Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

On May 15, 2012, Karl Lewies won the primary election for the position of Fremont County Prosecuting Attorney. Because he had no opponent in the November general election, he knew he would be elected as the prosecuting attorney. He was scheduled to be sworn into office on January 14, 2013. On November 23, 2012, he filed two petitions for review against the county commissioners of Fremont County. One petition for review was on behalf of Flying “A” Ranch, Inc., and the other petition was on behalf of E. C. Gwaltney, III. The petitions sought to overturn the designation by the county commissioners of certain roads as being public roads rather than private roads. On January 7, 2013, the county commissioners, represented by Blake Hall, the deputy prosecutor hired by the prosecutor that Lewies had defeated in the primary, filed motions in both cases seeking to have Lewies disqualified from representing the petitioners in those cases. On the same day, Lewies filed motions in both cases to withdraw as counsel for the petitioners. In his supporting affidavit, Lewies stated that he would be sworn in as prosecuting attorney on January 14, 2013, at which time he would have a conflict of interest in continuing to represent the petitioners. In each of the cases, Lewies had named two of the commissioners in both their official and individual capacities. The commissioners filed motions in both cases to dismiss the actions against them. The court made preliminary rulings that Lewies could not represent any parties in the two cases; that the county would be awarded attorney fees against him personally for having to file the motion to disqualify; that an action against the two commissioners in their individual capacities could not be joined with a petition for judicial review; and that attorney fees would not be awarded against Lewies for having named them in their individual capacities. At another hearing, the issue of attorney fees against Lewies was discussed. After the parties argued that issue, the court entered a final decision in both cases awarding the county attorney fees against Lewies personally pursuant to Rule 11(a)(1). Lewies timely appealed. Because there was no legal basis for the award, the Supreme Court reversed. View "Flying "A" Ranch v. Bd. of Cty. Comm. of Fremont" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was an order of the Idaho Public Utilities Commission holding that it had jurisdiction to decide whether the force majeure clauses in the Appellants' contracts with Idaho Power Company excused them from their contractual obligations to have their power generation facilities constructed and in operation by specified dates in order to sell electricity to Idaho Power. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission. View "Idaho Power v. New Energy Two & IPUC" on Justia Law

Claimant DeAnne Muchow began working for Varsity Contractors in, 2011 as a human resources assistant. During her employment, she had an ongoing conflict with her supervisor and had lodged several complaints about her supervisor. The director decided to have a meeting with claimant and her supervisor in an effort to resolve the conflict. During the meeting, the claimant and her supervisor both stated that they had documentation outlining their complaints. The director told them to get their documentation and bring it back to his office. Claimant asked for time to better prepare her papers, but the director denied that request because he was leaving the next day on a business trip. He did give claimant a few minutes to look over her papers. She returned to her desk and after a few minutes printed her documents. She took the documents and walked toward the director, who was standing outside his office. The claimant waved the documents in the air, told the director she had them and was going to shred them, and walked past him toward the shredder. He told her not to shred them, but she continued to the shredder and shredded them. The director then discharged her for insubordination. Claimant applied for unemployment benefits, which were initially denied. She appealed, an appeals examiner held an evidentiary hearing by telephone. He later issued findings of fact and conclusions of law and reversed the ruling that claimant was not entitled to unemployment benefits. He held that as a matter of law there was no insubordination. The basis of his ruling was that the director’s order not to shred the documents was not a directive that the director was authorized to give and entitled to have obeyed, because the documents belonged to claimant and contained her personal notations about issues and problems she was having with a coworker. The employer then appealed to the Industrial Commission. The commission adopted the findings of fact made by the appeals examiner. However, the commission disagreed with the conclusions of law made by the appeals examiner: the held that the director requested the documents because they pertained to a conflict between two employees that he was attempting to resolve; that he had a reasonable expectation that his order not to shred the documents would be obeyed; and that the claimant chose to disregard the director’s order and shredded the documents. The commission concluded that her conduct constituted employment-related misconduct, and it reversed the decision of the appeals examiner and held that the claimant was not eligible for unemployment benefits. Claimant then appealed to the Supreme Court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission. View "Muchow v. Varsity Contractors, Inc" on Justia Law

Ada County Highway District (ACHD) appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Terrie Rowley. This case arose from a dispute in the ownership of a ten-foot-wide walkway in a Boise subdivision and arose after Rowley sought an injunction to remove a shed her neighbor placed on that walkway. The district court held that: (1) the subdivision plats showed the original developers clearly and unequivocally dedicated the walkway to the public; and (2) ACHD owned the walkway. ACHD appealed, arguing no evidence in the record showed the original developers clearly and unequivocally intended a public dedication and no statutory provision authorized ACHD to own the walkway. Rowley contended that the original developers clearly intended a public dedication as the walkway was a public street’s corridor extension. Upon review of the facts in record, the Supreme Court agreed with ACHD's argument, finding that the district court erred in holding the subdivision's original owners demonstrated clear and unequivocal intent to dedicate the walkway to the public. The Court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of ACHD. View "Rowley v. ACHD" on Justia Law

The Board of Trustees of the Mountain Home School District No. 193 appealed the district court’s denial of the its request for attorney fees. This case arose when School District employee Terri Sanders claimed that the Board breached its contract with her by hiring a candidate less qualified than her for a teaching position that Sanders had also applied for. After a jury found the Board did not breach its contract, the district court held the Board was not entitled to attorney fees because Sanders presented a legitimate issue for trial. The court also held that because I.C. 12-117 was the exclusive source of attorney fees for a school district, I.C. 12-120(3) could not apply. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that attorney fees under I.C. 12-117 were not exclusive. Because fees were available under I.C. 12-120(3), the Court remanded the case for the district court to enter the appropriate award of attorney fees under that statute. The Court also vacated the district court’s award of arbitration costs to the Board. Neither party received attorney fees on appeal. View "Sanders v. Bd of Trustees - Mt. Home School Dist 193" on Justia Law

