Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Victor Virgin Construction Corporation appealed a Superior Court remitting a jury award following an advisory jury finding of breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation by defendant New Hampshire Department of Transportation (DOT). DOT cross-appealed, asking that the award be further reduced. In 2008, Virgin bid on a DOT project to replace a stone box culvert located underneath Depot Road in Hollis. Virgin submitted the lowest bid and was awarded the contract. After completion of the project, DOT paid Virgin the sum agreed to in the contract with only a minor upward adjustment. Virgin sued DOT for both breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation. The trial court denied DOT's request to bifurcate the trial; subsequently the jury found in favor of Virgin. DOT then moved for a new trial or to set aside the jury's damages award. The trial court granted remittitur, but did no enter a finding of liability on the breach of contract claim, finding that the award could only be sustained on the negligent misrepresentation claim. Virgin then appealed, seeking the full amount of damages awarded by the jury. The Supreme Court found that Virgin's negligent misrepresentation claim for money damages was capped by statute, therefore it was not entitled to the full amount of damages originally awarded by the jury. That cap does not apply to breach of contract, however, and because the trial court did not include findings with regard to liability on the breach of contract claim, the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Victor Virgin Construction Corp. v. New Hampshire Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

Like many Michigan municipalities, Pontiac has experienced significant economic difficulties, especially since 2008. Michigan’s Governor appointed Schimmel as Pontiac’s emergency manager. Acting under Michigan’s then-existing emergency manager law (Public Act 4), in 2011, Schimmel modified the collective bargaining agreements of Pontiac’s retired employees and modified severance benefits, including pension benefits, that Pontiac had given retirees not covered by collective bargaining agreements. The retired employees claim that Schimmel and Pontiac violated their rights under the Contracts Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Bankruptcy Clause. The district court denied the retirees an injunction. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for expedited consideration of state law issues. Michigan voters have since rejected Public Act 4 by referendum, which may have rendered Schimmel’s actions void.The court also questioned whether two-thirds of both houses of the Michigan Legislature voted to make Public Act 4 immediately effective. The court noted that similar issues face many Michigan municipalities. View "City of Pontiac Retired Emps. Ass'n v. Schimmel" on Justia Law

In 2011, the Forest Service solicited proposals for 34 line items, calling for a negotiated procurement process pursuant to Federal Acquisition Regulation Part 15. Each line item sought heavy or medium exclusive use helicopters for large fire support, tailored for a specific base and meeting performance specifications for operation at that base. Croman, an unsuccessful bidder, filed suit, alleging that the Forest Service’s evaluations of proposals did not have rational bases and were contrary to law. The Claims Court granted the government judgment on the administrative record. The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that the Forest Service had a rational basis for its decision to partially cancel the solicitation and that the Service conducted a proper tradeoff analysis so that its decision was reasonable. View "Croman Corporation v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2009 the Fire Protection District passed an ordinance under which it took over fire alarm monitoring for all commercial properties in the District. Private alarm companies that had previously provided that service sued, alleging interference with their business, illegal monopoly, violations of constitutional rights, and exceeding statutory powers. Before the district court issued an opinion on remand, the District repealed the 2009 ordinance. Under a new ordinance, the District would not own any transmitters and would permit property owners to contract with private companies for alarm transmission, monitoring, and equipment; signals would still be transmitted via the District’s network to the District’s receiver. The district court entered a modified permanent injunction, requiring the District to permit alarm companies to receive and transmit signals directly from property alarm boards, independently of the District. The injunction barred the District from requiring that fire signals be sent to its station, charging residents for fire protection services, or selling or leasing fire alarm system equipment. It required the District to allow alarm companies to use any technology equivalent to wireless transmission and compliant with the NFPA code, to adopt the most current version of the NFPA code, and to refund fees. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as modified. The new injunction sets appropriate boundaries and does not contravene the earlier decision in most ways. The court struck provisions requiring refunds to subscribers and requiring the District to adopt the most current versions of the NFPA code. View "ADT Sec. Servs., Inc. v. Chicago Metro. Fire Prevention Co." on Justia Law

The Authority was formed under Ga. Code 46-4-82(a) to provide member municipalities with natural gas. It operates as a non-profit, distributing profits and losses to member municipalities: 64 in Georgia, two in Tennessee, 12 in other states. It pays its own operating expenses and judgments; it is exempt from state laws on financing and investment for state entities and has discretion over accumulation, investment, and management of its funds. It sets its governance rules; members elect leaders from among member municipalities. Smyrna, Tennessee has obtained gas from the Authority since 2000, using a pipeline that does not run through Georgia. The Authority entered a multi-year “hedge” contract for gas acquisition, setting price and volume through 2014, and passed the costs on. The market price of natural gas then fell due to increased hydraulic fracturing (fracking), but Smyrna was still paying the higher price. Smyrna sued for breach of contract, violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment. The district court denied the Authority’s motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity under Georgia law and the Eleventh Amendment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that the Authority’s claim that any entity referred to as a state “instrumentality” in a Georgia statute is entitled to state-law sovereign immunity “requires quite a stretch of the imagination.” View "Town of Smyrna, TN v. Mun. Gas Auth. of GA" on Justia Law

