Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 2019, Tamika Miller filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA) against Citibank, alleging that the bank violated 2015 consent orders by hiding failures in its management of third-party risks to avoid paying regulatory fines. Miller claimed that Citibank altered audit reports to downplay compliance violations, thereby avoiding penalties. The United States declined to intervene in June 2020. In October 2020, Citibank entered into a new consent order with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and paid a $400 million civil penalty. Miller sought a share of this penalty, arguing it was an alternate remedy for her qui tam claim.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted Citibank's motion to dismiss Miller's complaint for failure to state a claim and denied her motion for a share of the $400 million penalty. The court found that Miller failed to allege an "obligation" to pay the government as required by the FCA and did not meet the particularity requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). The court also denied Miller's request for leave to amend her complaint, concluding that the deficiencies could not be cured by amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Miller failed to state a reverse false claim because she did not allege an established duty for Citibank to pay the government. The court also found that Miller's complaint did not meet the particularity requirement of Rule 9(b) as it failed to identify specific false statements or reports. Consequently, Miller was not entitled to a share of the $400 million penalty, and the district court did not err in denying her leave to amend her complaint. View "Miller v. United States, Citibank, N.A." on Justia Law

Tennessee Gas proposed constructing a new compressor station (Compressor Station 327) in West Milford Township as part of its East 300 Upgrade Project. The site is within the Highlands Preservation Area, which has stringent environmental standards. Tennessee applied to the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) for a Highlands Applicability Determination (HAD), claiming an exemption under N.J.S.A. 13:20-28(a)(11) (Exemption 11) of the Highlands Water Protection and Planning Act. The DEP issued the HAD, determining that the project qualified for Exemption 11.Food & Water Watch appealed the DEP’s decision, arguing that Exemption 11 should be narrowly construed so that the term “routine” modifies “upgrade.” The Appellate Division agreed, vacating the HAD and remanding the matter to determine if Compressor Station 327 qualifies as a “routine upgrade.” The court emphasized that statutory exemptions should be strictly construed to protect environmental interests and found that “routine” should modify all activities listed in Exemption 11.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment. The Court held that “routine” modifies only “maintenance and operations” and does not modify the other activities listed in Exemption 11, such as “upgrade.” The Court based its decision on the plain language of the statute, its grammatical structure, and the context within the law. The case was remanded to determine if the project is consistent with the goals and purposes of the Highlands Act, considering factors such as the project's location on already disturbed lands. View "In the Matter of Proposed Construction of Compressor Station" on Justia Law

Eric Mote, a former Captain in the United States Air Force, sought the removal of a Letter of Admonishment (LOA) and a Non-Judicial Punishment (NJP) from his military records, along with back pay for the fine associated with the NJP. The LOA and NJP were issued following Mote's repeated requests for a "White Heritage Month" at Hill Air Force Base, which were denied by his superiors. Mote's subsequent communications, which were deemed disrespectful, led to the LOA and NJP.The United States Court of Federal Claims reviewed Mote's case and granted judgment on the administrative record in favor of the government, upholding the decision of the Air Force Board for Correction of Military Records (AFBCMR). The Claims Court found that the AFBCMR's decision was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary or capricious. The court also held that the LOA and NJP were not illegal reprisals.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the Claims Court's decision regarding the NJP, finding that the AFBCMR's conclusions were supported by substantial evidence. However, the appellate court vacated the portion of the Claims Court's decision that reviewed the LOA and remanded the case for a determination of whether the Claims Court had jurisdiction over the LOA claim under the Tucker Act. The appellate court emphasized that the Claims Court's jurisdiction to grant non-monetary relief is limited to cases where such relief is incident to a money judgment. View "MOTE v. US " on Justia Law

