Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Maine Secretary of State Matthew Dunlap filed suit seeking access to documents from the Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity. The DC Circuit held that, because the emails at issue were neither "similar" to the "examples" of covered documents listed in the December 2017 injunction opinion, nor "substantive disclosures" within the plain meaning of that opinion, they were not among the disclosure obligations imposed by that injunction. Therefore, the court held that the January 2019 order that required their release changed the legal relationship between the parties and hence was immediately appealable.On the merits, the court held that Secretary Dunlap could not clearly and indisputably show that the emails he sought fell within the work of the Commission, and thus the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain his request for their disclosure. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's January 28, 2019 order insofar as it required the release of such emails. View "Dunlap v. Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity" on Justia Law

Virginia power wholesalers who buy electricity from Dominion challenged the Commission's conclusion that Dominion's Virginia customers, but not its North Carolina customers, should bear the costs of undergrounding new transmission wires.The DC Circuit denied the petitions for review and rejected petitioners' claim that the Commission did not properly invoke its power under section 206 of the Federal Power Act; held that petitioners were provided adequate notice of the Commission's intent to modify Dominion's filed rate; and held that the ALJ did not misinterpret a Commission order and thereby improperly cabined the scope of an evidentiary hearing. Finally, the court rejected petitioners' claim that the Commission acted arbitrarily by requiring Dominion's Virginia customers to bear the costs of undergrounding. View "Northern Virginia Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. FERC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), seeking information related to the FBI's thoughts about and possible uses of mosaic theory in its handling of FOIA cases. The DC Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the FBI, holding that the FBI failed to sufficiently explain its determinations.The court held that the FBI's affidavit did not explain how the agency concluded that the files preliminarily listed as responsive did not relate to the request; the affidavit said nothing—at least nothing clear—about the files whose numbers were redacted, though it identifies each numbered file as either non-responsive or destroyed; and the affidavit did not explain why or how the FBI knew that certain files had been destroyed. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's decision in part and remanded for further proceedings. View "Shapiro v. Department of Justice" on Justia Law

Cares filed suit claiming that defendants unlawfully allowed an insurer offering Medicare prescription drug coverage, Humana, to pay Cares less for drugs that Cares obtains at a discount under a separate federal program known as Section 340B, than Humana would reimburse a non-Federally Qualified Health Center (FQHC) for the same drugs.The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Cares' claim, holding that the Medicare statute does not preclude HHS from approving prescription drug plans that lower reimbursements for FQHC pharmacy services based on whether the FQHC obtained the pharmaceuticals at a discount under Section 340B. The court need not and did not decide whether the statute permits the contrary interpretation Cares advances or whether, as a matter of policy, HHS might promulgate regulations requiring Medicare prescription drug plans to include a "not less than" term in their agreements with FQHCs to secure to FQHCs broader financial benefits from 340B drug discounts. View "Cares Community Health v. Department of Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

The County and other parties filed a complaint in the district court claiming that DOT exceeded its authority under 26 U.S.C. 142(m)(1)(A) when it allocated $1.15 billion in Private Activity Bond (PABs) to fund Phase II of the AAF Project. The complaint also alleged that the allocation violated 26 U.S.C. 147(f), and challenged the adequacy of the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) prepared by the FRA under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that the County's interest were within the zone of interests protected by section 142 and thus the complaint raised claims that were cognizable under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). However, the court held that DOT permissibly and reasonably determined that the Project qualified for tax-exempt PAB financing under section 142(m), and that the EIS for the Project did not violate NEPA. View "Indian River County v. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

