Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The City of Newkirk and Kay Electric Cooperative both provide electricity to Oklahoma consumers. "When a city acts as a market participant it generally has to play by the same rules as everyone else. It can't abuse its monopoly power or conspire to suppress competition. Except sometimes it can. If the city can show that its parent state authorized it to upend normal competition [. . . ] the city enjoys immunity from federal antitrust liability. The problem for the City of Newkirk in this case is that the state has done no such thing." Kay sued Newkirk alleging that the City engaged in unlawful tying and attempted monopolization in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1,2. The district court refused to allow the case to proceed, granting Newkirk's motion to dismiss after it found the City "immune" from liability as a matter of law. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found that the state did not authorize Newkirk to enter the local electricity market as it did in this case. The Court reversed the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The qui tam suit, brought by a former contractor for one of the defendants, alleges that defendants violated the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729(a)(1) in connection with a sale of F-16 fighter jets to Greece, which paid for the jets with money borrowed from the United States. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. An FCA claim requires proof of an objective falsehood. There was no evidence to support allegations: that defendant lied about use of funds loaned by the U.S. to capitalize a Greek business development company; that defendant failed to disclose promptly its decision to delete a price adjustment clause from the draft contract; that defendant made misrepresentations relating to provisions concerning spare part purchases and an ill-fated "depot program;" and concerning a number of misrepresentations in two amendments to the contract.

Twenty three former tribal employees sued the Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma for breach of employment contracts. The contracts contained a limited waiver of sovereign immunity. Tribal law requires that waiver of sovereign immunity must be consented to by the Business Committee of the Tribe by resolution. The trial judge, on motion for reconsideration, granted the Tribe's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the case. On appeal, the question before the Supreme Court was whether the Tribe expressly and unequivocally waived its sovereign immunity with respect to Plaintiffs' employment contracts. Upon review of the contracts and the applicable tribal resolutions and legal standards, the Supreme Court held that waiver of sovereign immunity was neither expressed nor consented to in the Business Committee's resolutions that authorized the Chief to sign the employment contracts. The Court affirmed the lower courtâs decision.

The State Ethics Commission (Commission) appealed from an order of the Commonwealth Court that reversed the Commission's findings that Appellee Kenneth Kistler had violated two provisions of the Public Official and Employee Ethics Act (Act). Appellee was a member of the Carbon-Lehigh Intermediate Unit's (CLIU) board of directors from 1998 to 2002. As chairman of the building committee, Appellee was charged with pursuing the board's interests in various construction projects. Appellee also owned two building supply businesses. In late 1999, the board explored the possibility of constructing a garage in which to house its buses. The project's architect contacted Appellee as possible supplier for the project. Subsequently, Appellee resigned from his position with CLIU as a possible conflict-of-interest. At a board meeting, the solicitor for the CLIU opined that Appellee could "properly participate" in construction of the garage, but that he should abstain from any votes relating to that project. More projects were planned, and Appellee's businesses were again considered as suppliers. By this time, Appellee had withdrawn completely from participation with the CLIU's building committee. In 2004, the Commission notified Appellee that he was being investigated for possible violations of the Ethics Act. The Commission thereafter concluded that Appellee unintentionally violated the Act three times. The Commonwealth Court reversed the Commissionâs decision. In its interpretation of the Ethics Act, the court found no evidence that Appellee's participation in the building committee's discussions lead to the committee's choosing his private businesses for its building projects. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Commonwealth Court correctly interpreted the Ethics Act and affirmed its decision.

The Department of Justice issued a request for quotations for an automated recruiting and staffing system, providing that conflicting provisions would be considered as exceptions to the terms of the RFQ, and noting that any exceptions could adversely impact the evaluation rating. Plaintiff's bid included exceptions relating to confidentiality of data and how payments would be made, among other matters. Plaintiff's program obtained a higher score on a performance test. The DOJ disqualified plaintiff's bid and accepted intervenor's bid, stating that plaintiff's slight technical advantage did not justify the higher price and that plaintiff's exceptions were unacceptable. The government accountability office, claims court, and Federal Circuit upheld the decision. The contracting officer was not required to engage in discussions about the exceptions before disqualifying the bid and acted rationally in disqualifying the bid. The officer was entitled to rely on a certification of compliance with RFQ terms for the bid that was accepted and rationally accepted that bid.

