Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Alphonso Mobley Jr. requested public records from the Hamilton County Prosecutor's Office, specifically certified statements created under former R.C. 309.16 for 2016 through 2020 and the office’s records-retention schedule. When Mobley did not receive a response, he filed a mandamus action to compel the production of these records and sought statutory damages under the Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43.The Supreme Court of Ohio previously issued a limited writ of mandamus, ordering the prosecutor to either provide the requested records or certify that they do not exist. The prosecutor complied by certifying that all responsive records in her possession were provided to Mobley on April 20, 2023. Additionally, the prosecutor obtained and provided records from the Hamilton County Board of County Commissioners that were not retained by her office. Mobley then filed a motion to proceed to judgment on the issue of statutory damages.The Supreme Court of Ohio determined that the prosecutor failed to comply with R.C. 149.43(B) by not responding to Mobley’s request within a reasonable period. The court noted that the request was narrow, involved few records, and did not require redactions. The prosecutor’s delay of almost three months was deemed unreasonable. Consequently, the court awarded Mobley $400 in statutory damages, calculated at $100 per business day for the four business days between the filing of the mandamus action and the prosecutor’s compliance. View "State ex rel. Mobley v. Powers" on Justia Law

In the early morning of December 21, 2019, Corey Spiller went to assist his girlfriend, Dashanelle Moore, after her minor car accident on a Houston expressway. While conversing with officers at the scene, Sergeant Jared Lindsay arrived and directed Moore to a nearby truck stop for further procedures, instructing Spiller to follow in his car. When Spiller questioned the officers about Moore, Lindsay became enraged, seized Spiller by the neck, and slammed him onto a parked car, leading to a scuffle where Spiller was tased and arrested. The charges against Spiller were later dropped.Spiller filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Lindsay, Harris County, Harris County Constable Precinct 7, and Chief Constable May Walker, alleging excessive force, false arrest, bystander liability, retaliation, and ADA violations. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed claims against Harris County, Precinct 7, and Walker for failure to state a claim and granted summary judgment for Lindsay on the basis of qualified immunity. Spiller appealed, challenging the summary judgment on his Fourth Amendment excessive force, false arrest, First Amendment retaliation, and bystander liability claims against Lindsay, and the dismissal of his Monell claim against Harris County.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court’s summary judgment for Lindsay on the excessive force claim, finding genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether Lindsay's use of force was excessive and whether Spiller's actions justified such force. The court affirmed the district court’s rulings on the false arrest and First Amendment retaliation claims, concluding that Lindsay had probable cause for Spiller’s arrest. The court also upheld the dismissal of Spiller’s Monell claim against Harris County for failing to allege specific facts linking his injury to a county policy or custom. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Spiller v. Harris County" on Justia Law

The case involves the termination of parental rights of an incarcerated father, Anton K., to his two daughters, Allie and Melissa, who are Indian children under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) removed the children from their parents' home due to allegations of abuse and neglect. Anton was later incarcerated on charges of physical and sexual assault against the children's mother, Keri K., and remained in custody throughout the proceedings.The Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Palmer, initially found probable cause to believe the children were in need of aid and that OCS had made active efforts to avoid removing them. OCS developed case plans for both parents and facilitated some initial visitation. However, after Anton's incarceration, OCS's efforts to facilitate visitation and provide rehabilitative services were limited, partly due to COVID-19 restrictions and miscommunications with the Department of Corrections (DOC). OCS continued to work with Keri and the children's Tribe, eventually placing the children with maternal relatives after efforts to place them with paternal relatives failed.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's order terminating Anton's parental rights. The court held that OCS had made active efforts to prevent the breakup of the family, considering the entirety of its efforts, including those directed at Keri and the children's extended family. The court acknowledged the significant gaps in OCS's efforts to facilitate visitation and provide services to Anton while incarcerated but concluded that the overall efforts, including those to reunify the children with Keri and place them with relatives, were sufficient under ICWA. View "Anton K. v. State" on Justia Law

Sutter’s Place, Inc., which operates Bay 101 Casino, challenged the City of San Jose's annual cardroom regulation fee, arguing it was an unconstitutional tax imposed without voter approval and violated due process. The fee was equally divided between Bay 101 and Casino M8trix, the only two cardrooms in the city. The plaintiff contended that the fee included costs outside the constitutional exception for regulatory charges and that the equal allocation was unfair.The Santa Clara County Superior Court held a bench trial and found the fee valid, covering reasonable regulatory costs and fairly allocated between the cardrooms. The court determined the fee was for regulatory functions, the amount was necessary to cover costs, and the equal allocation was reasonable given the equal number of tables and benefits to both cardrooms. The court also excluded certain expert testimony from the plaintiff and denied a separate due process trial.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It upheld the trial court's finding that the equal allocation of the fee was reasonable but reversed the judgment on other grounds. The appellate court found the trial court erred by not specifically determining whether all costs included in the fee fell within the constitutional exception for regulatory charges. The case was remanded for the trial court to identify and exclude any non-permissible costs from the fee and to conduct further proceedings on the due process claim if necessary. The appellate court also reversed the award of costs to the city and directed the trial court to reassess costs after applying the correct legal standards. View "Sutter's Place, Inc. v. City of San Jose" on Justia Law

