Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

James Donelson, CEO of Long Leaf Trading Group, oversaw a company that provided trade recommendations in the commodities market and earned commissions on executed trades. Despite collecting $1,235,413 in commissions from customers participating in the "Time Means Money" (TMM) program, customers incurred losses totaling $2,376,738. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) investigated and filed a civil enforcement action against Donelson and others, alleging options fraud and other violations of commodities laws.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment to the CFTC on all but one count against Donelson. The court found that Donelson and Long Leaf made several misrepresentations, including misleading trade history emails, false return rate projections, and omissions about Long Leaf's history of losses. The court also determined that Long Leaf acted as a Commodity Trading Advisor (CTA) and should have registered as such. Donelson was ordered to pay restitution and disgorgement totaling $3,612,151. Donelson appealed the summary judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court's findings on options fraud, fraud by a CTA, and fraudulent advertising by a CTA, agreeing that Donelson made misleading statements and omissions. The court also upheld the finding that Long Leaf was a CTA and that Donelson was a controlling person of the company. However, the court reversed the summary judgment on the claims related to the failure to register as a CTA and failure to make required disclosures, remanding these issues for further proceedings to determine if Long Leaf was exempt from registration under CFTC regulations. View "Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Donelson" on Justia Law

The Washington State Department of Ecology (Ecology) identified nitrogen pollution from wastewater treatment plants as a significant issue for Puget Sound. The Northwest Environmental Advocates (NWEA) petitioned Ecology to include nitrogen discharge limits in their regulations. Ecology denied the petition but committed to setting nutrient loading limits at current levels for all permitted dischargers in Puget Sound through the individual permitting process. Subsequently, Ecology issued permits with varying nitrogen discharge limits.The City of Tacoma and other municipalities operating wastewater treatment plants petitioned the Thurston County Superior Court for judicial review, arguing that Ecology's commitment constituted a "rule" under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and was adopted without following statutory rule-making procedures. The superior court agreed, holding that Ecology's commitment was a "rule" and invalidated it. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, finding that Ecology's actions amounted to a directive of general applicability, thus constituting a "rule" under the APA.The Supreme Court of Washington reviewed the case and concluded that Ecology's commitment in the denial letter was not a directive of general applicability. The court found that Ecology's actions allowed for staff discretion and case-by-case analysis, rather than imposing a uniform standard. Therefore, the commitment did not meet the definition of a "rule" under RCW 34.05.010(16). The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case to the superior court for any further necessary proceedings. View "City of Tacoma v. Dep't of Ecology" on Justia Law

Three retired New Hampshire State Police troopers challenged their inclusion on the Exculpatory Evidence Schedule (EES), claiming their placement was based on outdated and misinterpreted conduct. Approximately twenty years ago, the troopers inflated traffic stop records in their activity logs to meet mandated quotas. An internal investigation led to their discipline but not termination. Initially placed on the "Laurie List," their names were later removed, only to be reinstated on the EES over a decade later.The Superior Court dismissed the troopers' complaint, finding their conduct potentially exculpatory and their placement on the EES appropriate. The court also ruled that the troopers had received adequate due process. The troopers appealed, arguing that their conduct was not fraudulent and that the age of the conduct diminished its relevance.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case, focusing on whether the troopers' conduct was "potentially exculpatory" under RSA 105:13-d. The court noted that "potentially exculpatory evidence" includes evidence that could be material to guilt or punishment, including impeachment evidence. The court emphasized that factors such as the age and nature of the conduct should be considered in determining its relevance.The court concluded that the limited record did not establish whether the troopers' conduct was potentially exculpatory, as it could have been a result of a mistaken interpretation of reporting requirements rather than dishonesty. Therefore, the court reversed the Superior Court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the potential exculpatory nature of the conduct, considering its admissibility and relevance in future criminal cases. View "Doe v. N.H. Attorney Gen." on Justia Law

