Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant, the Greater Boise Auditorium District, filed a petition for judicial confirmation (pursuant to Idaho Code section 7-1304) asking the district court for a determination that a lease the District intended to enter into did not violate the Constitution’s Article VIII, section 3 clause prohibiting a municipal body, without voter approval, from incurring indebtedness or liabilities greater than it has funds to pay for in the fiscal year. Respondent, Boise resident and property owner David Frazier, objected to the requested judicial confirmation, and appeared in the case to contest it. The district court denied the Petition for Judicial Confirmation and the District appealed. Frazier sought attorneys’ fees on appeal. After review, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s denial of the District’s request for judicial confirmation and held that the agreements into which it entered satisfied Article VIII, section 3 of the Constitution. View "Greater Boise Auditorium District v. Frazier" on Justia Law

Mike Layer built a sewer pumping station for Barrow County, and he allegedly entered into an agreement with the County pursuant to which he would retain an interest in a portion of the pumping capacity at the station. Layer, however, failed to get this alleged agreement in writing. After he was refused his alleged interest in the pumping capacity, Layer sued Barrow County, the City of Auburn, and a host of county and city officials (in both their official and individual capacities), asserting breach of contract, unjust enrichment, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, promissory estoppel, and an unconstitutional taking of his property without just compensation. The trial court dismissed his lawsuit, and Layer appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Layer v. Barrow County" on Justia Law

For many years, Idaho County had contracted for solid waste disposal services with Walco, Inc., and Simmons Sanitation Service, Inc., (Simmons Sanitation), with each entity covering a different portion of the county. In July 2012, the County entered into a contract with Simmons Sanitation for another ten-year term beginning on January 1, 2013. However, the County and Walco could not agree upon the terms of another ten-year contract commencing on January 1, 2013. Walco’s counsel informed the County that Walco would not accept the terms proposed by the County and suggested, “given the fact that this contract has not been bid for more than forty (40) years, that the contract should go out for bid.” The County decided not to solicit bids, but instead to solicit proposals for a contract to continue providing solid waste disposal services to that part of the county being served by Walco. The County Recorder received two envelopes containing responses to the request for proposals. One was from Walco and the other was from Simmons Sanitation. The proposals were opened at a public meeting of the county commissioners. Simmons Sanitation submitted a bid lower than that of Walco. A representative from Walco was at the meeting, but no representative of Simmons Sanitation attended. After the Commissioners reviewed the proposals, they had a short discussion with the representative from Walco. At the conclusion of the one meeting, the Commissioners voted to enter into contract negotiations with Simmons Sanitation. They did so, and on November 30, 2012, they entered into a contract for a ten-year term. Thereafter, Walco filed this action against the County and Simmons Sanitation, alleging a claim against the County for tortious interference with a prospective economic advantage and a claim against the County and Simmons Sanitation for misappropriation of Walco’s trade secrets. All of the parties filed motions for summary judgment. In response to the County’s motion, Walco conceded that its tortious interference claim should have been dismissed. The district court granted summary judgment to the Defendants on the claim that they had misappropriated Walco’s trade secrets, concluding that the dollar amount of Walco’s proposal did not constitute a trade secret because Walco had not taken reasonable steps under the circumstances to maintain the secrecy of that information. Walco filed a motion for reconsideration, which the district court denied after briefing and argument. Walco then appealed. Walco contended that one of the provisions in the request for proposals could reasonably be construed as indicating that the dollar amounts of the proposals would not be announced at a public meeting. The Supreme Court concluded that the district court did not err in holding that the dollar amount of Walco’s proposal did not constitute a trade secret because Walco did not make efforts that were reasonable under the circumstances to maintain the secrecy of that information. Therefore, the Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Walco’s complaint. View "Walco, Inc v. County of Idaho" on Justia Law

