Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 2010, Gerald Durk Simpson shot Ryan Mitchell in the back outside of a coffee shop in Pocatello. Prior to the shooting, Simpson had been receiving mental health services from the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare’s Adult Mental Health program. In fact, Simpson had been receiving services from the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (IDHW) for most of his adult life. In June of that year, IDHW sent a letter to Simpson informing him that he was being released from its program. The shooting occurred a little over three months after Simpson was released from IDHW’s care and custody. The Bannock County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office filed a charge of Aggravated Battery against Simpson with notice that the State would seek an enhancement penalty for the use of a deadly weapon in the commission of a crime. Approximately ten days after the shooting, psychologist Daniel Traughber, Ph.D., prepared a memorandum on behalf of the IDHW, explaining the processes and procedures that were used to implement the budget cuts so that patient mental health services would be terminated in a way that “reduced the risk of harm to patients and/or the community.” Mitchell appealed a district court order granting summary judgment in favor of the State after he brought suit alleging the State violated his constitutional and statutory victims’ rights and that the State was negligent when it discontinued Simpson’s services. Mitchell sought declaratory and injunctive relief for his victims’ rights claim and sought damages for his negligence claim. Mitchell argued: (1) the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA) did not shield the State from liability for its decision to discontinue mental health services for Simpson; and (2) the victims’ rights laws provided a private cause of action for declaratory and injunctive relief against a state agency. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in granting summary judgment on Mitchell's negligence claim: " It is clear that the complaint alleges that when IDHW made the decision to close Simpson’s file, it negligently followed, or failed to follow, procedures that were put into place to determine whether a client’s file should be closed. The evidence does not indicate who made the decision to close Simpson’s file in particular or how that decision was made." The Court reversed with respect to the negligence claim, affirmed in all other respects, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Mitchell v. Idaho" on Justia Law

This case involved a second set of appeals arising from an action challenging the bidding process for the Idaho Education Network (“IEN”). Syringa Networks, LLC, sued Qwest Communications, LLC, ENA Services, LLC, and the Idaho Department of Administration (“DOA”) and certain DOA employees, alleging injury arising from contract awards and amendments that DOA issued to Qwest and ENA related to the IEN. The district court dismissed all of Syringa’s claims. On appeal the Idaho Supreme Court held that Syringa had standing to pursue Count Three, which alleged that DOA violated Idaho Code section 67-5718A. Count Three was remanded to the district court for further proceedings. On remand, the district court entered partial summary judgment for Syringa on Count Three, holding that the amendments and the underlying contracts were void for violating state procurement law. The district court denied Syringa’s motion to order DOA to demand repayment of money advanced under the void contracts. The district court also awarded Syringa attorney fees. Syringa, Qwest, ENA, and DOA each appealed: Syringa appealed the district court’s denial of its request to order DOA to demand repayment from Qwest and ENA; the other parties appealed the district court’s grant of partial summary judgment to Syringa, arguing that the district court’s conclusions were procedurally improper and substantively incorrect for a variety of reasons. DOA also challenges the district court’s award of attorney fees to Syringa. Finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Syringa Networks v. Dept of Administration" on Justia Law

Appellant Rangen, Inc., filed a petition before the Director of the Idaho Department of Water Resources, alleging that junior ground water pumping in the Eastern Snake Plains Aquifer was materially injuring its water rights. The Director issued an order granting Rangen a curtailment of certain junior priority ground water pumping affecting Rangen’s water rights. The Director also interpreted the source and point of diversion elements of Rangen’s water rights to have a scope smaller than Rangen’s actual historical use. Rangen and intervenor Idaho Ground Water Appropriators, Inc. (“IGWA”) each filed petitions for judicial review. The issues raised by IGWA in its petition for judicial review were not at issue here; rather Rangen raised various issues related to the interpretation of its water rights and the sufficiency of the evidence before the agency. Specifically, Rangen appealed the Director’s determinations that Rangen could divert water only from the mouth of the Martin-Curren Tunnel and only within the ten-acre tract listed on its water right partial decrees. Rangen also appealed the Director’s adoption of an adverse expert’s analysis and the Director’s conclusion that junior priority ground water users are using water efficiently and without waste. The district court affirmed the Director’s orders, and Rangen appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court on substantially the same issues with substantially the same arguments. Finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Rangen, Inc. v. Idaho Dept of Water Resources" on Justia Law

Claimant Clarence Copper was an employee of Ace Hardware / Sannan, Inc. from 2004 until he was terminated in 2014. Prior to termination, Claimant was reprimanded numerous times for failing to perform his job duties. Claimant appealed an order of the Industrial Commission that the he was not entitled to unemployment benefits because he was discharged for misconduct in connection with his employment for violating his employer’s written policies. Finding no reversible error after review of the record, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's order. View "Copper v. Ace Hardware" on Justia Law

