Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

There is no hospital in Valencia County. People in Valencia County who are faced with a medical emergency must deal with the emergency itself, and find a way to travel twenty to thirty-five miles to an Albuquerque hospital. Ambulances coming from Valencia County can take two hours or longer to transport a patient to the nearest hospital, process the patient, and return. The long turnaround times mean that ambulance companies sometimes run at full capacity, or “zero status,” and cannot respond to calls from new patients because all available ambulances are in use. Since 1987, appellant Living Cross Ambulance Service has been the only ambulance company in Valencia County operating under a permanent certificate from the Public Regulation Commission (PRC). Living Cross has been at zero status and unavailable to transport patients for less than one percent of ambulance service requests. When Living Cross is at zero status, dispatch requests mutual aid from a nearby ambulance company, and if those mutual aid ambulances are also unavailable, the municipality whose EMTs first responded to the scene must transport the patients at the municipality’s expense. This case was a direct appeal from a final order of the Public Regulation Commission (PRC) granting a permanent certificate to American Medical Response Ambulance Service, Inc. d/b/a American Medical Response, Emergicare (AMR) for both emergency and nonemergency ambulance service in Valencia County. Living Cross petitioned the New Mexico Supreme Court to vacate the final order of the PRC, claiming that the PRC acted arbitrarily and capriciously by granting AMR’s certificate because there was no evidence of need for non-emergency ambulance service in Valencia County, and because there was insufficient evidence of need for additional emergency ambulance service. Living Cross also claimed that the PRC abused its discretion by allowing Living Cross’s former attorney to represent AMR in an initial hearing before ruling on its motion to disqualify the attorney. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the PRC decision to allow the former Living Cross attorney to appear for AMR during the hearing for the temporary permit was contrary to law, and that the wholesale admission of the record from that hearing as evidence in the hearing for the permanent certificate was plain error, requiring reversal. Because the Court determined that the attorney disqualification issue is dispositive, it did not reach the other issues in this case.View "Living Cross Ambulance Serv. v. N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm'n" on Justia Law

After electrical outages arising from Tropical Storm Irene on August 28, 2011 and a snowstorm two months later, the Department of Public Utilities entered orders against three utility companies - National Grid, NSTAR Electric Company (NSTAR), and Western Massachusetts Electric Company (WMEC) - that imposed monetary penalties for the utilities’ failure to restore service to their customers “in a safe and reasonably prompt manner.” The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the Department applied the appropriate reasonableness standard in finding that the utilities violated their duty to restore service in a safe and reasonably prompt manner; (2) the Department’s findings regarding National Grid and WMEC were supported by substantial evidence, but its finding that NSTAR failed timely to respond to priority two and three wires-down calls was not supported by substantial evidence; and (3) with two exceptions, the Department made the necessary findings and did not abuse its discretion in its imposition of monetary penalties. Remanded.View "Mass. Elec. Co. v. Dep’t of Pub. Utils." on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from the Public Utilities Commission’s first annual review of the fuel-adjustment clause (FAC) mechanism that was part of the first electric security plan (ESP) for two American Electric Power operating companies, Columbus Southern Power and Ohio Power Company. The FAC allowed the companies to recover fuel costs for providing generation service as those costs were incurred without being required to file a new rate case. An auditor found that the companies had underrecovered fuel costs through the FAC in 2009. After review, the Commission concluded (1) all of the proceeds that AEP had received from a 2008 contract settlement agreement with a coal supplier should be offset against Ohio Power’s FAC underrecovery; and (2) only the share of the settlement proceeds allocable to Ohio retail customers must be credited. Ohio Power appealed, and Industrial Energy Users-Ohio (IEU) cross-appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s orders, holding that Ohio Power and IEU did not carry their burden of showing reversible error in the Commission’s orders.View "In re Fuel Adjustment Clauses for Columbus S. Power Co. & Ohio Power Co." on Justia Law

A property owner/lessor filed suit against the City of Marksville seeking to recover damages for the City's denial of a retail alcoholic beverage permit to the lessee of its property. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the trial court erred in finding liability on the part of the City and awarding damages. In particular, the Court considered the City's contention that an error occurred in denying its peremptory exception of no cause of action. Finding merit in the City's claim that the property owner failed to state a cause of action for interference with a contractual relation caused by the denial of a liquor permit to its lessee, the Court reversed and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of the City. View "MAW Enterprises, LLC v. City of Marksville" on Justia Law

Donald Burkhart (Burkhart) died after developing mesothelioma. Mary Lou Burkhart (Claimant) filed a claim against H.J. Heinz Company (Employer), Burkhart’s former employer, seeking workers compensation benefits. In making her case that Employer had injuriously exposed Burkhart to asbestos, Claimant sought to admit deposition testimony Burkhart had given in a products-liability action he had filed against various asbestos manufacturers. On appeal from the Industrial Commission’s adverse ruling against Claimant, the trial court struck Burkhart’s testimony from the record and granted summary judgment for Employer. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Burkhart’s deposition testimony was admissible because the manufacturers in the asbestos litigation were predecessors-in-interest to Employer for purposes of Ohio R. Evid. 804(B)(1) in that they shared a similar motive to develop Burkhart’s testimony. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Burkhart’s deposition testimony was not admissible pursuant to Rule 804(B)(1) because the asbestos manufacturers that cross-examined Burkhart were neither predecessors-in-interest to Employer nor had a similar motive to develop the deposition testimony through cross-examination.View "Burkhart v. H.J. Heinz Co." on Justia Law

