Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Coastal Environmental Rights Foundation (CERF) sued Naples Restaurant Group, LLC, and its owner over the restaurant’s annual Fourth of July fireworks show at Alamitos Bay in Los Angeles, alleging violations of the Clean Water Act (CWA) due to fireworks discharges into the water without a permit. The district court found that one firework malfunctioned and fell into the water, but this single incident was insufficient to establish a continuing violation of the CWA. Consequently, the district court dismissed CERF’s claim without prejudice.After the district court’s decision, the Los Angeles Regional Water Quality Control Board began issuing a general National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit for public fireworks displays over Los Angeles waters. Naples applied for and received this permit, which authorized the discharges that CERF had challenged.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that it was constitutionally moot. The court held that the issuance of the NPDES permit made it absolutely clear that the alleged CWA violations could not reasonably be expected to recur, as Naples now had a permit authorizing the discharges. Therefore, CERF’s claims for declarative and injunctive relief were moot. The court also held that the same mootness standard applied to CERF’s claim for civil penalties, following the precedent set by the Supreme Court in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc. Finally, the court concluded that CERF’s claim for attorneys’ fees was also moot.The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss it as moot. View "COASTAL ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS FOUNDATION V. NAPLES RESTAURANT GROUP, LLC" on Justia Law

The City of Shelby operates a municipal water system in Toole County, Montana, supplying water to several service areas. In 2017, the Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC) approved changes allowing Shelby to temporarily service these areas. In 2019, Shelby applied to expand its service area and increase groundwater production. DNRC issued preliminary approvals for these applications in 2020, which the Town of Kevin objected to, leading to a hearing examiner's review.The hearing examiner denied Kevin's motion for summary judgment and later approved Shelby's applications, concluding that Shelby met the statutory criteria based on service agreements with communities in its service area. Kevin then petitioned the Montana Water Court for judicial review, arguing that DNRC misinterpreted the law and that Shelby's applications did not meet statutory requirements. The Water Court denied Kevin's petition, affirming DNRC's decisions.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case, focusing on whether DNRC erred in approving Shelby's permit and change of use applications. The court found that DNRC's interpretation of the law, which allowed service agreements to satisfy the statutory requirement for written consent, was reasonable. However, the court noted that the record lacked evidence of a service agreement with Galata, one of the proposed new service areas. Consequently, the court affirmed DNRC's decision in part but reversed it regarding the inclusion of Galata.The court remanded the case to DNRC to determine whether all required service agreements exist and to issue an order consistent with this opinion. The main holding was that DNRC's interpretation of the statutory criteria was correct, except for the missing service agreement with Galata. View "Town of Kevin v. Department of Natural Resources and Conservation" on Justia Law

Kavonte Amarion Vaughn sought a writ of mandate to vacate an order denying his request for mental health diversion under California Penal Code sections 1001.35 and 1001.36. Vaughn was charged with two counts of second-degree robbery and one count of second-degree attempted robbery. The trial court found that Vaughn met the eligibility and suitability requirements for mental health diversion, including that he would not pose an unreasonable risk to public safety. However, the court denied the diversion, citing Vaughn's failure to make a "serious enough effort" to be deemed suitable for mental health diversion.The Los Angeles County Superior Court initially reviewed the case. Vaughn posted bail and underwent a psychological evaluation, which confirmed his mental health issues, including schizoaffective disorder and PTSD. Despite the trial court's acknowledgment of Vaughn's eligibility, it denied the motion for diversion, focusing on Vaughn's perceived lack of seriousness about his mental health treatment, particularly his failure to bring his medication bottles to the evaluation.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court abused its discretion by not considering the legislative goals of the mental health diversion law. The appellate court noted that Vaughn had made a prima facie showing of eligibility and suitability for diversion and that the trial court's decision was not supported by substantial evidence. The appellate court emphasized that the trial court's discretion must align with the legislative intent to broadly apply mental health diversion to reduce recidivism and support public safety.The appellate court granted Vaughn's petition, directing the trial court to vacate its order denying mental health diversion and to grant the motion, barring any evidence of changed circumstances affecting Vaughn's suitability. The trial court must ensure that the recommended mental health treatment program meets Vaughn's specialized needs. View "Vaughn v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

