Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

This case stemmed from a 2019 lease by Respondents the City of Sandpoint (“the City”) to The Festival at Sandpoint (“The Festival”), a nonprofit corporation, to operate a multi-day music concert series in War Memorial Field Park. The Festival had a long-standing policy of prohibiting festival patrons from bringing weapons, including firearms, into the event. On August 9, 2019, Scott Herndon and Jeff Avery purchased tickets to the festival and attempted to enter. Avery openly carried a firearm and Herndon possessed a firearm either on his person or in a bag (the record was unclear on this point). Security personnel for the event denied entry to both. After discussions with a City police officer and the City’s attorney, who was coincidentally attending the same event in his private capacity, Herndon and Avery eventually left the music festival and received a refund for their tickets. Appellants Herndon, Avery, the Idaho Second Amendment Alliance, Inc., and the Second Amendment Foundation, Inc. subsequently sued the City and The Festival, asserting several claims, including seeking injunctive relief prohibiting the Respondents from violating the Idaho and United States Constitutions, particularly the Second Amendment and the Idaho Constitution’s provision securing the right to keep and bear arms in public for all lawful purposes. The district court ultimately granted the Respondents’ motions for summary judgment, awarded both the City and The Festival attorney fees and costs, and dismissed all the Appellants’ claims with prejudice. The issue raised on appeal was whether a private party who leased public property from a municipality may govern those who come and go from the property during the lease. The Idaho Supreme Court responded in the affirmative, and affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Herndon v. City of Sandpoint" on Justia Law

Petitioners-appellants the Reeses and their neighbors challenged the Blackfoot City Council’s decision to approve a Planned Unit Development (“PUD”) in a “Residential Ranchette” zoning district. The district court dismissed their petition for judicial review after holding the Reeses did not demonstrate prejudice to a substantial right. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed the district court's decision. View "Reese v. City of Blackfoot" on Justia Law

After submitting the winning bid, Eagle Rock Timber, Inc. (“Eagle Rock”), contracted with Teton County, Idaho to reconstruct a stretch of road known as “Chapin Lane.” During the course of the project, Eagle Rock claimed it discovered unsuitable base material under portions of the road. Eagle Rock maintained that Teton County’s agent, Darryl Johnson, directed Eagle Rock to remove the material and said that the county would “make it right.” However, when Eagle Rock attempted to recover an amount in excess of the original Contract Price, Teton County denied Eagle Rock’s request, stating that it had not authorized any changes to the Contract. When the parties could not resolve this dispute over the amount owed, Eagle Rock filed suit. Teton County twice moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the first motion, concluding that genuine issues of material fact existed concerning whether Johnson orally waived the writing requirement and whether Johnson had authorized Eagle Rock to remove the unsuitable base material, which could support an equitable remedy. In the County's second motion, the district court granted it, ruling that since Teton County’s agent did not have actual or apparent authority to bind Teton County, the claims asserted by Eagle Rock failed as a matter of law. Eagle Rock appealed, asserting that the district court erred because there were still genuine issues of material fact that should be resolved by a jury. Further, Eagle Rock claimed the district court’s refusal to grant leave to amend its complaint to assert a separate cause of action against Johnson personally was an abuse of discretion. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and denial of leave to amend. However, the Court affirmed the district court in not considering the ratification issue because it was beyond the scope of the pleadings at the time it was presented. View "Eagle Rock Timber, Inc. v. Teton County" on Justia Law

Petitioner Todd Wood appealed after his driving privileges were suspended following breath alcohol testing (BAC) by the Idaho State Policy. After a lawful traffic stop, Wood submitted to BAC testing. His results were 0.178 and 0.175, both in excess of Idaho’s legal limit of 0.08. However, during the fifteen-minute pretest observation period, the deputy sheriff admittedly did not observe Wood for roughly three minutes to ensure mouth alcohol was not present by way of burp, external contaminant, or otherwise prior to evidentiary testing. Wood challenged his suspension and argued that his BAC results were inadmissible because they had not been obtained in compliance with the required fifteen-minute pretest observation procedure. The ALS hearing officer disagreed, reasoning that ISP had promulgated rules making the pretest observation period only discretionary; thus, Wood’s BAC test results were not based on unlawful procedure. Wood petitioned for judicial review and argued the BAC rules allowing for a discretionary observation period are violative of “due process” and “fundamental fairness.” Wood further argued that the automatic admission of BAC results in his ALS hearing, pursuant to section 18-8004(4), unconstitutionally usurped the judicial branch’s power over the admission of evidence. The district court rejected Wood’s arguments and upheld his administrative license suspension. Wood appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court on the same grounds, which likewise upheld the suspension. View "Wood v. ITD" on Justia Law

