Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Eva Daley, a Guatemalan national, entered the United States as a child without inspection. As an adult, she was convicted of second-degree murder in California, but that conviction was later vacated and replaced with a conviction for assault with a deadly weapon. After serving nearly fifteen years in prison, Daley was detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) upon her release and transferred to a facility in Colorado. She applied for asylum and related relief, but after over a year in detention without a bond hearing, she filed a habeas corpus petition challenging her continued detention.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado granted Daley’s habeas petition, ordering the government to provide her with an individualized bond hearing. Following the court’s order, an immigration judge held a bond hearing and released Daley on bond after 450 days in ICE custody. Daley then moved for attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), and the district court awarded her $18,553.92 in fees. The government appealed the fee award, arguing that the EAJA does not authorize fees in habeas actions challenging immigration detention.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s fee award de novo, focusing solely on statutory interpretation of the EAJA. The Tenth Circuit held that habeas actions challenging immigration detention are “civil actions” within the meaning of the EAJA, based on common law history, judicial precedent, and statutory text. The court concluded that the EAJA unambiguously authorizes attorneys’ fees in such cases and affirmed the district court’s award of fees to Daley. View "Daley v. Choate" on Justia Law

The case concerns challenges to Executive Order No. 14160, issued in January 2025, which seeks to deny birthright citizenship to children born in the United States after its effective date if their fathers are not U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents and their mothers are either unlawfully or temporarily present in the country. Plaintiffs include individual immigrants, nonprofit organizations, and a coalition of states and local governments. They allege that the Executive Order violates the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a), the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment, the Separation of Powers doctrine, and the Administrative Procedure Act. The plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent enforcement of the Order.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted preliminary injunctions to both sets of plaintiffs, finding they were “exceedingly likely” to succeed on their claims under the Citizenship Clause and § 1401(a). The injunctions barred federal agencies and officials from enforcing the Executive Order against the plaintiffs and, in the case brought by the states, issued a nationwide injunction to provide complete relief. The government appealed, challenging the plaintiffs’ standing, the scope of the injunctions, and the merits of the constitutional and statutory claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s findings that the plaintiffs have Article III standing and are likely to succeed on the merits. The First Circuit held that the Executive Order’s denial of birthright citizenship to children born in the United States under the specified circumstances violates both the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a), as interpreted by United States v. Wong Kim Ark and subsequent precedent. The court affirmed the preliminary injunctions in part, vacated them in part as to agency defendants, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Doe v. Trump" on Justia Law

Five Indian citizens entered the United States on F-1 student visas, completed their studies, and enrolled in “optional practical training” (OPT) programs. They allege that the organizations providing their OPT programs failed to deliver any actual training or work, and ultimately ceased communication. After returning to India for brief visits, each attempted to reenter the United States. At the airports, immigration officials revoked their visas. Four were subjected to expedited removal, while the fifth was permitted to withdraw his application for entry. All five returned to India and subsequently filed suit from abroad.The plaintiffs brought their case in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, invoking the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to challenge the administrative findings that they had misused the OPT program. They claimed they never received notice of any administrative proceedings or an opportunity to respond. The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, relying on 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(A)(i), which generally bars judicial review of individual determinations or claims arising from expedited removal orders under §1225(b)(1). The court found that the plaintiffs’ attempt to challenge the underlying findings, rather than the removal orders themselves, did not avoid the jurisdictional bar.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that §1252(a)(2)(A)(i) precludes judicial review not only of expedited removal orders but also of the underlying justifications for those orders. The court further concluded that the administrative findings regarding the OPT programs were not “final” agency actions reviewable under the APA, as they were merely steps leading to the removal orders. Thus, the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the plaintiffs’ claims. View "Dubey v. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

