Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

S.W.S. appealed a juvenile court order terminating his parental rights to T.R.C. S.W.S. is the father and C.M.C. is the mother of T.R.C., who was born in 2011. The child was taken into custody of Traill County Social Services in late 2012, based on abandonment by C.M.C. A reunification plan was developed for each parent for reunification with the child. Close to a year later, the State petitioned to terminate the parental rights of S.W.S. and C.M.C. C.M.C. appeared at an initial hearing and advised the court that she wished to voluntarily terminate her parental rights to the child. A termination hearing was held and various witnesses testified, including the father, the father's wife, and the child's social worker. There was evidence presented about conditions in the father's home, the father's employment, and the father's chemical dependency. After the hearing, the juvenile court ordered termination of both parents' parental rights. The court found the child was deprived and the deprivation was likely to continue. The court also found it was contrary to T.R.C.'s welfare to continue to live with his parents, reasonable efforts were made to prevent the need for removing the child and to make reunification possible, and termination was in T.R.C.'s best interests. After review of S.W.S's argument on appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding the trial court's findings did not adequately explain the basis for its decision.View "Interest of T.R.C." on Justia Law

This case centered on a disputed permit for a wastewater system and potable water supply granted to applicants David and Martha Musto for a home on Lake Bomoseen. Next-door neighbor Carolyn Hignite appealed the environmental court's decision to deny her request to revoke the permit issued to applicants in 2009, and to dismiss her direct appeal of the permit. Applicants cross-appealed the environmental court's holding that neighbor had standing to appeal in either instance. Along with her brothers, Hignite was part owner of a lake property that has been in their family for sixty-two years. Applicants' property is a .38-acre lot on the western shore of the lake, which contained a single-story seasonal camp of about 960 square feet. In 2009, applicants submitted a permit application to the Agency of Natural Resources (ANR) to replace the camp's septic system and on-site water supply. On the permit application, applicants described the project as the "reconstruction of a 3 bedroom year-round single use family residence using a new wastewater disposal system and drilled bedrock water supply well." ANR issued the requested permit to applicants on March 30, 2009. In August 2009, Hignite filed a petition with ANR to revoke the permit, claiming that applicants submitted false or misleading information on the permit application regarding the number of bedrooms in the camp. ANR held a hearing in May 2010, and denied neighbor's petition to revoke the permit. Hignite subsequently appealed the permit to the environmental court in 2010, over a year after the permit was issued to applicants. Hignite also appealed ANR's denial of revocation in 2013. The environmental court reviewed both cases de novo but did not conduct a new hearing, instead basing its review on exhibits and testimony from the ANR hearing, as the parties stipulated. Hignite appealed the court's decision on both dockets. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the court's holding in both of the neighbor's appeals.View "In re Musto Wastewater System" on Justia Law

Alberto Daniel Saucedo Suarez and his attorneys, Allan Davis and the law firm of Robinson Calcagnie Robinson Shapiro Davis, Inc. appealed a trial court's award of attorney fees and costs to the City of Corona. In 2008, Suarez was injured when the compressed natural gas (CNG) tank in a van in which he was a passenger exploded while being filled at a fueling station owned by the City. In April 2009, Suarez sued the City and a number of other defendants. Suarez proceeded against the City on a theory of dangerous condition of public property. Appellants contended the trial court erred because: (1) section 1038 did not authorize an award of attorney fees and costs against a party's counsel; (2) the commissioner issuing the award did not have jurisdiction; (3) the award was not proper where the action was brought and maintained with reasonable cause; (4) the fees and costs awarded were not reasonably and necessarily incurred; and (5) the award violated due process. The Court of Appeal agreed that section 1038 did not authorize an award of fees and costs against a party's attorney. Accordingly, the Court reversed that portion of the judgment awarding the City its fees and costs against the Attorneys. In all other respects, the Court affirmed. View "Suarez v. City of Corona" on Justia Law

Petitioner Wayne Kassotis appealed a Superior Court decision dismissing his complaint, arising from the nonrenewal of his employment contract to remain as the Town of Fitzwilliam's Chief of Police. Petitioner filed a complaint against the Town seeking, among other things, reinstatement as Chief of Police, damages, costs, and attorney’s fees, for the Town’s alleged failure to comply with RSA 105:2-a, which provided procedural protections to appointed chiefs of police who are "dismiss[ed]." The Town moved to dismiss, arguing that, "[b]ecause the Petitioner was not dismissed, RSA 105:2-a does not apply, and he fails to state a claim for relief." The trial court granted the Town’s motion on the basis that "the provisions of RSA 105:2-a are inapplicable to the [Town’s] decision not to renew the employment contract." Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Kassotis v. Town of Fitzwilliam" on Justia Law

