Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 2004 Taylor, an employee of the IRS, began applying for promotions and transfers, and was rejected until she received a promotion in 2006. In 2004, after being denied a promotion, Taylor filed her first discrimination complaint and was assigned to work in a unit supervised by Shields. While working in this unit, Taylor alleges that Shields took several retaliatory actions against Taylor, including written reprimands, a three-day suspension without pay, and providing negative references for Taylor to prospective employers. Based on these alleged actions, Taylor filed additional complaints for retaliation. In 2005, the IRS and Taylor entered into a settlement agreement. Taylor subsequently alleged noncompliance by the IRS. In 2006 and 2008, the agency issued decisions concluding that although the IRS had breached the agreement, it was currently in compliance. Taylor did not appeal either decision, but filed a complaint alleging retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(a) and breach-of-settlement-agreement. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to the breach claim, holding that Congress has not waived sovereign immunity with respect to such claims, but reversed with respect to retaliation.View "Taylor v. Geithner" on Justia Law

The Department of Defense issued a solicitation seeking offers for a multiple award, indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contract for information technology services. The agency described the services as “Net-Centric Integrated Enterprise Information Technology Services,” including help desk, server, network, and applications support services. The solicitation instructed bidders to submit separate bids for the Basic Contract, Task Order 1, and Task Order 2. Every bidder, including Comint, submitted separate bids. The Department then limited the initial award to the Basic Contract and amended the solicitation. Comint acknowledged the amendment. The Source Selection Evaluation Board evaluated each proposal according to factors in the solicitation, the most important of which was “Quality/Capability.” The Board rated Comint’s proposal as “marginal,” concluding that Comint had a “moderate to high associated risk of unsuccessful performance.” The district court rejected Comint’s challenge of the award to another bidder; Comint lacked standing to challenge the solicitation or award because the agency had not erred in rejecting Comint’s bid on technical grounds. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that Comint failed to preserve its right to challenge the solicitation by failing to raise objections before award and that Comint has not demonstrated standing to protest the agency’s failure to award it a contract. View "Comint Sys. Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law

Ruppel sued CBS in Illinois alleging CBS’s predecessor, Westinghouse, caused the mesothelioma from which he suffers. Westinghouse had included asbestos in the turbines it supplied to the U.S. Navy, and Ruppel was allegedly exposed to it during his Naval service and later when he worked on an aircraft carrier as a civilian. CBS removed the case under the federal officer removal statute, which permits removal of certain suits where a defendant that acted under a federal officer has a colorable federal defense, 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1). Ruppel moved to remand and, without allowing response, the district court granted the motion. The district court concluded Ruppel only sued CBS for failing to warn about the dangers of asbestos for which there is no federal defense. The Seventh Circuit reversed. CBS’s relationship with Ruppel arises solely out of CBS’s duties to the Navy. It also has a colorable argument for the government contractor defense, which immunizes government contractors when they supply products with specifications approved by the government. View "Ruppel v. CBS Corp." on Justia Law

The Phenix City Board of Education ("the Board") sought mandamus relief from the Russell Circuit Court's denial of the Board's motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for a summary judgment on claims brought against it by The Lisle Company, Inc. ("Lisle"). Because the Board is immune from suit pursuant to § 14, Ala. Const. 1901, the Supreme Court granted the Board's petition and issued the writ. View "Lisle Company, Inc. v. Phenix City Board of Education" on Justia Law

In 1993, Bowers and the FAA entered into a lease for office and warehouse space. The FAA agreed to monthly payments, $19,509, beginning in January 1994, payable each month “in arrears.” The parties modified the lease eight times until termination on September 30, 2006. In 2008, Bowers filed a claim of $82,203.72 with the contracting officer (41 U.S.C. 7103(a)(1)), for the final month’s rent and property damage. Bowers claimed that because the contract provided for payment “in arrears,” payment made in September, 2006 was for the August rent. The contracting officer held that rent was actually paid in advance, but allowed other, minor, claims. Before the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals, Bowers attempted to establish that the FAA had not paid rent for three months in 1994. CBCA rejected the attempt and Bowers signed a certificate of finality. In 2009 Bowers submitted two more claims: $56,640.78 (plus interest) for assertedly unpaid rent for January, February, and March of 1994 and that the FAA underpaid by $664 every month from October 1, 1998 to October 1, 2006, a total of $64,408.00 (plus interest). The contracting officer denied the claims. The Claims Court held that the CBCA’s final decision precluded the litigation. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Bowers Inv. Co, LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2007 the Postal Service awarded Tip Top a contract under which the Postal Service would assign individual projects by issuing work orders. In 2009, the Postal Service issued a work order to replace the air conditioning system at the Main Post Office in Christiansted, Virgin Islands, for the price of $229,736.92. As a result of that work Tip Top submitted a claim and request for an equitable adjustment under the Contract Disputes Act, 41 U.S.C. 7101-7109, in the amount of $34,553.77, consisting of a subcontractor’s price for a change, plus 10% profit, 4% insurance, and 4% gross receipts tax, plus $9,655 for “Preparation Costs & Extended Overhead” and $2,745 for “Legal Fees.” The Postal Service Board of Contract Appeals ruled that Tip Top was entitled to recover $2,565. The Board ruled that Tip Top was not entitled to recover the balance of the amount claimed because it had failed to demonstrate that the costs at issue were incurred as a result of the change order. The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded, with directions to grant the appeal in its entirety. The ruling was based upon an error of law and not supported by substantial evidence. View "Tip Top Constr., Inc.v. Donahoe" on Justia Law

