Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

GA entered into a blanket purchase agreement (BPA 218), with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) in June 2011, to furnish trained service dogs for disabled veterans. A year later, the contracting officer sent an email questioning GA's performance. On August 31, 2012, the officer sent notice terminating BPA 218 for default and suspending open orders, informing GA that it had the right to appeal under the disputes clause of the contract. On December 21, 2012, GA sent a letter to the VA’s Rehabilitation Research & Development Service, arguing that it had fulfilled its duties and that the default termination should be converted to a termination for the convenience of the government. On February 28, 2013, GA sent the contracting officer a “formal demand.” On March 21, the officer sent a letter stating that she had received the claim but needed supporting documentation. GA began compiling documentation, but on May 3, the officer sent another letter, stating that she would not reconsider her decision, but that GA could appeal under 41 U.S.C. 7104(b). On January 7, 2014, GA filed suit. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed, finding the claim time-barred because, while the February 2013 letter qualified as a request for reconsideration, the officer did not reconsider, so the statute of limitations never tolled. The Federal Circuit reversed. The 12-month statutory appeal period did not begin to run until the officer rejected the request for reconsideration on May 3. View "Guardian Angels Med. Serv. Dogs, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

The California Department of Transportation (CalTrans) and Papich Construction Company, Inc. appealed a trial court’s issuance of a writ of mandate to vacate the award of a public works contract to Papich. DeSilva Gates Construction submitted the second-lowest bid (the first bidder was disqualified for a non-responsive bid), and included the names and description of work by all subcontractors slated to perform work exceeding one-half of one percent of the bid amount. DeSilva later sent a letter to CalTrans noting DeSilva had inadvertently supplied CalTrans with additional information on the subcontractor list "above and beyond what was required." DeSilva explained it had not listed "All Steel Fence" as a subcontractor in its bid because the value of the bid items it would perform was less than one-half of one percent of the bid and the information for All Steel Fence (submitted within 24 hours of the bid) was additional information that was not required. Papich challenged DeSilva’s bid as having changed the subcontractor list. CalTrans rejected DeSilva’s bid as nonresponsive. DeSilva protested CalTrans’s determination that its bid was nonresponsive and protested Papich’s bid. The trial court granted the writ on grounds CalTrans erroneously rejected DeSilva's bid, and erred by awarding the contract to Papich despite Papich’s failure to comply with a material requirement of the information for bids. On appeal, CalTrans and Papich argued DeSilva’s bid was nonresponsive. Appellants also argued CalTrans had discretion to waive Papich’s mistake in failing to acknowledge the addendum to the information for bids. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not err. DeSilva’s disclosure of a subcontractor performing work amounting to only one-tenth of one percent of the total value of the contract was not required by the Public Contract Code or CalTrans’s information for bids. The additional information was accurate, albeit unnecessary, and did not render DeSilva’s bid nonresponsive. By contrast, CalTrans initially declared Papich’s bid to be nonresponsive and then waived Papich’s mistake and determined the bid to be responsive. The Court concluded CalTrans abused its discretion by awarding Papich the contract. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court’s issuance of the writ of mandate. View "DeSilva Gates Construction, LP v. Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

The County Assessor for Eddy County sought to use money in a county property valuation fund (as established by the Legislature in 1986) to contract with a private company for technical assistance in locating and valuing oil and gas property. The County Commission for Eddy County refused to approve the proposed plan because it believed that a contract to pay private, independent contractors to assist the County Assessor in the performance of the Assessor’s statutory duties exceeded the Commission’s lawful authority. The Supreme Court was persuaded that the County Commission did have such authority under law, and that the contract under consideration here would not have exceed that authority or be otherwise ultra vires. The district court having previously issued a declaratory judgment to that same effect, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Robinson v. Bd. of Comm'rs of the Cty. of Eddy" on Justia Law

The U.S. Air Force solicited bids from private companies to supply equipment and services to build a new radar system. Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, and Lockheed Martin cleared early hurdles; each received a solicitation for proposals for Engineering and Manufacturing Development. The Air Force subsequently sent Evaluation Notices to Raytheon and Northrop that “contractors would not be permitted to use IR & D costs to reduce their costs of performing . . . if those costs were implicitly or explicitly required for contract performance.” Raytheon objected; Northrop did not.. The Air Force then changed its view and accepted Raytheon’s treatment of certain costs as IR & D costs, but never communicated its new view to Northrop. In final proposals, Raytheon proposed IR & D cost reductions, whereas Northrop did not. The Air Force awarded the contract to Raytheon. Northrop and Lockheed filed protests with the Government Accountability Office (31 U.S.C. 3551). In response, the Air Force “decided to take corrective action” and to reopen discussions. Raytheon filed a protest under 28 U.S.C. 1491(b) to challenge the decision to take corrective action. The Federal Circuit affirmed denial of the protest, concluding that the reopening decision was proper based on the disparate-information violation. View "Raytheon Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

Appellant, the Greater Boise Auditorium District, filed a petition for judicial confirmation (pursuant to Idaho Code section 7-1304) asking the district court for a determination that a lease the District intended to enter into did not violate the Constitution’s Article VIII, section 3 clause prohibiting a municipal body, without voter approval, from incurring indebtedness or liabilities greater than it has funds to pay for in the fiscal year. Respondent, Boise resident and property owner David Frazier, objected to the requested judicial confirmation, and appeared in the case to contest it. The district court denied the Petition for Judicial Confirmation and the District appealed. Frazier sought attorneys’ fees on appeal. After review, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s denial of the District’s request for judicial confirmation and held that the agreements into which it entered satisfied Article VIII, section 3 of the Constitution. View "Greater Boise Auditorium District v. Frazier" on Justia Law

