Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 1998 Prazen retired as superintendent of the City of Peru electrical department. He had more than 27 years of service and purchased five years of age-enhancement credit. Prazen had an unincorporated electrical business, which was incorporated just before he retired. Before he retired, the City entered into an agreement with his corporation for operation of the City’s electrical department, including management and supervision. First year compensation under the contract was about $7,000 higher than Prazen’s prior annual salary. The relationship lasted until 2009, when the corporation was dissolved. In 2010, the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund notified Prazen that, after participating in the early retirement incentive plan, he had violated the statutory prohibitions (40 ILCS 5/7-141.1(g)) against returning to work. The Fund recalculated his years of service as 27 and claimed he should repay $307,100 as a statutory forfeiture. The circuit court agreed. The appellate court reversed and the Illinois Supreme Court agreed. The work done between 1999 and 2009 was done by a separate corporate entity and was not precluded by statute. If the legislature had wanted to specifically prohibit this, it could have said so. The statute does not show intent to prohibit outsourcing to a retired employee’s corporation and the legislature did not grant the Trustees of the Fund authority to find that a corporation was a “guise.” The court noted that, earlier in the period under consideration, the Board had expressed the view that what the arrangement was p View "Prazen v. Shoop" on Justia Law

The pro se plaintiff sued her former employer, a private recipient of federal funding, alleging violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794, by requiring her to complete certain duties as a dental assistant that she was incapable of performing due to an unspecified disability that limits her strength and mobility, and then firing her because of her disability. The district judge dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Seventh Circuit reversed. A plaintiff under the Rehabilitation Act against a recipient of federal money is not required to exhaust the administrative remedies that the Act provides; an employee or former employee of a private company, such as the plaintiff, is not required Act to even file an administrative charge or complaint. View "Williams v. Milwaukee Health Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

The Department of Human Services revoked a contractor's eligibility to provide home delivered meals to Medicaid clients because the contractor breached its contract with the department by failing to comply with certain food preparation and delivery standards. The contractor, Homestyle Direct, objected to the revocation, arguing that the standards in the contract were not enforceable because they should have been promulgated as administrative rules. The department rejected those arguments, concluding that whether the standards could have been promulgated as administrative rules was irrelevant to their enforceability as terms of a contract. The Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the department could not enforce unpromulgated rules as terms of a contract. The Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court and reversed its decision. The Court affirmed the final order of the department. View "Homestyle Direct, LLC v. DHS" on Justia Law

Project labor agreements (PLAs) are used in the construction industry to set common conditions of employment for large projects involving multiple subcontractors and unions. On a public construction project, a PLA can be entered into by the governmental unit paying for the project or by its general contractor; the other party is a labor organization. If the governmental unit enters into a PLA, all contractors bidding on the project must agree to abide by it. Opponents argue that PLAs discourage nonunion contractors from bidding on government contracts and increase construction costs. Proponents, such as the trades councils, claim that PLAs enhance job-site cooperation and reduce labor disputes. The federal government has gone back and forth on allowing PLAs. Michigan passed the first version of the Fair and Open Competition in Governmental Construction Act in 2011, restricting the use of PLAs on publicly funded projects. Following entry of an injunction, that version was superseded by an amended act, passed in 2012. The district court enjoined the current version as preempted by the National Labor Relations Act. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the act furthers Michigan’s proprietary goal of improving efficiency in public construction projects, and is no broader than necessary to meet those goals. View "MI Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Snyder" on Justia Law

Before the invasion of Iraq, KBR entered into contracts with the U.S. Army for the provision of dining facility (DFAC) services in Iraq. The contract at issue was for DFAC services at Camp Anaconda, one of the largest U.S. bases in Iraq. KBR subcontracted with Tamimi to provide services in Anaconda. As troop levels increased, the Defense Contract Auditing Agency (DCAA) engaged in audits of DFAC subcontracts. With respect to Anaconda, the DCAA concluded that KBR had charged $41.1 million in unreasonable costs for services provided from July 2004 to December 2004 and declined to pay KBR that amount. KBR sued and the government brought counterclaims, including a claim under the Anti-Kickback Act. The Court of Federal Claims held that KBR was entitled to $11,460,940.31 in reasonable costs and dismissed the majority of the government’s counterclaims, but awarded $38,000.00 on the AKA claim. The Federal Circuit affirmed the determination of cost reasonableness and dismissal of the government’s Fraud and False Claims Act claims and common-law fraud claim. The court remanded in part, holding that the Claims Court improperly calculated KBR’s base fee and erred in determining that the actions of KBR’s employees should not be imputed to KBR for purposes of the AKA. . View "Kellogg Brown & Root Servs, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Victor Virgin Construction Corporation appealed a Superior Court remitting a jury award following an advisory jury finding of breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation by defendant New Hampshire Department of Transportation (DOT). DOT cross-appealed, asking that the award be further reduced. In 2008, Virgin bid on a DOT project to replace a stone box culvert located underneath Depot Road in Hollis. Virgin submitted the lowest bid and was awarded the contract. After completion of the project, DOT paid Virgin the sum agreed to in the contract with only a minor upward adjustment. Virgin sued DOT for both breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation. The trial court denied DOT's request to bifurcate the trial; subsequently the jury found in favor of Virgin. DOT then moved for a new trial or to set aside the jury's damages award. The trial court granted remittitur, but did no enter a finding of liability on the breach of contract claim, finding that the award could only be sustained on the negligent misrepresentation claim. Virgin then appealed, seeking the full amount of damages awarded by the jury. The Supreme Court found that Virgin's negligent misrepresentation claim for money damages was capped by statute, therefore it was not entitled to the full amount of damages originally awarded by the jury. That cap does not apply to breach of contract, however, and because the trial court did not include findings with regard to liability on the breach of contract claim, the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Victor Virgin Construction Corp. v. New Hampshire Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

