Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant is the mother of two minor children who were placed into the custody of the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare on suspicion that they were abused or neglected. On March 27, 2009, the Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney filed a petition under the Child Protective Act alleging that Appellant’s infant daughter was abused. On April 8, 2009, the prosecutor filed an amended petition adding Appellant’s son and alleging that he was neglected. A year later, the prosecutor filed a petition seeking to terminate Appellant’s parental rights in her two children. The matter was tried to the magistrate court, which on December 7, 2011, issued its decision. The court found that Appellant had failed to complete the tasks required of her under the case plan. Finding no abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment terminating Appellants parental rights.

Plaintiffs-Appellants JoAn and Fred Ball were patrons of the City of Blackfoot's municipal pool. JoAn slipped on ice accumulated on the sidewalk between the pool and the parking lot. The Balls brought suit against the City. A district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City, dismissing the Balls' claims on grounds that property owners are not liable for injuries resulting from natural accumulations of snow or ice. The Balls appealed. Upon further review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court appealed the wrong legal standard to the Balls' case, and therefore its grant of summary judgment was in error. The Court reversed the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings.

When "Child" was three years and seven months old, his Mother was arrested while Child was in her care. Since Father was already incarcerated, the state declared Child to be in imminent danger. Child was placed in the the Department of Health and Welfare's custody, and a child protection case was initiated. The matter proceeded to trial, after which the trial court granted the Department's petition to terminate Father-Petitioner John Doe's parental rights. Father appealed. Finding clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father's parental rights were in Child's best interests, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision to terminate.

Plaintiff-Appellant Robert Arambarri was Regional Director of Region VI with the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare. In this capacity, he was a non-classified, at-will employee serving at the pleasure of the Director of the Department. Due to budget reductions, four of the seven regional director positions, including Plaintiff's position, were eliminated by the Director. Responsibility for the seven administrative regions was consolidated in the remaining three regional directors. Plaintiff contended that the Director did not have the statutory authority to abolish those positions. He further contended that the Idaho Board of Health and Welfare did not properly concur with a formal vote in the elimination of the four regional director positions. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court did not err when it granted the Director's Motion for Summary Judgment and the denial of Plaintiff's Motion to Strike did not affect his substantial rights. The Court affirmed the judgment in favor of the Department.

Claimant Gary Brown filed a complaint with the Industrial Commission seeking disability benefits after he injured his back while working for The Home Depot. Arguing that the injuries caused by the accident in combination with his preexisting conditions, left him permanently and totally disabled, Claimant sought workers' compensation benefits from both Home Depot and the Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (ISIF). The Commission determined that Claimant was not permanently and totally disabled. Claimant contended on appeal that the Commission erred by evaluating his ability to find work based upon his access to the local labor market at the time his medical condition stabilized in 2005. He argued that his labor market access should have been evaluated as of the date of the Commission hearing in 2009. He also argued that the Commission based its finding that he was 95 percent disabled on an incorrect understanding of the expert testimony presented at the hearing. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Claimant's labor market at the time of the disability hearing was the proper labor market to be used in evaluating his disability. But because the Commission applied an incorrect legal standard, the Court vacated the Commission's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Appellant Lincoln McNulty worked as a ski patroller for Sinclair Services Company as a member of the Sun Valley Resort from 2005 to 2010. Once the ski season ended in 2009, Appellant filed for unemployment benefits effective April 2009, through November 2009. During those off-season months, he began working part-time at the Sawtooth Club for extra income. However, Appellant failed to report such employment or any earnings from the Sawtooth Club to the Idaho Department of Labor when he filed for unemployment benefits each week. The Idaho Department of Labor discovered the discrepancy and a claims investigator spoke with Appellant and ultimately issued an Eligibility Determination that Appellant was ineligible for benefits because he willfully made false statements or failed to report material facts in order to obtain benefits. Appellant appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that his failure to report was not willful, the facts were not material, and that he should be eligible for a waiver of the requirement to repay the unemployment benefits. Upon review, the Court affirmed the Industrial Commission's conclusion that Appellant willfully failed to disclose material facts in order to obtain unemployment benefits and that he must repay the overpayment of both state and federal benefits as well as any applicable interest and penalties.