The State of Alabama, on behalf of Rick Allison, Probate Judge of Walker County, appealed a Walker Circuit Court judgment entered in favor of Jill Farris, the county administrator for Walker County. By statute, Judge Allison, as the chief elections officer for Walker County, must publish certain voter lists and election notices. Judge Allison argued on appeal, as he did in the circuit court, that he had the authority to determine in which newspaper of general circulation notices would be published and that he could also contract with that newspaper for the cost of publishing the notices. Farris argued Judge Allison did not follow established procedure by obtaining competitive bids for the pricing of such publishing. The Supreme Court As chief election officer for Walker County pursuant to statute, Judge Allison could contract to publish the notices he is required to publish. The Court reversed the circuit court's judgment insofar as it held otherwise. The case was remanded for further proceedings, including a determination of whether Judge Allison substantially complied with the competitive-bid law and, if so, whether Judge Allison's request for attorney fees was appropriate. View "State of Alabama ex rel. Allison, v. Farris" on Justia Law

In this case, San Diegans for Open Government (SanDOG) filed a Government Code section 1090 taxpayers' action on behalf of the Sweetwater Union High School District seeking to recover contract payments made to three building contractors, including appellant Har Construction, Inc. SanDOG alleged the District superintendent and several District board members were "financially interested" in the public works contracts and thus the contracts were void. About 16 months after SanDOG filed its first amended complaint, Har Construction moved to dismiss the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute. The court denied the motion because it found SanDOG met its burden to show a probability of prevailing. Har Construction appealed the anti-SLAPP denial order. The Court of Appeal affirmed, but on different grounds. The Court determined Har Construction's motion was untimely and the anti-SLAPP statute was inapplicable because SanDOG's claims fell within the statute's public interest exemption. The Court did not reach the issue whether SanDOG's claims arose out of protected activity and, if so, whether SanDOG met its burden to show a probability of prevailing. View "San Diegans etc. v. Har Construction" on Justia Law

Astornet alleges that it is sole exclusive licensee and owner of all rights in the 844 patent, issued in 2009 to Haddad as the inventor and entitled “Airport vehicular gate entry access system” and asserted the patent against NCR, MorphoTrust USA, and BAE Astornet alleged that the three had contracts with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to supply boarding-pass scanning systems; that TSA’s use of the equipment infringed and would infringe the patent; and that NCR and MorphoTrust were bidding for another contract to supply modified equipment whose use by TSA would also infringe. The Federal Circuit affirmed dismissal, finding that Astornet’s exclusive remedy for the alleged infringement was a suit against the government in the Court of Federal Claims under 28 U.S.C. 1498. View "Astornet Techs., Inc. v. BAE Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

The Defense Contract Management Agency within the Department of Defense (DOD) employed Vassallo as a computer engineer in 2012. That summer, it announced a vacancy for the position of Lead Interdisciplinary Engineer, stating that only certain individuals could apply: “[c]urrent [DCMA]” employees or “[c]urrent [DOD] [e]mployee[s] with the Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics . . . [w]orkforce who are outside of the Military Components.” Vassallo, a veteran, applied, but DCMA rejected his application. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) determined that DOD was not required to afford him veterans employment preferences under the Veterans Employment Opportunities Act of 1998 (VEOA), 112 Stat. 3182. OPM defines the word “agency” in 5 U.S.C. 3304(f)(1) to mean “Executive agency” as defined in 5 U.S.C. 105 and concluded that DCMA was not required to give Vassallo an opportunity to compete under 5 U.S.C. 3304(f)(1) because the DOD— the agency making the announcement—did not accept applications from outside its own workforce. Vassallo sought corrective action from the Merit Systems Protection Board, which concluded that OPM’s regulation permissibly fills a gap in the governing statute. The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the OPM regulation contradicts the plain terms of the statute and unreasonably undermines the purpose of the VEOA. View "Vassallo v. Dept. of Defense" on Justia Law

