Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court denying the Utah State Tax Commission's motion to dismiss Gail and Margaret Christensens' petition seeking judicial review of an order of an administrative law judge (ALJ) requiring Gail to pay income tax and interest on income he earned while working in the Republic of Angola, holding that the Christensens did not exhaust their administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial review.Gail did not file Utah tax returns for the three years he was working in Angola. The Auditing Division of the Commission ordered Gail to pay his taxes, along with interest and penalties. Gail challenged that decision, and an ALJ ordered him to pay taxes and interest but not a penalty. Gail did not request a formal hearing before the Commission but, instead, sought review of the order, along with his wife, in the district court. The Commission moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds that the district court lacked jurisdiction. The district court denied the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, by failing to request a formal hearing, the Christensens did not exhaust their administrative remedies, as required by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. View "Christensen v. Utah State Tax Commission" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit dismissed petitions for review of several Federal Aviation Administration actions related to the proposed expansion of the Paulding Northwest Atlanta Airport. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction because none of petitioners' challenges involves an ongoing case or controversy. In this case, petitioners lack standing to pursue their challenge to the FAA's decision to withdraw its concurrence in GDOT's written reevaluation, because petitioners' injuries are not fairly traceable to the challenged action. Furthermore, petitioners' remaining challenges concerning the FAA's concurrence in GDOT's written re-evaluation, the FAA's denial of reconsideration of that concurrence, and the FAA's withdrawal of the airport expansion from the then-pending commercial service environmental assessment are all moot. View "Louie v. Dickson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, three cigar and pipe tobacco industry associations, filed suit challenging various provisions of the FDA's Deeming Rule, which subjects newly regulated tobacco products, including cigars and pipe tobacco, to requirements akin to those previously imposed by statute on cigarettes, cigarette tobacco, roll-your-own tobacco, and smokeless tobacco. Plaintiffs contend that the warning requirements for cigars and pipe tobacco violate the Tobacco Control Act and the Administrative Procedure Act because the FDA did not adequately consider how the warnings would affect smoking. Plaintiffs also argued that the warning requirements violate the First Amendment.The DC Circuit held that Congress required the FDA to consider whether any regulation under section 906(d)(1) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act would likely affect the number of tobacco users. In promulgating the warning requirements for cigars and pipe tobacco, the court held that the FDA failed to satisfy that obligation. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the FDA and the denial of summary judgment to plaintiffs. The court dismissed as moot plaintiffs' appeal from the denial of their motion for a preliminary injunction. Finally, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Cigar Association of America v. Food and Drug Administration" on Justia Law

The burden of producing judicial records may not permanently foreclose their unsealing. After plaintiffs, a journalist and the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, applied to the district court to unseal certain electronic surveillance orders and related filings in closed investigations, the district court withheld some of the requests due to the administrative burden of unsealing. The requests relate to judicial warrants issued under the Stored Communications Act (SCA) and court orders issued under the Pen Register Act.The DC Circuit held that the public's right of access to judicial records is a fundamental element of the rule of law. Administrative burden is relevant to how and when a judicial record may be unsealed, but not to whether it may be released at all. The court explained that precluding public access because of the personnel-hours required to produce those records is no more warranted than precluding public access to high-profile trials because of the costs of crowd control. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded for the district court to determine, in its sound discretion, how and when greater access can be provided. View "In re: In the Matter of the Application of Jason Leopold to Unseal Certain Electronic Surveillance Applications and Orders" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court affirming the decision of the Town of Casco Zoning Board of Appeals in which the Board denied the request for a shoreline zoning permit filed by Mark and Valerie Tomasino, holding that the Tomasinos lacked standing to seek such a permit.On appeal, the Tomasinos argued that the Board erred in determining that they demonstrated insufficient right, title, or interest in the property to obtain a permit to remove three trees from property owned by Lake Shore Realty Trust, the abutting property owner, over which the Tomasinos claimed a deeded easement. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that, even assuming that the Tomasinos demonstrated that they had some interest in the particular portion of property at issue in this case, they failed to demonstrate that they had the kind of interest that would allow them to cut the trees if they were granted a permit to do so. View "Tomasino v. Town of Casco" on Justia Law

