Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 1991, the predecessor to the plaintiffs conveyed land to the United States in a land exchange but retained certain water rights that could only be accessed through the conveyed property, now managed by the U.S. Forest Service. The conveyance documents did not mention these water rights or provide any right of access. Over the years, the plaintiffs and their predecessors sought permits from the Forest Service to access and develop the water rights, but the agency repeatedly expressed concerns about environmental impacts and indicated it had the authority to deny access. In 2010, the Forest Service formally opposed the plaintiffs’ efforts to maintain the water rights in state court, asserting it would not grant the necessary land use authorization.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims under the Quiet Title Act (QTA) and the Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA). The court found the QTA claim time-barred by the statute’s twelve-year limitations period, reasoning that the plaintiffs or their predecessors were on notice of the government’s adverse claim well before the suit was filed in 2022. The court also dismissed the DJA claim, holding it was essentially a quiet title claim subject to the same limitations period.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Tenth Circuit held that the QTA claim was untimely because, by 2006 at the latest, the Forest Service had asserted exclusive control sufficient to put the plaintiffs on notice of its adverse claim, causing the limitations period to expire before the suit was filed. The court also held that it lacked jurisdiction over two of the plaintiffs’ requests for declaratory relief and that the third, alleging a taking, was not ripe because the plaintiffs had not first sought compensation under the Tucker Act. View "Purgatory Recreation I v. United States" on Justia Law

The California Department of Water Resources (DWR) planned to conduct preconstruction geotechnical work, such as soil and groundwater testing, in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta and Suisun Marsh as part of preparations for the Delta tunnel project, which aims to improve water conveyance and environmental protection. Various municipal, tribal, and public interest entities objected, arguing that DWR could not begin this work until it certified that the tunnel project was consistent with the Delta Plan, as required by the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta Reform Act of 2009. The disputed geotechnical work included soil borings, groundwater monitoring, test trenches, and other activities intended to inform the project’s design and mitigation measures.The Superior Court of Sacramento County reviewed several related actions brought by these entities. The plaintiffs sought and obtained preliminary injunctions preventing DWR from conducting the preconstruction geotechnical work until it submitted a certification of consistency with the Delta Plan. The trial court found that the geotechnical work was an integral part of the tunnel project, which was a “covered action” under the Delta Reform Act, and concluded that DWR was required to certify consistency before initiating any part of the project, including the geotechnical work.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reversed the trial court’s orders. The appellate court held that the Delta Reform Act does not require DWR to submit a certification of consistency before engaging in preconstruction geotechnical work, distinguishing the requirements of the Delta Reform Act from those of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The court found that the geotechnical work was not itself a “covered action” under the Delta Reform Act and that the Act does not incorporate CEQA’s prohibition against “piecemealing.” The case was remanded for the trial court to reconsider the motions for preliminary injunction in light of this holding. View "Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. Dept. of Water Resources" on Justia Law

The case concerns the North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ), which is responsible for issuing permits for animal waste management systems. In 2019, the DEQ added three new conditions to its general permits for swine, poultry, and cattle operations: requirements for monitoring wells in floodplains, a Phosphorous Loss Assessment Tool analysis with mitigation, and annual reporting. These conditions were not present in the previous 2014 permits but were included in a draft permit as part of a 2018 settlement with environmental groups. The North Carolina Farm Bureau Federation challenged the new conditions, arguing that the DEQ had not followed the rulemaking procedures required by the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) granted summary judgment to the Farm Bureau, finding that the new conditions were “rules” under the APA and thus invalid because they had not been adopted through the required rulemaking process. The Superior Court, Wake County, reversed the OAH, holding that the conditions were not “rules” because they only applied to those who opted for general permits, not all permittees, and thus lacked general applicability. The court also cited legislative history and statutory language to support its conclusion.The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the Superior Court, holding that the conditions were generally applicable regulations and thus “rules” under the APA, requiring formal rulemaking. The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the Court of Appeals, holding that the three general permit conditions are “rules” within the meaning of the APA and are invalid until adopted through the APA’s rulemaking process. The court clarified that while general permits themselves need not be adopted as rules, generally applicable conditions within them must be. View "N.C. Dep't of Env't Quality v. N.C. Farm Bureau Fed'n, Inc." on Justia Law

