Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

This was an interlocutory appeal of superior court decision, on appeal from a decision of an appellate officer, remanding this disciplinary case to the Board of Nursing to determine whether the Board intended that the case be continued. The central question for the Supreme Court's review was whether an attorney for the Office of Professional Regulation (OPR) within the office of the Vermont Secretary of State has the power to appeal a Board of Nursing decision vacating an earlier consent order suspending from practice appellee, David Shaddy. The Court concluded that the attorney had this power and reinstated the decision of the appellate officer. View "Shaddy v. State of Vermont Office of Professional Regulation" on Justia Law

This case centered on the interpretation and application of two statutes, ORS 144.335(3) and ORS 144.135, to a final order of the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision that postponed petitioner’s release date from prison. The threshold question presented to the Oregon Supreme Court was whether, by amending ORS 144.335(3) in 1999, the legislature intended to exempt the board from the substantial reason standard that this court had identified and applied in "Martin v. Board of Parole," (957 P2d 1210 (1998)). If the legislature did not intend to exempt the board from the substantial reason standard, the second question was whether the board’s order in this case satisfied the substantial reason standard. The third question is whether the board’s order complied with ORS 144.135. The Court concluded that ORS 144.335(3) (1999) did not eliminate the substantial reason requirement that inheres in the substantial evidence standard of review to which the board’s orders are subject. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the board’s final order in this case satisfied that requirement and satisfied ORS 144.135. The Court affirmed the board’s final order postponing petitioner’s release date.View "Jenkins v. Board of Parole" on Justia Law

In consolidated property tax appeals, taxpayers challenged the valuation of their real property by the Clackamas County Assessor. In their appeals to the Magistrate Division of the Tax Court, they challenged only the valuation of the improvements on their land, not the valuation of the land itself. The Magistrate Division affirmed. Taxpayers then appealed to the Regular Division of the Tax Court, again challenging only the valuation of their improvements. In the pendency of that appeal, the legislature had enacted ORS 305.287. Under that new statute, even if a taxpayer challenged only one aspect of a property tax assessment, any other party to an “appeal” may challenge other aspects of the assessment as well. Relying on that statute, the county asserted for the first time before the Regular Division of the Tax Court that it had erroneously undervalued taxpayers’ land. The Tax Court concluded, however, that challenges before the Regular Division were not “appeals” for the purposes of that statute. As a result, the court ruled that the county could not challenge the valuation of taxpayers’ land. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Tax Court correctly concluded that ORS 305.287 did not apply to appeals to the Regular Division of the Tax Court. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Tax Court erred in ruling that the statute did not apply and that the county could not challenge its own land valuations.View "Village at Main Street Phase II v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

Los Alamitos Unified School District (the District) filed an action to validate its lease-leaseback agreement with a contractor performing improvements on the track and athletic field of the District's high school. Another contractor, Howard Contracting, Inc. (Howard), filed an answer, claiming the lease-leaseback agreement was unconstitutional, illegal, and invalid because the District did not obtain competitive bids for the project. The primary issue presented by this appeal was legal: did Education Code section 17406 exempt school districts from obtaining competitive bids when entering into what are known as "lease-leaseback" agreements to improve school property? After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the answer was yes. "More than 40 years ago, the California Attorney General concluded the language of the statute is plain, unambiguous, and explicit, and does not impose bid requirements on school districts. We agree, and nothing has occurred in the interim that would change our conclusion."View "Los Alamitos Unified etc. v. Howard Contracting" on Justia Law

Appellants filed suit in federal court seeking a declaration that Nevada’s Live Entertainment Tax (NLET) was facially unconstitutional for violating the First Amendment. The federal court dismissed the suit. Appellants then filed a de novo action (Case 1) in a Nevada district court seeking similar remedies to those sought in federal court and asserting an as-applied challenge to NLET. While Case 1 was pending, Appellants filed individual tax refund requests with the Nevada Department of Taxation on the grounds that NLET is facially unconstitutional. The Department denied refunds, and the Nevada Tax Commission affirmed. Appellants then filed a second de novo action (Case 2) challenging the administrative denials of their refund requests and asserting an as-applied challenge to NLET. The district court (1) dismissed Appellants’ as-applied challenge in Case 1; and (2) dismissed the entirety of Case 2 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Appellants failed to file a petition for judicial review after the completion of their administrative proceedings. This appeal challenging the district court’s dismissal of Case 2 followed. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as Nevada law required Appellants to file a petition for judicial review.View "Deja Vu Showgirls of Las Vegas, LLC v. Nev. Dep't of Taxation" on Justia Law