TriCenturion audited Nichole Medical as a Program Safeguard Contractor under the Medicare Integrity Program, 42 U.S.C. 395ddd(a), and concluded that Nichole “might” be improperly billing for medical equipment; that Nichole had received overpayments; and that it had not maintained sufficient medical records to establish reasonableness or medical necessity. TriCenturion directed Nichole’s carrier, HealthNow, to withhold payments. TriCenturion calculated the actual overpayment of several specific claims, used those as a representative sampling, and extrapolated an overpayment amount for all relevant claims. The Attorney General found no evidence of fraud and refused to prosecute; HealthNow stopped withholding payments. TriCenturion instructed HealthNow’s successor to re-institute the offset. Nichole went out of business, but pursued an appeal. An ALJ determined that Nichole was entitled to reimbursement on some, but not all, appealed claims and found that the process for arriving at the extrapolated overpayment was flawed. The Medicare Appeals Council found that all 39 claims had been reopened and reviewed improperly. The district court dismissed Nichole’s suit against TriCenturion, which alleged torts and breach of the statutory duty of care under 42 U.S.C. 1320c-6(b). The Third Circuit affirmed. Defendants are immune from suit as officers or employees of the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services. View "Nichole Medical Equip & Supply, Inc. v. Tricenturion, Inc." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a dispute over the proper calculation of royalty payments on state oil and gas leases. Over the years, the Legislature has enacted several versions of the statutory oil and gas lease, and Lessees have entered into “hundreds” of oil and gas leases with the State. Specifically, the New Mexico Legislature enacted statutory oil and gas leases in 1919, 1925, 1927, 1929, 1931, 1945, 1947 and 1984. This appeal concerned the royalty clauses contained in the 1931 and the 1947 statutory lease forms. Both the 1931 lease and 1947 lease specified that the payment of royalty was to be calculated as a percentage of the “net proceeds” resulting from the sale of gas. During 2005 and 2006 Commissioner audited ConocoPhillips Company and Burlington Resources Oil & Gas Company’s royalty payments. Following the Audit, Commissioner notified Lessees that they had been underpaying their royalty obligations and issued them assessments for the underpayment. The Commissioner claimed that pursuant to the terms of the statutory lease forms Lessees could not deduct the post-production costs necessary to prepare the gas for the commercial market when calculating their royalty payments. Commissioner claimed that the improper deductions for post-production costs resulted in ConocoPhillips underpaying royalties by approximately $18.9 million and Burlington underpaying by approximately $5.6 million. In response to Commissioner’s audit and assessments, Lessees filed a complaint in the district court seeking a declaration that Commissioner’s assessment of additional royalty constituted a deprivation of due process, an unconstitutional impairment of contract, and breach of contract. In addition, Lessees claimed that Commissioner had exceeded his constitutional and statutory powers by issuing the assessments and had effectively usurped legislative power by seeking royalty payments under calculation methods not approved by the Legislature. In response, Commissioner alleged a host of counterclaims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of the implied covenant to market. This appeal pertained to three orders granting summary judgment on behalf of Lessees and a fourth order denying Commissioner’s motion for reconsideration of the district court’s previous dismissal of his counterclaim for breach of the implied covenant to market. In the first order, the district court granted Lessees’ motion for summary judgment. Upon review of the several orders and claims before the Supreme Court on appeal, the Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment. View "ConocoPhillips Co. v. Lyons" on Justia Law

In August 2008 Ellington accepted the position of Deputy Clerk of the City Council of East Cleveland. The City Council wanted him, but then-Mayor, Brewer, stood in the way. After resolution of an approximately three-month-long standoff between the sides, Ellington began receiving regular paychecks and compensation for wages unpaid since he had begun performing services. Ellington sued, claiming that failure to issue him paychecks between August 2008 and November 2008 violated the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201–219, article II, section 34a of the Ohio Constitution; and the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act, Ohio Rev. Code 4111.01–.99. The district court concluded that Ellington, as an employee of the City Council, was subject to the “legislative employee” exclusions to the federal and state minimum wage and overtime provisions and granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. To conclude that Ellington, who has been found to be an employee of a legislative body, is covered by the FLSA because, as Deputy Clerk of Council, he is also part of the City of East Cleveland’s workforce would effectively excise the FLSA’s “legislative employee” exclusion.

The Franklin County Sheriff's Office appealed the trial court's judgment in favor of the St. Albans City Police Department. The Sheriff's Office contended that the City Police Department engaged in an unfair method of competition with the intent to harm competition under the Vermont Consumer Fraud Act's (VCFA) predatory pricing provision. Specifically, the Sheriff's Office argued that the City Police Department submitted an "artificially low" bid in response to the Town of St. Albans's request for proposals for law enforcement services. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed. "Here, the 'competitors' are all statutorily created entities, meaning that one entity cannot lower its prices so as to put another out of business, nor can potential entrants be deterred from entering the 'market' because the statutory scheme allows no new entrants. Although there is competition within a limited sphere as between the statutorily empowered entities, there is no threat of monopolization by any one of them. Thus, the Sheriff's Office's injuries alleged in the complaint do not fall within the zone of interests to be protected by Vermont's predatory pricing statute. . . .the Sheriff's Office was not denied something in which it had a legally protected interest, nor is its claim within the zone of interests protected by the statute, and it therefore lack[ed] constitutional and prudential standing."