A health care provider operating imaging centers in Wake County, North Carolina, and a major hospital system both applied for a Certificate of Need (CON) to acquire a new fixed MRI scanner, as required by state law. The state’s 2021 plan determined that only one additional scanner could be approved in the county. The provider sought to place the scanner in Wake Forest, while the hospital system proposed a location in Raleigh. After a competitive review, the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services awarded the CON to the hospital system, finding its application more effective under certain comparative factors.The provider challenged this decision in the Office of Administrative Hearings, alleging the agency’s review was flawed and prejudicial. The administrative law judge (ALJ) found that the agency’s comparative analysis contained errors, deviated from established practices, and was based on subjective judgment rather than expertise or proper procedure. The ALJ reversed the agency’s decision and awarded the CON to the provider, also finding that the provider suffered substantial prejudice from the denial.On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the ALJ’s decision, holding that the appellants failed to challenge specific findings of fact, which made those findings binding on appeal. The court applied the whole record review standard, focusing on whether substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and held that, under current law, the ALJ’s final decision—not the agency’s—is the focus of judicial review, and a high degree of deference is owed to the ALJ’s findings. The Court affirmed the lower court’s judgment regarding the comparative analysis but reversed on the issue of substantial prejudice, finding that the provider, as a denied applicant, was inherently prejudiced by the agency’s decision. The award of the CON to the provider was affirmed. View "Pinnacle Health Servs. of N.C. LLC v. N.C. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs" on Justia Law

A tenured professor at Winston-Salem State University was terminated in 2017 for failing to fulfill essential job duties, including grading and teaching, and for sending a letter to a colleague containing offensive racial slurs. The professor challenged his dismissal through the university’s administrative process, arguing, among other things, that the university did not follow its own rules and regulations regarding the termination of tenured faculty.The case proceeded from the university’s Board of Trustees to the University of North Carolina Board of Governors, then to the Superior Court in Forsyth County, and finally to the North Carolina Court of Appeals. At each stage, the professor’s claims were rejected. The Court of Appeals held that courts must defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations unless that interpretation is plainly erroneous, relying on federal law principles.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case to clarify the standard for judicial review of state agency interpretations of their own regulations. The court held that, under North Carolina law, courts must apply de novo review to state agency interpretations of state rules and regulations, meaning courts are not bound by the agency’s interpretation but may consider it as informative. The court expressly rejected any rule requiring judicial deference to state agencies’ interpretations of their own regulations and overruled contrary lower court precedent. On a separate issue, the court determined that the Court of Appeals dissent erred in suggesting a remand was necessary for further First Amendment analysis, holding that appellate courts may resolve such legal questions de novo without remand if the issue was preserved. The Supreme Court modified and affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Mitchell v. Univ. of N.C. Bd. of Governors" on Justia Law

A Colorado-based company applied to the Utah state engineer for permission to divert 55,000 acre-feet of water annually from the Green River in Utah, intending to pipe it across Wyoming for use in Colorado. The company proposed to use the water along Colorado’s Front Range but had not finalized a delivery location or obtained any approvals from Colorado authorities. The application was subject to both the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, which governs interstate water allocations, and Utah’s statutes regulating water appropriation and export.After receiving the application, the Utah state engineer published notice, received protests, and held an administrative hearing. The engineer ultimately denied the application, finding that the company had not demonstrated compliance with Utah’s Export Statute, particularly the requirement to show that the water could be beneficially used in Colorado. The engineer also noted the absence of any guarantee from Colorado that the water would be counted against its compact allocation. The company’s request for reconsideration was denied by default. The company then sought de novo review in the Eighth District Court, Daggett County.The district court granted summary judgment for the state engineer, ruling that the Upper Compact did not preempt Utah’s water laws and that the applicant failed to show beneficial use as required by Utah’s Export Statute. The court also found, in the alternative, that Colorado was a necessary and indispensable party that could not be joined. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that Utah’s Export Statute is not preempted by the Upper Compact and that the applicant failed to establish a reason to believe the exported water could be beneficially used in Colorado. View "Water Horse v. Wilhelmsen" on Justia Law

A non-profit watchdog organization sought disclosure of formal written opinions issued by the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) within the Department of Justice (DOJ) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). After initial litigation, the dispute narrowed to three categories of OLC opinions: those resolving interagency disputes, those concerning the adjudication or determination of private rights, and those interpreting non-discretionary legal duties. OLC opinions are considered authoritative within the Executive Branch, but are rarely published.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the claims seeking disclosure of OLC opinions concerning private rights and non-discretionary legal duties, finding these were not subject to FOIA’s reading-room provision because they did not constitute “working law” unless adopted by the agency. However, the district court held that OLC opinions resolving interagency disputes were disclosable, reasoning that OLC’s process for resolving such disputes was adjudicative in nature and that agencies effectively adopted these opinions by agreeing in advance to abide by them. The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff on this category, and both parties appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that none of the OLC opinions sought by the plaintiff were subject to mandatory disclosure under FOIA’s reading-room provision. The court found that OLC’s opinions do not constitute “final opinions made in the adjudication of cases” nor “statements of policy and interpretations which have been adopted by the agency” unless the agency takes further action to adopt the advice as its own working law. The court reversed the district court’s judgment requiring disclosure of opinions resolving interagency disputes and affirmed the dismissal of claims regarding private rights and non-discretionary duties. View "Campaign for Accountability v. DOJ" on Justia Law