Kelli Sevy sustained a work-related injury on October 31, 2006, and contended that she was totally and permanently disabled. The Industrial Commission found that Sevy failed to meet her burden of establishing total and permanent disability. Although the Commission found that Sevy was “profoundly disabled,” the Commission held that Sevy had failed to demonstrate that the accident contributed to her disability beyond a 2% permanent partial impairment (PPI). Sevy argued on appeal that the Commission’s decision that she did not suffer disability in excess of her impairment is not supported by substantial and competent evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Kelli Sevy v. SVL Analytical, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2013, claimant Scott Chadwick filed a complaint with the Industrial Commission seeking benefits under the Worker’s Compensation Law from his employer, Multi-State Electric, LLC, and its surety, Idaho State Insurance Fund. Claimant alleged that he had suffered back injuries as a result of two separate accidents at work in 2012. The matter was tried to a referee, but the Commission did not adopt the referee’s recommendations. After considering the Claimant’s prehearing deposition, the testimony presented during the evidentiary hearing before the referee, and the exhibits, the Commission issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order. The Commission found that Claimant failed to prove that he suffered an injury from a workplace accident in a May event and that he failed to prove that a July event occurred. The Commission alternatively found that he had failed to provide timely notice to his employer of both claimed accidents, and that he failed to prove that Employer was not prejudiced by the failure to give timely notice. Therefore, he was denied benefits. Claimant then timely appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission. View "Chadwick v. Multi-State Electric, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellant, the Greater Boise Auditorium District, filed a petition for judicial confirmation (pursuant to Idaho Code section 7-1304) asking the district court for a determination that a lease the District intended to enter into did not violate the Constitution’s Article VIII, section 3 clause prohibiting a municipal body, without voter approval, from incurring indebtedness or liabilities greater than it has funds to pay for in the fiscal year. Respondent, Boise resident and property owner David Frazier, objected to the requested judicial confirmation, and appeared in the case to contest it. The district court denied the Petition for Judicial Confirmation and the District appealed. Frazier sought attorneys’ fees on appeal. After review, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s denial of the District’s request for judicial confirmation and held that the agreements into which it entered satisfied Article VIII, section 3 of the Constitution. View "Greater Boise Auditorium District v. Frazier" on Justia Law

Joseph Talbot worked at Desert View Care Center as a nurse and was discharged due to a Facebook post that Desert View found violated its Social and Electronic Media Conduct Policy. Talbot applied for unemployment benefits, and an Idaho Department of Labor Appeals Examiner awarded him benefits. The Idaho Industrial Commission reversed, concluding that Talbot engaged in employment-related misconduct. Talbot appealed, arguing that Desert View never communicated its Social Media Policy to him. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Industrial Commission's decision. View "Talbot v. Desert View Care Center" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court stemmed from a district court decision affirming the approval of a subdivision by the Board of County Commissioners of Clearwater County. In approving the subdivision, the Board approved three variances granted by the Clearwater County Planning and Zoning Commission with respect to the road providing access to the subdivision. A portion of the access road crossed over land owned by Edward and Donilee Shinn, who opposed the variances and petitioned the district court for judicial review. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the Board erred when it failed to make the approval of the variance application expressly contingent upon judicial resolution of the access issue. The Court remanded the case back to the district court to determine whether the Shinns' substantial rights were prejudiced by the Board's decision. View "Shinn v. Bd of Co Comm Clearwater Co" on Justia Law

In 2005, John Block purchased property in Lewiston from Jack Streibick to develop. Block submitted an application to resubdivide the property into three residential lots, which Lewiston approved. Prior to Block's purchase of the property, Lewiston issued two separate permits to Streibick allowing him to place and grade fill in the area of those lots. In 2006, Block received permits from Lewiston to construct homes on each of the three lots. During construction of the homes, Block hired engineering firms to test compaction of the finished grade for the footings on the lots. Following the construction of the homes, Lewiston issued Block certificates of occupancy for each of the homes after conducting inspections that found the homes to be constructed in accordance with applicable building codes and standards. In April 2007, Block sold the home and property at 159 Marine View Drive. In November of that year, the owner reported a crack in the home's basement. Around that same time, settling was observed at the other two properties. In early December 2007, Block repurchased 159 from the owners. He also consulted with engineers regarding options for immediate repair to the homes. As early as February 2009, further settling problems were reported at the properties. After Lewiston inspected the properties in May following a gas leak at 153, it posted notice that the residential structures on 153 and 159 were unsafe to occupy. Block ultimately filed a Notice of Claim for Damages with Lewiston that also named City Engineer Lowell Cutshaw as a defendant, but did not effectuate process on Lewiston and Cutshaw until ninety days had elapsed from the date he had filed the Notice of Claim. The City defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Block's claims should be dismissed because he failed to timely file a Notice of Claim with Lewiston. This first motion for summary judgment was denied because a question of material fact existed concerning whether Block reasonably should have discovered his claim against Lewiston prior to 2009. The City defendants filed a second motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of all of Block's claims against them, arguing that they were immune from liability for all of these claims under the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA) and that Block could not establish that he was owed a duty. The district court granted this second summary judgment motion dismissing Block's claims based on the application of the economic loss rule. The court also held that immunity under the ITCA and failure to establish a duty provided alternate grounds for dismissal of Block's claims. Block appealed on the issue of immunity. Finding no reversible error as to that issue, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. View "Block v. City of Lewiston" on Justia Law