Two defendants, Arturo Cuellar ("AC") and Ricardo Quintanilla, were involved in a scheme to bribe city commissioners in Weslaco, Texas, to secure contracts for an infrastructure project. The bribes were intended to influence the awarding of contracts to Camp Dresser & McKee (CDM) and Briones Consulting and Engineering, Ltd. Quintanilla bribed Commissioner Gerardo Tafolla, while AC bribed Commissioner John Cuellar (JC). Leo Lopez, a consultant for CDM and Briones, facilitated the bribes. The scheme involved multiple meetings and payments, with both commissioners taking actions to favor CDM and Briones. The city paid approximately $42.5 million to CDM, Briones, and LeFevre, with Lopez distributing funds to AC and Quintanilla.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas convicted Quintanilla and AC of various federal offenses, including conspiracy to commit honest-services wire fraud, honest-services wire fraud, federal program bribery, conspiracy to launder monetary instruments, and money laundering. Quintanilla was sentenced to 200 months in custody, while AC received 240 months. Both were also ordered to pay fines, special assessments, restitution, and forfeiture amounts. The defendants appealed their convictions and sentences.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the convictions and sentences. The court addressed several issues raised by the defendants, including claims of constructive amendment of the indictment, sufficiency of the indictment, recusal of the district judge, and evidentiary rulings. The court found that the government did not constructively amend the indictment and that the evidence supported the convictions. The court also held that the district judge did not need to recuse herself and that the evidentiary rulings were within the court's discretion. The court concluded that the defendants' arguments were either forfeited, not meritorious, or both. View "USA v. Quintanilla" on Justia Law

The case involves a historic Black burial ground in Montgomery County, Maryland, known as Moses Cemetery. The land, which contains the remains of many individuals, including formerly enslaved persons, was sold and developed into an apartment complex and parking lot in the 1960s. The development process desecrated the burial ground, and it is likely that human remains are still interred there. The current owner of the property is the Housing Opportunities Commission of Montgomery County (HOC). The plaintiffs, including descendants of those buried in Moses Cemetery and a local church, sought to challenge HOC's plan to sell the land to a developer.The Circuit Court for Montgomery County granted the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction to prevent the sale and later issued a writ of mandamus compelling HOC to file an action under Maryland's Business Regulation Article § 5-505 before selling the property. The court found that there was overwhelming evidence of the burial ground's existence and that many bodies likely remain on the property.The Appellate Court of Maryland reversed the circuit court's decision, holding that § 5-505 is an optional procedure for selling burial grounds and does not impose a mandatory duty on HOC to file an action before selling the land. The Appellate Court reasoned that the statute is designed to allow certain burial grounds to be sold free from claims but does not require this procedure to be followed in all cases.The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the Appellate Court's judgment in part and reversed it in part. The Court held that the common law of burial places in Maryland provides an appropriate framework for disputes regarding burial grounds and that extraordinary relief in the form of a writ of mandamus was not appropriate. The Court remanded the case to the circuit court, allowing the plaintiffs to seek leave to amend their complaint to state a claim for relief based on an alleged violation of specific rights protected under the common law of burial places. The Court also held that § 5-505 does not abrogate the common law of burial places and provides an optional procedure for selling burial grounds. View "BETHESDA AFRICAN CEMETERY COALITION, v. HOUSING OPPORTUNITIES COMMISSION OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY" on Justia Law

Daniel Pomerantz appealed the Cannabis Control Board’s denial of his request to waive application and licensing fees for his proposed commercial cannabis cultivation establishment. Pomerantz claimed he qualified as a “social equity applicant” due to past incarceration for a cannabis-related offense and coming from a community historically impacted by cannabis prohibition. The Board determined he did not meet the criteria and denied his request.Initially, Pomerantz applied for a Tier 5 cultivation license on behalf of Rebel East, LLC, asserting he qualified for social equity status due to a past cannabis-related offense in Nevada. The Board found he was not eligible because his sentencing was deferred, and he was not incarcerated as a penalty for the offense. Pomerantz then argued he qualified as a socially disadvantaged individual due to his residency in Humboldt County, California, a region he claimed was disproportionately affected by cannabis prohibition. The Board allowed him to amend his application but ultimately found he did not demonstrate personal harm from living in Humboldt County.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the Board’s decision. The Court upheld the Board’s interpretation that “incarcerated” meant serving a prison sentence as a penalty for a cannabis-related conviction, which Pomerantz did not. The Court also agreed with the Board’s assessment that merely living in Humboldt County did not automatically qualify Pomerantz as being from a disproportionately impacted community. Furthermore, the Court found that Pomerantz did not sufficiently demonstrate personal harm from his residency in Humboldt County, noting his significant personal and professional advancements during that time.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the Board’s decision, concluding that Pomerantz did not qualify as a social equity individual applicant under the Board’s rules. View "Pomerantz v. Cannabis Control Board" on Justia Law

