Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Health Law
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After William Dean was involuntarily hospitalized, the Department of Health and Human Services was appointed as Dean’s temporary public conservator. Thereafter, the Department sold some of Dean’s property. Dean’s sister, Claire Perry, filed a complaint against the Department and certain state individuals, asserting claims arising out of the Department’s management of Dean’s property during the public conservatorship. Later, Pamela Vose was appointed as Dean’s conservator. Vose filed a cross-claim and then a separate action against the Department, alleging breach of fiduciary duty. The court consolidated the two cases. The Department and the individual state defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting sovereign immunity. The court entered a summary judgment in favor of the defendants on most claims but denied the Department’s motions for summary judgment on Vose’s claim for breach of fiduciary duty in both cases, concluding that the Maine Probate Court waived sovereign immunity and that the Department was subject to suit in tort when acting as a public conservator. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order denying the Department’s motions for summary judgment, holding that the Department is immune from the breach of fiduciary duty claims asserted in these cases because the Probate Code does not expressly waive sovereign immunity and the Department did not waive immunity. View "Perry v. Dean" on Justia Law

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Domestic Violence Survivors’ Support Group, Inc. (DVCC), a non-profit corporation that provides counseling services to victims of domestic violence, applied for a behavioral health center license. The West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR), Office of Health Facility Licensure and Certification (OHFLAC) denied the application for licensure on the ground that DVCC does not employ a licensed counselor. The circuit court affirmed the administrative decision. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that OHFLAC’s interpretation of its administrative rule as requiring all professional counselors to be professionally licensed was contrary to the statutory and regulatory schemes. Remanded. View "Domestic Violence Survivors' Support Group, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources" on Justia Law

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In 1994, the Texas State Board of Examiners of Marriage and Family Therapists (the Therapists Board) adopted a rule listing specific therapeutic services that licensed marriage and family therapists (MFTs) may provide. As relevant to this appeal, the rule permits MFTs to provide “diagnostic assessment…to help individuals identify their emotional, mental, and behavioral problems.” In 2008, the Texas Medical Association filed suit against the Board seeking a declaratory judgment that the rule was invalid because it grants MFTs authority that the Texas Licensed Marriage and Family Therapists Act does not grant and that the Texas Medical Practice Act reserves for medical licensees. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Medical Association. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Texas Occupations Code authorizes MFTs to provide diagnostic assessments, and therefore, the diagnostic-assessment rule is valid. View "Texas State Board of Examiners of Marriage & Family Therapists v. Texas Medical Ass’n" on Justia Law

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Indiana’s 2015 Vapor Pens and E-Liquid Act regulates the manufacture and distribution of vapor pens and the liquids used in e-cigarettes, Ind. Code 7.1-7- 1-1. The Act has extraterritorial reach and imposed detailed requirements of Indiana law on out-of-state manufacturing operations. It purported to regulate the design and operation of out-of-state production facilities, including requirements for sinks, cleaning products, and even the details of contracts with outside security firms and the qualifications of those firms’ personnel. The Seventh Circuit reversed dismissal of a challenge to the Act. Imposing these Indiana laws on out-of-state manufacturers violates the dormant Commerce Clause. Indiana has ample authority to regulate in-state commerce in vapor pens, e-liquids, and e-cigarettes to protect the health and safety of its residents, by prohibiting sales to minors and requiring child-proof packaging, ingredient labeling, and purity. The requirements for in-state production facilities pose no inherent constitutional problems. Indiana may not, however, try to achieve its health and safety goals by directly regulating out-of-state factories and commercial transactions. View "Legato Vapors, LLC v. Cook" on Justia Law

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Delek petitions for review of OSHA citations for violations of its process safety management rules, which govern an employer’s responsibility to inspect, and to develop inspection and recording regimes for, machinery that handles large volumes of hazardous chemicals. Item 4 alleges a failure to resolve open findings and recommendations identified during process hazard analyses that occurred in 1994, 1998, 1999, 2004, and 2005—prior to Delek purchasing and taking possession of the refinery. Item 8 alleges an inadequate monitoring and inspection regime for certain equipment involved in process safety management. Item 12 alleges that Delek failed to determine and document a response to the findings of a 2005 compliance audit in a timely manner. Item 12 was also conducted before Delek took possession of the refinery. The court concluded that citations for Items 4 and 12 are barred by the six-month statute of limitations in 29 U.S.C. 658(c). Accordingly, the court vacated those items. The court also concluded that the regulations relevant to the citation for Item 8 are ambiguous and the Secretary's interpretation is reasonable. The court affirmed the citation for Item 8. View "Delek Refining, Ltd. v. OSHC" on Justia Law

