Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves the City of Jackson, Mississippi's water-related utilities, which faced significant failures. The United States and the State of Mississippi brought enforcement actions under the Clean Water Act (CWA) and the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) against the City for violations, including allowing raw sewage to be discharged into waterways and failing to comply with the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) orders. The district court appointed a federal receiver, Edward Henefin, as interim third-party manager (ITPM) to manage the City's water and sewer systems. Henefin, operating through JXN Water, Inc., developed new utility rates, including a discount for residents receiving Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi ruled that the ITPM's rate-setting activities constituted a federal assistance program under the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 (FNA), thereby allowing access to SNAP recipient data. The United States and Mississippi opposed this, arguing that such disclosure violated the FNA's privacy protections for SNAP recipients.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the ITPM's rate-setting activities did not qualify as a federal assistance program under the FNA. The court emphasized that the term "federal assistance program" implies administration by a federal entity, and the ITPM's authority derived from municipal law, not federal law. The court also noted that the statutory history and context supported a narrow interpretation of "federal assistance program." Consequently, the court reversed the district court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Mississippi v. JXN Water" on Justia Law

In 2021, the Napa Foundation for Options in Education (Napa Foundation) filed a petition with the Napa Valley Unified School District (School District) to establish the Mayacamas Charter Middle School. The School District Board of Education denied the petition, and the Napa Foundation then submitted the petition to the Napa County Board of Education (County Board), which also denied it. The Napa Foundation appealed to the State Board of Education (State Board), which reversed the denials. The School District and the California School Boards Association’s Educational Legal Alliance (Educational Legal Alliance) filed petitions for writs of mandate to set aside the State Board’s decision.The trial court granted the writ petitions, finding that the State Board abused its discretion. The court concluded that the District Board did not provide a fair and impartial hearing process and that the County Board’s decision was supported by substantial evidence, including the fiscal impact of the proposed charter school on the School District.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the State Board’s determination that the District Board failed to provide a fair and impartial hearing was not supported by substantial evidence. The court also found that the County Board’s written factual findings, which detailed the negative fiscal impact of the proposed charter school, were supported by substantial evidence. The court concluded that the State Board’s decision to reverse the County Board’s denial was arbitrary, capricious, and entirely lacking in evidentiary support.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgments, upholding the denials of the charter school petition by the District Board and the County Board. The court emphasized that the State Board failed to properly apply the abuse of discretion standard in its review of the lower boards’ decisions. View "Napa Valley Unified School Dist. v. State Bd. of Education" on Justia Law

The case involves a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by the Oregon State Building and Construction Trades Council (OBTC) against a preliminary injunction issued by the Marion County Circuit Court. The injunction was part of a public contracting dispute between the Oregon-Columbia Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of America (AGC) and the Oregon Department of Transportation (ODOT). AGC challenged the process used by ODOT to set the terms of "community benefit contracts" for certain highway improvement projects under ORS 279C.308.The Marion County Circuit Court issued a preliminary injunction preventing ODOT from using the terms of a Community Workforce Agreement (CWA) in any projects while AGC's challenge to the validity of the CWA under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) was pending before the Oregon Court of Appeals. AGC had filed three cases: one in the circuit court and two petitions for judicial review in the Court of Appeals. The circuit court case sought declaratory relief and an injunction against ODOT's use of the CWA. The Court of Appeals certified the case challenging the CWA's validity to the Oregon Supreme Court, which accepted the certification.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and decided the challenge to the validity of the CWA in a related case, Oregon-Columbia Chapter of AGC v. ODOT. As a result, the preliminary injunction issued by the circuit court expired, rendering OBTC's request for mandamus relief moot. Consequently, the Oregon Supreme Court dismissed the petition for a writ of mandamus. View "Oregon-Columbia Chapter Associated General Contractors of America v. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