Rodney Dickenson brought a whistleblower case against the Benewah County Sheriff’s Office (“BCSO”), Benewah County Board of Commissioners, and former Benewah County Sheriff, David Resser (collectively, the “County”). BCSO told Dickenson that his employment was being terminated for violating law enforcement policy and ethics. Dickenson alleged his termination violated Idaho’s Whistleblower Act because he was terminated for secretly recording meetings with Sheriff Resser and Undersheriff Anthony Eells to document malfeasance and the illegal activities of some deputies. After unsuccessful attempts at administrative appeals, Dickenson filed a complaint in district court alleging wrongful termination from his employment as a sergeant, in violation of Idaho Code sections 6-2101-2109, “because he communicated in good faith, with reasonable basis in fact, regarding a violation or suspected violation of the law.” The County moved for summary judgment on Dickenson’s complaint, which the district court granted, concluding Dickenson could not show he was fired for engaging in a protected activity. Dickenson appealed, arguing: (1) disputed issues of material fact precluded summary judgment; (2) the question of causation should have been a question for the jury; and (3) that the district court erred in its interpretation of the Whistleblower Act. The Idaho Supreme Court found that while these three issues were clear from Dickenson's opening brief, the brief included practically no citations to the record to support his claims. Neither the recordings themselves nor a transcript of either meeting was in the record, and the Court was left to divine from Dickenson’s generalized or conclusory statements in his affidavit what was said. "This dilemma alone is not just problematic, but fatal to Dickenson’s position on appeal." The district court concluded that Dickenson did not “provide[] evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact that he was terminated because he engaged in an activity protected by Idaho’s Whistleblower Act, and summary judgment [is] granted to defendants.” The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision. View "Dickenson v. Benewah County" on Justia Law

Idaho Power Company and Avista Corporation (collectively the “Companies”) contested the the Idaho State Tax Commission (the “Commission”), in its capacity as the State Board of Equalization, assessments of their operating property during 2019 and 2020, asserting that those assessments violated the proportionality and uniformity requirements set out in Article VII, sections 2 and 5 of the Idaho Constitution. The Commission rejected the Companies’ challenges and upheld its assessments. The Companies then sought judicial review of the Commission’s decision in district court, arguing that the Commission had erred in two significant ways: (1) because the Commission reduced the assessed values of certain railroads’ operating property in compliance with federal law, the assessed values of the Companies’ operating property were unconstitutionally assessed at a higher percentage of their actual cash value than were the railroads’ operating properties (the "4-R" claim); and (2) that commercial property had been assessed (and therefore taxed) at a lower percentage of its actual cash value than the Companies’ operating property, rendering the Companies’ operating property unconstitutionally disproportionally over-taxed (the "alternative claim"). The district court granted summary judgment to the Commission as to the Companies’ first argument. However, the district court concluded genuine issues of material fact existed as to the Companies’ second argument and declined to grant the Commission’s request for summary judgment. Both parties appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in dismissing the 4-R claim, but did not err as to the alternative claim. Judgment was reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Idaho Power Company v. Idaho State Tax Commission" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned a district court’s award of attorney fees to Burns Concrete, Inc., and Burns Holdings, LLC (collectively “Burns”). After extensive litigation, Burns prevailed on the merits of its claims and judgment was entered against Teton County, Idaho. The district court awarded Burns attorney fees pursuant to the parties’ development agreement. Both Burns and Teton County appealed, arguing the district court abused its discretion in awarding the fees. Burns argued the district court should have awarded more fees, while Teton County argued it should have denied the fees or awarded less fees. Finding no reversible error in the district court's award, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Burns Concrete, Inc. v. Teton County" on Justia Law