Several individuals who had received grants of parole under programs established by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for nationals of Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela challenged the government’s decision to terminate those grants. The parole programs, created during the Biden Administration, allowed eligible individuals from these countries to enter the United States temporarily for up to two years, based on urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit. When President Trump took office in January 2025, he issued executive orders directing DHS to end categorical parole programs, including the CHNV programs. DHS subsequently published a notice terminating the programs and revoking all existing grants of parole within thirty days, rather than allowing them to expire naturally.The plaintiffs, affected by the early termination, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The district court certified a class of affected individuals and granted a preliminary stay, preventing DHS from revoking their parole grants before the original expiration dates. The court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that the categorical termination was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), in part because the agency’s rationale rested on a legal error and failed to adequately consider reliance and humanitarian interests.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s order. The First Circuit held that the relevant statute requires DHS to grant parole only on a case-by-case basis, but does not impose the same limitation on the termination of parole. The court also found that the agency’s explanation for terminating the parole programs was not so deficient as to be arbitrary and capricious under the APA. Concluding that the plaintiffs had not made a strong showing of likelihood of success on the merits, the First Circuit vacated the district court’s stay and remanded for further proceedings. View "Doe v. Noem" on Justia Law

Hundreds of thousands of Venezuelan nationals living in the United States received Temporary Protected Status (TPS), which allowed them to work and protected them from deportation due to ongoing humanitarian crises in Venezuela. In January 2025, the Secretary of Homeland Security extended TPS for Venezuelans through October 2026, consolidating two prior designations to streamline the process. Shortly after, a new Secretary, following a change in administration, attempted to vacate this extension and terminate TPS for one group of Venezuelan nationals, citing confusion and alleged improvements in Venezuela’s conditions. This abrupt reversal threatened TPS holders with imminent loss of status, employment, and the risk of deportation.The National TPS Alliance and several individual TPS holders filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, seeking to restore the extension. The district court granted preliminary relief, postponing the effective dates of the vacatur and termination notices nationwide under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), finding that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits, would suffer irreparable harm without relief, and that the balance of equities and public interest favored postponement.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. The Ninth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to review the preliminary relief and that neither the TPS statute nor 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) barred judicial review of the Secretary’s authority. The court concluded that the Secretary lacked statutory authority to vacate a prior extension of TPS, as the statute provides specific procedures for designation, extension, and termination, but not for vacatur. The court also found that nationwide relief was necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs. The district court’s order postponing the vacatur and termination of Venezuelan TPS was affirmed. View "National TPS Alliance v. Noem" on Justia Law

A private company operating a federal immigration detention facility in Washington State challenged the enforcement of several provisions of a state law that imposed health, safety, and inspection requirements on private detention centers. The law required the state Department of Health to adopt rules ensuring sanitary and safe conditions, authorized unannounced inspections, provided for civil penalties for violations, and created a private right of action for detainees. The company argued that these provisions violated the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity and were preempted by federal law, claiming they improperly targeted federal contractors and conflicted with federal standards.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granted a preliminary injunction, finding that the challenged sections of the law violated intergovernmental immunity by discriminating against the federal government and its contractor. The court compared the requirements imposed on the federal facility to those imposed on state prisons and concluded that the law treated the federal contractor less favorably. The state appealed, and while the appeal was pending, the Washington legislature amended the law, but the changes did not materially alter the issues on appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s preliminary injunction and remanded for further proceedings. The Ninth Circuit held that the appropriate comparison for determining discrimination under intergovernmental immunity is between the federal immigration facility and other civil detention facilities in the state, not state prisons. The court directed the district court to make this comparison in the first instance. The Ninth Circuit also held that the challenged provisions were not preempted by federal law and that the district court erred in enjoining the private right of action, as the state officials named as defendants had no enforcement authority under that provision. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "THE GEO GROUP, INC. V. INSLEE" on Justia Law

