Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Idaho Supreme Court - Civil
Elias-Cruz v. Idaho Dept. of Trans.
The issue on appeal in this case came from a decision of a district court which held that in a hearing regarding an administrative license suspension pursuant to Idaho Code section 18-8002A, the hearing officer must consider the margin of error of the breath testing machine when determining whether the test results support suspension. Facing a license suspension, Defendant Alma Elias-Cruz argued at trial that any suspension must be based upon her actual blood alcohol concentration rather than the alcohol concentration as shown by the test because, due to the test's margin of error, her actual blood alcohol content could have been below the statutory limit, and that the testing equipment had not been calibrated once a year as recommended by its manufacturer. The district court ruled sua sponte that her due process rights were violated by the hearing officer's rejection of the equipment's margin of error and that she had a statutory right to present such evidence. The court vacated the hearing officer's decision and ordered the matter remanded. The State then timely appealed. The Supreme Court reversed: "[u]nder Idaho Code section 18-8002A(1)(e), by definition the test results show the alcohol concentration. The issue is not the alcohol concentration in the blood. It is the alcohol concentration as shown by the test results. There is nothing to which to compare the test results. All that is required is that the test results show that the alcohol concentration was above the legal limit." The Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in its interpretation of that statute.
Fuchs v. Idaho State Police
The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court concerned Appellant Daniel Fuchs appeal of a district court's decision which found that the Director of the Idaho State Police Alcohol Beverage Control (ABC) had properly exercised his discretion when he ruled that neither party had been a prevailing party for the purposes of attorney fees. Fuchs was issued a Retail Alcohol Beverage License and subsequently opened Aubrey's House of Ale (Aubrey's) in Coeur d'Alene. The Alcohol Beverage Control Bureau Chief conducted an unannounced inspection of the premises. After this inspection, ABC filed a Complaint for Forfeiture or Revocation of Retail Alcohol Beverage License regarding Fuchs's license. Eventually, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment in the action before an ABC hearing officer. After oral argument, the hearing officer granted summary judgment to Fuchs. On appeal to the Director of the ABC, the Director did not order Fuchs' license revoked because of confusion surrounding the proper interpretation of the applicable rule under which Fuchs was cited. The Director's Final Order addressed the hearing officer's erroneous application of quasi-estoppel and Fuchs' unsuccessful arguments regarding improper rulemaking and claim that the agency acted arbitrarily. The Director denied attorneys' fees to both parties, declaring neither was the prevailing party because neither acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that Fuchs was not a prevailing party and affirmed the district court's decision to deny fees.
Friends of Minidoka v. Jerome County
The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned the approval of a permit application for a Livestock Confinement Operation (LCO), also known as a Concentrated Animal Feeding Operation (CAFO), by the Jerome County Board of County Commissioners. The Board approved the application after a remand by the district court of the Board's decision previously denying the permit. Several individuals and organizations opposed to the LCO because of the potential harms to the neighboring farms and to the Minidoka National Historic Site petitioned the district court for review of the Board's decision. The district court affirmed the Board's approval of the permit, finding in the process that four of the organizations concerned with the effects on the Minidoka National Historic Site lacked standing. Several of the objecting parties appealed the district court's decision, asking the Supreme Court to find that these parties had standing to challenge the permit approval, that the Board's procedure for presenting evidence before the Board violated procedural due process rights, and that the Board failed to follow all of the county's relevant zoning ordinances when it approved the application. The issue central to the Court's opinion pertained to standing of all the appellant-organizations, the Board's procedure for presenting evidence throughout the LCO permit application process, the constitutionality of the "one mile rule" of Idaho Code section 67-6529, and the application of the Jerome County Zoning Ordinances. The Court concluded that the Board properly applied its zoning ordinance to the LCO permit application process, that I.C. 67-6529 was not unconstitutional, and that the public was afforded appropriate due process prior to, and during the LCO permit application hearing.
RE: Termination of Parental Rights of John (2011-23) Doe
John Doe (Father) is a citizen of Mexico who entered the United States illegally in 2003. In mid-2007, he married Jane Doe (Mother) in Payette, Idaho. After they were married, Father was arrested in Ontario, Oregon, when he attempted to open a bank account with a false social security number. He served three months in jail, and was then transferred to a jail in Portland to be held for deportation. He agreed to voluntarily leave the United States and did so, returning to his parents’ home in Salamanca, Guanajuato, Mexico. Mother also went to Mexico, but she returned to the United States after she became pregnant. Their child (Daughter) was born in the United States in November 2008. Mother also had a four-year-old son by another man. In March 2009, Father reentered the United States illegally in an attempt to be with his wife and Daughter, but he was caught in Arizona and returned to Mexico. In March, 2009, Mother was living in Middleton, Idaho, with her boyfriend, who had a son who was about seven years old. Mother and her boyfriend took his son to the hospital regarding severe bruising on his head. Because Mother and her boyfriend gave conflicting accounts of how the boy was injured, the medical personnel notified law enforcement. The investigation disclosed Mother’s son had struck her boyfriend’s son several times with a hairbrush. Daughter and the boyfriend’s son were taken into custody by law enforcement, and on the same day the county prosecuting attorney filed a petition under the Child Protective Act with respect to those children. The petition alleged that the name of Daughter’s father was unknown and that he was in Mexico at an unknown address. Father spoke by telephone from Mexico with the Department’s caseworker that he would like to be involved in Daughter’s life and to be reunited with Mother and her son. He also said he would like Mother to begin the process that would allow him to come into the United States lawfully. In August, the Department’s caseworker told Father she would present a home study to the court if it was received in time. On September 15, 2010, the Mexican consulate emailed the report to the caseworker. The termination hearing was held on September 29. At that hearing, the Department did not present the study to the court. The caseworker testified that she disregarded the report because the Department had decided to terminate Father’s parental rights. Thus, default was entered against Father, even though he had clearly not been properly served with process regarding the termination proceedings. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the magistrate court and remanded this case with instructions for the court to order the Department to take all reasonable steps to promptly place Daughter with Father in Mexico.