A certified question of law from the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho was presented to the Idaho Supreme Court. Karen White and her development company, Elkhorn, LLC, sought to recover $166,496 paid to Valley County for "capital investments for roads in the vicinity of [their] White Cloud development." Phase I of White Cloud was completed and it was undisputed by the parties that the tax monies paid for Phase I were used by the County to complete capital investments for roads in the vicinity of the White Cloud development. The County conceded that it did not adopt an impact fee ordinance or administrative procedures for the impact fee process as required by the Idaho Development Impact Fees Act (IDIFA). The County also conceded it did not enact an IDIFA-compliant ordinance, because, at the time, the County believed in good faith that none was required. Plaintiff filed suit against the County claiming that the road development fee imposed by the County as a condition for approval of the White Cloud project violated Idaho state law and deprived Plaintiff of due process under both the federal and Idaho constitutions. In her Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff raised two claims for relief. The first claim for relief alleged that “Valley County’s practice of requiring developers to enter into a Road Development Agreement ("RDA," or any similar written agreement) solely for the purpose of forcing developers to pay money for its proportionate share of road improvement costs attributable to traffic generated by their development is a disguised impact fee, is illegal and therefore should be enjoined." The first claim for relief also alleged that, because the County failed to enact an impact fee ordinance under IDIFA, the imposition of the road development fees constituted an unauthorized tax. Plaintiff’s second claim for relief alleged that the County’s imposition of the road development fee constituted a taking under the federal and Idaho constitutions. The County argued Plaintiff voluntarily agreed to pay the RDA monies. Plaintiff denies that the payment was voluntary since it was required to obtain the final plat approval. The issue the federal district court presented to the Idaho Supreme Court centered on when the limitations period commences for statutory remedies made available under Idaho law to obtain a refund of an illegal county tax. The Court answered that the limitations period for statutory remedies made available under Idaho law to obtain a refund of an illegal county tax commences upon payment of the tax. View "White v. Valley County" on Justia Law

In September 2010, Corral Agriculture, Inc. (Corral) contracted with Williamson Orchards to provide laborers to pick apples. Marco Fonseca worked as a laborer for Corral as a member of Coronado’s crew at Williamson Orchards. Fonseca's workers' compensation complaint stems from an injury he claims to have suffered while working. He was picking apples near the top of a ten or fifteen foot ladder when the ladder broke, causing him to fall to the ground and resulting in an injury to his hip and back. Fonseca testified that he reported his fall and his hip and back pain to Dr. Partridge on both visits but the medical records contain no notes regarding the fall or complaints of hip or back pain. The Industrial Commission denied Fonseca workers' compensation benefits after concluding he failed to prove he suffered an accident. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's decision. View "Fonseca v. Corral Ag, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2011, plaintiff-respondent Jamee Wade was shot twice by a Fruitland police officer after an altercation. Intending to file a claim under the Idaho Tort Claims Act, Wade sought copies of investigatory records related to the incident pursuant to the Idaho Public Records Act (IPRA). This appeal arose from a Petition for Access to Public Records filed by plaintiff seeking the disclosure of investigatory records in the possession of the Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office (CCPA). The district court ordered CCPA to produce the records pursuant to the request, but limited disclosure to Wade and his counsel. CCPA timely appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court vacated the district court's judgment: the district court applied an erroneous legal standard in its analysis under I.C. 9-335. The records Wade requested were active investigatory records. View "Wade v. Taylor" on Justia Law

There are five children involved in this case: C.C., M.R., G.C., M.C.C., and A.C.C. The children have four different fathers. This appeal is the culmination of several child protection actions involving their mother Jane Doe. The State petitioned to terminate Jane Doe's parental rights as to all children, and Jane Doe appealed the ultimate termination order. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Re: Thermination of Parental Rights (mother)" on Justia Law

In 2006, claimant William Waters was working as a drywall hanger and taper. He was injured on a jobsite and sought medical care from a chiropractor. When chiropractic did not resolve his pain, he was recommended for surgery. The surgeon released Claimant to return to light work with a 45-pound lifting restriction. In 2007, the surgeon concluded that Claimant had reached medical stability, and he released Claimant to full activities, restricting him only from impact loading with axial activities, such as diving and gymnastics. Claimant returned to drywall work, but was laid off due to his difficulty keeping up. He applied for jobs at a convenience store and at rental car agencies, but was not hired. Later that year, Claimant sustained a whiplash injury to his neck in a rear-end motor vehicle accident, for which he sought and received emergency medical care. During the first part of 2008, he tripped and fell while running, sustaining an injury to his right shoulder for which he also sought and received emergency medical care. Claimant returned for treatment of right shoulder pain. After examining Claimant and conducting further testing, the doctor determined that Claimant had shoulder weakness from a nerve injury likely due to the industrial accident. Whether and to what extent Claimant was entitled to permanent partial disability benefits was tried to a referee. Claimant relied upon the testimony of two experts: his examining doctor and a vocational rehabilitation consultant. The central issue was whether the medical conditions identified by the doctor after the car accident were caused by the industrial accident. The referee concluded that Claimant had failed to prove that they were. The referee recommended that Claimant had failed to prove any permanent partial disability in excess of a 12% permanent partial impairment, which the State Insurance Fund (Surety) had already paid. The Commission adopted the referee’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law as its own. Claimant then timely appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Industrial Commission. View "Waters v. All Phase Const." on Justia Law