The Oregon Department of Transportation (ODOT) established terms for "community benefit contracts" for certain highway improvement projects, which included provisions for contractor training, use of apprentices, and employer-paid family health insurance. ODOT negotiated and signed a "Community Workforce Agreement" (CWA) with various trades councils and labor unions to include these terms in its contracts.The Oregon-Columbia Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of America (AGC) challenged the validity of the CWA in the Court of Appeals, arguing that it constituted a "rule" under Oregon's Administrative Procedures Act (APA) and that ODOT was required to follow the APA's notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures before adopting it. ODOT acknowledged it did not follow these procedures but contended that the CWA was not a "rule." The Court of Appeals certified the case to the Oregon Supreme Court.The Oregon Supreme Court held that the CWA is a "rule" under the APA because it is a statement of general applicability that prescribes ODOT's policies for its community benefit program. The court noted that the CWA applies to all current and future ODOT community benefit projects, making it generally applicable. The court concluded that ODOT was required to follow the APA's notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures before adopting the CWA. As ODOT did not comply with these procedures, the court declared the CWA invalid as an invalidly promulgated rule. View "Oregon-Columbia Chapter Associated General Contractors of America v. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

Kingfish Maine, Inc. sought permits from the Department of Environmental Protection to construct and operate a land-based aquaculture facility in Jonesport, Maine. The project included two primary buildings, access roads, ancillary buildings, and intake and outfall pipes for water from Chandler Bay. The Department issued a wastewater discharge permit and a combined Site Law and Natural Resources Protection Act (NRPA) permit for the project.The Superior Court (Kennebec County) affirmed the Board of Environmental Protection’s decision to uphold the Department’s issuance of the permits. Petitioners, Eastern Maine Conservation Initiative and Roque Island Gardner Homestead Corporation, argued that the Board erred in its scope of review under NRPA and failed to independently evaluate the environmental impacts of the wastewater discharge.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and held that the Board did not err in its interpretation of NRPA’s scope. The Court found that NRPA’s review is limited to specific activities listed in 38 M.R.S. § 480-C(2), which do not include the discharge of treated wastewater. The Court also held that the Board did not abuse its discretion by relying on the previously issued discharge permit, as the Department had already evaluated the environmental impacts of the discharge, including its effects on wildlife and water quality, during the discharge permit process.The Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court, concluding that the Board’s reliance on the discharge permit was reasonable and that the Board was not required to conduct a separate analysis of the wastewater discharge’s impact under NRPA. View "Eastern Maine Conservation Initiative v. Board of Environmental Protection" on Justia Law

Jeremy Kennedy filed a petition to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) to seek a declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus regarding a decision by the Arkansas Post-Prison Transfer Board (Board). The Board had denied his request for transfer to the Arkansas Division of Community Correction (DCC) and his subsequent request for a six-month reconsideration hearing. Kennedy argued that he was eligible for transfer under Arkansas law and that the Board acted outside its statutory authority by denying his transfer eligibility.The Izard County Circuit Court denied Kennedy’s IFP petition, finding that his claim was a duplicate of a previous lawsuit (case number 33CV-23-123) that was on appeal and another case (33CV-23-57) that he had voluntarily dismissed. The circuit court concluded that Kennedy’s petition did not state a colorable cause of action.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court’s decision. The court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kennedy’s IFP petition. The Supreme Court found that Kennedy’s latest filing did not present a legitimate claim that could be reasonably asserted based on the facts and current law. Therefore, the denial of Kennedy’s IFP petition was upheld. View "Kennedy v. Felts" on Justia Law

Adam Schulze, a retired firefighter from the City of Newburgh, was injured on the job in 2012 and classified as permanently partially disabled in 2015. He received full salary payments from the City under General Municipal Law § 207-a (1) and workers' compensation benefits until December 2015. In 2016, Schulze was approved for performance of duty (POD) retirement, entitling him to a 50% pension and supplemental payments from the City under General Municipal Law § 207-a (2).A Workers' Compensation Law Judge (WCLJ) awarded Schulze workers' compensation payments for periods before and after his retirement. The City sought reimbursement from these payments for its prior payments under General Municipal Law § 207-a (1) and (2). The WCLJ granted reimbursement for the period before Schulze's retirement but denied it for the period after. The Workers' Compensation Board upheld this decision, and the Appellate Division affirmed, citing Matter of Harzinski v Village of Endicott, which held that General Municipal Law § 207-a (2) payments are not "wages" under Workers' Compensation Law §§ 25 (4) (a) and 30 (2).The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. The court held that neither Workers' Compensation Law § 25 (4) (a) nor § 30 (2) entitles the City to reimbursement from workers' compensation awards for payments made under General Municipal Law § 207-a (2). The court emphasized that General Municipal Law § 207-a (2) payments are pension supplements, not wages, and that the statutory scheme requires the City to reduce its payments by the amount of workers' compensation benefits, not to seek direct reimbursement. The court concluded that the City is not entitled to reimbursement directly from Schulze's workers' compensation award for its prior payments. View "Matter of Schulze v City of Newburgh Fire Dept." on Justia Law

