Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Larry Hewitt appealed a district court judgment affirming the North Dakota Department of Transportation’s revocation of his driving privileges. Hewitt claimed the Department’s hearing file was improperly admitted at the administrative hearing. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the hearing file was properly admitted as a self-authenticating copy of an official record. View "Hewitt v. NDDOT" on Justia Law

Gregory Schwindt appealed a district court judgment affirming a Department of Transportation hearing officer’s revocation of his driving privileges for 180 days. Schwindt argued North Dakota’s implied consent and refusal laws were unconstitutional, the hearing officer erred by considering the results of the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test, and the hearing officer erred in finding he refused to take a chemical test. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the hearing officer’s findings of fact were supported by a preponderance of the evidence, the conclusions of law were sustained by the findings of fact, and the decision to revoke Schwindt’s driving privileges was in accordance with the law. View "Schwindt v. Sorel" on Justia Law

The North Dakota Department of Transportation (Department) appealed the district court's reversing a hearing officer’s decision suspending Holden Kastet’s driving privileges for 365 days. The Department argued the hearing officer did not abuse his discretion in admitting the chemical breath test, and State Highway Patrol Trooper King scrupulously complied with the approved method for testing Kastet’s breath on the Intoxilyzer 8000. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concurred with the Department and reversed the district court judgment. The matter was remanded with instructions to reinstate the hearing officer’s decision. View "Kastet v. NDDOT" on Justia Law

Workforce Safety & Insurance (WSI) appealed a district court judgment affirming the administrative law judge’s (ALJ) order concluding Isai Avila was entitled to both the scheduled permanent partial impairment award for vision loss and whole body permanent partial impairment award for additional injuries to his cervical spine, facial bone, acoustic nerve, and brain. In 2015, Avila fell on ice carrying a railroad tie while employed by SM Fencing & Energy Services, Inc., and sustained injuries. WSI issued an order awarding permanent impairment benefits of $34,000 to Avila. Avila requested a hearing. During a second review Avila underwent a permanent impairment evaluation. The evaluation determined Avila had 29% whole body permanent partial impairment which included 16% whole body impairment for vision loss of Avila’s left eye. WSI concluded under N.D.C.C. 65-05-12.2(11) that Avila was entitled to the greater of either the scheduled impairment award or the whole body impairment award, but not both. WSI issued a notice of decision confirming no additional award of permanent impairment benefits was due. Avila again requested a hearing after reconsideration. The sole issue at the administrative hearing was interpretation of the portion of N.D.C.C. 65-05-12.2(11). and whether the statute applied to the same work-related injury or condition, and not impairments for the same work-related incident. Since Avila’s loss of vision in his left eye was the same work-related injury or condition for which Avila received a 100 permanent impairment multiplier (PIM) scheduled injury award, the “loss of vision in left eye” component of the 29% whole body impairment must be subtracted from the award to determine Avila’s additional permanent impairment benefits. The ALJ concluded the additional injuries were not the same work-related injury or condition as the vision loss, and N.D.C.C. 65-05-12.2(11) was not applicable. Therefore, the ALJ determined Avila was entitled to both the scheduled impairment award for vision loss and the whole body impairment award for his additional injuries. The North Dakota Supreme Court found that because Avila had an injury set out in N.D.C.C. 65-05-12.2(11), he was entitled to the greater of the combined rating for all accepted impairments under the AMA Guides or the injury schedule. Here, N.D.C.C. 65-05-12.2(11) provided the greater PIM. Accordingly, WSI correctly determined Avila’s award. The ALJ judgment was not in accordance with the law. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded to the ALJ for further proceedings. View "WSI v. Avila, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant W. Clark Aposhian filed an interlocutory appeal of a district court’s denial of his motion for a preliminary injunction. The court concluded plaintiff did not show a likelihood of success on the merits of his challenge to a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) rule classifying bump stocks as machine guns under the National Firearms Act (NFA). Aposhian purchased a Slide Fire bump stock before the Final Rule was promulgated. He filed suit against various governmental officers and agencies challenging the Final Rule as unconstitutional and in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), arguing that the Final Rule contradicted an unambiguous statute, 26 U.S.C. 5845(b), and mistakenly extended its statutory definition of “machinegun” to cover bump stocks. The government argued the statute was unambiguous but that the Final Rule was merely interpretive and, as so, reflected the best interpretation of the statutory text. For its part, the district court did not specifically opine on whether the statute was ambiguous or not. The Tenth Circuit concurred plaintiff failed to demonstrate the threatened injury to him outweighed the harm that the preliminary injunction might cause to the government, or that the injunction would not adversely affect the public interest. Accordingly, denial of the injunction was affirmed. View "Aposhian v. Barr" on Justia Law

