Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit under the False Claims Act (FCA) and Georgia law, alleging that the county had engaged in a fraudulent scheme related to billing for ambulance services and had fired him in retaliation for his whistleblowing. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to the county on the FCA claim. The district court concluded that although plaintiff had engaged in "protected conduct" he had not created a genuine issue of material fact that he had been fired because of that conduct.The Eleventh Circuit held that the but-for causation standard applies to claims under the antiretaliation provision of the FCA just as it does to the antiretaliation provision of Title VII and the antidiscrimination provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The court declined to apply the motivating factor standard of causation to the FCA, explaining that it did not want to use legislative history to get around the plain meaning of a statute's text. In this case, plaintiff failed to show that the harm would not have occurred but for his protected conduct. View "Nesbitt v. Candler County, Georgia" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and the Association filed suit under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act against several Florida entities and officials, challenging defendants' failure to provide captioning for live and archived videos of Florida legislative proceedings.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling that Congress validly abrogated defendants' Eleventh Amendment immunity for the claims under Title II regardless of whether the right is "fundamental." The court agreed with the district court's holding that Congress validly abrogated defendants' Eleventh Amendment immunity because a fundamental right was at stake and, in the alternative, Congress validly abrogated defendants' Eleventh Amendment immunity even if a fundamental right was not at stake. Furthermore, Congress's identification of discrimination in public services and voting establishes the necessary history of discrimination for the rights implicated here: access to public legislative information relevant to voting, and Title II is an appropriate response to this history and pattern of unequal treatment.The court also affirmed the district court's holding that plaintiffs were entitled to pursue declaratory and injunctive relief against state officials under the doctrine of Ex parte Young for allegedly ongoing violations of Title II. Finally, the court held that the district court did not abuse is discretion in ordering discovery prior to resolving the question of sovereign immunity. View "National Association of the Deaf v. Florida" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court granting Plaintiff's petition for mandamus and ordering the City of Ottumwa to disclose names of all persons who had and had not been issued automated traffic enforcement (ATE) citations by the City after their vehicles were detected as speeding by an ATE camera, holding that the district court erred in ordering the production of records whose disclosure was prohibited by the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. 2721-2725, and a corresponding Iowa state law, Iowa Code 321.11.In denying the request for names, the City argued that the DPPA and section 321.11 prohibited disclosure of the requested information. The district court disagreed, concluding that the names of speed regulation violators was information on driving violations and therefore was not confidential information under the DPPA or section 321.11. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that where the personal identifying information sought by Petitioner came from a vehicle registration and driver's license database, its public disclosure was presumptively prohibited under the DPPA and section 321.11. View "Milligan v. Ottumwa Police Department" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) reversing the judgment of the compensation judge denying a qualified rehabilitation consultant's reimbursement claim for rehabilitation services provided during a period in which an employee was no longer suffering from a work-related injury, holding that the WCCA erred by imposing liability on the employer for rehabilitation services provided after the date that the employee's injury had resolved.In reversing the compensation judge, the WCCA concluded that the employer must pay for rehabilitation services until the employer filed a rehabilitation request for assistance. The Supreme Court reversed the WCCA's decision and reinstated the decision of the compensation judge, holding that the WCCA erred in concluding that the employer was required to show good cause to terminate the employee's rehabilitation services provided after the date that the employee's injury resolved. View "Ewing v. Print Craft, Inc." on Justia Law

GandyDancer, LLC, and Rock House CGM, LLC, were business competitors, and both provided railway construction and repair services to BNSF Railway Company. BNSF awarded contracts to Rock House to provide goods and services in New Mexico. GandyDancer filed a complaint with the New Mexico Construction Industries Division (CID) in 2015 that alleged Rock House violated the Construction Industries Licensing Act (CILA), by performing unlicensed construction work in New Mexico. GandyDancer thereafter filed a complaint in district court against Rock House, alleging theories of competitive injury, and including a claim that Rock House engaged in unfair methods of competition to obtain contracts with BNSF contrary to the UPA. GandyDancer alleged Rock House’s acts amounted to an “unfair or deceptive trade practice” under Section 57-12-2(D) of the New Mexico Unfair Practices Act (UPA). The district court certified for interlocutory review whether the UPA supported supports a cause of action for competitive injury. The Court of Appeals accepted interlocutory review and held that a business may sue for competitive injury based on a plain reading of the UPA. The New Mexico Supreme Court reversed, because the Legislature excluded competitive injury from the causes of action permitted under that statute. Furthermore, the Court observed that Gandydancer relied upon dicta in Page & Wirtz Construction Co. v. Soloman, 794 P.2d 349. Therefore, the Court formally disavowed reliance on Page & Wirtz or prior New Mexico case law that conflicted with its opinion here. View "GandyDancer, LLC v. Rock House CGM, LLC" on Justia Law