Workforce Safety and Insurance (WSI) issued a notice ending benefits for Russell C. Jones, who had been receiving them due to a work-related injury in Mountrail County. The matter proceeded to a telephonic hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ) with participants in different locations: the ALJ in Minnesota, Jones in Wisconsin, Jones’s attorney in Bismarck, and WSI’s attorney in Fargo. The ALJ left the record open for a physician to provide deposition testimony from Bismarck and ultimately reversed WSI’s decision. WSI then filed a notice of appeal with the district court in Burleigh County.The district court in Burleigh County dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, agreeing with Jones’s argument that the court lacked jurisdiction because he did not reside there and his injury did not occur there. WSI appealed this dismissal.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case and determined that the district court in Burleigh County had jurisdiction under the default rules set out by the Administrative Agencies Practice Act, N.D.C.C. ch. 28-32. The court found that since part of the administrative hearing was held in Bismarck, the district court in Burleigh County was an appropriate venue for the appeal. The court concluded that Title 65 of the North Dakota Century Code did not specify where WSI must appeal, and thus the default provisions of N.D.C.C. ch. 28-32 applied. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Workforce Safety and Insurance v. Jones" on Justia Law

Two elderly individuals, Ms. Penelope Lamle and Ms. Maxine Houston, applied for Medicaid but faced delays and additional questions from the Oklahoma Department of Human Services, allegedly directed by attorney Susan Eads. They refused to answer these questions and subsequently sued, seeking an expedited decision, payment of Medicaid benefits, and damages. Both applicants died during the litigation, and their estates were substituted as parties in the appeal.The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma dismissed the action with prejudice, citing the plaintiffs' failure to state a valid claim. However, the court was unaware that the applicants had died while the action was pending.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the claims for an injunction became moot when the agency denied benefits and the applicants died. The court noted that the requested relief would no longer benefit the estates, as the Oklahoma Department of Human Services had already denied the applications. The court also held that the Eleventh Amendment barred the requested retrospective relief. Consequently, the court remanded the case to the district court with instructions to vacate the judgment on the claim for a prospective injunction and dismiss it without prejudice.Regarding the claim against Ms. Eads in her individual capacity, the Tenth Circuit held that she was entitled to qualified immunity. The court found that the plaintiffs did not allege facts showing the violation of a clearly established right. As a result, the court affirmed the dismissal with prejudice of the claim for damages against Ms. Eads. View "Lamle v. Eads" on Justia Law

In 2019, the Rhode Island Department of Corrections (DOC) implemented changes to its Absenteeism Management Program (AMP), citing abuse of the existing sick-time policy. The changes included new discipline tracks, sanctions for absenteeism, stricter sick note requirements, and closer scrutiny of pattern sick time use. The Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers (RIBCO) requested bargaining over these changes, which the DOC refused, leading RIBCO to file an unfair labor practice charge.The Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board (SLRB) found that the DOC had committed an unfair labor practice by making substantial changes to working conditions without bargaining. The board rejected the DOC's defenses, including the argument that the changes were within the director’s statutory authority and the management-rights clause of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA).The DOC appealed to the Superior Court, which reversed the SLRB's decision. The Superior Court found that the board's decision was not supported by substantial evidence and that the changes were within the DOC director’s statutory authority under Rhode Island law.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. The Court held that the SLRB's decision was not supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence. It also agreed that the changes to the AMP were within the DOC director’s statutory authority under sections 42-56-10(2), (5), and (7) of the Rhode Island General Laws, which grant the director broad discretion in managing the department, maintaining safety and order, and disciplining employees. Thus, the DOC was not obligated to bargain over the AMP changes. View "State of Rhode Island v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law