Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 2012, Dominion Virginia Power filed an application with the State Corporation Commission seeking approval of a power station and transmission interconnection facilities associated with the generation plant. Dominion’s application also sought approval of a rate adjustment clause (RAC) to recover the costs of the power station and the associated transmission infrastructure. As part of the RAC, Dominion sought an enhancement on its general rate of return on common equity (ROE) for a certain period and proposed applying the enhanced ROE to the costs of the power station and associated transmission infrastructure. The Commission approved the power station and associated transmission infrastructure and allowed Dominion to recover an enhanced ROE for the transmission infrastructure. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission properly interpreted Va. Code 56-585.1(A)(6) to allow Dominion to recover an enhanced ROE for the transmission infrastructure associated with the power station and included in the subsection (A)(6) RAC for that facility.View "Attorney Gen. v. State Corp. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Eric McDougle held licenses as a mental health practitioner and as a provisional alcohol and drug counselor. The director of the Division of Public Health of the Department of Health and Human Services (Department) issued an order revoking McDougle’s licenses after finding that McDougle engaged in unprofessional conduct. McDougle petitioned for judicial review, naming the Department and the State as parties to the petition and timely serving process upon them. The State filed a motion to dismiss the petition for review on the ground that McDougle failed to timely request preparation of the official record upon the Department. The district court granted the motion. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Department was a “party of record” under the Administrative Procedure Act such that McDougle was not required to timely request the preparation of the official record as a prerequisite to the district court’s jurisdiction over the petition for review. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Department was properly a party to the petition for review and was properly served with a copy of that petition, and therefore, McDougle was not required to separately serve the Department with a copy of the petition and a request to prepare the official record. Remanded.View "McDougle v. State ex rel. Bruning" on Justia Law

In 1997, the Village of Derby Center and the City of Newport entered into a contract whereby the Village would supply 10,000 gallons of water per day to the City. The City claimed that the contract did not authorize the Village to adopt a new rate schedule in 2006 that included a ready-to-serve fee on top of actual water usage charges. The Village counterclaimed, alleging that the City connected customers who were not authorized under the contract, and that the City’s water use was chronically underreported due to equipment malfunction. After a trial, the superior court ruled for the City on its contract claim, holding that the ready-to-serve fee was not authorized by either contract or statute. As to the Village’s counterclaims, the court found that there was insufficient evidence to support the unauthorized-connection claim, and referred the water-usage-reconstruction claim to mediation. The Village appealed on all counts. The Supreme Court found: the plain language of the agreement authorized the use of a ready-to-serve fee to support the Village’s maintenance of its facilities. "The court erred in concluding otherwise." With respect to the Village's counterclaims, the Supreme Court found that the trial court indicated that it was clear, based on the billing periods showing a reading of zero usage by the City, that there were some erroneous readings, but it referred the Village’s claims to mediation without further resolution. After the City brought suit, the Village filed a motion to allow its counterclaim as to the underreported usage, which the trial court granted. The trial court’s decision to refer the Village’s counterclaim to mediation in its order, after it had already granted the Village’s motion to allow the counterclaim at trial, served only to create greater delay and expense to the parties, thus undermining the purpose of the alternative dispute resolution clause. "Even if the trial court would ordinarily have discretion over whether to send a counterclaim to mediation, under these circumstances the trial court could not properly rescind its decision, relied on by the parties, to allow the counterclaim after the trial had already taken place. Therefore, we remand the Village’s counterclaim for resolution by the trial court." View "City of Newport v. Village of Derby Center" on Justia Law

In 2001 Millview County Water District began diverting water from the Russian River under the authority of a pre-1914 appropriative water right assigned to Millview by plaintiffs Hill and Gomes. Following a citizen complaint, the State Water Resources Control Board issued a cease and desist order substantially restricting Millview’s diversion of water under the right, finding it had been largely forfeited by a period of diminished use from 1967 through 1987. Millview argued that the Board lacked jurisdiction to limit appropriation under a pre-1914 water right and that the evidence did not support the Board’s finding of forfeiture because there was no evidence of a timely adverse claim of use. The trial court accepted Millview’s arguments. The appeals court affirmed. While the Board did have jurisdiction under Water Code section 1831 to issue a an order precluding excessive diversion under a pre-1914 right to appropriate and the Board properly determined the original perfected scope of the claim, it applied an incorrect legal standard in evaluating the forfeiture of Millview’s claimed water right. Applying the proper legal standard, the evidence before the Board was insufficient to support a finding of forfeiture. View "Millview Cnty. Water Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd." on Justia Law