A nonprofit association of homeowners in Woodbridge appealed a decision by the Connecticut Siting Council, which approved a telecommunications company's application to construct a cell phone tower in the town. The plaintiff intervened in the administrative proceeding, arguing that the proposed tower would unreasonably impact nearby scenic resources and vistas. During the hearings, the council stated that property values were not among the statutory criteria to be considered. The telecommunications company presented evidence that the tower would improve cell coverage, while the plaintiff's consultant argued that alternative locations would provide better coverage with less impact on residential neighborhoods.The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's administrative appeal, concluding that the council's decision was supported by substantial evidence and was reasonable. The court noted that the council had considered evidence from residents about the tower's impact on property values and had sufficiently considered alternative locations but found the approved site to be the most appropriate.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the plaintiff had standing to raise the claim about property values. However, the court concluded that a facility's impact on property values is not an enumerated or unenumerated significant adverse effect that the council must consider under the statute. The court also found that the council's decision was supported by substantial evidence, including extensive testimony and documentary evidence about the coverage provided by the proposed and alternative locations. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment, upholding the council's approval of the tower. View "Woodbridge Newton Neighborhood Environmental Trust v. Connecticut Siting Council" on Justia Law

Robert Turner, a property owner in Suwannee County, Florida, claimed that his homestead property was sold at an impermissibly low amount under Florida law, which deprived him of any surplus after back taxes and costs were deducted. Turner had a homestead exemption on his property, which was automatically renewed until 2015. After failing to pay property taxes, a tax certificate was issued, and a tax deed sale was conducted in 2015. Turner alleged that the sale was unlawful because it did not account for the homestead exemption, and he did not receive proper notice of the sale.Turner initially sought relief in state court, challenging the removal of his homestead exemption, but his complaint was dismissed as untimely. He then filed a federal lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming violations of his constitutional rights, including First Amendment retaliation, Fourth Amendment illegal seizure, and due process violations. The federal district court dismissed his complaint, finding that abstention was warranted under the comity doctrine, which prevents federal courts from interfering with state tax administration when state remedies are adequate.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court's decision. The court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the relief Turner sought would disrupt Florida's administration of its ad valorem property tax scheme. The court found that Florida provided plain, adequate, and complete state remedies, including the ability to challenge tax deed sales and homestead exemption removals in state court. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in abstaining from exercising jurisdiction under the comity doctrine. View "Turner v. Jordan" on Justia Law

Mark Glen Spencer died from sepsis two days after a surgical procedure performed by Dr. Lana Nelson at Norman Regional Medical Authority. Spencer's brother, Jimmy Wayne Spencer, acting as the Special Administrator of the estate, filed a wrongful death action against the hospital and Dr. Nelson, alleging negligent and grossly negligent treatment. The hospital delayed providing complete medical records, which were essential for evaluating the claim.The District Court dismissed the case, finding that the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the potential claim before the statutory deadline and that Dr. Nelson, as a hospital employee, was immune from individual liability under the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act (GTCA). The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the dismissal, holding that the discovery rule did not apply to wrongful death claims under the GTCA and that Dr. Nelson could not be individually sued for actions within the scope of her employment.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case and vacated the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion. The Supreme Court held that the discovery rule applies to wrongful death actions arising from medical negligence under the GTCA. It also ruled that governmental employees have no immunity under the GTCA for gross negligence or acts outside the scope of employment. The court found that the trial court erred in making factual determinations on a motion to dismiss and that it should have taken the plaintiff's allegations as true. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these findings. View "SPENCER v. NELSON" on Justia Law

A proposed constitutional amendment in Ohio seeks to repeal Articles XI and XIX of the Ohio Constitution and add Article XX, changing the standards and procedures for drawing electoral districts. The amendment would create a 15-member redistricting commission responsible for adopting redistricting plans. Citizens Not Politicians, a coalition aiming to end gerrymandering, and other relators challenged the ballot language and title adopted by the Ohio Ballot Board and Secretary of State Frank LaRose, arguing they were misleading.The Ohio Ballot Board approved the ballot language by a three-to-two vote. Relators filed for a writ of mandamus to compel the board to adopt new language and title. The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case, focusing on whether the ballot language and title would mislead, deceive, or defraud voters. The court found that sections five and eight of the ballot language were misleading. Section five inaccurately limited judicial review to a "proportionality standard," and section eight failed to mention the public's right to participate in the redistricting process through public meetings and hearings.The Supreme Court of Ohio granted a limited writ of mandamus, ordering the Ohio Ballot Board and Secretary of State to reconvene and adopt revised ballot language addressing these defects. The court denied the writ in all other respects, finding the remaining sections of the ballot language and the ballot title to be factually accurate and not misleading. The motion for leave to withdraw the answer was granted, and the motion to strike was denied as moot. View "State ex rel. Citizens Not Politicians v. Ohio Ballot Bd." on Justia Law

