Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Broadgate, Inc. employed an H-1B visa holder who filed a complaint with the Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division in February 2018, alleging that Broadgate had not paid him the full wages required by the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Division’s investigation substantiated the claim and found additional violations, including failure to post required workplace notices. Consequently, the Division issued a determination letter in December 2018, finding Broadgate had willfully violated the Act, barring it from the H-1B program for two years, requiring payment of back wages, and assessing a civil penalty.Broadgate sought review before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), challenging only the determination regarding the workplace notices. The ALJ agreed with Broadgate, vacating the determination. However, the Department’s Administrative Review Board reversed this decision. On remand, Broadgate argued that the Division exceeded its authority by investigating violations not alleged in the original complaint. The ALJ rejected this argument, and the Review Board and the district court affirmed the Director’s imposition of fines and penalties.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. Broadgate argued that the District Director lacked authority to issue the determination letter and that the Wage and Hour Division exceeded its authority by investigating the notice violations. The court held that the presumption of regularity applied, meaning the Director’s issuance of the letter was presumptive proof of her authority. The court also found that the Division was entitled to investigate the notice violations discovered during the investigation of the wage complaint. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, rejecting Broadgate’s arguments. View "Broadgate, Inc v. Su" on Justia Law

King County, Washington, issued Executive Order PFC-7-1-EO, which directed county officials to ensure that future leases at Boeing Field prohibit fixed base operators (FBOs) from servicing U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) charter flights. This order was based on the county's disagreement with federal immigration policies. Following the issuance of the order, all three FBOs at Boeing Field ceased servicing ICE flights, forcing ICE to relocate its operations to Yakima Air Terminal, which increased operational costs and security concerns.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granted summary judgment for the United States, finding that the Executive Order violated both the Supremacy Clause’s intergovernmental immunity doctrine and a World War II-era contract reconveying Boeing Field to King County. The district court concluded that the Executive Order discriminated against the federal government and its contractors and breached the Instrument of Transfer, which required King County to allow the United States nonexclusive use of the landing area at Boeing Field.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the United States had Article III standing to bring the suit, as it had suffered concrete and particularized injuries due to the increased operational costs and imminent risk of future injury from the Executive Order. The court also found that the United States’ claims were ripe for adjudication.The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Executive Order violated the Instrument of Transfer by preventing ICE from using Boeing Field, thus breaching the contractual right of the United States to use the airport. Additionally, the court held that the Executive Order violated the intergovernmental immunity doctrine by improperly regulating federal operations and discriminating against the federal government and its contractors. The court rejected King County’s defenses, including the anti-commandeering and market participant doctrines. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "USA V. KING COUNTY" on Justia Law

The State of Texas placed a concertina wire fence along part of the border with Mexico in the Eagle Pass area to deter illegal crossings. The United States Border Patrol agents cut the wire multiple times, claiming it was necessary to fulfill their duty of patrolling the border to prevent illegal entry. Texas sued for an injunction, arguing that the Border Patrol was needlessly cutting the wire. The district court found that the Border Patrol was not hampered by the wire and had breached it numerous times without apparent purpose other than to allow migrants easier entrance. However, the court denied the injunction, citing the United States' sovereign immunity against Texas's claims.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas initially denied Texas's request for a preliminary injunction, despite agreeing with Texas on the facts. The court believed that the United States retained sovereign immunity. A motions panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit disagreed and granted a temporary injunction pending appeal. The United States sought relief in the Supreme Court, which vacated the injunction without providing reasons. The case was remanded to the district court to investigate events in Shelby Park, where Texas's actions were alleged to have obstructed Border Patrol operations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that Texas is entitled to a preliminary injunction. The court held that the United States waived sovereign immunity as to Texas's state law claims under § 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act. The court also rejected the United States' arguments that the injunction was barred by intergovernmental immunity and the Immigration and Nationality Act. The court found that Texas satisfied the injunction factors from Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment and granted Texas's request for a preliminary injunction, with modifications based on the district court's supplemental fact findings. View "Texas v. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