On June 28, 2010, Appellant Maria Gomez filed a Worker’s Compensation Complaint with the Industrial Commission (Commission) claiming benefits for an accident that occurred in 2009, when she injured her lower back lifting sixty-pound boxes. The injury occurred at Blackfoot Brass (Dura Mark). Appellant had previously suffered two work-related accidents while working with Dura Mark, one in 2002, the other in 2006, but had returned to work without restrictions after participating in physical therapy for both injuries. The issue before the Supreme Court centered on a Commission order denying reconsideration of Appellant's motion to reopen the record to allow for additional evidence on the issue of causation. The Industrial Commission previously ordered that Appellant had failed to prove the medical treatment she received for a back injury was related to an industrial accident and injury. At the emergency hearing pursuant to the Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure adopted by the Commission, Appellant introduced evidence regarding her entitlement to reasonable and necessary medical care pursuant to I.C. 72-432, but the referee denied Appellant's claim on the grounds of causation. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's judgment. In doing so, the Court wanted to provide a "clear message that without a specific stipulation that causation will be a contested issue at the hearing pursuant to I.C. 72-713, and especially if there is a difference of opinion as to causation by opposing parties and their experts, claimant’s attorneys should no longer be lulled by anything other than a stipulation to all legal prerequisites and elements for recovery and be prepared to present evidence of a causal connection between the industrial injury or sickness and the required treatment."

Plaintiff-Appellant Thomas Weisel owned two adjacent parcels within the Beaver Springs Subdivision in Ketchum. He sought to unify and develop the lots. At some point, his plan indicated that he intended that construction would take place in a "setback zone" that abutted the lots' shared border. Plaintiff and the Beaver Springs Owners Association executed an agreement whereby Beaver Springs approved the unification and development plan. Construction on the property was completed in 1985, all structures were located on what used to be "lot 14" and the former setback zone and "lot 13" remained vacant. In 2009, Plaintiff filed suit to rescind or reform the agreement. The district court granted Beaver Springs' motion for summary judgment, and Plaintiff appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that "[i]n essence, Plaintiff asked the Court to reform an agreement for which the parties freely bargained." As such, the Court found that the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Beaver Springs.

Fall River Rural Electric Cooperative hired Plaintiff-Appellant Suzette Bollinger as a cashier and receptionist at its Ashton headquarters in 1988. She was terminated in 2009 despite having satisfactory performance without cause. Plaintiff alleged in her complaint that she signed an employment contract at the time of her hiring, but she failed to produce the contract at trial. In 2009, Fall River adopted an "at-will" employment policy which expressly superseded any prior conflicting policy. Plaintiff ultimately sued Fall River for: (1) breach of express and implied contract, including breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (2) retaliatory discharge and wrongful termination in violation of public policy; and (3) negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted summary judgment to Fall River on all of Plaintiff's claims. The district court also denied her motion for reconsideration, and she timely appealed to the Supreme Court. Finding that Plaintiff's claims were properly dismissed, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's ruling.

Claimant Brooke Stark worked for Assisted Living Concepts, Inc. from 2008 to 2010 as a "residence director" of one of Assisted Living's facilities. Claimant was called into the sales director's office one day, and the two talked about a rumor that one of Assisted Living's other facilities was imminently closing. Later that evening, Assisted Living's divisional director of human resources called Claimant to ask where Claimant heard of the closing rumor. Claimant did not disclose her source. Five minutes following that call, Assisted Living's chief executive officer called Claimant (with the director of HR on the call) to ask about the rumor. Claimant said she talked to a number of people, but that she did not want to share the information. The CEO emphasized the importance of knowing who started the rumor so that the company could reassure those involved that the facility in question would not close. Still declining to reveal her source, the CEO suspended Claimant. The human resources director, after a little investigation, found that Claimant violated company policy by refusing a direct order from her supervisor. Claimant was then terminated in the fall of 2010. The issue before the Supreme Court involved whether Claimant's refusal to respond to the CEO's question. The Industrial Commission held that Claimant's refusal to obey the direct order did not constitute misconduct under the Employment Security Law. The Supreme Court held as a matter of law, Claimant's conduct was indeed misconduct under the Employment Security Law, and reversed the Industrial Commission.