Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Government Law
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Petitioner Scott Anderson appealed a superior court order granting summary judgment to respondents, the Executive Director of the New Hampshire Retirement System (NHRS) and the State, and denying summary judgment to Anderson and three other petitioners. Anderson was a retired Plaistow police officer who was a member of the NHRS, and the only petitioner who appealed. After retiring, he worked part-time as a police officer in Plaistow, Atkinson, and Hampstead. When he retired, RSA 100-A:1, XXXIV provided that "[p]art-time," for the purposes of employing a NHRS retiree meant, "employment by an [NHRS] employer" of no more than "32 hours in a normal calendar week," or if the work hours in some weeks exceeded thirty-two hours, then no more than "1,300 hours in a calendar year." Anderson understood that provision "to mean [he] could work potentially up to 32 hours per week for Plaistow, up to 32 hours per week for Atkinson, and up to 32 hours per week for Hampstead." In 2012, the legislature amended RSA 100-A:1, XXXIV to provide that "[p]art-time," for the purposes of employing a NHRS retiree, "means employment during a calendar year by one or more employers of the retired member which shall not exceed 32 hours in each normal calendar week," or if the work hours in some weeks exceed thirty-two hours, then no more than 1,300 hours in a calendar year. In August 2012, Anderson and three other NHRS retirees petitioned for declaratory and injunctive relief. Anderson contended that to apply the 2012 amendment to him violated Part I, Article 23 of the New Hampshire Constitution. Specifically, he asserted that, as a result of the 2012 amendment, he would be "restored to service" under RSA 100-A:7 (2013) and, thus, lose his retirement benefits if he worked more than "[p]art-time" as defined in RSA 100-A:1, XXXIV. Under RSA 100-A:7, when a retiree is "restored to service," his "retirement allowance shall cease," and he "shall again become a member of the [NHRS] and . . . shall contribute" to that system. Anderson contended that the 2012 amendment substantially impaired his vested right because its effect is to restore him to service if he works more than thirty-two hours per week or 1,300 hours per year for any combination of NHRS employers, even if he did not work full-time hours for any single NHRS employer. Thereafter, the petitioners moved for summary judgment, and the State cross-moved for summary judgment. The trial court ruled in the State's favor, and Anderson's appeal followed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Anderson v. Executive Director, New Hampshire Retirement System" on Justia Law

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Petitioner Mahindra & Mahindra, Ltd. Appealed a superior court decision to affirm a default judgment by the New Hampshire Motor Vehicle Industry Board in favor of respondents Holloway Motor Cars of Manchester, LLC, Peters Auto Sales, Inc., and Crest Chevrolet, Inc. (collectively "dealers"). Mahindra argued that "there is no dispute that [it] was never properly served by the [dealers] in this matter," and argues that the trial court erred in finding that it waived its right to insist on proper service pursuant to the Hague Service Convention. The dealers contended they were not bound by the requirements of the Hague Service Convention in this case and that, regardless of the convention's applicability, Mahindra waived its challenge to service and jurisdiction. The Supreme Court agreed with Mahindra, and found that the trial court erred as a matter of law. View "Mahindra & Mahindra, Ltd. V. Holloway Motor Cars of Manchester, LLC" on Justia Law

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Respondents, Larry M. and Sonia M. appealed a Circuit Court order terminating their parental rights over their children, A.M. and C.M. On appeal, Larry argued that the trial court erred by: (1) proceeding with the termination case based on an underlying neglect case in which he was improperly denied counsel; and (2) finding that termination of his parental rights was in the best interests of the children. Sonia argues that the court erred because: (3) the trial judge did not recuse himself despite the fact that he presided over the underlying neglect case in the circuit court. Both respondents argue that the court erred by: (4) failing to afford them twelve months from the superior court's de novo finding of neglect within which to correct the conditions which led to the finding of neglect; and (5) finding that the petitioner, the New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF), made reasonable efforts to assist them in correcting the conditions that led to the neglect finding. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re C.M." on Justia Law