Mike Layer built a sewer pumping station for Barrow County, and he allegedly entered into an agreement with the County pursuant to which he would retain an interest in a portion of the pumping capacity at the station. Layer, however, failed to get this alleged agreement in writing. After he was refused his alleged interest in the pumping capacity, Layer sued Barrow County, the City of Auburn, and a host of county and city officials (in both their official and individual capacities), asserting breach of contract, unjust enrichment, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, promissory estoppel, and an unconstitutional taking of his property without just compensation. The trial court dismissed his lawsuit, and Layer appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Layer v. Barrow County" on Justia Law

For many years, Idaho County had contracted for solid waste disposal services with Walco, Inc., and Simmons Sanitation Service, Inc., (Simmons Sanitation), with each entity covering a different portion of the county. In July 2012, the County entered into a contract with Simmons Sanitation for another ten-year term beginning on January 1, 2013. However, the County and Walco could not agree upon the terms of another ten-year contract commencing on January 1, 2013. Walco’s counsel informed the County that Walco would not accept the terms proposed by the County and suggested, “given the fact that this contract has not been bid for more than forty (40) years, that the contract should go out for bid.” The County decided not to solicit bids, but instead to solicit proposals for a contract to continue providing solid waste disposal services to that part of the county being served by Walco. The County Recorder received two envelopes containing responses to the request for proposals. One was from Walco and the other was from Simmons Sanitation. The proposals were opened at a public meeting of the county commissioners. Simmons Sanitation submitted a bid lower than that of Walco. A representative from Walco was at the meeting, but no representative of Simmons Sanitation attended. After the Commissioners reviewed the proposals, they had a short discussion with the representative from Walco. At the conclusion of the one meeting, the Commissioners voted to enter into contract negotiations with Simmons Sanitation. They did so, and on November 30, 2012, they entered into a contract for a ten-year term. Thereafter, Walco filed this action against the County and Simmons Sanitation, alleging a claim against the County for tortious interference with a prospective economic advantage and a claim against the County and Simmons Sanitation for misappropriation of Walco’s trade secrets. All of the parties filed motions for summary judgment. In response to the County’s motion, Walco conceded that its tortious interference claim should have been dismissed. The district court granted summary judgment to the Defendants on the claim that they had misappropriated Walco’s trade secrets, concluding that the dollar amount of Walco’s proposal did not constitute a trade secret because Walco had not taken reasonable steps under the circumstances to maintain the secrecy of that information. Walco filed a motion for reconsideration, which the district court denied after briefing and argument. Walco then appealed. Walco contended that one of the provisions in the request for proposals could reasonably be construed as indicating that the dollar amounts of the proposals would not be announced at a public meeting. The Supreme Court concluded that the district court did not err in holding that the dollar amount of Walco’s proposal did not constitute a trade secret because Walco did not make efforts that were reasonable under the circumstances to maintain the secrecy of that information. Therefore, the Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Walco’s complaint. View "Walco, Inc v. County of Idaho" on Justia Law

The State of Alabama, on behalf of Rick Allison, Probate Judge of Walker County, appealed a Walker Circuit Court judgment entered in favor of Jill Farris, the county administrator for Walker County. By statute, Judge Allison, as the chief elections officer for Walker County, must publish certain voter lists and election notices. Judge Allison argued on appeal, as he did in the circuit court, that he had the authority to determine in which newspaper of general circulation notices would be published and that he could also contract with that newspaper for the cost of publishing the notices. Farris argued Judge Allison did not follow established procedure by obtaining competitive bids for the pricing of such publishing. The Supreme Court As chief election officer for Walker County pursuant to statute, Judge Allison could contract to publish the notices he is required to publish. The Court reversed the circuit court's judgment insofar as it held otherwise. The case was remanded for further proceedings, including a determination of whether Judge Allison substantially complied with the competitive-bid law and, if so, whether Judge Allison's request for attorney fees was appropriate. View "State of Alabama ex rel. Allison, v. Farris" on Justia Law

In this case, San Diegans for Open Government (SanDOG) filed a Government Code section 1090 taxpayers' action on behalf of the Sweetwater Union High School District seeking to recover contract payments made to three building contractors, including appellant Har Construction, Inc. SanDOG alleged the District superintendent and several District board members were "financially interested" in the public works contracts and thus the contracts were void. About 16 months after SanDOG filed its first amended complaint, Har Construction moved to dismiss the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute. The court denied the motion because it found SanDOG met its burden to show a probability of prevailing. Har Construction appealed the anti-SLAPP denial order. The Court of Appeal affirmed, but on different grounds. The Court determined Har Construction's motion was untimely and the anti-SLAPP statute was inapplicable because SanDOG's claims fell within the statute's public interest exemption. The Court did not reach the issue whether SanDOG's claims arose out of protected activity and, if so, whether SanDOG met its burden to show a probability of prevailing. View "San Diegans etc. v. Har Construction" on Justia Law

Astornet alleges that it is sole exclusive licensee and owner of all rights in the 844 patent, issued in 2009 to Haddad as the inventor and entitled “Airport vehicular gate entry access system” and asserted the patent against NCR, MorphoTrust USA, and BAE Astornet alleged that the three had contracts with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to supply boarding-pass scanning systems; that TSA’s use of the equipment infringed and would infringe the patent; and that NCR and MorphoTrust were bidding for another contract to supply modified equipment whose use by TSA would also infringe. The Federal Circuit affirmed dismissal, finding that Astornet’s exclusive remedy for the alleged infringement was a suit against the government in the Court of Federal Claims under 28 U.S.C. 1498. View "Astornet Techs., Inc. v. BAE Sys., Inc." on Justia Law