David Bunch, a real estate appraiser holding a license issued by the West Virginia Real Estate Licensing and Certification Board, filed a petition for a writ of prohibition in the Circuit Court of Cabell County seeking to halt an administrative disciplinary proceeding initiated against him. The Board filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that it was a state agency, and, pursuant to W. Va. Code 14-2-2(a)(1), venue for the action was proper only in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that it was unclear whether the Board was a “state agency” for purposes of the venue statute. The Supreme Court granted the requested writ, holding that the Board is a state agency entitled to the special venue provisions of section 14-2-2(a)(1), and therefore, the circuit court erred when it allowed the action to proceed in the Circuit Court of Cabell County.View "State ex rel. W. Va. Real Estate Licensing & Cert. Bd. v. Hon. Christopher D. Chiles" on Justia Law

Kentucky Employers’ Mutual Insurance (KEMI) was the workers’ compensation carrier for Beacon Enterprises, Inc. at the time that Julian Hoskins was injured during the course of his employment with Four Star Transportation, Inc. (Four Star). Four Star had configured its workforce pursuant to an employee leasing arrangement with a company affiliated with Beacon Enterprises, an employee leasing company. The Workers’ Compensation Board determined that Hoskins was not covered by Beacon Enterprises’ policy with KEMI because Hoskins was not an employee of Beacon Enterprises at the time of the injury. The court of appeals upheld the Board’s decision. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.615 does not require an employee to have knowledge of his status as a leased employee or of the nature of his relationship with the employee leasing company; and (2) because the court of appeals grounded its opinion upon Hoskins’s lack of knowledge, the matter must be remanded for the court to address other issues raised by KEMI in support of the Board’s decision.View "Ky. Ininsured Employers’ Fund v. Hoskins" on Justia Law

William Curtis was injured when Michael Lemna drove a golf cart over a retaining wall during a game of golf scheduled as part of a sales meeting in Arkansas. Both Curtis and Lemna were employees of Dial Corporation headquartered in Arizona at the time of the accident. Curtis sued Lemna in Benton County Circuit Court alleging negligence. The circuit court dismissed the case without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction until the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission could determine the applicability of Arkansas’ workers’ compensation laws. Curtis subsequently requested a hearing before the Commission. The Commission concluded that Curtis and Lemna were acting within the scope of their employment at the time of the accident and that co-employee immunity was extended to Lemna acting as the employer providing a safe work environment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission had jurisdiction over this case; (2) the Commission’s decision that Curtis’s injury occurred within the scope of his employment was supported by substantial evidence; and (3) the Commission’s decision that Lemna was entitled to immunity was supported by substantial evidence.View "Curtis v. Lemna" on Justia Law

Bruns, age 79, drove to a Centralia eye clinic. She did not use the parking lot, but parked on 2nd Street in front of the clinic, as she had on each of nine previous visits. As she walked toward the clinic, Bruns stubbed her toe on a crack in the sidewalk, causing her to fall and injure her arm, leg and knee. She had been looking “towards the door and the steps” of the clinic. Bruns “definitely” noticed the sidewalk defect every time she went to the clinic. Clinic employees had twice contacted the city about the defect, including after a previous accident, and offered to pay to remove the tree that caused it. The city would not authorize removal because of the 100-year-old tree’s historic significance. Bruns sued, arguing that the city should have reasonably foreseen that a pedestrian could become distracted and fail to protect herself against the dangerous condition. The trial court granted the city summary judgment, finding the defect open and obvious. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, reinstating the summary judgment. The city has miles of sidewalk to maintain; imposing a duty to protect plaintiffs from open and obvious defects would not be justified.View "Bruns v. City of Centralia" on Justia Law

Slepicka, a resident of a Cook County skilled nursing facility, received a notice of involuntary transfer or discharge. A Department of Public Health ALJ held a hearing at the facility. The Department approved the involuntary discharge of Slepicka unless the amount owed was paid in full. The order was mailed from a Sangamon County post office. Slepicka sought judicial review in Sangamon County. The facility moved to dismiss or transfer, arguing that Cook County was the only proper venue. The circuit court ruled that Sangamon County was a proper venue and upheld the order allowing involuntary discharge. The appellate court held that Sangamon County was not a proper venue under Administrative Review Law section 3-104, but rejected a claim that filing the action in an improper venue constituted a jurisdictional defect. The court did not decide the merits, but vacated and remanded with directions to transfer the cause to Cook County. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed that Sangamon County was not a permissible venue, but held that circumstance did not deprive the circuit court of jurisdiction to review the Department’s decision. Stating that it would be a waste of resources to require the Cook County court to review the decision again, the court vacated the portion of the judgment that vacated the Sangamon County decision and remanded to the appellate court for decision on the merits.View "Slepicka v. IL Dep't of Pub. Health" on Justia Law