A group of LGBTQ+ students sued the U.S. Department of Education, alleging that they experienced discrimination at religious colleges and universities that receive federal funding. They challenged the religious exemption to Title IX, which allows religious institutions to discriminate based on gender if it conflicts with their religious tenets. The plaintiffs claimed this exemption violated the First Amendment's Establishment Clause and the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantee. They also argued that the Department's 2020 amendment to Title IX regulations, which clarified that institutions do not need to submit a written statement to claim the exemption, was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The United States District Court for the District of Oregon dismissed the plaintiffs' claims. It ruled that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim that the religious exemption violated the First and Fifth Amendments. The court also found that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the 2020 amendment under the APA. The court denied the plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint, concluding that any amendment would be futile.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the Title IX religious exemption does not violate the Establishment Clause under the historical practices and understanding test set forth in Kennedy v. Bremerton School District. The court found that the exemption is consistent with a long history of religious accommodations in U.S. law. The court also held that the exemption does not violate the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantee, as it is substantially related to the important governmental objective of accommodating religious exercise. Finally, the court agreed that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the 2020 amendment, as they did not show that the rule caused them harm. The court also upheld the denial of leave to amend the complaint. View "HUNTER V. USEDU" on Justia Law

High Plains Power, a cooperatively owned utility in central Wyoming, proposed a tariff revision to the Wyoming Public Service Commission (PSC) in August 2022. The revision aimed to change the compensation rate for customer-generators—members who generate electricity through small net metering systems—from a retail rate credit to an avoided cost rate, which is lower. Powder River Basin Resource Council and Wyoming Outdoor Council opposed this change, arguing it would unfairly reduce compensation for customer-generators.The PSC held a hearing in May 2023, where both parties presented evidence and testimony. The PSC approved the tariff revision on a two-to-one vote, with Chairman Throne dissenting. The appellants then petitioned the district court for review, which certified the case to the Wyoming Supreme Court.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and found that the PSC misinterpreted the relevant statute and failed to perform its ratemaking function. The court held that the PSC erred in presuming that the avoided cost rate was a just and reasonable rate for monthly compensation under Wyoming Statute § 37-16-103(a)(iii). The court emphasized that the statute does not specify the value of monthly credits or compensation, leaving it to the PSC to determine through its ratemaking process. The court concluded that the PSC did not evaluate the evidence or consider whether the proposed change served the public interest. Consequently, the Wyoming Supreme Court reversed the PSC's decision. View "Powder River Basin Resource Council v. Wyoming Public Service Commission" on Justia Law

Eight rural electric cooperatives (RECs) sought judicial review after the Kansas Board of Tax Appeals (BOTA) denied their property valuation challenges for the 2019 and 2020 tax years. The RECs argued that the valuation methodology used by the Kansas Department of Revenue's Property Valuation Division (PVD) violated the requirement for "generally accepted appraisal procedures" under K.S.A. 79-5a04. The RECs elected to go to district court for a trial de novo, which allows for an evidentiary hearing where issues of law and fact are determined anew.The Shawnee County District Court agreed with the RECs, concluding that PVD's valuation methodology violated K.S.A. 79-5a04. The court found that the methodology resulted in non-uniform and unequal valuations of the RECs' properties, thus inflating their property values and taxes. The district court ordered PVD to adjust its methodology to account for the RECs' treatment of margin stabilization adjustments (MSAs) in their net operating income (NOI).On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court reviewed whether the district court exceeded its scope of judicial review by considering issues not raised before BOTA. The Supreme Court held that a trial de novo under K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 74-2426(c)(4)(B) does not expand a district court's scope of judicial review beyond what is permitted by K.S.A. 77-617. The court determined that the RECs had only raised a constitutional issue regarding uniform and equal taxation before BOTA, not a statutory compliance issue under K.S.A. 79-5a04. Therefore, the district court exceeded its scope of review by deciding on the statutory issue.The Kansas Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment, holding that the district court improperly expanded its scope of review by addressing the statutory compliance issue that was not litigated before BOTA. View "FreeState Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law