Respondent City of Manchester appealed a Superior Court order denying the City’s motion to dismiss and granting the motion for summary judgment filed by the petitioner, Prolerized New England Company (Prolerized). The City argued on appeal that the trial court erroneously ruled that RSA chapter 322 preempted the City’s ordinances regulating junk and scrap metal dealers. The Supreme Court agreed, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Prolerized New England Company v. City of Manchester" on Justia Law

Before the Supreme Court in this case was appeal and cross-appeal of a Superior Court's order ruling in favor of the petitioners, eight individual New Hampshire residents and taxpayers and LRS Technology Services, LLC (LRS), on their petition for a declaratory judgment that the Education Tax Credit program. The State and several intervenors defended the program. The intervenors were three New Hampshire citizens, who wanted their children to receive scholarship funds under the program, and the Network for Educational Opportunity, a non-profit organization involved with the program. The trial court ruled that the petitioners had standing. The Supreme Court did not reach the merits of the petitioners’ declaratory judgment petition because it concluded that: (1) the 2012 amendment to RSA 491:22, I, which allowed taxpayers to establish standing without showing that their personal rights have been impaired or prejudiced, was unconstitutional; and (2) absent that amendment, the petitioners had no standing to bring their constitutional claim. Accordingly, the Court vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss the petition. View "Duncan v. New Hampshire" on Justia Law

Appellant injured his lower back in 2007 while working for Employer. Employer denied further treatment that same year. Appellant filed a petition for hearing in 2009, alleging that he was entitled to medical benefits. Based on a deposition of Dr. Dale Anderson, Employer filed an amended answer admitting that Appellant’s work activities were a major contributing cause to his need for medical treatment. The Department of Labor dismissed the case in 2010. In 2011, Employer denied further medical treatment based upon a recent independent medical evaluation by another doctor. Appellant petitioned for a hearing, arguing that res judicata applied to prevent Employer from changing its position from its previous admittance. The Department found res judicata inapplicable and that Appellant failed to meet his burden of proof on causation. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Dr. Anderson’s opinion was adopted by Employer and judicially accepted by the Department through its 2010 order of dismissal, Employer was judicially estopped from taking an inconsistent position; and (2) Appellant met his burden of proving that his work-related activities as of 2010 were a major contributing cause of his disability. Remanded.View "Hayes v. Rosenbaum Signs & Outdoor Advertising, Inc. " on Justia Law

Florida Power & Light (FPL) filed an application for a rate base increase. Three intervenors to the proceedings and FPL reached a negotiated settlement agreement. After evidentiary hearings pertaining exclusively to the settlement agreement, the Florida Public Service Commission (Commission) approved the settlement agreement, finding that it established fair, just, and reasonable rates and that it was in the public interest. Citizens of the State of Florida (Citizens) appealed the decision of the Commission. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission did not violate the essential requirements of the law or commit a material error in procedure by approving the negotiated settlement agreement over Citizens’ objection; (2) the procedures followed by the Commission did not violate Citizens’ due process rights; and (3) the Commission’s findings and conclusions were support by competent, substantial evidence and were not clearly erroneous. View "Citizens of the State of Fla. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n" on Justia Law

Plunderbund Media, LLC sought the disclosure of records documenting threats against the governor that were kept by the Director of Public Safety. Legal counsel for the Department of Public Safety refused to produce any records based on Ohio Rev. Code 149.433, which exempts “security records” from disclosure under the Public Records Act. Plunderbund filed an action for a writ of mandamus to require the Department to produce the requested records. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding any records of threats made to the governor are “security records” and are therefore exempt from disclosure as public records under section 149.433. View "State ex rel. Plunderbund Media v. Born" on Justia Law

In 2010, almost ten years after he had left his employment with his employer, Formica Corporation, Appellant applied for temporary-total-disability (TTD) compensation. The Industrial Commission denied Appellant’s application, concluding that Appellant’s failure to search for work since leaving Formica was evidence that he had abandoned the job market and retired, making him ineligible to receive further compensation. Appellant filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus. The court of appeals denied the writ, concluding that the evidence supported the Commission’s decision that Appellant intended to voluntarily abandon the workforce when his employment with Formica ended. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err when it determined that the Commission’s order was supported by sufficient evidence that Appellant had already abandoned the entire workforce when he applied for TTD compensation in 2010.View "State ex rel. Floyd v. Formica Corp." on Justia Law