Former Texas state judge Suzanne Wooten filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against state and local law enforcement officials, alleging that they violated the Constitution by investigating and prosecuting her in retaliation for unseating an incumbent judge and making rulings they disagreed with. At issue in this appeal was whether defendants are entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity for their alleged acts.The Fifth Circuit held that the district court was without jurisdiction to accept Wooten's second amended complaint; that her first amended complaint remains operative; and that this appeal is not moot. The court also held that it has jurisdiction to hear defendants' appeal regarding prosecutorial immunity and Defendant White and Abbott's official immunity claims. However, the court held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear any defendant's appeal on qualified immunity and Defendants Roach and Milner's claims to official immunity.On the merits, the court held that Defendants Roach, White, and Abbott are each entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity. However, the court held that Defendant Milner is not shielded by absolute prosecutorial immunity because he was performing investigative functions that do not qualify for absolute immunity. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Wooten v. Roach" on Justia Law

This appeal involved the relationship between the detention and release provisions of two statutes: the Bail Reform Act (BRA), 18 U.S.C. sections 3141-3156, and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. sections 1101-1537. The district court ordered Jose Luis Barrera-Landa released pending trial subject to the conditions the magistrate judge set in an earlier order. Barrera did not appeal that portion of the district court’s release order. As part of its order granting pretrial release, the district court denied Barrera’s request to enjoin the United States Immigration Customs and Enforcement (ICE) from detaining or deporting him during the pending criminal proceedings. Barrera appealed that portion of the district court’s release order. Barrera raised two new arguments on appeal: (1) 18 U.S.C. 3142(c) authorized a district court to prohibit the United States from deporting a defendant to assure his appearance in court; and (2) the Tenth Circuit should recognize the courts’ inherent supervisory authority to enjoin the United States from arresting or deporting Barrera while the criminal case is pending. Furthermore, Barrera argued the government had to choose to either proceed with immigration enforcement or his criminal prosecution, but could not do both. He asserted that if the government chose to prosecute, it had to must submit to the detention rules that governed criminal prosecutions and ICE could not detain or remove him. The district court denied Barrera’s request to enjoin ICE, explaining that every circuit that has addressed the issue has concluded that ICE may fulfill its statutory duties under the INA to detain an illegal alien regardless of a release determination under the BRA. The Tenth Circuit found Barrera forfeited his first two arguments by failing to raise them at the district court. The Court concluded the BRA and the INA "are capable of co-existing in the circumstances presented here." It therefore affirmed the district court's release order. View "United States v. Barrera-Landa" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction against enforcement of a Department of Homeland Security joint interim final rule which—with limited exceptions—categorically denies asylum to aliens arriving at the border with Mexico unless they have first applied for, and have been denied, asylum in Mexico or another country through which they have traveled.After determining that plaintiffs have Article III standing, the panel held that plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success on their claim that the rule is unlawful under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), where it is not in accordance with law and in excess of statutory limitations because it is not consistent with 8 U.S.C. 1158. The panel also held that plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success on their claim that the rule is arbitrary and capricious because it runs counter to the evidence before the agency and entirely failed to consider important aspects of the problem. Furthermore, the panel held that plaintiffs have shown that they will suffer irreparable harm, that the balance of equities lies in their favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest. Finally, the panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in entering an injunction covering the four states along the border with Mexico. View "East Bay Sanctuary Convenant v. Barr" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit's review involved an interpretation of an environmental regulation addressing the renewal of permits under Title V of the Clean Air Act. The statute and accompanying regulation allowed renewal of these permits only if they ensured “compliance with” all of the “applicable requirements.” The term “applicable requirements” was defined in the regulation, but not the statute. The Sierra Club interpreted the regulatory definition to require compliance with all existing statutory requirements; the EPA interpretd the regulatory definition more narrowly, arguing that the applicability of certain requirements was determined by the state permit issued under a separate part of the Clean Air Act (Title I). The Tenth Circuit agreed with the Sierra Club’s interpretation: the regulatory definition of “applicable requirements” included all requirements in the state’s implementation plan, and Utah’s implementation plan broadly required compliance with the Clean Air Act. So, the Court concluded, all of the Act’s requirements constituted “applicable requirements” under the regulation. View "Sierra Club v. EPA" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants in an action alleging that the BLM's geld and release plan for wild horses violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act.The panel held that the BLM did not act arbitrarily or capriciously when it chose to geld and release some of the male horses that would otherwise be permanently removed. The panel also held that the BLM permissibly determined that the intensity factors, whether considered individually or collectively, did not show that the Gather Plan would have a significant effect on the environment; the BLM considered and addressed the relevant factor that the Gelding Study raised and explained why additional information was not available, which meets NEPA's "hard look" standard; the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act does not require the BLM to discuss explicitly all expert opinions submitted during the public-comment period; and by addressing the concerns and factors that the NAS Report raised, the BLM complied with the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act's requirement that the BLM "consult" the National Academy of Sciences. View "American Wild Horse Campaign v. Bernhardt" on Justia Law