In a procurement dispute, the Honolulu Board of Water Supply (BWS) solicited bids for a well-drilling project and disqualified Alpha, Inc. for not having the required contractor’s license. Alpha challenged the decision administratively and judicially, arguing that its bid was responsive and that the winning bidder, Beylik/Energetic A JV, was nonresponsive. BWS maintained that the administrative hearings officer and courts lacked jurisdiction to hear the protest because Alpha did not meet the statutory requirement that the protest concern a matter worth at least ten percent of the contract’s value.The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) concluded that the ten percent requirement was not jurisdictional and had jurisdiction to hear Alpha’s appeal. On the merits, OAH found that Alpha’s bid was nonresponsive due to the lack of a required subcontractor listing. The Circuit Court of the First Circuit affirmed OAH’s decision, agreeing that BWS could require a C-27 license for tree removal and that Alpha’s bid was nonresponsive. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) also affirmed, holding that the ten percent requirement related to standing, not jurisdiction, and that Alpha had standing to appeal.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i reversed the ICA’s decision, holding that the ten percent requirement is jurisdictional. The court concluded that Alpha did not meet this requirement, and therefore, OAH and the courts lacked jurisdiction to review BWS’s decision. The court also provided guidance on the merits, affirming BWS’s disqualification of Alpha’s bid for not listing a required subcontractor and not having the proper license for tree removal. View "Alpha Inc. v. Board of Water Supply" on Justia Law

Phillip Weeks filed a lawsuit against the City of Webster Groves and St. Louis County, alleging violations of Missouri’s Sunshine Law for failing to produce public records he requested. Weeks sought raw data files from vehicle stop forms, including officer identification numbers (DSNs), for specific years. Webster Groves and St. Louis County, which use the Regional Justice Information Services (REJIS) for data storage, did not fully comply with his requests. Webster Groves claimed the Sunshine Law did not require creating new records, while St. Louis County initially provided some data but later redacted the DSNs, arguing they were exempt from disclosure.The Circuit Court of St. Louis County granted summary judgment in favor of Webster Groves and St. Louis County. The court found that the DSNs were not responsive to Weeks' requests and that the Sunshine Law did not require the creation of new records. Additionally, St. Louis County argued that the DSNs were exempt under sections 610.021(3) and (13) of the Sunshine Law, which pertain to personnel records and information related to employee performance.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the case and vacated the circuit court’s summary judgment. The court held that the record did not establish whether the DSNs were part of the requested vehicle stop data or if they were exempt from disclosure. The court emphasized that the Sunshine Law requires public records to be open unless specifically exempt and that the exemptions must be strictly construed. The case was remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the DSNs are public records and if any exemptions apply. View "Weeks vs. St. Louis County, MO." on Justia Law

K.N., an eight-year-old boy with multiple disabilities, lives in a non-wheelchair-accessible apartment in the District of Columbia. His mother, Margda Pierre-Noel, requested that the District and his school, Bridges Public Charter School, provide assistance to move K.N. from their apartment door to the school bus. The District denied the request, citing its policy that staff only retrieve students from the outermost door of their dwelling and do not physically lift or carry students.The Office of the State Superintendent of Education (OSSE) hearing officer ruled that it was beyond his authority to order the requested assistance but required OSSE to offer transportation services to and from the outer door of K.N.'s apartment building. Pierre-Noel then filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, which granted summary judgment in favor of the District, ruling that the service requested was not a transportation service under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the IDEA requires the District to provide door-to-door transportation services for K.N., as such services are necessary for him to benefit from his special education. The court found that the term "transportation" under the IDEA includes moving a child from their apartment door to the vehicle that will take them to school. The court vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The appeal was dismissed as moot with respect to Bridges Public Charter School, as K.N. was no longer enrolled there. View "Pierre-Noel v. Bridges Public Charter School" on Justia Law

Lake Region Healthcare Corporation operates a hospital in Minnesota and experienced a significant decrease in Medicare inpatient discharges in 2013, qualifying it for a volume-decrease adjustment (VDA). The hospital sought an adjustment of $1,947,967 using a method that estimates the portion of Medicare payments attributable to fixed costs. A Medicare contractor denied the adjustment, applying a method that treats all Medicare payments as compensation for fixed costs, resulting in no adjustment. The Provider Reimbursement Review Board (PRRB) reversed the contractor's decision, but the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) reinstated it.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia ruled in favor of the government, deferring to CMS's method under Chevron deference. The court found that the statute did not specify how to calculate the VDA and that CMS's method was a reasonable interpretation, even if not the best one. The court concluded that CMS's approach was consistent with the statutory requirement to compensate only for fixed costs.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that CMS's method of attributing all Medicare payments to fixed costs did not comply with the statutory requirement to fully compensate hospitals for their fixed costs. The court noted that Medicare payments cover both fixed and variable costs and that CMS's method overstates the amount of reimbursed fixed costs, thus understating unreimbursed fixed costs. The court found that reasonable proxies exist to estimate the fixed-cost component of Medicare payments and that CMS's method was not a reasonable approximation of full compensation for fixed costs.The court reversed the district court's decision, granted summary judgment to Lake Region, and remanded the case to the agency for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Lake Region Healthcare Corporation v. Becerra" on Justia Law