Christopher Denney, a firefighter, sued the city of Richland, Washington in 2017. He argued the city violated the Public Records Act by withholding two investigative complaints Denney made about on-the-job harassment and discrimination. In 2019, both Denney and the city filed cross motions for summary judgment. After a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment for the city and denied Denney’s motion, finding the requested records were properly exempted from disclosure as attorney work product. The city promptly filed its notice of presentation three days after the February 12, 2019 judgment. On March 14, 2019, the final judgment was entered against Denny, awarding taxable costs to the city for a total judgment of $200. Because Denney filed his appeal more than 30 days after the summary judgment order was issued, the Court of Appeals sua sponte set the matter for dismissal as untimely. Denney argued the 30-day limitation ran from the March 14 judgment; alternatively, he asked for an extension of time based on the extraordinary circumstance that the February 12 order was misleading. The Court of Appeals commissioner disagreed, noting that under RAP 2.2(a)(1), “[t]he language Mr. Denney quotes from the [trial court’s] Order was not misleading because it clearly refers to entry of a judgment in favor of the City, as the ‘prevailing party.’ The requested judgment is for a judgment that awards specific amounts as costs to the City.” The commissioner dismissed Denney’s appeal, which Denney then moved to modify. The Chief Judge denied the motion in part, upholding the commissioner’s ruling dismissing Denney’s appeal of the February 12 order and granting the motion as to the appeal of the March 14 final judgment on the “limited scope of the [$200] cost award.” Denney moved for discretionary review with the Washington Supreme Court, which found that a summary judgment order disposing of all claims can constitute a final judgment, thereby starting the 30-day appeal deadline. An appeal of a trial court decision on the merits brings along a subsequent cost award, but a timely appeal of a cost judgment does not bring along review on the merits. Here, the Court found the summary judgment order wholly resolved Denney’s suit on the merits and reserved a cost award for later determination, triggering the deadline. Denny filed his appeal more than 30 days after the summary judgment and dismissal order issue. However, because Denney’s misinterpretation of the RAPs was an excusable error, the Supreme Court held Denney’s case warranted an extension of time to appeal. The Court therefore reversed and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. View "Denney v. City of Richland" on Justia Law

Alton Johnson appealed a judgment denying his variance application. In the 1970s Johnson purchased land in Burlington, ND, and in 1973, opened an auto body shop. The auto body shop was zoned as a C-1 residential sometime after the shop was built. In 1989, a fire damaged the building. After building repairs in 1991, Johnson leased part of the property. Johnson began to use another location for his auto body business. In 2012, Johnson sold his business at the second location. Property owners neighboring the property raised concerns about the use of the property. In May 2013, the city attorney issued an opinion regarding the body shop, stating it “was a non-conforming use when the zoning ordinance was initially passed, so it was essentially ‘grandfathered in’” and when the auto body shop’s use was discontinued, and the current renters went into the building, the auto body shop was no longer “grandfathered in” and would need approval by the planning commission. Johnson operated the auto body shop at the location of the property at issue subsequent to the sale of the second location. In October 2013, Johnson moved for a temporary injunction and ex parte restraining order to allow him to continue to use his auto body shop, which was granted by the district court. In October 2016, Johnson requested a variance from the City. When it was denied, he appealed, arguing the City’s findings were arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, and not supported by substantial evidence. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded after review it was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable for the City to deny Johnson’s variance application and there was substantial evidence to support the City’s decision. Accordingly, the Court affirmed judgment. View "Johnson v. City of Burlington" on Justia Law

During former New Jersey Governor Christie’s 2013 reelection campaign, Fort Lee’s mayor refused to endorse Christie. Kelly, Christie's Deputy Chief of Staff, Port Authority Deputy Executive Director, Baroni, and another official decided to reduce from three to one the number of lanes reserved at the George Washington Bridge’s toll plaza for Fort Lee’s commuters. To disguise the political retribution, the lane realignment was said to be for a traffic study. Port Authority traffic engineers were asked to collect some numbers. An extra toll collector was paid overtime. The lane realignment caused four days of gridlock, ending only when the Port Authority’s Executive Director learned of the scheme. The Third Circuit affirmed the convictions of Baroni and Kelly for wire fraud, fraud on a federally funded program, and conspiracy to commit those crimes. The Supreme Court reversed. The scheme did not aim to obtain money or property. The wire fraud statute refers to “any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,” 18 U.S.C. 1343. The federal-program fraud statute bars “obtain[ing] by fraud” the “property” (including money) of a federally funded program or entity, section 666(a)(1)(A). The statutes are limited to the protection of property rights and do not authorize federal prosecutors to set standards of good government.The Court rejected arguments that the defendants sought to take control of the Bridge’s physical lanes or to deprive the Port Authority of the costs of compensating employees. Their realignment of the access lanes was an exercise of regulatory power; a scheme to alter a regulatory choice is not one to take government property. The time and labor of the employees were an incidental byproduct of that regulatory object. Neither defendant sought to obtain the services that the employees provided. View "Kelly v. United States" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the workers' compensation commission's award based on Va. Code 65.2-503 for Michael Richardson's loss of use before hip replacement surgery, holding that the court of appeals did not err in holding that, pursuant to the statute, loss of use is calculated before any surgery that improves functionality by use of a prosthetic device.Richardson sustained a work-related hip injury that would have deprived him of seventy-four percent of the normal use of his left leg if it remained untreated. Richardson's employer, however, paid for a total hip replacement that left Richardson with an eleven percent permanent loss of the use of his leg. Richardson filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits based on a seventy-four percent loss of use of his left leg. The Commission awarded Richardson permanent partial disability benefits reflecting a seventy-four percent loss-of-use rating. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that loss of use under section 65.2-503 is calculated before any surgery that improves functionality by use of a prosthetic device. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals' interpretation of the statute was reasonable. View "Loudoun County v. Richardson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court affirming the assessed value of Appellants' agricultural land by the Meade County Commission sitting as a board of equalization (the Board), holding that the circuit court did not err.Before the Board, Appellants argued that the director of equalization incorrectly applied statutory provisions to determine their land's production value. The Board further adjusted the assessment from an average of $519 per acre down to an average of $512 per acre. Appellants appealed the Board's decision to circuit court. After a trial de novo, the circuit court affirmed the Board's tax assessment of the property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err when it determined that (1) the Board complied with the statutory provisions for evaluating agricultural land in their assessment of Appellants' property; and (2) the Board's tax assessment of the property did not violate provisions of the South Dakota Constitution that require uniform taxation at no more than its actual value. View "Trask v. Meade County Commission" on Justia Law