Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Kingfish Maine, Inc. sought permits from the Department of Environmental Protection to construct and operate a land-based aquaculture facility in Jonesport, Maine. The project included two primary buildings, access roads, ancillary buildings, and intake and outfall pipes for water from Chandler Bay. The Department issued a wastewater discharge permit and a combined Site Law and Natural Resources Protection Act (NRPA) permit for the project.The Superior Court (Kennebec County) affirmed the Board of Environmental Protection’s decision to uphold the Department’s issuance of the permits. Petitioners, Eastern Maine Conservation Initiative and Roque Island Gardner Homestead Corporation, argued that the Board erred in its scope of review under NRPA and failed to independently evaluate the environmental impacts of the wastewater discharge.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and held that the Board did not err in its interpretation of NRPA’s scope. The Court found that NRPA’s review is limited to specific activities listed in 38 M.R.S. § 480-C(2), which do not include the discharge of treated wastewater. The Court also held that the Board did not abuse its discretion by relying on the previously issued discharge permit, as the Department had already evaluated the environmental impacts of the discharge, including its effects on wildlife and water quality, during the discharge permit process.The Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court, concluding that the Board’s reliance on the discharge permit was reasonable and that the Board was not required to conduct a separate analysis of the wastewater discharge’s impact under NRPA. View "Eastern Maine Conservation Initiative v. Board of Environmental Protection" on Justia Law

Jeremy Kennedy filed a petition to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) to seek a declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus regarding a decision by the Arkansas Post-Prison Transfer Board (Board). The Board had denied his request for transfer to the Arkansas Division of Community Correction (DCC) and his subsequent request for a six-month reconsideration hearing. Kennedy argued that he was eligible for transfer under Arkansas law and that the Board acted outside its statutory authority by denying his transfer eligibility.The Izard County Circuit Court denied Kennedy’s IFP petition, finding that his claim was a duplicate of a previous lawsuit (case number 33CV-23-123) that was on appeal and another case (33CV-23-57) that he had voluntarily dismissed. The circuit court concluded that Kennedy’s petition did not state a colorable cause of action.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court’s decision. The court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kennedy’s IFP petition. The Supreme Court found that Kennedy’s latest filing did not present a legitimate claim that could be reasonably asserted based on the facts and current law. Therefore, the denial of Kennedy’s IFP petition was upheld. View "Kennedy v. Felts" on Justia Law

Adam Schulze, a retired firefighter from the City of Newburgh, was injured on the job in 2012 and classified as permanently partially disabled in 2015. He received full salary payments from the City under General Municipal Law § 207-a (1) and workers' compensation benefits until December 2015. In 2016, Schulze was approved for performance of duty (POD) retirement, entitling him to a 50% pension and supplemental payments from the City under General Municipal Law § 207-a (2).A Workers' Compensation Law Judge (WCLJ) awarded Schulze workers' compensation payments for periods before and after his retirement. The City sought reimbursement from these payments for its prior payments under General Municipal Law § 207-a (1) and (2). The WCLJ granted reimbursement for the period before Schulze's retirement but denied it for the period after. The Workers' Compensation Board upheld this decision, and the Appellate Division affirmed, citing Matter of Harzinski v Village of Endicott, which held that General Municipal Law § 207-a (2) payments are not "wages" under Workers' Compensation Law §§ 25 (4) (a) and 30 (2).The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. The court held that neither Workers' Compensation Law § 25 (4) (a) nor § 30 (2) entitles the City to reimbursement from workers' compensation awards for payments made under General Municipal Law § 207-a (2). The court emphasized that General Municipal Law § 207-a (2) payments are pension supplements, not wages, and that the statutory scheme requires the City to reduce its payments by the amount of workers' compensation benefits, not to seek direct reimbursement. The court concluded that the City is not entitled to reimbursement directly from Schulze's workers' compensation award for its prior payments. View "Matter of Schulze v City of Newburgh Fire Dept." on Justia Law