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The Jackson County Board of Education petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to enter an order dismissing the complaint of D.C. Pruett Contracting Company, Inc. on the ground of sovereign immunity. Pruett Contracting submitted a proposal for renovations to the Pisgah High School gymnasium. The Jackson County superintendent of education executed a purchase order authorizing Pruett Contracting to make certain renovations to the gymnasium, totaling $231,309. Pruett Contracting then began renovating the gymnasium. The Superintendent later received a letter from the State of Alabama Building Commission stating that "all work on the renovation of the Pisgah High School gymnasium [was] to stop immediately" because the project had not been submitted to or approved by the Building Commission. The Board instructed Pruett Contracting to cease all work on the gymnasium. Pruett Contracting submitted an invoice to the Board for the work that had been performed prior to the letter. Months later, because it had not received payment for its work, Pruett Contracting sued the Board, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment and seeking recovery of damages on theories of quantum meruit, work and labor done, open account, and account stated. The Board moved the court to dismiss the complaint, arguing that it was entitled to sovereign immunity as to the claims alleged by Pruett Contracting and that the court therefore lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the action. Pruett Contracting responded, arguing that this case involved a protected property interest, that immunity was thus precluded, and that the court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the action. The Supreme Court concluded the Board established that it was entitled to sovereign immunity and that the trial court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over this action; therefore, the action had to be dismissed. Because the Board demonstrated a clear legal right to an order directing the Circuit Court to dismiss Pruett Contracting's complaint, the Supreme Court granted the Board's petition for a writ of mandamus and directed the Circuit Court to dismiss Pruett Contracting's complaint. View "D.C. Pruett Contracting Company, Inc. v. Jackson County Board of Education" on Justia Law

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First United Security Bank and its wholly owned subsidiary, Paty Holdings, LLC (collectively, "the bank"), brought suit to recover excess funds received by Tuscaloosa County from the tax sale of real estate owned by Wayne Allen Russell, Jr., and on which First United had a mortgage. The bank foreclosed on its mortgage after the tax sale but before the demand for excess proceeds was made. The issue presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether a purchaser at a foreclosure sale is an "owner" entitled under 40-10-28, Ala. Code 1975, to receive the excess proceeds from a tax sale of the real property foreclosed upon. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the bank was entitled to the excess tax-sale proceeds. The Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "First United Security Bank v. McCollum" on Justia Law

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Alabama Rivers Alliance and Friends of Hurricane Creek (collectively, "ARA") petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Civil Appeals' decision reversing the trial court's decision to dismiss an appeal by Tuscaloosa Resources, Inc. ("TRI") of a decision of the Environmental Management Commission. The Alabama Department of Environmental Management ("ADEM") oversees the Commission. The Alabama Supreme Court granted certiorari review to consider whether the Court of Civil Appeals' decision conflicted with its decision in "Price v. South Central Bell," (313 So. 2d 184 (1975)), and the Court of Civil Appeals' decision in "Personnel Board of Jefferson County v. Bailey," (475 So. 2d 863 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985)). Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Civil Appeals' decision in this case conflicted with "Price" and "Bailey," and accordingly reversed its judgment. View "Tuscaloosa Resources, Inc. v. Alabama Department of Enviromental Management" on Justia Law

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San Diego County approved a "Remedial Action Plan" (RAP) for a remediation project at the former Otay Skeet and Trap Shooting Range (Project) in Chula Vista, and adopted a "Final Mitigated Negative Declaration" (MND). The Project involved "investigation and remediation of surface and subsurface areas impacted from historic shooting range activities" and included "remediation of soil impacted by lead and polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), removal of 'White Material['], as well as the removal of target debris and wood debris from the site." The Otay Ranch, Sky Communities, and Sky Vista (collectively, Otay Ranch parties) were the former owners of the shooting range. They filed a petition for writ of mandate alleging the County: (1) did not comply with the requirements of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) when it approved and adopted the MND and RAP without preparing an environmental impact report; and (2) did not comply with Health and Safety Code in approving the RAP. The Otay Ranch parties also sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Real party in interest, Flat Rock Land Company, LLC was the current owner of the shooting range property and project applicant, which undertook voluntary remediation of the site before future development. The central issue in this appeal was whether, after a voluntary dismissal of a petition for writ of mandate, the trial court erred by allowing the County to recover actual labor costs incurred for an attorney and paralegals to prepare an administrative record. Finding no error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order and judgment. Preliminarily, however, the Court dismissed the appeals of The Otay Ranch (a cancelled limited partnership), and Sky Communities, Inc. (a suspended corporation), for lack of capacity. The Court of Appeal denied the motion to dismissed the appeal of the remaining appellant, Sky Vista, Inc. (Sky Vista), which was an active corporation. View "Otay Ranch, L.P. v. County of San Diego" on Justia Law

