Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Respondent-Appellant Pneumotech, Inc. appealed the Industrial Commission's determination that its former employee, Petitioner-Appellee Angela Hopkins, was eligible for unemployment benefits. Pneumotech hired Petitioner as a bookkeeper and receptionist on July 3, 1995. She worked at Pneumotech until June 22, 2010, when her supervisor fired her. The same month, Petitioner filed a claim for unemployment benefits with the Idaho Department of Labor. At the hearing, Pneumotech presented testimony that Petitioner was discharged because: (1) for two years she had been habitually late for work; (2) she took time off without supervisor permission; (3) she took sick time off but went to the water park instead; (4) she spent time at work playing video games and talking on her cell phone; and (5) she failed to help train a new employee when asked. Petitioner denied all of these accusations, including that her supervisor had repeatedly warned her that her conduct was unacceptable. In fact, the supervisor testified that Petitioner never received a written warning or suspension, and in January 2009, she received a $2-per-hour raise. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the Commission did not abuse its discretion or violate Pneumotech's right to procedural due process in denying the company's request for a new hearing. Furthermore, substantial and competent evidence supported the Commission's decision to uphold Petitioner's award of unemployment benefits. Accordingly, the Court affirmed.

Appellants Ismael Chavez and Dolores Mercado (collectively Chavez) appealed the district court's granting their petition for judicial review, claiming that their original complaint should not have been converted into a petition for judicial review. Canyon County cross-appealed the district court's decision that the flat fee included on the County's notice of pending issue of tax deed was in violation of I.C. 63-1005(4)(d) requiring an itemized statement. In 2009, Chavez filed a class action complaint seeking a declaratory judgment and damages. Chavez alleged that Canyon County had violated a requirement in Idaho Code section 63-1005(4)(d) for an itemized statement of all costs and fees in its notice prior to an issuance of treasurer's tax deeds on two parcels of land they owned. In its Notice of Pending Issue of Tax Deed on the two parcels, the County charged a $500 flat fee for administration costs. In 2010, upon a motion for summary judgment, the district court denied the motion and found Chavez had failed to follow the proper procedures. The court allowed Chavez fourteen days to file the required Petition for Judicial Review. In its review, the Supreme Court held that the district court improperly converted Chavez's declaratory action into a petition for judicial review and was without jurisdiction to rule on the petition for judicial review. Furthermore, the Court declared the notices of pending issue of tax deed to be deficient and void and the corresponding fee was found as moot.

In March 2009, the City of Nampa issued a request for proposals regarding obtaining services to prosecute city misdemeanors and infractions. Former Canyon County prosecuting attorney John Bujak desired to contract with Nampa to perform those services. The Canyon County commissioners unanimously adopted a proposal pursuant to permit him to do so. Plaintiff-Appellant Bob Henry filed three public records requests with the county clerk asking for information regarding the contract with Nampa, including "invoices, etc sent to Nampa by county for prosecuting svc." and "an accounting of where those funds are being deposited + how they are being dispursed [sic] to Canyon County." Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the requested records were public records, but that the City could not be required to produce them because it was not the public official who refused to disclose the records.

The Supreme Court considered this appeal of a district court's decision pertaining to the "Snake River Basin Adjudication" which held: (a) that Pocatello could not use its wells as alternate points of diversion for its surface water rights; (b) that it could use its interconnected wells as alternate points of diversion for all of the associated water rights on the condition that doing so would not change the priority date and quantity of water that could be pumped from each well; (c) that one groundwater right was properly classified as for an irrigation purpose; and (d) that Pocatello failed to establish earlier priority dates for two of its groundwater rights. The City of Pocatello submitted an application to the State for a groundwater right, stating the proposed use was to irrigate crops located outside the city. The State challenged the City's claims of pre-existing rights and water access points upon which it would permit the City to make changes to then-current water rights. Upon careful review of the parties briefs and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found sufficient evidence to support the district court's holding, and affirmed its judgment.