Mohamed Lamine Kouyate, a 36-year-old native and citizen of Guinea, entered the United States on a tourist visa in 2014 due to concerns about political unrest in Guinea. He overstayed his visa and was later convicted in Maryland for identity fraud involving over $100,000, resulting in a 15-year prison sentence. Following his release on parole, the Department of Homeland Security charged him with removability for overstaying his visa. Kouyate applied for asylum, withholding of removal under the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA), and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), claiming he would be persecuted or tortured if returned to Guinea due to his father's political notoriety.An immigration judge (IJ) denied Kouyate's applications, ruling that his identity fraud conviction constituted a "particularly serious crime," making him ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal under the INA and CAT. The IJ also denied his application for deferral of removal under the CAT, finding insufficient evidence that he would likely be tortured if returned to Guinea. The IJ noted that the political climate in Guinea had changed, and Kouyate's fears were speculative and based on generalized concerns of violence.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Kouyate's appeal, deeming his challenge to the IJ's particularly serious crime ruling waived and affirming the IJ's denial of deferral of removal under the CAT. The BIA agreed with the IJ's assessment that Kouyate's fears were speculative and not supported by sufficient evidence of a particularized risk of torture.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed both the IJ's and BIA's decisions, finding no reversible error. The court upheld the BIA's determination that Kouyate had not exhausted his administrative remedies regarding the particularly serious crime ruling and affirmed the denial of deferral of removal under the CAT, concluding that substantial evidence supported the BIA's decision. The petition for review was denied. View "Kouyate v. Garland" on Justia Law

Three practicing Muslim men alleged that federal agents asked them to serve as informants in Muslim communities. When they refused, the agents placed or retained them on the "No Fly List" and suggested they could be removed from the list if they agreed to work as informants. The plaintiffs sought damages under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), claiming that their religious beliefs precluded them from serving as informants and that the agents substantially burdened their exercise of religion by conditioning their removal from the No Fly List on actions that violated those beliefs.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the complaint on qualified immunity grounds, concluding that the agents were entitled to qualified immunity because there was no clearly established right not to be pressured to inform on members of one's religious community through the coercive or retaliatory use of the No Fly List.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that the agents were entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable person in their position would not have understood that their conduct implicated the plaintiffs' religious beliefs. The court noted that the plaintiffs did not disclose their religious objections to the agents, and there were no facts plausibly supporting the conclusion that the agents knew the plaintiffs' objections were grounded in their religious beliefs. Therefore, the agents were entitled to qualified immunity from damages in their personal capacities. View "Tanvir v. Tanzin" on Justia Law

Adrian Galvez-Bravo, a Mexican national, entered the United States in 1994 and has lived in the Memphis area since then, except for a brief return to Mexico to marry his wife. He has three children, two of whom are U.S. citizens. In 2013, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him, alleging he was a noncitizen present in the U.S. without being admitted or paroled. Galvez-Bravo conceded the charge and sought cancellation of removal under § 240A of the Immigration and Nationality Act, arguing that his removal would cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his U.S. citizen children.An Immigration Judge (IJ) disagreed with Galvez-Bravo's assessment of hardship, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the IJ's decision, ordering his removal to Mexico. Galvez-Bravo then filed a motion to reopen the removal proceedings, citing new evidence, including his daughter's recent dyslexia diagnosis and the potential impact on his children's education and well-being if he were removed. The BIA denied the motion, concluding that the new evidence did not meet the hardship standard required for cancellation of removal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the BIA's decision. The court confirmed its jurisdiction to review the legal challenges presented by Galvez-Bravo, noting that his arguments focused on whether the BIA engaged in reasoned decision-making. The court found that the BIA had articulated a rational explanation for its decision, considering the new evidence but determining that the hardship did not exceed what would normally be expected upon the removal of a close family member. The court also rejected Galvez-Bravo's argument that the BIA's decision was inconsistent with its prior decisions, noting that the unpublished decisions he cited did not establish a pattern of conflicting outcomes.The Sixth Circuit held that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Galvez-Bravo's motion to reopen and denied his petition for review. View "Galvez-Bravo v. Garland" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to the "metering" policy implemented by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) at the U.S.-Mexico border. Under this policy, asylum seekers without valid travel documents were turned away when ports of entry were deemed at capacity. Plaintiffs, including an immigrant rights organization and individual asylum seekers, argued that this policy unlawfully prevented them from applying for asylum. They also challenged the subsequent application of the "Asylum Transit Rule," which required asylum seekers to apply for asylum in a third country before seeking it in the U.S., to those turned away under the metering policy.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California found the metering policy unlawful under § 706(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which mandates that courts compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed. The court issued a permanent injunction prohibiting the application of the Asylum Transit Rule to those turned away under the metering policy before the rule took effect. The court also ordered the government to unwind past asylum denials based on the rule. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on the APA § 706(1) and due process claims but did not reach the APA § 706(2) claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that the metering policy violated § 706(1) of the APA, holding that noncitizens stopped at the border are eligible to apply for asylum under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) and that border officials have a mandatory duty to inspect them under 8 U.S.C. § 1225. The court also affirmed the classwide declaratory relief but vacated the district court's judgment on the due process claim, deeming it unnecessary. The court affirmed the negative injunctive relief prohibiting the application of the Asylum Transit Rule to class members but vacated the portion of the injunction requiring the government to reopen or reconsider past asylum denials on its own initiative, as it violated 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1). View "AL OTRO LADO V. AMAYORKAS" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, citizens of the Dominican Republic, requested records from three federal agencies under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) related to the revocation of their U.S. visas. The agencies produced some records but withheld others, citing FOIA exemptions, including Exemption 3 and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 222(f). The plaintiffs challenged the adequacy of the searches and the exemptions claimed by the agencies.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida reviewed the case. The government filed declarations from FOIA officials explaining the searches and the withheld records. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the government, concluding that the agencies conducted adequate searches and properly invoked FOIA Exemption 3 to withhold and redact documents.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the agencies conducted reasonable searches and properly invoked Exemption 3. The court found that INA § 222(f) qualifies as a withholding statute under Exemption 3 and that visa revocation records fall within its scope. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that the agencies' declarations violated the best evidence rule and that the searches were inadequate because they did not include alien number searches or routing requests to other DHS components. The court concluded that the agencies' actions were reasonable and in compliance with FOIA requirements. View "Jimenez v. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