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The issue in these four appeals was whether the $100,000 statutory cap of 11-47-190, Ala. Code 1975, applied when a peace officer, acting outside his employment, was sued in the officer's individual capacity. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the $100,000 statutory cap did not apply when a peace officer, acting outside his employment, was sued individually. "The limitation on recovery in the second sentence of 11-47-190 is intended to protect the public coffers of the municipality, not to protect municipal employees from claims asserted against them in their individual capacity. [. . .] We recognize that municipal employees were not the intended subject of the legislature's enactment of 11-17-190, and we also recognize that the legislature is better suited to speak comprehensively on the individual liability of municipal employees."View "Alabama Municipal Insurance Corporation v. Willie Allen " on Justia Law

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The State Comptroller, Thomas L. White, Jr., appealed a preliminary injunction entered in response to an action for declaratory and injunctive relief brought by Karen John, the Alabama Education Association ("the AEA"), Randy Hebson, and the Alabama State Employees Association ("the ASEA"). This was the third time a case involving the question of deductions by the comptroller from a State employee's salary for payment of contributions and dues has come before the Supreme Court in recent months. The comptroller executed payroll deductions for dues from State employees who were members of the AEA and the ASEA. On June 29, 2012, the comptroller issued a "memorandum" to "Affected Organizations" regarding "Act 2010-761 Guidelines (State Comptroller Payroll Deductions, Revised June 2012)." The memorandum also contained a sample "Act 2010-761 Certification Form for Organizations:" if the organization wanted to receive salary deductions from State employees, the form required an individual from the organization to provide a notarized signature and to certify under penalty of being barred from receiving deductions that the organization would "not use any portion of the membership dues collected by payroll deduction from the pay of its members who are State employees for political activity as that term is defined in [the Act]" and that the organization would "provide to the State Comptroller a detailed breakdown of the expenditure of those membership dues not later than the deadline, and using the forms, prescribed by the Comptroller from time to time." The comptroller sent copies of the memorandum to the AEA, the ASEA, and other organizations that were receiving dues from State-employee members via salary deductions. The ASEA submitted its certification to the comptroller, along with a letter from its counsel, stating, in part, that the organization submitted the certification "under protest and without waiving any of its rights as they relate to any ongoing litigation concerning [the Act], or related to the rules and regulations promulgated in your 'Memorandum to Affected Organizations.'" The AEA declined to submit a certification form and thus was deemed ineligible to receive dues via payroll deductions. On August 17, 2012, the AEA, AEA member and State employee Karen John, the ASEA, and ASEA president Randy Hebson sued White in his official capacity as comptroller and the "Office of the State Comptroller" seeking a judgment declaring that the guidelines were void because they had been promulgated without following the procedures required in the Alabama Administrative Procedure Act. The Supreme Court reversed: plaintiffs' action was "due to be dismissed"insofar as it purported to name "the Office of the State Comptroller" as a defendant, and the circuit court was instructed to dismiss the action in that regard. Furthermore, the Court found the circuit court erred in issuing the injunction as plaintiffs did not meet their burden for injunctive relief. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "White v. John et al. " on Justia Law

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Sara Crossfield appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Limestone County Commission in her action to reverse the Commission's decision to vacate a portion of Dogwood Flats Road in Limestone County. In early 2013, the Commission proposed to vacate a portion of Dogwood Flats Road. Crossfield's property did not abut the portion of Dogwood Flats Road proposed to be vacated; it abutted Dogwood Flats Road approximately 400 feet north of the portion of the road that the Commission proposed to vacate. At a hearing on the matter, Crossfield alleged that she was a "party affected by the vacation of a portion of Dogwood Flat[s] Road" and asked the trial court to set aside the vacation of the road. Crossfield alleged, among other things, that the Commission had obstructed her access to Piney Creek, east and south of Crossfield's property. The Commission moved to dismiss, arguing Crossfield was not affected by the vacation and therefore lacked standing to appeal the Commission's decision regarding Dogwood Flats. The trial court granted the Commission's motion for a summary judgment and dismissed Crossfield's appeal. Crossfield's evidence, even when viewed in the light most favorable to her as the nonmovant, did not create a genuine issue of material fact that would preclude a summary judgment for the Commission. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the Commission. View "Crossfield v. Limestone County Commission " on Justia Law