Jeffrey Harmon and David Beasley, longtime employees of the City of Cincinnati and members of a city-employees union, were placed on leave under a Temporary Emergency Leave (TEL) program implemented in April 2020 in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. They used accrued paid leave during this period and appealed the city's decision to the Cincinnati Civil Service Commission, arguing that the city had not followed proper layoff procedures. The commission determined that the TEL program was not a layoff and denied their request for a hearing, instead holding an "appearance."Harmon and Beasley appealed the commission's decision to the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, which reversed the commission's determination and remanded the matter for a hearing. The city appealed to the First District Court of Appeals, arguing that the common pleas court lacked jurisdiction because the matter was governed by the collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) and the commission's decision was not the result of a quasi-judicial proceeding. The First District held that the common pleas court had jurisdiction under the CBA and R.C. 2506.01, as the commission's decision was an adjudication from a quasi-judicial proceeding.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and affirmed the First District's judgment. The court held that Harmon and Beasley had a right to appeal the commission’s decision under R.C. 2506.01 and were not precluded by R.C. 4117.10. The court determined that the commission was required to hold a hearing under the Cincinnati Civil Service Rules, and its failure to do so did not divest the common pleas court of jurisdiction. The court concluded that the commission's decision was the result of a quasi-judicial proceeding, thus allowing the appeal to the common pleas court. View "Harmon v. Cincinnati" on Justia Law

Hermilo Cantu Silva sustained a gunshot wound when a Border Patrol Agent attempted to apprehend him for suspected illegal entry into the United States. Silva sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), asserting several intentional tort claims and negligence. The case proceeded to a bench trial solely on the negligence claim. At the close of evidence, the trial court raised the potential applicability of the discretionary function exception, which the parties briefed. The trial court determined that the discretionary function exception deprived the court of jurisdiction.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas held a bench trial and, at the close of evidence, raised the issue of the discretionary function exception. The Government filed a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, and Silva responded. The trial court concluded that the discretionary function exception applied, thus depriving the court of jurisdiction over Silva’s FTCA claim. Silva appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The appellate court agreed with the lower court that the discretionary function exception applied. The court found that Agent Mendoza’s decision to draw and not re-holster his firearm was discretionary and grounded in policy considerations, meeting both prongs of the Gaubert test. Consequently, the discretionary function exception precluded subject matter jurisdiction over Silva’s FTCA claim. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the case. View "Silva v. United States" on Justia Law

John Doe, a recipient of vocational rehabilitation services from the California Department of Rehabilitation, sought to have his rent covered while attending a law school outside commuting distance from his home. The Department agreed to cover his tuition and other expenses but refused to pay his rent, classifying it as a non-covered "long-term everyday living expense." Doe argued that rent should be considered "maintenance" under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and related California law, which the Department disputed.An administrative law judge (ALJ) upheld the Department's decision, interpreting the law to allow rent as "maintenance" only for short-term shelter, not for the three-year duration Doe required. The Superior Court of Orange County denied Doe's petition for a writ of mandate, agreeing with the ALJ that three years of rent did not qualify as "short-term shelter."The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that the term "maintenance" under the Rehabilitation Act and California law includes costs incurred in excess of normal expenses while receiving vocational rehabilitation services, without distinguishing between short-term and long-term costs. The court held that the Department's categorical refusal to cover long-term rent as "maintenance" was incorrect. The court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case, directing the Department to reconsider Doe's request for rental assistance based on his individual circumstances, rather than a blanket policy against long-term expenses. View "Doe v. Dept. of Rehabilitation" on Justia Law