Plaintiff brought action under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729, claiming that the company used a kickback scheme and knowingly caused submission of false Medicare, Medicaid, and TRICARE claims by hospitals and doctors. The district court held that hospital claims at issue were not false or fraudulent, and that doctor claims were false or fraudulent, but not materially so. The First Circuit reversed. If kickbacks affected the transactions underlying the claims, the claims failed to meet a condition of payment and were false, regardless of the hospital's participation in or knowledge of the kickbacks. It cannot be said, as a matter of law, that the alleged misrepresentations were not capable of influencing Medicare's decision to pay the claims.

Plaintiff, who was employed as the City of McDonough's ("city") chief building inspector, brought suit against the city when the city refused to pay him severance under an employment agreement contract. At issue was whether the contract was binding to a successor municipal council in violation of OCGA 36-30-3(a). The court held that the contract was ultra vires and void because the contract was renewed automatically and the severance package required the city to pay plaintiff his salary and benefits for an entire year after the year in which the contract was terminated.

This case involves the State's "working retiree program," and the propriety of its withholding retirement contributions from eligible members who returned to work with the state prior to July, 2005. Before that time, the program allowed employees to retire, then after a break, be re-hired and receive retirement benefits and a salary of up to $50,000 per year without having to pay into the pension plan. The State was ordered to refund any contributions made since July, 2005 by program members. In 2005, the State Retirement System Preservation and Investment Reform Act amended the program to require retired members pay the employee contribution as if they were active members but without accruing additional service credit. The State appealed the circuit court's order to refund the contributions. The retirees challenged the change in the program, arguing that it was unlawful for the State to change the terms of the working retiree program after the retirees "irreversibly retired" with the understanding that contributions to the pension plan would not be required. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and legal authority, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's holding with respect to the State's return of contributions since 2005. The Court found that the Legislature enabled the State to take the contributions when it amended the program by Act in 2005. The Court dismissed the Retirees' challenge to the State Retirement System Preservation and Investment Reform Act, finding no merit in their argument.

Pinnacle Armor, Inc. ("Pinnacle") produced armor designed to protect buildings, vehicles, and the human body. Among Pinnacle's primary customers were local law enforcement agencies who depended in large part upon a federal subsidy to purchase the body arbor. The federal subsidy was conditioned on certification that the manufacturer's body armor was compliant with standards set by the National Institute of Justice ("NIJ"). Pinnacle alleged that the NIJ's decision to revoke certification of one of its products violated its procedural due process rights under the Fifth Amendment and was arbitrary and capricious in violation of 706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. 701(a)(2). The court held that the due process claims were properly dismissed because the NIJ afforded Pinnacle adequate process. The court also held that the NIJ's certification decision was not committed to agency discretion by law and was therefore reviewable under the APA where Pinnacle's claims were sufficient to survive a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) claim.

After petitioners fell behind schedule in developing a stealth aircraft (A-12) for the Navy, the contracting officer terminated their $4.8 billion fixed-price contract for default and ordered petitioners to repay approximately $1.35 billion in progress payments for work the Government never accepted. Petitioners filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims ("CFC"), challenging the termination decision under the Contract Disputes Act of 1978, 41 U.S.C. 609(a)(1). The CFC held that, since invocation of the state-secrets privilege obscured too many of the facts relevant to the superior-knowledge defense, the issue of that defense was nonjusticiable, even though petitioners had brought forward enough unprivileged evidence for a prima facie showing. Accordingly, at issue was what remedy was proper when, to protect state secrets, a court dismissed a Government contractor's prima facie valid affirmative defense to the Government's allegations of contractual breach. The Court concluded that it must exercise its common-law authority in this situation to fashion contractual remedies in Government-contracting disputes and held that the proper remedy was to leave the parties where they were on the day they filed suit.