Following the death of Patricia Lewis (Worker), her widower Michael Lewis (Petitioner) was awarded death benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) based the award on the finding that Worker, while employed with Albuquerque Public Schools (Employer), contracted allergic bronchopulmonary aspergillosis (ABPA) which proximately resulted in Worker’s death. Employer appealed the award to the Court of Appeals. Pertinent here, the appellate court concluded: (1) the WCJ correctly rejected Employer’s argument that Petitioner’s claim for death benefits was time-barred; and (2) he WCJ erred in excluding from evidence certain medical testimony and records which Employer contended related to Worker’s cause of death. The Court of Appeals therefore remanded the case for retrial on whether Worker’s ABPA “‘proximately result[ed]’” in her death. On the first issue, the New Mexico Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that Petitioner’s claim for death benefits was not time-barred, and affirmed. On the second issue concerning the WCJ’s exclusion of medical testimony and evidence on Worker’s cause of death, the Supreme Court held the Court of Appeals erred in its interpretation of Section 52-1-51(C), but agreed based on the Supreme Court's own interpretation of Section 52-1-51(C) that the case had to be remanded for further proceedings. In all other respects, the opinion of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. View "Lewis v. Albuquerque Public Schools" on Justia Law

The Association filed suit challenging the National Park Service's authority to prohibit commercial herring fishing in the waters of the Golden Gate National Recreation Area in San Francisco Bay. In a prior appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the Association had failed to allege any final agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and directed the district court to dismiss the case. On remand, the district court allowed the Association to replead, but held that its proposed amendments still failed to allege final agency action.The panel held that the Association's proposed second amended complaint sufficiently alleged final agency action; the Park Service's in-water enforcement orders were final agency action that could be challenged in court; and the Park Service's contrary position that would require fishermen either to violate the law and risk serious punishment or engage in unnecessary further pleas before the agency would leave regulated parties facing stiff penalties without the judicial recourse that the APA enables. The panel held, however, that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to add a Declaratory Judgment Act count that the Association could have brought much earlier. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "San Francisco Herring Assoc. v. U.S. Department of the Interior" on Justia Law

Among its reforms, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) required private health insurers to provide coverage for individuals regardless of their gender or health status, including preexisting conditions. Congress anticipated these reforms might hamper the ability of insurers to predict health care costs and to price health insurance premiums as more individuals sought health insurance. To spread the risk of enrolling people who might need more health care than others, Congress established a risk adjustment program for the individual and small group health insurance markets. Congress tasked the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) with designing and implementing this risk adjustment program with the states. HHS developed a formula to calculate how much each insurer would be charged or paid in each state. The formula relied on the “statewide average premium” to calculate charges and payments. Plaintiff-Appellee New Mexico Health Connections (“NMHC”), an insurer that was required to pay charges under the program, sued the HHS Defendants-Appellants under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), alleging that HHS’s use of the statewide average premium to calculate charges and payments in New Mexico from 2014 through 2018 was arbitrary and capricious. The district court granted summary judgment to NMHC, holding that HHS violated the APA by failing to explain why the agency chose to use the statewide average premium in its program. It remanded to the agency and vacated the 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018 rules that implemented the program. After the district court denied HHS’s motion to alter or amend judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), HHS appealed. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals: (1) determined NMHC’s claims regarding the 2017 and 2018 rules were moot, so the matter was remanded to the district court to vacate its judgment on those claims and dismiss them as moot; (2) reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to NMHC as to the 2014, 2015, and 2016 rules because it determined HHS acted reasonably in explaining why it used the statewide average premium in the formula. Because the Court reversed the district court on its summary judgment ruling in favor of NMHC, it did not address the denial of HHS’s Rule 59(e) motion. View "New Mexico Health Connections v. HHS" on Justia Law

ICP filed suit against Treasury and OCC, alleging claims under Section 3608 of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and the Fifth Amendment. ICP alleged that defendants failed to regulate the federal Low-Income Housing Tax Credit program so as to promote fair housing. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants on three grounds.The court held that ICP lacked standing to sue either OCC or Treasury, because ICP could not establish causation or redressability. In this case, neither defendant regulates ICP. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to ICP's claims against OCC and Section 3608 claims against Treasury. Because the district court reached the merits of ICP's Fifth Amendment claim against Treasury, the court vacated the summary judgment and rendered a judgment of dismissal for want of jurisdiction. View "Inclusive Communities Project v. Department of Treasury" on Justia Law

CBD filed suit seeking to compel the Department of the Interior to reinstate the Refuges Rule that prevented Alaska from applying certain state hunting regulations on federal wildlife refuges. In 2017, Congress used the Congressional Review Act (CRA) to order Interior to rescind the regulation.The Ninth Circuit held that CBD lacked standing to challenge the Reenactment Provision, because it failed to allege an injury in fact that was more than speculative. Therefore, the panel dismissed CBD's argument that the Reenactment Clause violated the nondelegation doctrine.After determining that the Jurisdiction-Stripping Provision of the CRA did not include any explicit language barring judicial review of constitutional claims, the panel held that the Joint Resolution disapproving the Refuges Rule did not violate the Take Care Clause of the Constitution, and thus CBD's complaint failed to state a claim that was plausible on its face. The panel rejected CBD's argument that the CRA and Joint Resolution violated separation-of-powers principles because they interfere with the Executive Branch's duty under the Take Care Clause. The panel held that, because Congress properly enacted the Joint Resolution, and therefore validly amended Interior's authority to administer national wildlife refuges in Alaska, Congress did not prevent the President from exercising his constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws.The panel joined other circuits in holding that federal courts do not have jurisdiction over statutory claims that arise under the CRA. In this case, CBD challenged Interior's rescission of the Refuges Rule solely on the ground that Congress did not validly enact the Joint Resolution. Therefore, the panel held that CBD's claim necessarily involved a challenge to a congressional "determination, finding, action or omission" under the CRA, and was therefore subject to the Jurisdiction-Stripping Provision. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. Bernhardt" on Justia Law