Bay County Utilities provides water and sewer services. The County Commissioners establish rates. In 1966, the U.S. Air Force contracted with the County for water services at Tyndall Air Force Base. The parties entered into a sewer services contract in 1985. Both required the parties to renegotiate any new rates. In 1994, Federal Acquisition Regulations were amended to require standardized clauses in utility service contracts. When the government is contracting with an unregulated utility or the utility is subject to non-independent oversight, the parties must negotiate new rates. If the utility is overseen by an independent regulatory body, no further negotiations are required. In 2007 and 2009, Bay County increased water rates. The Air Force ignored those increases, but, in 2009 and 2010, unilaterally modified the water contract, with new rates, lower than the rates set by Bay County. In 2009 Bay County increased sewer rates. The Air Force refused to pay those higher rates, and instituted a unilateral contract modification to moderately increase sewer rates. Bay County submitted unsuccessful Contract Disputes Act claims to recover the unpaid balance of approximately $850,000. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Court of Federal Claims, holding that Bay County is an independent regulatory body and may revise rates in utility contracts without resorting to negotiations with the Air Force. View "Bay Cnty., Fla. v. United States" on Justia Law

Duit, an Oklahoma highway contractor, contracted with the Arkansas State Highway and Transportation Department (ASHTD) to reconstruct I-30 between Little Rock and Benton. Duit encountered soil conditions that, it alleges, differed materially from information provided by the ASHTD during bidding. Duit’s claims for compensation were denied by the ASHTD, the Arkansas State Claims Commission, and the General Assembly. Duit sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, citing the “in re Young” exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Duit alleged violations of the Federal Aid Highway Act, 23 U.S.C. 101, and the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses and sought to “enjoin Defendants from accepting federal aid … until . . . they fully comply with the federally mandated differing site clause.” The court dismissed the FAHA claim because that statute is enforced exclusively by an executive agency, dismissed the due process claim because Duit’s interest in future highway contracts is not a protected property interest and because the state appeals process for claim denials satisfies procedural due process requirements. The court declined to dismiss the equal protection claim, concluding Duit sufficiently alleged that the Commission treated out-of-state-contractor Duit differently from similarly situated in-state contractors without a rational reason. The Eighth Circuit held that Duit lacks standing to bring its equal protection claim and that the court erred in not dismissing that claim. View "Duit Constr. Co. Inc. v. Bennett" on Justia Law

Bridge Company appeals a district court judgment ordering it to donate a toll bridge to the cities of Fargo, North Dakota, and Moorhead, Minnesota, free and clear of all liens. In May 1986, the cities and the Company entered into an agreement for the purpose of construction and operation of a private toll bridge over the Red River connecting the cities. The bridge was completed and started operations on June 1, 1988. The bridge was originally financed with publicly-sponsored bonds issued by Moorhead and capital from an investment firm. In 2004, the cities agreed to allow the Company to refinance the indebtedness, but the refinancing was required to be completely amortized by June 1, 2013, which was 25 years from the commencement of the operation of the bridge. The bank refinancing the debt required personal guarantees from the Company's two shareholders. As of June 1, 2013, the Company owed approximately $75,000 on the refinanced loan. In early September 2013, the Company's two shareholders satisfied their personal guarantees for the debt, and as of September 6, 2013, none of the original indebtedness for construction of the bridge remained outstanding. During the 25-year time span, the Company's records reflected $108,761 was paid for maintenance and repair of the bridge. All of these bills were paid by the Company before February 6, 2014. However, taxes remained owing to Cass County, North Dakota, and Clay County, Minnesota, and the unpaid taxes constituted a lien on the bridge. The district court found that during the 25-year period between June 1, 1988, and June 1, 2013, the bridge was closed 249 days because of flooding on the Red River. Applying an Acts of God clause in the original agreement, the court ruled the 25-year period was extended 249 days to February 5, 2014, and because there was no qualifying debt in existence as of that date, the Company was required to donate the bridge to the cities free and clear of any liens. Because the district court did not err in interpreting the parties' agreement and the court's findings of fact were not clearly erroneous, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "City of Moorhead v. Bridge Co." on Justia Law