Appellant Lynnette Patterson argued that she was constructively discharged from her position with the Fraud Unit of the state Department of Health and Welfare (IDHW) due to her complaints about an intra-office romance between her supervisor and a lateral employee. IDHW had a strict policy regarding romantic relationships between supervisors and employees. Ms. Patterson made multiple complaints regarding the relationship which she alleged resulted in her first negative performance review with the IDHW, culminating in a "constructive discharge." In 2007, she filed a complaint with the Human Rights Commission (IHRC) then with the district court. The court granted summary judgment to the IDHW, finding that Ms. Patterson did not file her claim within a proscribed 180 day period following her initial complaint, and that she failed to demonstrate that her complaint was a "protected activity" in order to sustain her claim. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Ms. Patterson argued that the district court erred in its determination. Upon consideration of the trial record, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the dismissal of Ms. Patterson's case.

Petitioner-Appellant Stan Hawkins appealed a decision by the Bonneville County Board of Commissioners that granted his neighbors Dale and Mary Meyers variances to replace aging homes on two parcels of their land. The parcels in question were originally zoned as agriculture, and each contained homes built before the 1940s. People living on the Meyers' land regularly used a road over Mr. Hawkins' land for access. Bonneville County enacted its zoning ordinance in 1959, after the homes on the Meyers' land were built and occupied. The ordinance required dwellings to have frontage along a county-approved road. No easement was ever granted across Mr. Hawkins' land, nor was a public road officially designated to the Meyers' property. The Meyers filed for variances in 2007 believing that they needed to comply with the frontage requirement. At a hearing, the Commissioners found that the Meyers' did not need variances because their property had been "grandfathered in" so that the frontage requirement did not apply. However, the Commissioners granted the variance anyway. A trial court dismissed Mr. Hawkins' petition for review, holding that he did not have standing to file a petition for judicial review, and he did not show that the County had prejudiced any of his substantial rights. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that Mr. Hawkins had standing to pursue his petition for judicial review. However, the Court dismissed his petition because he did not show any prejudice to his substantial rights. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's order dismissing Mr. Hawkins' petition.

Appellants David and Marsha Steed are the former employers of Claimant Marsha Fearn. Ms. Fearn resigned from her job in April 2009, and sent an email with her personal contact information to approximately 7500 of the Steedsâ sales contacts. Upon finding out about this email, the Steeds terminated Ms. Fearn's employment. A state Department of Labor (DOL) appeals examiner and the Industrial Commission (Commission) both determined that the Steeds failed to show that Ms. Fearn was discharged for misconduct. The Steeds appealed the decisions of both the DOL and the Commission. Upon consideration of the record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that the DOL's and Commission's decisions were supported by substantial and competent evidence. The Court affirmed the decisions.

Petitioner-Appellant Roger Steele and several residents appealed a district court order that dismissed their claim that the City of Shelley (City) illegally annexed land in Bingham County known as "Kelley Acres." The district court found that there was no statutory authorization for the district court's review of the annexation. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Appellants argued that the annexation was "arbitrary and capricious" and procedurally defective. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that there was indeed, no statutory authority for judicial review of the annexation. Furthermore, the Court found substantial evidence that supported the City's annexation of Kelley Acres. The Court affirmed the lower court's decision.

Plaintiff Eileen McDevitt tripped and fell on a recessed irrigation box outside Sportsman's Warehouse. The store was part of a larger shopping center. Plaintiff sued the store and others to recover for her injuries. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the store, finding that as a tenant in the shopping center, the store owed no duty to shoppers (or invitees) to warn them of potential hazards. Plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision.

Coeur d'Alene Paving, Inc. (CDA Paving) leased several parcels of real property in Kootenai County from Beacon West, LLC. Approximately thirty acres of this leased property was zoned for mining activity. CDA had an interest in two undeveloped parcels that were initially zoned for agricultural use. The two agricultural parcels bordered the mining-parcel, but were not adjacent to it. In January 2008, CDA Paving submitted an application to the Kootenai County Building and Planning Department to have its two agricultural lots rezoned for mining. The Kootenai County Board of County Commissioners (BOCC) held public hearings on the application, and eventually approved the application. Several property owners located in the vicinity of the zone changes, including Appellant Linda Ciszek, petitioned the district court for a declaratory judgment, alleging the zone change was invalid. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of CDA Paving, holding that the BOCC had the authority to amend its zoning map. Appellants raised multiple issues with the district court's decision. Principal among their arguments to the Supreme Court was that the BOCC lacked statutory authority to approve a zoning application as it had for CDA Paving. The Supreme Court found all of Appellants' arguments persuasive, and affirmed the district court's decision.