Workforce Safety and Insurance (WSI) issued a notice ending benefits for Russell C. Jones, who had been receiving them due to a work-related injury in Mountrail County. The matter proceeded to a telephonic hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ) with participants in different locations: the ALJ in Minnesota, Jones in Wisconsin, Jones’s attorney in Bismarck, and WSI’s attorney in Fargo. The ALJ left the record open for a physician to provide deposition testimony from Bismarck and ultimately reversed WSI’s decision. WSI then filed a notice of appeal with the district court in Burleigh County.The district court in Burleigh County dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, agreeing with Jones’s argument that the court lacked jurisdiction because he did not reside there and his injury did not occur there. WSI appealed this dismissal.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case and determined that the district court in Burleigh County had jurisdiction under the default rules set out by the Administrative Agencies Practice Act, N.D.C.C. ch. 28-32. The court found that since part of the administrative hearing was held in Bismarck, the district court in Burleigh County was an appropriate venue for the appeal. The court concluded that Title 65 of the North Dakota Century Code did not specify where WSI must appeal, and thus the default provisions of N.D.C.C. ch. 28-32 applied. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Workforce Safety and Insurance v. Jones" on Justia Law

Two elderly individuals, Ms. Penelope Lamle and Ms. Maxine Houston, applied for Medicaid but faced delays and additional questions from the Oklahoma Department of Human Services, allegedly directed by attorney Susan Eads. They refused to answer these questions and subsequently sued, seeking an expedited decision, payment of Medicaid benefits, and damages. Both applicants died during the litigation, and their estates were substituted as parties in the appeal.The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma dismissed the action with prejudice, citing the plaintiffs' failure to state a valid claim. However, the court was unaware that the applicants had died while the action was pending.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the claims for an injunction became moot when the agency denied benefits and the applicants died. The court noted that the requested relief would no longer benefit the estates, as the Oklahoma Department of Human Services had already denied the applications. The court also held that the Eleventh Amendment barred the requested retrospective relief. Consequently, the court remanded the case to the district court with instructions to vacate the judgment on the claim for a prospective injunction and dismiss it without prejudice.Regarding the claim against Ms. Eads in her individual capacity, the Tenth Circuit held that she was entitled to qualified immunity. The court found that the plaintiffs did not allege facts showing the violation of a clearly established right. As a result, the court affirmed the dismissal with prejudice of the claim for damages against Ms. Eads. View "Lamle v. Eads" on Justia Law

In 2019, the Rhode Island Department of Corrections (DOC) implemented changes to its Absenteeism Management Program (AMP), citing abuse of the existing sick-time policy. The changes included new discipline tracks, sanctions for absenteeism, stricter sick note requirements, and closer scrutiny of pattern sick time use. The Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers (RIBCO) requested bargaining over these changes, which the DOC refused, leading RIBCO to file an unfair labor practice charge.The Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board (SLRB) found that the DOC had committed an unfair labor practice by making substantial changes to working conditions without bargaining. The board rejected the DOC's defenses, including the argument that the changes were within the director’s statutory authority and the management-rights clause of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA).The DOC appealed to the Superior Court, which reversed the SLRB's decision. The Superior Court found that the board's decision was not supported by substantial evidence and that the changes were within the DOC director’s statutory authority under Rhode Island law.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. The Court held that the SLRB's decision was not supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence. It also agreed that the changes to the AMP were within the DOC director’s statutory authority under sections 42-56-10(2), (5), and (7) of the Rhode Island General Laws, which grant the director broad discretion in managing the department, maintaining safety and order, and disciplining employees. Thus, the DOC was not obligated to bargain over the AMP changes. View "State of Rhode Island v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

A national consumer advocate law firm (C Co.) and its affiliate (S Co.) providing administrative support services sought injunctive and declaratory relief against the Department of Banking. The Department had initiated an administrative enforcement action against S Co. for allegedly engaging in unlicensed debt negotiation activities. The plaintiffs argued that S Co. was exempt from licensing requirements under a presumption established in a prior case (Persels & Associates, LLC v. Banking Commissioner), which holds that attorneys providing debt negotiation services as part of their legal practice fall under the exclusive regulation of the Judicial Branch.The trial court denied the Department's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' action, concluding that the plaintiffs were not required to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial intervention on whether the Persels presumption applied to S Co. The Department appealed, arguing that the Commissioner of Banking should first determine whether the presumption applied.The Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the plaintiffs were not required to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial intervention. The court reasoned that the Commissioner of Banking lacks the expertise to determine whether the Persels presumption applies, as this involves assessing whether the activities in question constitute the practice of law, which falls under the exclusive authority of the Judicial Branch. The court emphasized that allowing the commissioner to make this determination would violate the constitutional separation of powers. Therefore, the plaintiffs could seek declaratory and injunctive relief in the trial court without waiting for the commissioner to resolve the issue. View "Commonwealth Servicing Group, LLC v. Dept. of Banking" on Justia Law

