Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff brought a claim against the State Procurement Policy Board challenging the validity of Haw. Admin. R. 3-122-66, claiming it was contrary to the “minimum of three” persons requirement in Haw. Rev. Stat. 103D-304(g) and should be struck down. Plaintiff also sought a declaration that every government contract issued under the invalid authority of Rule 3-122-66 was void ab initio. The circuit court concluded that Plaintiff had standing to bring the action and that Rule 3-122-66 was invalid, but the court declined invalidate all contracts issued under Rule 3-122-66. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Petitioner had standing to bring his claim based on his status as an “interested person” and in order to satisfy the “needs of justice”; (2) Rule 3-122-66 is invalid because manifestly exceeds the scope of authority given by the legislature to the Board; and (3) the circuit court did not err in refusing to rule that every government contract issued under Rule 3-122-66 was void ab initio. View "Asato v. State Procurement Policy Bd." on Justia Law

In 2001 KBR agreed to provide the Army with logistics support services during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Individual task orders required KBR to install, operate and maintain dining services near Mosul, Iraq on a cost-plus-award-fee basis. KBR selected ABC, a subcontractor, to build a prefabricated metal dining facility and to provide dining services for a camp population of 2,573. In June 2004, the Army ordered KBR to stop construction of the metal facility and begin construction of a reinforced concrete facility for an estimated 2,573 to 6,200+ persons. Instead of requesting bids for the new work, KBR kept ABC as the subcontractor due to the urgency of the request. ABC submitted a new proposal with a total monthly cost about triple the monthly cost initially quoted. ABC attributed the increased costs to additional labor and equipment to serve a larger population and to a drastic increase in the cost of labor and a severe shortage of staff willing to work in Iraq. Due to a calculation error, it was determined that ABC’s proposal was reasonable. KBR’s management reviewed and approved a change order, embodying ABC’s proposal. In 2005 the subcontract ended and title to the dining facility passed to the Army. In 2007, the Defense Contract Auditing Agency suspended payment of certain costs paid by KBR to ABC pursuant to the change order. KBR prepared a new price justification for the concrete dining facility and ultimately filed suit, seeking recovery of the $12,529,504 in costs disapproved for reimbursement. The Claims Court awarded $6,779,762. The Federal Circuit affirmed.View "Kellogg Brown & Root Servs. v. United States" on Justia Law

The Job Corps program, a national residential training and employment program administered by the Department of Labor, was reformed by the 1998 Workforce Investment Act, which authorized the Secretary of Labor to enter into agreements with government agencies or private organizations to operate “Job Corps centers,” 29 U.S.C. 2887. Adams is the incumbent contractor for the Gadsden and the Shriver Job Corps Centers. When the contracts expired, Adams was disqualified from renewal because of the small business limitation imposed by the Department on the bids. Adams cannot does not qualify as a small business. The limit is $35.5 million in annual receipts, 13 C.F.R. 121.201. After unsuccessful bid protests, the Claims Court and the Federal Circuit upheld the administrative actions against challenges that they were arbitrary. View "Adams & Assocs., Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Mitchell began working as a Social Security Administration lawyer in 1998. The Department of Justice appointed her as a Special Assistant United States Attorney in 2006, a one-year appointment during which she remained an employee of and was paid by, the SSA. The Department extended that appointment, so that she served more than two years in the Special Assistant position. Effective December 21, 2008, the Department hired Mitchell as an AUSA in the same office. The Department’s form 50-B cited 28 U.S.C. 542, which authorizes AUSA appointments generally. The form stated that the appointment was not to exceed 18 months, was “temporary” and “subject to” successful completion of a pending background investigation. The background check concluded in July 2009. In August 2009, the Department provided Mitchell another form 50-B, citing 28 U.S.C. 542, but stating that Mitchell was subject to a two-year trial period beginning August 2, 2009, during which she could be removed without cause or appeal. The Department fired Mitchell days before that period was to end, without notice or opportunity to respond. The Merit Systems Protection Board dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that Mitchell was not an “employee” under 5 U.S.C. 7511(a). The Federal Circuit reversed, reasoning that Mitchell had “completed 2 years of current continuous service in the same or similar positions in an Executive agency under other than a temporary appointment limited to 2 years or less,” considering the time during which the background check was performed.View "Mitchell v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd." on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between Bessemer Water Service (BWS) and Lake Cyrus Development Company, Inc. (LCDC) over a contract referred to as the "1998 water agreement." In "Bessemer I," the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court had exceeded its discretion in holding that the 1998 water agreement was a valid binding contract and in awarding LCDC $224,979.83 because the agreement was entered into violation of section 39-2-2 and was therefore void. On appeal, the Attorney General intervened and filed a complain seeking to recover payments BWS made to LCDC under the 1988 water agreement. The trial court ultimately entered a judgment in favor of the Attorney General (for the benefit of BWS). LCDC thereafter filed a postjudgment motion requesting the trial court alter, amend or vacate its judgment, or in the alternative, order a new trial. The trial court denied LCDC's motion; that denial was brought before the Supreme Court in this case. After review, the Supreme Court held the trial court's denial of LCDC's motion should have been reversed. The case was then remanded for further proceedings. View "Lake Cyrus Development Company, Inc. v. Bessemer Water Service " on Justia Law

