Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Through mediation efforts in connection with a federal lawsuit pending in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, Respondent, the Honorable J. Kevin Stitt, Governor of Oklahoma, negotiated and entered into new tribal gaming compacts with the Comanche Nation and Otoe-Missouria Tribes to increase state gaming revenues. The tribal gaming compacts were submitted to the United States Department of the Interior, and the Department of the Interior deemed them approved by inaction, only to the extent they were consistent with the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). The Comanche Nation and Otoe-Missouria Tribes were not parties to this matter; these tribes were sovereign nations and have not submitted to the jurisdiction of the Oklahoma Supreme Court. The limited question presented to the Oklahoma Supreme Court was whether Governor Stitt had the authority to bind the State with respect to the new tribal gaming compacts with the Comanche Nation and Otoe-Missouria Tribes. To this, the Supreme Court held he did not. The tribal gaming compacts Governor Stitt entered into with the Comanche Nation and Otoe-Missouria Tribes authorized certain forms of Class III gaming, including house-banked card and table games and event wagering. Any gaming compact to authorize Class III gaming had to be validly entered into under state law, and it was Oklahoma law that determined whether the compact was consistent with the IGRA. The tribal gaming compacts Governor Stitt entered into with the Comanche Nation and Otoe-Missouria Tribes were invalid under Oklahoma law. The State of Oklahoma was not and could not be legally bound by those compacts until such time as the Legislature enacted laws to allow the specific Class III gaming at issue, and in turn, allowing the Governor to negotiate additional revenue. View "Treat v. Stitt" on Justia Law

In this appeal by allowance, the issue presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was whether application of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”) to the judicial branch of our tripartite form of government violated separation of powers principles. On April 3, 1989, the Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas (“CCP”) Office of Adult Probation hired Appellant Michael Renner as a Parole Officer. In July 2011, Appellant informed Lehigh County Chief Probation Officer John Sikora that he had been diagnosed with a serious mental health condition and was hospitalized; he was subsequently absent from work for 4 to 6 weeks. During Appellant’s absence, Sikora telephoned him numerous times to confirm the legitimacy of Appellant’s condition. Upon his return to work, Appellant alleged Sikora and Lehigh County Benefits Manager Mark Surovy, both of whom supervised Appellant, pressured Appellant to resign or take a leave of absence. Appellant confronted Sikora about his hostilities towards him, but Sikora refused to discuss the matter. Subsequently, in March 2014, Sikora terminated Appellant for failing to administer a urine test to an offender under his supervision. Appellant claimed the test was not required and that the reason for his termination was pretextual. Appellant protested his termination to then-President Judge of the CCP Carol McGinley, but Judge McGinley refused to take any action. As a result, Appellant claimed he could not obtain other employment in any other court system, and, in 2014, he filed a charge of unlawful discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which was dual-filed with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (“PHRC”), against Lehigh County Adult Probation, Sikora, and Surovy. Thereafter, Appellant completed training as a municipal officer, and, subsequently, was offered a police officer position by Northampton and Fountain Hill Boroughs. Appellant alleged that the CCP and Lehigh County learned that Appellant was offered employment as a police officer, and caused an order to be issued banning Appellant from possessing a firearm or taser in the Lehigh County Courthouse, Old Courthouse, and Government Center. As a result, Northampton and Fountain Hill Boroughs rescinded their employment offers. Appellant eventually got his gun possession ban lifted, but as a condition, the CCP and Lehigh County required him to undergo a medical exam, which Appellant contended was a violation of the PHRA. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that application of the PHRA to the judiciary would violate separation of powers principles, and thus, affirmed the order of the Commonwealth Court. View "Renner v. CCP of Lehigh Co., et al" on Justia Law

