Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court held that the Arizona Department of Health Services' (ADHS) interpretation of Arizona Administrative Code R9-17-303, which governs ADHS's allocation of marijuana dispensary registration certificates, violated Ariz. Rev. Stat. 36-2804(C).On June 16, 2016, ADHS announced that, because every county had at least one dispensary, it would allocate new registration certificates based on other factors set forth in R9-17-303. Saguaro Healing LLC timely applied for a certificate for its dispensary in La Paz County. During the application period, the only dispensary in La Paz County relocated out of the county. ADHS, however, did not consider the vacancy when prioritizing registration certificates and did not issue a certificate to Saguaro, leaving La Paz County without a dispensary. Saguaro filed a complaint for special action. The trial court dismissed the complaint because R9-17-303(B) "does not say when, during the process of issuing new certificates, [ADHS] must determine how certificates will be allocated." The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Ariz. Rev. Stat. 36-2804(C) requires ADHS to issue at least one medical marijuana dispensary registration certificate in each county with a qualified applicant; and (2) ADHS's interpretation of R9-17-303 contrary to this statutory mandate violates section 36-2804(C). View "Saguaro Healing LLC v. State" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit denied the Refinery's motion to proceed under a pseudonym. The court weighed the markedly thin showing of potential injury by the Refinery against the substantial public interest in transparency and openness in cases involving the government's administration of an important statutory and regulatory scheme, holding that the Refinery has not overcome the customary and constitutionally-impeded presumption of openness in judicial proceedings.In this case, the Refinery has failed to demonstrate that requiring it to proceed in its own name will risk the disclosure of sensitive and highly personal information; the Refinery itself faces no risk of physical or mental harm; and the Refinery has chosen to sue a government agency regarding the operation of a statutory program and, in particular, applications for special exemptions from the law's obligations. The court held that none of the factors commonly involved in analyzing a request to proceed anonymously weigh in the Refinery's favor. Furthermore, the Refinery's additional arguments add nothing to its side of the scale either. View "In re: Sealed Case" on Justia Law

The United States filed suit against the State of Washington, claiming that HB 1723 impermissibly directly regulates and discriminates against the Federal Government and those with whom it deals in violation of the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity. HB 1723 amended Washington's workers' compensation scheme and established for workers at the Hanford site – a decommissioned federal nuclear production site – a presumption that certain conditions and cancers are occupational diseases that is rebuttable only by clear and convincing evidence.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Washington, holding that HB 1723 fell within the waiver of 40 U.S.C. 3172, which authorizes states to apply their workers' compensation laws to federal lands and projects in the states in the same way and to the same extent as if the premises were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the state. Therefore, HB 1723 did not violate the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity. Finally, the panel declined to resolve the remaining issues raised by the parties because they were not properly before the court. View "United States v. State of Washington" on Justia Law

Cottingham sought compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. 300aa-10, alleging that a Gardasil® vaccination received by her minor daughter, K.C., in 2012, for the prevention of HPV, caused K.C. injuries. The claim was filed immediately before the limitations period ran out.The government stated argued that a "reasonable basis for bringing the case may not be present.” Cottingham’s counsel was granted additional time but was unable to submit an expert opinion supporting her claim. The Special Master denied compensation. Cottingham sought attorneys’ fees and litigation costs ($11,468.77), 42 U.S.C. 300aa-15(e)(1). The Master found no evidence to support the "vaguely asserted claims" that the vaccination caused K.C.’s headaches, fainting, or menstrual problems." While remand was pending the Federal Circuit held (Simmons) that although a looming statute of limitations deadline may impact the question of whether good faith existed to bring a claim, that deadline does not provide a reasonable basis for asserting a claim. The Master decided that Simmons did not impact his analysis, applied a “totality of the circumstances” standard, and awarded attorneys’ fees. The Claims Court vacated and affirmed the Special Master’s third decision, finding no reasonable basis for Cottingham’s claim.The Federal Circuit vacated, noting that there is no dispute that Cottingham filed her claim in good faith. Simmons did not abrogate the “totality of the circumstances inquiry.” K.C.’s medical records paired with the Gardasil® package insert constitute circumstantial, objective evidence supporting causation. View "Cottingham v. Secretary of Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

POET petitioned for review of a letter from the Assistant Administrator of the EPA, contending that the letter embodies the EPA's final decision to deny POET's application to generate D3 Renewable Identification Numbers (RINs) by producing cellulosic ethanol from corn-kernel fiber at its facility in Hudson, South Dakota.The Eighth Circuit held that the controversy regarding the EPA's alleged denial of the application is moot and dismissed the petition. In this case, POET has since filed a new, non-identical application to generate D3 RINs at its Hudson facility, which is currently pending for the EPA's review. View "POET Biorefining - Hudson, LLC v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