Triple A, a Michigan corporation, has offices in Dearborn, Michigan, the Congo (previously known as Zaire), and Sierra Leone. In 1993, Zaire ordered military equipment worth $14,070,000 from Triple A. A South Korean manufacturer shipped the equipment to Zaire at Triple A’s request. For 17 years, Triple A sought payment from Zaire and then the Congo without success. In 2010, Triple A sued the Congo for breach of contract. The district court dismissed the case, citing lack of jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1602. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, citing the language of the Act, under which federal courts have jurisdiction “in any case in which the action is based upon” the following: [1] a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or [2] upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or [3] upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States. View "Triple A Int'l, Inc. v. Democratic Republic of the Congo" on Justia Law

The Canal Authority appealed the district court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Interior, Bureau, San Luis, and Wetlands, in a suit to establish priority water rights under Central Valley Project (CVP) water service contracts. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants, holding that all claims arising before February 11, 2004 were time-barred and that Canal Authority was not entitled to priority water allocation under the CVP contracts. The court affirmed the district court's decision on the alternative basis that California Water Code 11460 did not require the Bureau to provide CVP contractors priority water rights, because contracts between the Canal Authority and Bureau contained provisions that specifically address allocation of water during shortage periods. View "Tehama-Colusa Canal Auth. v. U.S. Dept. of Interior" on Justia Law

Hosea O. Weaver & Sons, Inc. appealed a jury verdict in favor of Ira Balch, personal representative of the Estate of Danny Balch, and Melvin Balch, personal representative of the estates of Bernard Balch and Armie Balch. The matter stemmed from a road-resurfacing project conducted by the Alabama Department of Transportation (ALDOT). ALDOT hired Weaver to complete the project. The Balches were traveling on the portion of the road resurfaced by Weaver when the vehicle they were riding in was hit head-on by a tractor-trailer. Their personal representatives filed wrongful-death actions against Weaver and others, alleging that Weaver negligently performed the resurfacing project, and that negligent performance caused the deaths of the Balches. The trial court denied Weaver's prejudgment motions, and the jury returned a verdict in the estates' favor. Weaver appealed the denial of its postjudgment motion, and alleged multiple errors at trial in its argument to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Weaver owed no duty to the decedents, and therefore was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Court reversed the trial court and entered a judgment in favor of Weaver. View "Hosea O. Weaver & Sons, Inc. v. Balch" on Justia Law

The 1987 Public Utilities Act, 220 ILCS 5/8-403.1, was intended to encourage development of power plants that convert solid waste to electricity. Local electric utilities were required to enter into 10-year agreements to purchase power from such plants designated as “qualified” by the Illinois Commerce Commission, at a rate exceeding that established by federal law. The state compensated electric utilities with a tax credit. A qualified facility was obliged to reimburse the state for tax credits its customers had claimed after it had repaid all of its capital costs for development and implementation. Many qualified facilities failed before they repaid their capital costs, so that Illinois never got its tax credit money back. The Act was amended in 2006, to establish a moratorium on new Qualified Facilities, provide additional grounds for disqualifying facilities from the subsidy, and expand the conditions that trigger a facility’s liability to repay electric utilities’ tax credits. The district court held that the amendment cannot be applied retroactively. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The amendment does not clearly indicate that the new repayment conditions apply to monies received prior to the amendment and must be construed prospectively. View "Illinois v. Chiplease, Inc." on Justia Law

The Town of Kearny hired Brandt-Kuybida Architects to design and plan the construction of a new public safety facility. Construction began in 1994. The general contractor, Belcor Construction, signed a "Certificate of Substantial Completion" in late 1995. Approximately ten days later, the architects signed the same Certificate. The Certificate defined the date of substantial completion in language similar to that of the construction contract. The signatories to the Certificate, however, left the "date of issuance" and the "date of completion" of the project blank. In Spring1996, the Town's Construction Official issued the first Temporary Certificate of Occupancy (TCO), limited to the police section of the building. Structural defects in the facility surfaced shortly after the Kearny Police Department took occupancy, including leaks, buckled tiles and cracks in the walls. By 2007, ceilings in the facility had fallen and pipes had separated and pulled, all of which were attributed to uneven settlement. The Town never issued a final certificate of occupancy and on February 8, 2007, had the building vacated. Belcor initiated arbitration proceedings against the Town because the Town withheld final payment under the contract. Belcor and the Town resolved their dispute by Stipulation of Settlement. Both the Stipulation of Settlement and the related Town of Kearny Resolution identified the date of substantial completion of the facility as February 1, 1996. The issues before the Supreme Court were: (1) when could a building be considered substantially complete for purposes of calculating the ten-year period of the statute of repose; and (2) whether the Comparative Negligence Act and the Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Law authorized the allocation of fault to defendants who obtained dismissals pursuant to the statute of repose. The Supreme Court concluded after review that (1) the ten year period of the statute of repose started when the first Temporary Certificate of Occupancy was issued for the facility; and (2) when the claims against a defendant are dismissed on statute of repose grounds, fault may be apportioned to the dismissed defendant under the Comparative Negligence Act and the Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Law. View "Townof Kearny v. Brandt" on Justia Law