David Howard, a former coal miner, worked from 1978 to 1997, with his last employer being Apogee Coal Company, which was self-insured by Arch Resources at the time. Howard filed a claim for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA) in 2014. Initially, the District Director identified Patriot Coal Company as the liable insurer, but after Patriot's bankruptcy, the Department of Labor (DOL) issued a bulletin directing that Arch Resources be notified as the liable insurer. Arch contested this designation but failed to submit evidence within the required timeframe.The District Director issued a Proposed Decision and Order (PDO) naming Arch as the liable insurer. Arch's subsequent motions for discovery and to hold the case in abeyance were denied by the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). Arch then appealed to the Benefits Review Board, which affirmed the ALJ's decision. Arch petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for review, arguing that the DOL's bulletin was a new rule requiring notice and comment, and that the evidentiary procedures violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The Sixth Circuit denied Arch's petition for review and its motion to supplement the administrative record. The court held that the BLBA regulations, which require evidence to be submitted to the District Director within 90 days, were consistent with the APA and did not violate due process. The court also found that the DOL's bulletin did not constitute a new rule requiring notice and comment, as it merely provided guidance and did not alter any rights or obligations. The court concluded that Arch had received adequate notice and an opportunity to defend against its designation as the liable insurer. View "Apogee Coal Co. v. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, property owners in West Virginia, filed a lawsuit against the current and former owners of abandoned oil and gas wells on their properties. They sought damages for the defendants' failure to plug the wells, alleging common law nuisance, trespass, and negligence. The defendants argued that the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection (WVDEP) was responsible for well plugging and that WVDEP had approved transactions between the defendants, which purportedly relaxed their statutory duty to plug the wells. They claimed WVDEP was an indispensable party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 and, because it could not be joined due to sovereign immunity, sought judgment in their favor under Rule 12(c).The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia denied the defendants' motion, ruling that WVDEP was not a necessary and indispensable party under Rule 19. The court concluded that it could grant the plaintiffs damages on their common law claims without implicating the State’s interests. The defendants then filed an interlocutory appeal, arguing that the district court's order was reviewable under the collateral order doctrine, as it effectively denied WVDEP sovereign immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the district court's order did not rule on any immunity issue but only on whether WVDEP was a necessary and indispensable party under Rule 19. The appellate court found that the order did not satisfy the requirements of the collateral order doctrine and was not a final decision. Consequently, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "McEvoy v. Diversified Energy Company PLC" on Justia Law

During Winter Storm Uri, Southwest Power Pool, Inc. (Southwest) contacted Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc. (the Cooperative) to purchase emergency energy. The Cooperative provided the energy, and Southwest compensated the Cooperative according to their existing written contract, known as the Tariff, filed with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). The Cooperative claimed the payment was insufficient and not in line with a separate oral agreement made during the storm. Southwest refused to pay more than the Tariff rate, leading the Cooperative to file a lawsuit in federal district court for breach of contract and equitable claims.Southwest petitioned FERC for a declaratory order asserting primary jurisdiction over the dispute and confirming that the payment was appropriate under the Tariff. FERC agreed, and the Cooperative's petition for rehearing was denied. The Cooperative then sought review from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which denied the petitions, affirming FERC's primary jurisdiction and the applicability of the Tariff rate.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri granted Southwest’s motion to dismiss the Cooperative’s complaint, agreeing with FERC’s jurisdiction and the Tariff’s control over the payment terms. The district court also denied Southwest’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. The Cooperative appealed the dismissal, and Southwest appealed the denial of attorneys’ fees.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo and affirmed the decision, agreeing that FERC had primary jurisdiction and the Tariff controlled the payment terms. The court also affirmed the district court’s denial of attorneys’ fees, finding that the relevant contract provision did not apply to this dispute and that the district court did not abuse its discretion. View "Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Southwest Power Pool, Inc." on Justia Law

During Winter Storm Uri, Southwest Power Pool, Inc. (Southwest) contacted Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc. (the Cooperative) to purchase emergency energy. The Cooperative provided the energy and was subsequently paid by Southwest according to their existing written contract and the rates filed with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). The Cooperative claimed that the payment was insufficient and not in accordance with a separate oral agreement made during the storm. Southwest refused to pay more than the rate in the written contract, leading the Cooperative to file a lawsuit in federal district court for breach of contract and equitable claims.Before the district court made any determinations, Southwest petitioned FERC for a declaratory order asserting that FERC had primary jurisdiction over the dispute and that Southwest had properly compensated the Cooperative. FERC agreed, stating it had primary jurisdiction and that Southwest had appropriately compensated the Cooperative according to the filed rate. The Cooperative then petitioned for review of FERC’s order and the denial of rehearing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the emergency energy transaction was governed by the existing written contract and the rates filed with FERC, not by any separate oral agreement. The court found that FERC had properly exercised primary jurisdiction over the dispute and correctly applied the filed rate doctrine, which mandates that no seller of energy may collect a rate other than the one filed with and approved by FERC. Consequently, the court denied the Cooperative’s petitions for review, affirming that Southwest had not breached its contractual obligations. View "Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. FERC" on Justia Law