Six women who were formerly incarcerated at the Jasper City Jail in Alabama alleged that they suffered repeated sexual abuse by jailers, primarily by one officer, while serving as inmates. The plaintiffs described a range of sexual assaults and harassment, with one plaintiff also alleging abuse by a second jailer. The jail operated under the authority of the City of Jasper’s police chief, with a chief jailer and other supervisory staff responsible for daily operations. Jail policies expressly prohibited sexual contact between staff and inmates, and there were procedures for reporting grievances, but the plaintiffs claimed these mechanisms were ineffective or inaccessible.After the alleged abuse, the Alabama State Bureau of Investigation began an inquiry, leading to the resignation of the primary alleged abuser and, later, his indictment on state charges. The plaintiffs filed six separate lawsuits, later consolidated, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Eighth Amendment violations against the police chief, chief jailer, and the City, as well as claims under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA). One plaintiff also brought claims against a second jailer. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama granted summary judgment to all defendants, finding insufficient evidence that the supervisory officials or the City had knowledge of, or were deliberately indifferent to, the alleged abuse, and that the claims against one jailer failed for lack of proper service.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish a causal link between the actions or inactions of the supervisory officials or the City and the alleged constitutional violations, as there was no evidence of a widespread custom or policy of tolerating sexual abuse, nor of deliberate indifference or failure to train. The court also found that certain claims were time-barred and that the TVPRA claims failed due to lack of evidence that the City knowingly benefited from or had knowledge of the alleged trafficking. View "Bridges v. Poe" on Justia Law

In early October 2025, the President of the United States invoked his authority under 10 U.S.C. § 12406 to federalize and deploy members of the National Guard in Illinois, despite opposition from the state’s Governor. The President justified this action by citing the need to address violent assaults against federal immigration agents and property, particularly in the context of increased protests at an ICE facility in Broadview, Illinois, following the launch of “Operation Midway Blitz.” Although protests had grown in size and occasionally involved minor disruptions and isolated incidents of violence, state and local law enforcement consistently maintained control, and federal agencies reported continued success in their operations.The State of Illinois and the City of Chicago filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, challenging the federalization of the Guard. They argued that the statutory conditions for such action under § 12406 were not met, and that the move violated the Tenth Amendment and the Posse Comitatus Act. After an adversary hearing, the district court granted a temporary restraining order, finding insufficient evidence of rebellion or inability to execute federal law with regular forces, and enjoined the federalization and deployment of the Guard. The administration appealed and sought a stay of the order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s order, applying clear error review to factual findings and de novo review to statutory interpretation. The Seventh Circuit held that the President’s decision to federalize the National Guard under § 12406 is judicially reviewable and that, even granting substantial deference to the executive, the statutory predicates for federalization were not met on the current record. The court denied the administration’s motion for a stay pending appeal as to deployment, but continued to stay the portion of the order enjoining federalization. View "Illinois v. Trump" on Justia Law

A developer entered into an agreement with a city to develop a downtown district, which included provisions for three large signs identifying the area as "Reno's Neon Line District." The city council approved the agreement and adopted it by ordinance. A nonprofit organization dedicated to scenic preservation objected, arguing that the signs were actually billboards prohibited by city code and that the developers lacked the necessary interest to enter into the agreement.The Second Judicial District Court in Washoe County partially granted the nonprofit’s petition for a writ of mandamus. The court found that the nonprofit had standing to challenge the agreement. It ruled that one sign (the archway sign) was a permissible area identification sign, but determined that the other two signs (the gas station sign and the cemetery sign) were, respectively, an on-premises advertising display and a billboard, both in violation of city code. The court severed the provisions for these two signs from the agreement and issued a writ preventing their construction.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed whether the nonprofit had standing and whether the district court properly reclassified the signs. The Supreme Court held that the city’s classification of the signs as area identification signs was entitled to a presumption of validity and that substantial evidence supported this classification. The court further held that the nonprofit lacked standing to seek writ relief because it did not have a direct and substantial beneficial interest in the agreement, as the signs were not billboards and thus not covered by a prior settlement agreement with the city. The court also found that the nonprofit had waived any argument for representational standing. The Supreme Court of Nevada vacated the district court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "RENO REAL ESTATE DEVEL., LLC VS. SCENIC NEVADA, INC." on Justia Law