Badlia Brothers, LLC, a check-cashing business, cashed 15 checks issued by the State of Maryland. These checks had already been paid by the State before Badlia presented them for payment. Some checks were deposited using a mobile app, creating "substitute checks," and were then fraudulently or negligently presented to Badlia. Others were reported lost or stolen, leading the State to issue stop payment orders and replacement checks, which were also cashed by Badlia. Badlia accepted the checks without knowledge of prior payments and sought payment from the State, which refused.Badlia filed complaints in the District Court of Maryland, claiming the right to enforce the checks as a holder in due course. The court consolidated the cases, ruled that the State enjoyed qualified immunity, and dismissed the cases. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City reversed, holding that a check is a contract, and thus, the State had waived sovereign immunity. On remand, the District Court found that Badlia was a holder in due course entitled to enforce the checks. The Circuit Court affirmed, and the State petitioned for certiorari.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and held that a check is a contract for purposes of the State’s waiver of sovereign immunity under § 12-201(a) of the State Government Article. The court affirmed the Circuit Court's decision, concluding that the State has waived sovereign immunity for claims by a holder in due course seeking payment on an authorized State-issued check. View "Comptroller v. Badlia Brothers, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves Pueo Kai McGuire, who filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the County of Hawai'i, the county prosecutor, and three deputy prosecutors, alleging violations of his constitutional rights, including malicious prosecution. The United States District Court for the District of Hawai'i certified a question to the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i to determine whether, under Hawai'i law, a county Prosecuting Attorney and/or Deputy Prosecuting Attorney acts on behalf of the county or the state when preparing to prosecute and/or prosecuting criminal violations of state law.The United States District Court for the District of Hawai'i reviewed the case and found the matter of whether county prosecutors act on behalf of the county or the state to be unsettled under Hawai'i law. Consequently, the court certified this question to the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i for clarification.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i held that, under Hawai'i law, county prosecuting attorneys and their deputies act on behalf of the county when preparing to prosecute or prosecuting state law offenses. The court's decision was based on an analysis of the historical and current legal framework governing prosecutorial authority in Hawai'i, including the Hawai'i Constitution, state statutes, and county charters. The court emphasized that county prosecutors are primarily responsible for initiating and conducting criminal prosecutions within their county jurisdictions, with the state attorney general retaining only residual authority to intervene in compelling circumstances. The court declined to extend state sovereign immunity to county prosecutors, affirming that they are suable persons under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. View "McGuire v. County of Hawai'i" on Justia Law

An off-duty St. Louis Police Officer, Milton Green, was mistakenly shot by Officer Christopher Tanner during a pursuit of a suspect who had fired at police officers. Green filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Tanner and the City of St. Louis, alleging Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations and state law claims. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that Tanner did not violate Green’s constitutional rights and that official immunity barred the state-law claims. The court also denied Green’s motions to alter or amend the judgment and to submit newly discovered evidence.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding that Tanner’s actions were reasonable under the circumstances and that there was no constitutional violation. The court also ruled that Green’s Monell claim against the City failed due to the lack of an underlying constitutional violation and that official immunity protected Tanner from the state-law claims. Green’s motions to alter or amend the judgment and to reopen discovery were denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that Tanner’s use of force was objectively reasonable given the circumstances, which involved a rapidly evolving and dangerous situation. The court also upheld the dismissal of the Monell claims against the City, as there was no constitutional violation by Tanner. Additionally, the court affirmed the denial of Green’s post-judgment motions and the dismissal of the state-law battery claims, agreeing that official immunity applied. View "Green v. City of St. Louis" on Justia Law