In an appeal by allowance, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered the level of deference courts had to afford an administrative agency’s interpretation of its enabling statute. Additionally, the Court considered whether the Commonwealth Court erred in concluding that Distributed Antenna System (DAS) networks were public utilities under the Pennsylvania Public Utility Code (Code), thereby reversing the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission’s (PUC) interpretation of the definition of “public utility." This case involved the status of DAS networks as public utilities in Pennsylvania. Appellees, Crown Castle NG East LLC (Crown Castle NG) and Pennsylvania-CLEC LLC (Pennsylvania-CLEC) (collectively Crown Castle), operated DAS networks. Crown Castle’s DAS networks provided telecommunications transport services to Wireless Service Providers (WSP), such as AT&T Wireless, Verizon Wireless, T-Mobile, and others. The WSPs offered "commercial mobile radio service" (CMRS) to retail end-users. The Supreme Court agreed with the Commonwealth Court that DAS network operators did not provide CMRS because DAS network operators “own no spectrum, need no phone numbers, and their contractual relationship is solely with the WSPs, not with the retail cell phone user. . . . [T]he DAS network operator has no control over the generation of that signal [that it transports for the WSPs].” Accordingly, the Court concluded that DAS network operators did not furnish CMRS and were not excluded from the definition of public utility by Section 102(2)(iv). Further, the Court concluded the Commonwealth Court did not err in holding that the PUC’s interpretation of a clear and unambiguous statutory provision was not entitled to deference. Further, the Commonwealth Court properly concluded that DAS network service met the definition of “public utility” and is not excluded from that definition as it did not furnish CMRS service. View "Crown Castle NG East LLC, et al v. Pennsylvania Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit filed an amended opinion affirming in part and reversing in part the district court's judgment in favor of the United States, the FBI, and federal officials in a putative class action alleging that an FBI investigation involved unlawful searches and anti-Muslim discrimination; denied a petition for panel rehearing; and denied on behalf of the court a petition for rehearing en banc.Plaintiffs, three Muslim residents of California, filed a putative class action against Government Defendants and Agent Defendants, alleging that the FBI paid a confidential informant to conduct a covert surveillance program that gathered information about Muslims based solely on their religious identity. Plaintiffs argued that the investigation involved unlawful searches and anti-Muslim discrimination, in violation of eleven constitutional and statutory causes of action.The panel held that some of the claims dismissed on state secrets grounds should not have been dismissed outright. Rather, the district court should have reviewed any state secrets evidence necessary for a determination of whether the alleged surveillance was unlawful following the secrecy protective procedure in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). The panel held that the Fourth Amendment injunctive relief claim against the official-capacity defendants should not have been dismissed, because expungement relief was available under the Constitution to remedy the alleged constitutional violations. The panel declined to address whether plaintiffs' Bivens claim remained available after the Supreme Court's decision in Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017), and thus remanded for the district court to determine whether a Bivens remedy was appropriate for any Fourth Amendment claim against the Agent Defendants. The panel held that some of plaintiffs' remaining allegations state a claim while others do not. Accordingly, the panel remanded to the district court for further proceedings on the substantively stated claims. View "Fazaga v. FBI" on Justia Law

Healthcare insurers filed suit challenging an emergency regulation promulgated in 2017 by New York's Superintendent of the Department of Financial Services that would have significantly reduced the amount of risk adjustment funding to which plaintiffs were entitled in 2017 under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) and subsequent years using HHS's federal methodology.The Second Circuit held that New York's emergency regulation was preempted by the ACA and HHS's regulations. The court held that New York's regulation interferes with, indeed reverses, some of the central "criteria and methods" that HHS, acting within its statutory authority, established for implementing a risk adjustment program and methodology. Accordingly, the court reversed the portion of the district court's judgment that dismissed plaintiffs' preemption claim and remanded with instructions to grant summary judgment in plaintiffs' favor on that claim. The court also vacated the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' takings and exaction claims, remanding for further proceedings. View "UnitedHealthcare of New York, Inc. v. Lacewell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the emergency petition filed by the Legislature for a peremptory writ of mandate seeking relief from redistricting deadlines set by California law in light of the delay of census data collection and processing, holding the Legislature was entitled to a one-time adjustment to the deadlines.Under California law, the Citizens Redistricting Commission has the task of redistricting and draws new maps based on the federal census data. As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, the federal Census Bureau delayed census data collection and processing. Consequently, the data required to draw new district maps would not be released to states in time for the Commission to meet the redistricting deadlines. The Supreme Court issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the Commission to release the first preliminary statewide maps for public display and comment no later than November 1, 2021, notwithstanding Cal. Gov't Code 8253, subdivision (a)(7), and directing the Commission to approve and certify the final statewide maps by no later than December 15, 2021. View "Legislature of State of California v. Padilla" on Justia Law