Hung Huu Quoc Nguyen challenged the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services’ (USCIS) revocation of its approval of his EB-3 visa petition. An EB-3 visa allows noncitizens performing unskilled labor with a full-time job offer to work in the U.S. and potentially adjust their status to permanent resident. Nguyen’s employer, Muy Pizza Tejas, LLC, filed an I-140 petition on his behalf, which was later approved. However, after Muy Pizza sold the restaurant employing Nguyen to Ayvaz Pizza, USCIS issued a Notice of Intent to Revoke the approval, citing concerns about Muy Pizza’s ability to pay Nguyen’s wages and the validity of the numerous I-140 petitions it had filed.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed Nguyen’s case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the claims amounted to a challenge of an unreviewable discretionary decision by USCIS. Nguyen appealed, arguing that his I-140 petition met the portability provision requirements under 8 U.S.C. § 1154(j), which should have prevented USCIS from revoking the petition. He also claimed that USCIS made procedural errors, including failing to make a successor-in-interest determination regarding Ayvaz Pizza.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that the portability provision did not apply to Nguyen’s I-140 petition because it was invalid from the start due to Muy Pizza’s failure to prove its ability to pay Nguyen’s wages. Consequently, the court found that USCIS’s revocation of the petition was a discretionary decision not subject to judicial review. Additionally, the court determined that Nguyen did not establish any specific procedural errors by USCIS that would warrant judicial review. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Nguyen v. Jaddou" on Justia Law

The petitioner, Nayanaben Patel, entered the United States in March 2000 under unclear circumstances. She applied for adjustment of status based on her husband's legal status but lied about her manner of entry. She later admitted to lying but provided conflicting testimonies. The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied her application for adjustment of status and ordered her removal to India, citing factual inconsistencies. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision.The IJ's decision was discretionary and protected by statute from judicial review. The petitioner did not raise any colorable constitutional claims that would allow for judicial review. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the IJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence, including the petitioner's multiple contradictory statements and lack of credible evidence regarding her manner of entry.The Sixth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the IJ's discretionary decision under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), which bars judicial review of any judgment regarding the granting of relief under sections 1182(i) and 1255. The court also found that the petitioner did not exhaust her administrative remedies regarding her claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and judicial bias, and that her judicial bias claim was not a constitutional issue but rather a factual dispute.The court denied the petition for review, emphasizing that the IJ's decision was within his discretion and supported by the evidence. The court also noted a significant error in the IJ's understanding of the difference between a visa and an I-94 form but concluded that this error did not affect the overall decision. View "Patel v. Garland" on Justia Law