Like many Michigan municipalities, Pontiac has experienced significant economic difficulties, especially since 2008. Michigan’s Governor appointed Schimmel as Pontiac’s emergency manager. Acting under Michigan’s then-existing emergency manager law (Public Act 4), in 2011, Schimmel modified the collective bargaining agreements of Pontiac’s retired employees and modified severance benefits, including pension benefits, that Pontiac had given retirees not covered by collective bargaining agreements. The retired employees claim that Schimmel and Pontiac violated their rights under the Contracts Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Bankruptcy Clause. The district court denied the retirees an injunction. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for expedited consideration of state law issues. Michigan voters have since rejected Public Act 4 by referendum, which may have rendered Schimmel’s actions void.The court also questioned whether two-thirds of both houses of the Michigan Legislature voted to make Public Act 4 immediately effective. The court noted that similar issues face many Michigan municipalities. View "City of Pontiac Retired Emps. Ass'n v. Schimmel" on Justia Law

In 2011, the Forest Service solicited proposals for 34 line items, calling for a negotiated procurement process pursuant to Federal Acquisition Regulation Part 15. Each line item sought heavy or medium exclusive use helicopters for large fire support, tailored for a specific base and meeting performance specifications for operation at that base. Croman, an unsuccessful bidder, filed suit, alleging that the Forest Service’s evaluations of proposals did not have rational bases and were contrary to law. The Claims Court granted the government judgment on the administrative record. The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that the Forest Service had a rational basis for its decision to partially cancel the solicitation and that the Service conducted a proper tradeoff analysis so that its decision was reasonable. View "Croman Corporation v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2009 the Fire Protection District passed an ordinance under which it took over fire alarm monitoring for all commercial properties in the District. Private alarm companies that had previously provided that service sued, alleging interference with their business, illegal monopoly, violations of constitutional rights, and exceeding statutory powers. Before the district court issued an opinion on remand, the District repealed the 2009 ordinance. Under a new ordinance, the District would not own any transmitters and would permit property owners to contract with private companies for alarm transmission, monitoring, and equipment; signals would still be transmitted via the District’s network to the District’s receiver. The district court entered a modified permanent injunction, requiring the District to permit alarm companies to receive and transmit signals directly from property alarm boards, independently of the District. The injunction barred the District from requiring that fire signals be sent to its station, charging residents for fire protection services, or selling or leasing fire alarm system equipment. It required the District to allow alarm companies to use any technology equivalent to wireless transmission and compliant with the NFPA code, to adopt the most current version of the NFPA code, and to refund fees. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as modified. The new injunction sets appropriate boundaries and does not contravene the earlier decision in most ways. The court struck provisions requiring refunds to subscribers and requiring the District to adopt the most current versions of the NFPA code. View "ADT Sec. Servs., Inc. v. Chicago Metro. Fire Prevention Co." on Justia Law

The Authority was formed under Ga. Code 46-4-82(a) to provide member municipalities with natural gas. It operates as a non-profit, distributing profits and losses to member municipalities: 64 in Georgia, two in Tennessee, 12 in other states. It pays its own operating expenses and judgments; it is exempt from state laws on financing and investment for state entities and has discretion over accumulation, investment, and management of its funds. It sets its governance rules; members elect leaders from among member municipalities. Smyrna, Tennessee has obtained gas from the Authority since 2000, using a pipeline that does not run through Georgia. The Authority entered a multi-year “hedge” contract for gas acquisition, setting price and volume through 2014, and passed the costs on. The market price of natural gas then fell due to increased hydraulic fracturing (fracking), but Smyrna was still paying the higher price. Smyrna sued for breach of contract, violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment. The district court denied the Authority’s motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity under Georgia law and the Eleventh Amendment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that the Authority’s claim that any entity referred to as a state “instrumentality” in a Georgia statute is entitled to state-law sovereign immunity “requires quite a stretch of the imagination.” View "Town of Smyrna, TN v. Mun. Gas Auth. of GA" on Justia Law