The ACAP and others challenged the Departments' Short-Term Limited Duration Insurance (STLDI) Rule defining STLDI as coverage with an initial contract term of less than one year and a maximum duration of three years counting renewals. The Departments also expanded disclosure requirements.The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Departments and agreed with the district court that the STLDI Rule was a reasonable interpretation of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), and that the change from the 2016 Rule to the current STLDI Rule was not arbitrary and capricious. View "Association for Community Affiliated Plans v. Department of the Treasury" on Justia Law

In these consolidated actions, a group of hospitals challenged HHS's rate reduction for off-campus provider-based departments (PBDs) falls outside of the agency's statutory authority. The district court agreed and set aside the regulation.Applying Chevron deference, the DC Circuit reversed and held that HHS's regulation rests on a reasonable interpretation of its statutory authority to adopt volume-control methods. In this case, Congress did not unambiguously forbid the agency from doing so and the agency reasonably read 42 U.S.C. 1395l(t)(2)(F) to allow a service specific, non-budget-neutral reimbursement cut in the circumstances the court considered here. View "American Hospital Assoc. v. Azar" on Justia Law

Asylum seekers filed suit challenging executive-branch policies adopted to implement the expedited-removal provisions of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). Asylum seekers principally argue that the policies raise the bar for demonstrating a credible fear of persecution far above what Congress intended and that the Attorney General and various agencies violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by failing to adequately address important factors bearing on the policies' adoption. The district court found that the policies are inconsistent with the IIRIRA and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), enjoining their enforcement.After addressing jurisdictional issues, the DC Circuit held that the condoned-or-completely-helpless standard is arbitrary and capricious; the new choice-of-law policy is arbitrary and capricious due to USCIS's failure to acknowledge and explain its departure from past practice; when viewed as a whole, the Guidance accurately restates the circularity rule as described in Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 321 (2018); the record in this case does not support the asylum seekers' argument that USCIS and the Attorney General have erected a rule against asylum claims involving allegations of domestic and/or gang violence; and neither 8 U.S.C. 1252(f)(1) nor 1252(e)(1) prohibited the district court from issuing an injunction.Therefore, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment with respect to the circularity rule and the statements regarding domestic- and gang-violence claims, vacated the injunction insofar as it pertains to those issues, and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Grace v. Barr" on Justia Law

The San Mateo County Assessment Appeals Board invalidated escape assessments imposed by the County Assessor based on the value of machinery and equipment (M&E) at Genentech’s San Mateo County facility. The fair market value of the M&E on which property tax is imposed is determined with reference to either the cost of equipment purchased in a finished state or, if the equipment is not purchased in a finished state, costs incurred to bring the equipment to a finished state. The Board determined that Genentech purchased all of the M&E in a finished state and that the assembly of the equipment into a production line did not render the equipment “self-constructed property” justifying the inclusion of the additional costs in determining fair market value. The trial court determined that none of the equipment was in a finished state until put to use in a functioning production line and that the additional costs capitalized for accounting purposes add to the value of the property for purposes of the property tax.The court of appeal reversed. The trial court adopted a standard for determining when equipment is in a finished state for which there is no justification, and erroneously rejected Board findings that are supported by substantial evidence. Fair market value and net book value are separate concepts with separate purposes; the assessor may not rely on Genentech’s capitalization of expenses for accounting purposes to establish that those expenses increase the value of the equipment and are subject to assessment. View "Church v. San Mateo County Assessment Appeals Board" on Justia Law