In 2008-2010, then-governor Schwarzenegger issued executive orders requiring the unpaid furloughs of most state employees. In 2010, the Legislature passed the budget for the 2010-2011 fiscal year, authorizing “reductions in employee compensation achieved through the collective bargaining process or through administrative actions for represented employees and a proportionate reduction for nonrepresented employees (utilizing existing authority of the administration to adjust compensation for nonrepresented employees).” The Governor then issued Executive Order No. S-15-10, applicable to most nonunion state employees, including supervisory and other exempt employees represented by PECG and CAPS, reducing their net compensation by imposing a one-day per month personal leave program. Between EO S-15-10 and the three-day-furlough previously in effect, nonunionized employees’ net compensation for 2010-2011 was reduced by 8.5 percent, equivalent to the 8.5 percent total reduction to the net compensation of employees in state bargaining units represented by SEIU. Union employees represented by CAPS and PECG, however were furloughed for three days each month throughout 2010 and into 2011 and incurred an 8.5 percent reduction in net compensation after their first furlough day in March 2011 but were subjected to two more furlough days. The trial court invalidated mandatory furloughs for employees represented by PECG and the CAPS. The appeals court affirmed. View "Prof'l Eng'rs in CA Gov't v. Brown" on Justia Law

LumiData, Inc. is a software company that sells a software program called SOLYS to retail suppliers. Between 2005 and 2008, LumiData did not file Minnesota sales tax returns or pay sales tax on its SOLYS sales. The Commissioner of Revenue assessed sales tax on LumiData’s SOLYS sales for the period at issue, concluding the software sales were subject to sales tax. LumiData appealed the Commissioner’s order to the tax court, arguing that its software sales were nontaxable because modifications it made to its software removed it from the definition of “prewritten computer software” within the meaning of Minn. Stat. 297A.61(17). The tax court upheld the assessment, concluding that SOLYS was taxable, prewritten computer software. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because LumiData did not separately state its customization charges in its invoices, the tax court correctly concluded that the sales price for SOLYS was taxable as a sale of prewritten computer software; and (2) because the record did not establish that LumiData had reasonable cause to believe that its sales of SOLYS were not taxable, the tax court did not err in upholding the Commissioner’s penalty assessments.View "LumiData, Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue" on Justia Law

Petitioner, who was injured while performing her work duties, filed a workers’ compensation claim. Liberty Northwest (Liberty), the insurer for the claim, terminated Petitioner’s temporary partial disability (TPD) benefits after Petitioner revoked releases and authorizations she had previously signed allowing Liberty and its agents to have ex parte communications with her medical care providers. Petitioner filed an action asserting that the statutes relied upon by Liberty to terminate her medical benefits, Mont. Code Ann. 39-71-604 and Mont. Code Ann. 50-16-527, were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Court (WCC) determined that section 39-71-604(3), as applied in Petitioner’s case, violated Petitioner’s constitutional right of privacy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the WCC did not err in concluding that section 39-71-604(3) violated Petitioner’s right of privacy set forth in the Montana Constitution.View "Malcomson v. Liberty Northwest" on Justia Law

The Essex County Prosecutor’s Office executed a search warrant issued in connection with a criminal investigation and seized items owned by plaintiffs Robert and Karen Lavezzi. The criminal investigation was eventually abandoned and the State did not institute either criminal charges or a civil-forfeiture action against plaintiffs. Plaintiffs claimed that their property was lost and damaged while in the custody of the Prosecutor’s Office. They filed a complaint alleging that the Prosecutor’s Office and three of its employees were liable to them on theories of negligence, conversion, and unlawful taking. Defendants requested that the Attorney General’s Office defend and indemnify the action. The Attorney General denied defendants’ requests, finding that the Prosecutor’s Office’s processing and safeguarding of plaintiffs’ property were administrative acts. The County appealed and the Appellate Division affirmed, finding that the retention of plaintiffs’ property "long after any related law enforcement activity" had concluded constituted an administrative function that did not implicate the Attorney General’s obligation to defend and indemnify State employees. After its review of the matter, the Supreme Court found that the State was obligated to defend and indemnify the Prosecutor’s Office employees at this early stage of the litigation because, based on the limited record before the Court, this case arose from the performance of their law enforcement duties. View "Lavezzi v. New Jersey" on Justia Law

The California Coastal Commission appealed the grant of the writ of mandamus directing it to remove three conditions from a coastal development permit amendment issued to respondents Barbara Lynch and Thomas Frick. The Commission contended respondents waived any challenge to these conditions by signing and recording documents agreeing to them and then accepting the benefit of the permit by completing their project. The Commission further contended the conditions were valid and supported by substantial evidence. The Court of Appeal agreed with both contentions and reversed the judgment.View "Lynch v. California Coastal Commission" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Elaine and Gerald Rominger challenged a mitigated negative declaration approved by defendant Colusa County with respect to a subdivision proposed by real party in interest Adams Group Inc. The trial court denied the Romingers’ petition based on the conclusion that, notwithstanding the county’s approval of a mitigated negative declaration, the county’s "action in approving the subdivision map was not a project for CEQA purposes and [thus] no review beyond the preliminary review stage was required." The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred in determining the proposed subdivision was not a CEQA project, even though the proposal did not include any specific plans for development. On independent review of the Romingers’ other complaints, however, the Court found merit in only one: the Romingers adequately showed there was substantial evidence in the record that the subdivision may have had a significant unmitigated impact on traffic at a particular intersection adjacent to the project site. Accordingly, on that basis only, the Court reversed and remanded for the preparation of an environmental impact report (EIR). View "Rominger v. County of Colusa" on Justia Law