Idaho Transportation Board V. HJ Grathol
HJ Grathol is a California general partnership that owed real estate in Idaho. Grathol purchased a parcel for development. The Idaho Transportation board later sought to condemn sixteen acres of the parcel in order to realign US Highway 95 and to construct an interchange with State Highway 54. Grathol contended that the Board failed to negotiate for the sixteen acres in good faith because the Board's offer did not account for the extension of two roads which were believed to have significantly increased the property's value. Grathol also asserted that the Board failed to file its complaint and order of condemnation in accordance with Idaho law before moving for early possession of the property pursuant to a "quick take" provision. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Board indeed did negotiate in good faith for the subject property, and filed its complaint and order of condemnation in accordance with the applicable statute. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision that the "quick take" provision in question was satisfied.
Pioneer Irrigation v. City of Caldwell
In 2008, Pioneer Irrigation District filed suit against the City of Caldwell seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as the removal of urban stormwater discharge conduits constructed by the City without Pioneer's authorization. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Pioneer. The court held that Pioneer held exclusive interests in its irrigation easements and rights-of-way such that Pioneer could maintain trespass claims against the City. The court also held that I.C. 42-1209 granted Pioneer the power to remove encroachments constructed without its permission that it deemed to unreasonably or materially interfere with its easements and rights-of-way. The district court held that review of certain decisions by the irrigation district would be limited to whether they were arbitrary and capricious or reached in an unreasonable manner. The City moved for permissive appeal, which motion the district court granted. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, except for its holding that irrigation easements and rights-of-way were exclusive interests.
City of Osburn v. Randel
Defendants-Appellants David and Pamela Randel appealed the denial of their request for attorney fees under I.C. 12-117, following the dismissal of a zoning enforcement action brought against them by the City of Osburn (City). The district court found the Randels to be the prevailing party but held they were not entitled to a fee award because the City had not pursued the action frivolously or without foundation. The Randels appealed to the Supreme Court and upon review, the Court affirmed: "the court discussed that, having considered the parties' arguments and the issues raised, it 'remain[ed] convinced that the action was not brought frivolously or without foundation.' That conclusion is eminently reasonable, especially since the City moved to dismiss the action when it failed to prevail on its motion for summary judgment. The court was presented with relatively little information about the merits of the action, and the arguments it did consider were fairly characterized as non-frivolous. The court acted within the bounds of its discretion and reached its decision through an exercise of reason. It, therefore, did not abuse its discretion when it denied the Randels' fee request."
Hart v. Idaho Tax Commission
Petitioner-Appellant Philip Hart appealed two State Tax Commission Notice of Deficiency determinations to the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA). The BTA found Petitioner's appeal untimely and dismissed it. Petitioner then appealed to the district court who likewise found the appeal untimely and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with both the district court and the BTA, and dismissed Petitioner's appeal.
Abolafia v. Reeves
The appellant in this case, Kenneth Adler, had been appointed as guardian ad litem for the children of Plaintiff-Respondent Joseph Abolafia and Defendant-Respondent Rebecca Reeves who were involved in a proceeding to modify the custody provisions of their divorce decree. After the parties reached an agreement to resolve their dispute and the magistrate court terminated Appellant as guardian ad litem. Appellant sought to appeal, challenging his termination. The district court held Appellant did not have standing to appeal, and dismissed the appeal and awarded attorney fees to the parents. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court: "Although he may have been miffed by his termination as guardian ad litem, injury to his pride is not justiciable. After he was terminated as guardian ad litem . . ., his actions in appealing to the district court have simply been those of an officious intermeddler. He had no standing to appeal."
RE: Termination of Parental Rights of Jane (2011-24) Doe
Appellant is the mother of two minor children who were placed into the custody of the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare on suspicion that they were abused or neglected. On March 27, 2009, the Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney filed a petition under the Child Protective Act alleging that Appellant’s infant daughter was abused. On April 8, 2009, the prosecutor filed an amended petition adding Appellant’s son and alleging that he was neglected. A year later, the prosecutor filed a petition seeking to terminate Appellant’s parental rights in her two children. The matter was tried to the magistrate court, which on December 7, 2011, issued its decision. The court found that Appellant had failed to complete the tasks required of her under the case plan. Finding no abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment terminating Appellants parental rights.