In this fifth case arising from an ongoing dispute between Plaintiffs and Glacier County and certain county officials (collectively, the County), the Supreme Court reversed the district court's grant of Plaintiffs' motion for appointment of a financial receiver for the County, holding that the court abused its discretion.Plaintiffs alleged claims against the County regarding alleged financial mismanagement and non-compliance with government budgeting, auditing, and tax laws. By motion filed prior to filing their complaint, Plaintiffs sought appointment of a financial receiver pendente lite to assure that the budgeting, tax levying, expenditure and disbursement, and accounting laws were strictly complied with. The district court refused to appoint a receiver for the purpose requested by Plaintiffs but appointed a more limited receivership to determine the extent of personal liability for the County officials for deficit spending. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court (1) erred in appointing a receiver for a stated purpose in excess of and unrelated to the limited purpose of a receivership pendente lite; and (2) erred in basing the receivership on a preliminary adjudication of the ultimate merits of its underclass claims for relief and on a reason that did not establish or contribute to the requisite necessity for appointment of a receiver under section 27-20-102(3). View "Gottlob v. DesRosier" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendants' motion to dismiss claims asserted against Glacier County officials (collectively, the County) in Plaintiffs' complaint due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the district court did not err.This was the fourth case arising from a dispute between Plaintiffs and the County regarding alleged financial mismanagement and non-compliance with government budgeting, auditing, and tax laws. The County sought dismissal of certain claims under Mont. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), arguing that subject matter jurisdiction was lacking because no express or implied right to remedy existed. The district court denied the motion on the ground that Mont. Code Ann. 15-1-406 through -408 provided and express private right and related remedies, and thus related subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed without prejudice to issues properly preserved and raised pursuant to Mont. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), holding that the district court did not err in denying the County's Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss. View "Gottlob v. DesRosier" on Justia Law

After the Department discharged plaintiff based on her failure to report another deputy's use of force against an inmate and her failure to seek medical assistance for the inmate, the Commission affirmed the discharge. However, the trial court granted plaintiff's petition for writ of mandate and directed the Commission to set aside plaintiff's discharge, award her back pay, and reconsider a lesser penalty.The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in upholding plaintiff's discharge. In this case, plaintiff committed a more egregious violation of Department policy that went beyond a failure to report the use of force or to seek medical attention by perpetuating a code of silence among deputies in the jail, which encouraged other deputies to ignore their responsibilities and brought embarrassment to the Department. Therefore, plaintiff's conduct also violated the general behavior policy, which requires a deputy "not act or behave privately or officially in such a manner as to bring discredit upon himself or the Department." Given the Department's reasoned explanation that discharge was necessary in light of plaintiff's furtherance of the code of silence and the resulting embarrassment and loss of trust in the Department, the court held that this is not the exceptional case where reasonable minds cannot differ on the appropriate penalty. View "Pasos v. Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission" on Justia Law

Semmerling worked as a contractor for the U.S. Military Commissions Defense Organization as part of the legal team for a person charged as an al-Qaeda enemy combatant. Semmerling, who is gay, disclosed his sexuality to the lead attorney of that team. Semmerling alleges that, despite promising secrecy, that attorney disclosed his sexuality to the client and told the client that Semmerling was infatuated with the client and was pursuing that interest. Semmerling sued the lead attorney for state-law torts of defamation, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and he sued the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2674, for negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court dismissed the suit.The Seventh Circuit denied the government’s motion for summary affirmance while acknowledging that Semmerling’s brief is substantively deficient in multiple ways. The court noted that the other defendant filed a brief. Sparse briefing alone is not a reason to enter a merits judgment, and this case does not rise to the level of “incomprehensible or completely insubstantial.” Semmerling may, within seven days, seek leave to strike his opening brief and to file a brief that complies with Rule 28. View "Semmerling v. Bormann" on Justia Law

Mother and Father appealed a Family Court order terminating their parental rights to Giselle, who was four months old when the Family Court first ordered her removed from the parents’ care. The court found Giselle was at risk of chronic and life threatening abuse based on the previous unexplained serious injuries to her older sibling. The Family Court also found Mother and Father failed to plan for Giselle’s physical needs and her mental and emotional health and development. Mother and Father challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the termination of parental rights and raised a number of constitutional arguments on appeal. Finding the arguments lacked merit, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Family Court’s judgment. View "Sierra v. DSCYF" on Justia Law