Salem, under contract, coordinated Marine Corps Community Services (MCCS) shipments around the country. Estes, a federal motor carrier, handled some shipments under its common carrier tariff, without a written contract. The Salem-MCCS contract provided that Salem would pay carriers directly and invoice MCCS. Salem agreed not to represent itself as a representative of MCCS. All bills of lading indicated that “third party freight charges” were to be billed to “Marine Corps Exchange C/O Salem Logistics.” Delivery receipts specified that charges should be billed to the “Marine Corps Exchange” and were signed by a representative of the MCCS or MCX delivery location. MCCS paid Salem for some of the shipments; Salem never paid Estes. After becoming aware that Salem was not paying carriers, MCCS began paying carriers directly, for shipments for which it had not yet paid Salem. Estes sued Salem and the government, seeking to recover $147,645.33. The Claims Court dismissed, finding that there was no privity of contract between Estes and the government and rejecting a claim under 49 U.S.C. 13706, which governs the liability of consignees for shipping charges incurred by a common carrier. The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding that the bills of lading were sufficient to establish privity. View "Estes Express Lines v. United States" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on a contract dispute between the State of Vermont and Corizon Health, Inc., formerly known as Prison Health Services, Inc. (PHS). The State appealed a declaratory judgment ruling that PHS was not contractually obligated to defend the State and its employees against certain claims brought by the estate of an inmate who died while in the custody of the Department of Corrections.  Upon review of the contract in question, the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that PHS had a duty to defend. View "Vermont v. Prison Health Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Bachner Company and Bowers Investment Company were unsuccessful bidders on a public contract proposal. They filed a claim for intentional interference with prospective economic opportunity against four individual procurement committee members. The superior court found that the bidders failed to present a genuine issue of material fact regarding the committee members' alleged bad faith conduct. The superior court then held that the committee members were protected by qualified immunity and that the lawsuit was barred by the exclusive remedy statute. The bidders thereafter appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the bidders indeed failed to present a genuine issue of material fact regarding the committee members' alleged bad faith. Furthermore, the exclusive remedy statute barred the bidders' suit. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Bachner Company, Inc. v. Weed" on Justia Law

The Village of Bement, Piatt County, has a five-year contract, under which E.R.H. Enterprises operates and maintains the Village’s potable water facility and parts of its water delivery infrastructure. The Department of Labor issued a subpoena to E.R.H.’s attorney seeing employment records as part of an investigation under the Prevailing Wage Act, 820 ILCS 130/0.01. E.R.H. asserted that it was exempt from the Act as a public utility. The trial court ruled in favor of the Department and ordered E.R.H. to provide the requested documents, noting that the company was not regulated by the Illinois Commerce Commission. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, finding that E.R.H. is simply an outside contractor. View "People v. IL Dep't of Labor" on Justia Law

Under the Workforce Investment Act, 29 U.S.C. 2887(a)(2)(A), the Department of Labor administers the Job Corps program, providing education, training, and support services to help at-risk youth obtain employment. There are 125 Job Corps Centers, including Blue Ridge in Marion, Virginia, which Res-Care has operated since 1998. In 2011, DOL published a Request for Information from potential bidders on an upcoming procurement for the operation of Blue Ridge. Res-Care’s contract was to expire in 2013. The Request encouraged firms that qualify as small businesses to respond with a “capabilities statement.” One large and four small businesses submitted statements. Res-Care, a large business, did not submit. The contracting officer found that, based on the responses, DOL would likely receive bids from at least two responsible small businesses at fair market prices, as required by the Federal Acquisition Regulation, 38 C.F.R. 19.502-2(b), and recommended conducting the selection as a small business set-aside. DOL issued a presolicitation notice indicating that the next Blue Ridge contract, with a value of $25 million, would be solicited as a “100% Set-Aside for Small Business.” Res-Care filed a bid protest alleging that DOL violated WIA by setting aside the Blue Ridge contract for small businesses, based on the “competitive basis” provision in section 2887. The Claims Court and Federal Circuit upheld the DOL determination.View "Res-Care, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law