In 2018, Terri Richardson Mattson (“Mattson”) and her husband filed this action against the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, and its employee, Laurie Gallegos, a certified physician assistant (“Defendants”), alleging medical malpractice and failure to obtain informed consent related to outpatient mental health services Mattson received from Defendants. As a part of those services, Gallegos prescribed Mattson Prozac (fluoxetine), an antidepressant. Roughly one month later, the day of her follow up appointment with Gallegos, Mattson woke up, took a firearm from her gun cabinet, went to the liquor store, bought a bottle of vodka, drank the entire bottle while driving to her follow up appointment, and when she arrived in the Department’s parking lot, fired the gun into her head. Mattson survived but suffered extensive injuries. Subsequently, Mattson and her husband filed this action. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants on two grounds: (1) Defendants were immune from liability under the Idaho Tort Claims Act (“ITCA”) because Mattson’s claims arose out of injuries sustained while she was receiving services from a “mental health center”; and (2) the “reckless, willful and wanton conduct” exception to immunity did not apply as a matter of law. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision that Mattson’s and her husband’s claims fell within the purview of the “mental health center, hospital or similar facility” immunity provision in Idaho Code section 6-904A(2). However, the Court reversed the district court’s decision that there was no triable jury question under the “reckless, willful and wanton conduct” exception to immunity. The Supreme Court found Mattson alleged sufficient facts at summary judgment to demonstrate that a reasonable person could find that Defendants’ acts or omissions were “reckless, willful and wanton[.]” Thus, the Court vacated the judgment and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Mattson v. IDHW" on Justia Law

A group of pro se aggrieved property owners dubbed “Riverton Citizens Group,” timely filed a petition for judicial review challenging the Bingham County Commissioners’ (“the County”) decision to grant a zone change request. The caption of the petition named “Riverton Citizens Group” as the pro se petitioner, but the body of the petition then named the aggrieved property owners individually as the parties petitioning the County’s decision, while also providing that they were proceeding pro se under the title of “Riverton Citizens Group.” The petition was not signed by any of the aggrieved property owners. Instead, it was signed by a non-petitioner who purported to be the “agent” for “Riverton Citizens Group.” The purported “agent” was not licensed to practice law in Idaho. After the district court entered a notice of intent to dismiss the petition because Riverton Citizens Group was not represented by counsel, the aggrieved property owners attempted to correct the petition through five subsequent filings, each signed by only one of the aggrieved property owners. The district court subsequently issued a written decision, concluding the petition was “improperly filed” and therefore was not a “petition” that invoked the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84(n). Because the time for filing a new “petition” under I.R.C.P. 84(n) had passed, the district court dismissed the case with prejudice—reasoning it no longer had jurisdiction. A licensed attorney did not appear on behalf of the aggrieved property owners until after the district court’s decision to dismiss. The Idaho Supreme Court vacated the district court’s order: “the errors in the caption and the omitted signatures were not fatal or so defective as to render the petition a nullity or ‘improperly filed’ such that the district court had no subject matter jurisdiction. Instead, these errors may be corrected through a filing or amended petition on remand that relates back to the date of the timely petition.” View "Riverton Citizens Group v. Bingham County Commissioners" on Justia Law

Appellants were residents of Blaine County, Idaho (the “County”) who opposed a modified conditional use permit that the County granted to Idaho Power to install above-ground power lines. After the County denied Petitioners’ motion to reconsider as untimely, Petitioners sought judicial review of the permit in district court. Intervenor, Idaho Power Company, filed a motion to dismiss the petition, which the County joined, arguing that Petitioners’ underlying motion to reconsider was untimely, thereby precluding the district court from exercising its jurisdiction over the petition. The district court granted the motion to dismiss and concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition because the Local Land Use and Planning Act (LLUPA) required aggrieved parties to file a timely motion to reconsider prior to seeking judicial review. The district court further held that no exception to the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine applied. Petitioners timely appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court to resolve the question of whether the LLUPA required a timely motion to reconsider to be filed in advance of a petition for judicial review. The Supreme Court concluded the act does require the filing of a timely motion to reconsider in advance of a petition for judicial review, and, therefore, affirmed the district court's order. View "Richardson v. Blaine County" on Justia Law