A married couple, both citizens of Mexico, have lived in the United States for over twenty years without legal status. They have two U.S.-born children, one of whom, I.L., has a learning disability, ADHD, and requires ongoing medical and educational support. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against the couple, who conceded inadmissibility but sought cancellation of removal, arguing that deportation would cause their son an “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” due to his special needs and the alleged lack of adequate services in Mexico.An immigration judge found both parents credible and agreed they met the first three statutory requirements for cancellation of removal, but concluded they did not satisfy the hardship requirement. The judge acknowledged the difficulties I.L. would face but determined these did not rise to the high threshold set by the statute. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the judge’s decisions in separate, but materially identical, rulings, agreeing that the hardship standard was not met.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the Board’s application of the hardship standard under the substantial-evidence standard, as clarified by recent Supreme Court precedent. The court held that the Board’s determination was supported by substantial evidence, given the record showed that some medical and educational services were available in Mexico and that the Board applied the correct legal standard. The court denied the petitions for review, holding that the Board’s application of the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) is reviewable for substantial evidence, and that the Board’s decisions in these cases met that standard. View "Lopez-Martinez v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Two students challenged the University of California’s policy that prohibits the employment of undocumented students who lack federal work authorization. The University’s longstanding practice allowed employment of undocumented students with Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) status, as they have federal work authorization, but excluded those without such authorization. After the federal government stopped accepting new DACA applications, the number of undocumented students without work authorization increased. The University considered changing its policy but ultimately decided against it, citing significant risks of federal enforcement under the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) and related regulations, and dissolved a working group tasked with exploring alternatives.The students filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, arguing that the University’s policy was an abuse of discretion and violated the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) by discriminating based on immigration status. The court initially denied the petition, but the California Supreme Court granted review and transferred the case back, instructing the appellate court to reconsider. The University argued that its policy was based on risk assessment rather than a definitive interpretation of IRCA, and that even if the policy was discriminatory, the risk of federal enforcement justified its continuation.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, held that the University’s policy facially discriminates based on immigration status and that, under state law, such discrimination is only permissible if required by federal law, which the University did not establish. The court concluded that the University abused its discretion by relying solely on litigation risk as a justification for its policy. The court issued a writ of mandate directing the University to reconsider its policy using proper legal criteria. View "Munoz v. The Regents of the University of Cal." on Justia Law

Sun Valley Orchards, a New Jersey farm, was accused by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) of breaching an employment agreement under the H-2A nonimmigrant visa program. The DOL alleged that Sun Valley failed to provide adequate housing, meal plans, transportation, and guaranteed work hours to its workers, as stipulated in the job order. The DOL imposed civil penalties and back wages totaling hundreds of thousands of dollars through administrative proceedings.The case was first reviewed by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who affirmed most of the DOL's findings but slightly modified the penalties and back wages. Sun Valley then appealed to the Administrative Review Board, which upheld the ALJ's decision. Subsequently, Sun Valley challenged the DOL's decision in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, arguing that the administrative proceedings violated Article III of the Constitution, among other claims. The District Court dismissed Sun Valley's claims, holding that the DOL's actions fit within the public-rights doctrine and that the agency had statutory authority to impose penalties and back wages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and held that Sun Valley was entitled to have its case decided by an Article III court. The court found that the DOL's enforcement action resembled a common law breach of contract suit, which traditionally would be heard in a court of law. The court also determined that the case did not fit within the public rights exception to Article III adjudication, as the H-2A labor certification regulations primarily concern domestic employment law rather than immigration control. Consequently, the Third Circuit reversed the District Court's decision and remanded the case with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Sun Valley. View "Sun Valley Orchards LLC v. United States Department of Labor" on Justia Law

CoreCivic, Inc. has contracted with the federal government since 1996 to operate a private immigration detention center in Elizabeth, New Jersey. In 2023, CoreCivic planned to renew its contract, but New Jersey passed a law (AB 5207) prohibiting new, expanded, or renewed contracts for civil immigration detention. CoreCivic sued, arguing that the law violates the Supremacy Clause by infringing on intergovernmental immunity and being preempted by federal law. The United States supported CoreCivic, emphasizing the detention center's critical role in federal immigration enforcement.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey granted summary judgment in favor of CoreCivic. The court found that AB 5207 interferes with the federal government's discretion in detaining aliens, violating intergovernmental immunity and being preempted by federal law. New Jersey appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The Third Circuit held that AB 5207 directly regulates the federal government by effectively banning contracts for immigration detention, a core federal function. The court emphasized that the law's impact on federal operations is substantial, as it would cripple ICE's ability to detain and remove aliens efficiently. The court concluded that New Jersey's law violates intergovernmental immunity and is unconstitutional as applied to CoreCivic. View "CoreCivic, Inc. v. Governor of New Jersey" on Justia Law