statement that prior to his naturalization he was known by another name but he applied for, and was issued, his passport using his uncontested legal name.Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his Administrative Procedure Act (APA) suit challenging the Department's revocation of his passport. The district court dismissed the complaint after determining that the revocation of plaintiff's passport was neither arbitrary nor capricious, and did not violate Due Process.The Second Circuit reversed the district court's judgment and found that plaintiff could not have fraudulently obtained his passport when he used the name and birthdate denoted on his unchallenged immigration and citizenship documents, including his certificate of naturalization. The court reversed the Department's final decision upholding the passport revocation and ordered the Department to return plaintiff's expired passport so that he may apply for a new United States passport if he so chooses. View "Alzokari v. Pompeo" on Justia Law

Petitioners Michael Haugen, Jacob Stutzman, Trent Barkus, and the Brighter Future Alliance sought a writ to enjoin North Dakota Secretary of State Alvin Jaeger from placing an initiated measure on the November 3, 2020 ballot. The measure sought to amend the North Dakota Constitution concerning elections and legislative districting. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court granted the writ, concluding the petition did not comply with the constitutional requirement that it contain the full text of the measure. The Court set aside the Secretary of State’s decision to place Measure 3 on the November ballot and enjoined him from doing so. View "Haugen, et al. v. Jaeger, et al." on Justia Law

After TABC investigated Spec's and brought a largely unsuccessful administrative action against it, Spec's filed suit against TABC. The district court dismissed the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), reasoning that defendants were entitled to various forms of immunity.The Fifth Circuit held that the district court correctly determined that defendants are entitled to absolute immunity from Spec's' 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims regarding administrative holds, protests of applications, and denials of renewals. However, the district court erred by concluding that defendants are absolutely immune from Spec's' section 1983 individual-capacity claim regarding the concealment of evidence. The court also held that the district court correctly determined that sovereign immunity bars Spec's' official-capacity claims for damages and for injunctive and declaratory relief. The district court also correctly held that defendants are entitled to state-action immunity from Spec's' antitrust claims, and that Texas Alcoholic Beverage Code 102.07(a)(7) is not a per se violation of the Sherman Act. Finally, the court held that the district court's decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over Spec's' state-law malicious prosecution claim must be vacated because the grounds for that decision are no longer applicable. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Spec's Family Partners, Ltd. v. Executive Director of the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of an action brought by plaintiffs, customers of the DWP, claiming that DWP overcharged for electric power and then transferred the surplus funds to the City, thereby allowing the City to receive what amounts to an unlawful tax under California law. Plaintiffs alleged claims under the Hobbs Act, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and 42 U.S.C. 1983, as well as claims under state law.The panel agreed with its sister circuits that the Hobbs Act does not support a private civil right of action; held that municipal entities are not subject to liability under RICO when sued in their official capacities, but the RICO claims in this case were asserted against the defendant City and DWP officials in their personal capacities; held that the RICO claim was nonetheless properly dismissed because it failed as a matter of law because it did not adequately allege a predicate act in extortion under California law or the Hobbs Act, mail and wire fraud, or obstruction of justice; and held that, under the Johnson Act, the district court lacked jurisdiction over the the section 1983 claims. Because plaintiffs have provided no basis for concluding that any of these deficiencies could be cured by an amendment of the complaint, and based upon the panel's own thorough review of the record, the panel held that amendment would be futile. View "Abcarian v. Levine" on Justia Law