Carl McDaniel, a Wisconsin prisoner with multiple serious medical conditions, sued the Wisconsin Department of Corrections under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, claiming the Department violated his rights by denying him a cell in a no-stairs unit, a single-occupancy cell, and a bed without a top bunk. He also brought an Eighth Amendment claim against Dr. Salam Syed, alleging deliberate indifference to his medical needs. The district court granted summary judgment for the Department on all claims and for Dr. Syed on the Eighth Amendment claim. McDaniel appealed.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin initially handled the case. McDaniel, representing himself, submitted evidence that he missed approximately 600 meals in one year due to the pain and difficulty of navigating stairs to access meals and medications. The district court, however, largely discounted McDaniel’s factual statements and granted summary judgment for the defendants, concluding that McDaniel’s cell assignment was reasonable and that his medical treatment did not violate the Eighth Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the summary judgment for the Department on the claims for a single-occupancy cell and no top bunk, as well as the Eighth Amendment claim against Dr. Syed. However, it reversed the summary judgment on the refusal to assign McDaniel to a no-stairs unit. The court found that McDaniel presented sufficient evidence that the denial of a no-stairs unit effectively denied him access to meals and medications, which could be seen as an intentional violation of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. The court also held that McDaniel’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims for compensatory damages survived his release from prison and his death.The Seventh Circuit concluded that a reasonable jury could find that the denial of a no-stairs unit amounted to an intentional violation of McDaniel’s rights under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, and that the Department was not entitled to sovereign immunity. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "McDaniel v. Syed" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge by local governments and municipal organizations to the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) 2020 Ruling, which interprets and clarifies existing legislative rules from the 2014 Order. These rules implement section 6409(a) of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, requiring state and local governments to approve certain wireless network modifications that do not substantially change existing facilities.The petitioners challenged several provisions of the FCC’s 2020 Ruling: the Shot Clock Rule, the Separation Clause, the Equipment Cabinet Provision Clarification, the Concealment and Siting Approval Conditions Provisions, and the Express Evidence Requirement. They argued that these clarifications were either arbitrary and capricious or improperly issued without following the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) notice-and-comment procedures.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the 2020 Ruling’s clarifications of the Shot Clock Rule, the Separation Clause, and the Equipment Cabinet Provision were consistent with the 2014 Order, were interpretive rules, and were not arbitrary or capricious. Therefore, the court denied the petition for review regarding these provisions.However, the court found that the 2020 Ruling’s clarifications of the Concealment and Siting Approval Conditions Provisions were inconsistent with the 2014 Order, making them legislative rules. The FCC’s failure to follow the APA’s procedural requirements in issuing these legislative rules was not harmless. Consequently, the court granted the petition for review concerning these provisions.Finally, the court denied the petition for review regarding the Express Evidence Requirement, concluding that its application would not have a retroactive effect. The court’s decision was to grant the petition in part and deny it in part, affirming some of the FCC’s clarifications while invalidating others. View "League of California Cities v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law

Elizabeth Holt, a former insurance agent for Medicare Medicaid Advisors, Inc. (MMA), alleged that MMA and several insurance carriers (Aetna, Humana, and UnitedHealthcare) violated the False Claims Act (FCA). Holt claimed that MMA engaged in fraudulent practices, including falsifying agent certifications and violating Medicare marketing regulations, which led to the submission of false claims to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri dismissed Holt's complaint. The court found that no claims were submitted to the government, the alleged regulatory violations were not material to CMS’s contract with the carriers, and the complaint did not meet the particularity standard required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). The court also denied Holt's motion for reconsideration, which introduced a fraudulent inducement theory and requested leave to amend the complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal, agreeing that Holt's allegations did not meet the materiality requirement under the FCA. The court applied the materiality standard from Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, considering factors such as whether the government designated compliance as a condition of payment, whether the violations were minor or substantial, and whether the government continued to pay claims despite knowing of the violations. The court found that the alleged violations did not go to the essence of CMS’s contract with the carriers and were not material to the government's payment decisions.The Eighth Circuit also upheld the district court's denial of Holt's motion for reconsideration and request to amend the complaint, concluding that adding a fraudulent inducement claim would be futile given the immateriality of the alleged violations. View "United States ex rel. Holt v. Medicare Medicaid Advisors" on Justia Law