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Petitioner was charged with several criminal offenses. Petitioner pleaded not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. After a nonadversarial proceeding, the court rendered a judgment acquitting Petitioner of all offenses on the basis of mental disease or defect and committed Petitioner to the custody of the Commissioner of Mental Health and Addiction Services (Respondent) for a period not to exceed twenty-five years. Respondent later transferred custody of Petitioner to the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board. Petitioner remained committed to the custody of the Board for more than twenty-five years. Petitioner then filed a petition for habeas corpus challenging his extended confinement. The habeas court denied Petitioner’s petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the habeas court properly denied Petitioner relief on his claim regarding the knowing and voluntary nature of his plea; and (2) the habeas court correctly determined that Petitioner did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel. View "Dyous v. Commissioner of Mental Health & Addiction Services" on Justia Law

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West Texas LTC Partners, Inc., doing business as Cedar Manor Nursing & Rehabilitation Center ("Cedar Manor"), appealed a Departmental Appeals Board ("DAB") of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") decision. In 2013, Cedar Manor was surveyed by the Texas Department of Aging and Disability Services ("DADS"). The surveyor found Cedar Manor out of compliance with three regulations after observing the care provided to two wheelchair-bound residents, Resident #1 and Resident #4. Early the next year, DADS found additional violations of several regulations. The surveys were conducted by a designated state agency on behalf of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services ("CMS") of HHS. The findings were reviewed by CMS, and civil money penalties ("CMPs") or other remedies may be imposed by the Secretary of HHS if the facility was found noncompliant. For the two sets of violations, CMS recommended two CMPs: $6,050 per day for three days, and $350 per day for forty-two days, to run consecutively from the end of an "immediate hazard" penalty. Cedar Manor appealed the findings and CMPs and requested a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). CMS moved for summary judgment on all of the violations after the briefing and evidence were submitted. The ALJ granted summary judgment and upheld the CMPs. On de novo review, the DAB affirmed. The Fifth Circuit found that the DAB decision was neither arbitrary and capricious nor unsupported by substantial evidence, it denied Cedar Manor's petition for review. View "West Texas LTC Partners, Inc. v. Dept. of Health & Hum. Svcs." on Justia Law

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In 1973, two Kalamazoo, Michigan hospitals formed a consortium to manage their health education programs and to train interns and residents. In the 1980s, they joined Michigan State University to form the Michigan State University Kalamazoo Center for Medical Studies (KCMS). KCMS administered graduate medical programs for residency programs for the hospitals. The hospitals agreed to incur “joint and equal responsibility for providing [KCMS] with sufficient financing to carry out its programs as negotiated on a yearly basis.” KCMS also received patient-care revenue, support from Michigan State University, and funds from contracts and grants. The hospitals sought reimbursement on their Medicare cost reports (42 U.S.C. 1395ww(h)) during fiscal years 2000–2004 for costs incurred for residents’ training at KCMS’s nonhospital clinics. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services found that the hospitals failed to show they incurred all or substantially all of the costs of their residency programs and that they failed to comply with a requirement of a written agreement detailing the financing of their offsite programs. The district court and D.C. Circuit affirmed the denials of reimbursement, rejecting an argument that the “written agreement” requirement was satisfied by a collection of documents executed over the years. None of the documents met the regulatory criteria. View "Borgess Medical Center v. Burwell" on Justia Law

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Seaside filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), 2671-2680, alleging that the FDA negligently issued a contamination warning in response to an outbreak of Salmonella Saintpaul that devalued Seaside’s tomato crop by $15,036,293.95. The court affirmed the district court's holding that the FDA was exercising a discretionary function in connection with the contamination warning. The court explained that the ruling was essential to protect the FDA’s vital role in safeguarding the public food supply. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Seaside Farm, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

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The consolidated appeals in this case involved a dispute between the Secretary of Health and Human Services and a group of Maine hospitals about certain payments - called disproportionate share payments (DSH payments) - the hospitals had received in reimbursement from the federal government for charity care for fiscal years dating as far back as 1993. Generally speaking, the more low-income patients a hospital services, the higher the hospital’s DSH payment. In this case, the Secretary maintained that the Hospitals were overinclusive in their DSH payment calculations. An intermediary reassessed the DSH payments and recouped from the Hospitals approximately $22 million in alleged overpayments. The Provider Reimbursement Review Board, in turn, ordered the intermediary to restore approximately $17 million to the Hospitals. The Secretary reversed. The Hospitals sought judicial review, but neither side was satisfied with the district court’s ruling. On appeal, the First Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the Secretary properly reopened the disputed years and adequately demonstrated that the Hospitals had received substantial overpayments of DSH funds; and (2) the Hospitals’ defenses to repayment were unavailing. View "Maine Medical Center v. Burwell" on Justia Law