The Indiana Department of Environmental Management (IDEM), Indiana’s environmental agency, revised its interpretation of the regulatory term “chemical process plants.” After IDEM issued operating permits to two companies for ethanol and ethanol production facilities, NRDC sought administrative review of both permits based on the interpretation of the term “chemical process plants.” The Indiana Office of Environmental Adjudication (OEA) ordered the permits remanded to IDEM. The companies and others sought judicial review of the OEA order. The trial court reversed the OEA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) IDEM was not required to formally amend Indiana’s State Implementation Plan to effectuate its change in how it interprets the regulatory phrase “chemical process plant”; and (2) IDEM’s new interpretation was reasonable and supported the issuance of the permits in this case.View "Nat. Res. Defense Council v. Poet Biorefining- North Manchester, LLC" on Justia Law

This case concerned the City's approval of a residential infill development project in downtown Fresno to build 28 two-story townhouses. The trial court decided that the City violated certain procedural requirements of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), Public Resources Code 21000 et seq., in approving the project, but applied the correct legal standards in determining the two houses at issue were not "historical resources" protected by CEQA. The court concluded that CEQA allows a local lead agency, such as the City, to delegate the authority to approve a mitigated negative declaration and a project to a nonelected decisionmaking body such as the Preservation Commission. In this case, the Fresno Municipal Code did not actually authorize the Preservation Commission to complete the environmental review required by CEQA and approve the mitigated negative declaration. Therefore, the Preservation Commission's approval of the mitigated negative declaration did not comply with CEQA. In regards to historical resources, the court confirmed the statutory analysis in Valley Advocates v. City of Fresno and concluded that the substantial evidence test, rather than the fair argument standard, applies to a lead agency's discretionary determination of whether a building or district is an historical resource for purposes of CEQA. Therefore, the trial court did not err when it applied the substantial evidence test to the City's determination that no historical resources were impacted by the project. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Citizens etc. L Street v. City of Fresno" on Justia Law

Respondent, the City of Concord (City) appealed a superior court decision granting summary judgment in favor of petitioner Northern New England Telephone Operations, LLC d/b/a FairPoint Communications - NNE (FairPoint), in its equal protection challenge to the City’s taxation of FairPoint’s use and occupation of public property, and striking the tax levied against FairPoint. In order to provide telecommunications services throughout the City, FairPoint maintained poles, wires, cables, and other equipment within the City’s public rights-of-way. For the 2000 to 2010 tax years, the City imposed a real estate tax upon FairPoint for its use and occupation of this public property. Prior to 2010, the City did not impose a right-of-way tax upon Comcast, which used the City’s rights-of-way to provide cable services pursuant to a franchise agreement. The City began imposing the tax upon Comcast in 2010 in response to a ruling by the New Hampshire Board of Tax and Land Appeals (BTLA) that, notwithstanding the franchise agreement, Comcast was subject to the tax. Prior to 2008, the City did not impose the same tax upon Public Service of New Hampshire (PSNH) because it was unaware that PSNH had used and occupied the rights-of-way. Similarly, the City did not tax certain other users of its rights-of-way for their use and occupation of public property during the relevant tax years because it was not aware of their usage. FairPoint brought an action challenging, in relevant part, the constitutionality of the City’s right-of-way tax assessments against it for the 2000 through 2010 tax years. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In granting FairPoint’s motion, and denying the City’s motion, the trial court ruled, as an initial matter, that "intentionality" was not a required element of FairPoint’s equal protection claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that FairPoint’s equal protection claim was one of "selective enforcement," and not an equal protection challenge to the tax scheme itself. Thus, because the trial court applied an erroneous legal standard in ruling that the City selectively imposed the tax upon FairPoint, the Court vacated the trial court’s rulings and remanded for further proceedings. View "Northern New England Telephone Operations, LLC v. City of Concord" on Justia Law

A firefighter developed prostate cancer when he was in his mid-fifties, after working for nearly 30 years. He filed a workers’ compensation claim under a new statute creating a presumption that certain diseases in firefighters, including prostate cancer, are work related when specific conditions are met. The employer contended that the firefighter could not attach the presumption of compensability because he had not strictly complied with statutory and regulatory medical examination requirements. The employer also wanted to present expert testimony that the cause of prostate cancer was unknown. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board heard the claim and refused to consider parts of the expert’s testimony, deciding that the firefighter was eligible for benefits because he had attached the presumption of compensability by substantially complying with the statutory requirements and the employer had not rebutted the presumption. On appeal, the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission agreed, but reversed the Board’s decision disallowing the expert testimony. The Commission decided that the employer could rebut the presumption through its expert’s testimony that the cause of prostate cancer was unknown, and remanded the case to the Board for further proceedings. Because the employer also contended that the firefighter-presumption statute violated the Alaska Constitution’s equal protection guarantee, the State of Alaska intervened on appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s decision that the firefighter attached the presumption by substantially complying with the applicable requirements. However, the Court reversed the Commission’s decision that the employer could rebut the presumption through expert testimony that there was no known cause of prostate cancer.View "Adamson v. Municipality of Anchorage" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Faith Krueger appealed and Grand Forks County cross-appealed a judgment in favor of the County in Krueger's action for breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, trespass to chattel, conversion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent supervision of a public administrator. In July 2012, Krueger sued the County alleging she lost over $300,000 in property and assets after Barbara Zavala, the Grand Forks County Public Administrator, was appointed her guardian and conservator. Krueger claimed the County was liable for Zavala's actions under N.D.C.C. 32-12.1-03 because Zavala was a county employee. Krueger argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the district court erred in denying her motion to compel discovery, denying her motion for a continuance, denying her claim for damages for mental anguish, erred in its evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, and by allowing certain statements by the County's attorney during closing arguments. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court.View "Krueger v. Grand Forks County" on Justia Law