Four aliens who were denied asylum and an organization assisting them filed FOIA requests for copies of the aliens’ Assessments to Refer and associated documents. USCIS released the factual portions of the Assessments but withheld portions containing analysis by the asylum officers, including opinions, deliberations, and recommendations regarding each applicant’s eligibility for asylum. The plaintiffs sued to obtain the full Assessments.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment to the government. It held that the deliberative-process privilege covers the requested Assessments and that USCIS had adequately shown that releasing the withheld portions would foreseeably harm USCIS’s interest in receiving candid recommendations from its asylum officers. After the plaintiffs appealed, the case was remanded for further consideration in light of a new decision, Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press v. FBI. On remand, USCIS submitted a supplemental declaration elaborating on the agency’s assessment of foreseeable harm, and the district court again granted summary judgment to DHS.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the deliberative-process privilege applies to the four requested Assessments and that DHS adequately showed that disclosure of their analysis portions would foreseeably harm interests the privilege protects. The court found that the supplemental declaration provided by USCIS’s Chief FOIA Officer sufficiently demonstrated foreseeable harm by explaining the sensitive nature of asylum adjudications and the specific concern about facilitating asylum fraud. The court affirmed the summary judgment for DHS. View "Emuwa v. DHS" on Justia Law

The case involves the U.S. Sugar Corporation and other industry petitioners challenging the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) 2022 rule that classified certain industrial boilers as "new" sources of hazardous air pollutants, even though they were built before the applicable emission standards were proposed in 2020. The EPA used a 2013-era dataset to establish these standards, excluding more recent data to maintain consistency with still-valid 2013 standards. Environmental petitioners argued that this exclusion violated the Clean Air Act.The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The lower court had previously remanded the EPA's 2011 rule without vacatur, allowing the invalid standards to remain while the EPA revised them. The industry petitioners argued that the EPA's classification of boilers built after June 4, 2010, as "new" sources was incorrect, as these boilers were constructed before the 2020 proposal of the new standards. The environmental petitioners contended that the EPA's decision to use outdated data was arbitrary and capricious.The D.C. Circuit held that the EPA's classification of boilers built before August 24, 2020, as "new" sources was incorrect under the Clean Air Act. The court found that the proper date to determine whether a boiler is "new" should be when each specific emission standard is first proposed, not when any standard for the category was first proposed. Therefore, the court set aside the EPA's 2022 rule to the extent that it defined sources constructed before August 24, 2020, as "new."The court also held that the EPA's decision to rely on the 2013-era dataset was neither unlawful nor arbitrary and capricious. The court found that the EPA's choice was reasonable given the limited nature of the remand and the need for consistency across standards. Thus, the court denied the environmental petitioners' petition for review. View "United States Sugar Corporation v. EPA" on Justia Law

In this case, the appellant, Chitta Roy, challenged the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare's (the "Department") denial of her criminal history background clearance during her certified family home (CFH) recertification. Roy had a 2008 conviction for involuntary manslaughter, which was dismissed in 2011 under Idaho Code section 19-2604 after she successfully completed probation. Despite this, the Department denied her 2021 application for background clearance, citing the conviction as a disqualifying crime under its updated rules.The District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of Idaho upheld the Department's decision, rejecting Roy's arguments that the dismissal of her conviction should preclude the Department from denying her clearance and that the Department should be bound by its 2009 decision to grant her an exemption. The district court also determined that Roy failed to show substantial prejudice from the denial, as the Department could still approve her CFH recertification through a separate process.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in its conclusions. The Supreme Court held that the Department improperly based its denial on the dismissed conviction, which, under Idaho Code section 19-2604, should be treated as if it never existed. The Court also determined that the case was ripe for adjudication and that Roy's substantial rights were prejudiced by the Department's denial. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Roy was awarded costs on appeal. View "Roy v. Idaho Department of Health and Welfare" on Justia Law