The 1986 Bay Area County Traffic and Transportation Funding Act (Pub. Util. Code 131000) established a framework for counties and cities within the nine-county San Francisco Bay area to collectively develop and implement traffic and transportation projects and authorized the voters in those counties to create a county transportation authority to implement a retail transactions and use tax for funding a local transportation plan. San Francisco voters approved the creation of the San Francisco County Transportation Authority (SFCTA). Urban submitted public records requests to the SFCTA under the California Public Records Act (Gov. Code 6250) and the Sunshine Ordinance. SFCTA claimed it was not subject to the Sunshine Ordinance. Urban filed suit. After the parties resolved the outstanding records request issue, the trial court concluded the request for declaratory relief was not moot “due to the SFCTA’s position that it is not subject to the Sunshine Ordinance, which is sufficient to establish an actual controversy” then concluded the SFCTA is a state agency, exempt from the Ordinance. The court of appeal affirmed. Local public agencies are distinct from the cities and counties they serve. While the SFCTA may be classified as a local agency based on the scope of its functions, it remains an agency of the state. The Sunshine Ordinance indicates that it is limited to city agencies. View "SF Urban Forest Coalition v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

The City of Desert Hot Springs (the City) tried to abate a public nuisance by serving the owner of a dilapidated hotel/motel with notice that it was required to correct numerous building and safety violations. When the owner failed to timely correct the violations or apply for a permit to raze the building, the City sought a declaration that the building constituted a nuisance and, pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 17980.7(c), requested the appointment of a receiver to oversee the building’s rehabilitation. Instead of addressing the notice and opportunity given to the owner of the hotel/motel and the proposed receiver’s qualifications, the trial court here questioned the viability of the proposed receiver’s financial and construction plan. And, having concluded the plan made no economic sense because the value of the property after its rehabilitation would not exceed the costs of rehabilitation plus the additional costs associated with appointment of a receiver, the court denied the City’s request and subsequently dismissed the action. The Court of Appeal concurred with the City which argued the court exceeded its authority under section 17980.7(c). Therefore, judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for the trial court to reconsider the City’s request for appointment of a receiver. View "City of Desert Hot Springs v. Valenti" on Justia Law

Former psychologist at Ironwood State Prison (Ironwood), John Doe, sued his former employer, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) alleging discrimination, retaliation, and harassment based on disability. Doe also alleged CDCR violated FEHA by failing to accommodate his two disabilities, asthma and dyslexia, by relocating him to a cleaner and quieter office and providing him with requested computer equipment. Finding no triable issues of material fact, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of CDCR. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Doe v. Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the "methods and means" that the Census Bureau has adopted for the 2020 Census, and the contention that the 2020 Census will produce an even greater differential undercount. Plaintiffs represent hard-to-count communities that historically have suffered the greatest harms from differential undercounts, and that directly will lose federal funding if the differential undercount increases in 2020. The district court dismissed plaintiffs' claims under the Enumeration Clause and the Administrative Procedures Act (APA).The Fourth Circuit affirmed in part, holding that plaintiffs' APA claims, as pleaded, did not satisfy the jurisdictional limitations on judicial review set forth in the APA. However, mindful of the Supreme Court's recent guidance affirming judicial review of "both constitutional and statutory challenges to census-related decision-making," Dep't of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2568 (2019), the court held that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' Enumeration Clause claims as unripe, and in precluding plaintiffs from filing an amended complaint regarding those claims after defendants' plans for the 2020 Census became final. Therefore, the court reversed in part and remanded to allow plaintiffs to file an amended complaint setting forth their Enumeration Clause claims. View "NAACP v. Bureau of the Census" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the circuit court affirming the decision of the administrative law judge (ALJ) concluding that an officer did not have reasonable grounds to believe that Respondent was driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle while impaired, holding that the ALJ erred in imposing his credibility determinations and inferences to make the legal determination at issue.Following a traffic infraction, the officer in this case approached the vehicle, observed Respondent sitting in the driver's seat, and smelled alcohol on her breath and person. The officer requested that Respondent take an alcohol concentration test. Respondent refused to submit to the breath test, and the officers confiscated her driver's license. The ALJ took "no action" on the order of suspension, and Respondent's driving privileges were reinstated. The circuit court affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the detaining officer had reasonable grounds to suspect Respondent was driving or attempting to drive while impaired or under the influence of alcohol. View "Motor Vehicle Administration v. Medvedeff" on Justia Law