Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Department of Labor (DoL) issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) in 2019 to amend its 2010 regulations regarding the H-2A visa program. In January 2021, during the final days of the Trump Administration, the DoL announced a final rule and submitted it to the Office of the Federal Register (OFR) for publication. However, the rule was withdrawn by the DoL under the Biden Administration before it was made available for public inspection. In 2022, the DoL issued a new rule based on the 2019 NPRM.The National Council of Agricultural Employers (NCAE) challenged the withdrawal of the 2021 rule and the promulgation of the 2022 rule, arguing that the 2021 rule was unlawfully repealed. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia concluded that the NCAE lacked standing to challenge the withdrawal of the 2021 rule but had standing to challenge the 2022 rule. The court denied the NCAE's request for a preliminary injunction and later granted the DoL's cross-motion for summary judgment, determining that the 2021 rule had not become final because it was never made available for public inspection by the OFR.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and held that the rulemaking process culminated in the 2022 rule. The court determined that a substantive rule is not final until the OFR makes it available for public inspection. Since the 2021 rule was withdrawn before it became final, the DoL did not violate the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by issuing the 2022 rule without a new round of notice and comment. The court affirmed the district court's decision. View "National Council of Agricultural Employers v. DOL" on Justia Law

Sunshine State Regional Center, Inc. (Sunshine State) is an EB-5 regional center that was designated in 2014. The EB-5 program allows immigrants to obtain visas by investing in job-creating enterprises in the U.S. The EB-5 Reform and Integrity Act of 2022 (the Act) introduced an annual fee for regional centers to fund the EB-5 Integrity Fund, aimed at preventing fraud. Sunshine State, which is not currently sponsoring new investment projects, argued that it should not be subject to this fee because it was designated before the Act was passed.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied Sunshine State’s motion for summary judgment and granted, in part, the motion to dismiss filed by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). The district court found that the Act’s text did not exempt pre-Act regional centers from the Integrity Fund Fee and that the structure of the Act suggested the opposite.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Act’s language and structure indicate that all regional centers, regardless of when they were designated, are subject to the Integrity Fund Fee. The court reasoned that the term “designated under subparagraph (E)” includes both pre- and post-Act regional centers because the Act governs the entire EB-5 program, and any designation for that program must now operate under subparagraph (E). The court also rejected Sunshine State’s argument that imposing the fee would be retroactive, stating that the fee is prospective and applies to the ongoing status of being a designated regional center.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, upholding the imposition of the Integrity Fund Fee on Sunshine State. View "Sunshine State Regional Center, Inc. v. Director, US Citizenship and Immigration Services" on Justia Law

The case involves two organizations, Doc Society and International Documentary Association (IDA), which promote documentary filmmaking globally. They challenged a policy by the Secretary of State requiring visa applicants to disclose their social media information from the past five years. The plaintiffs argued that this policy violated the First Amendment and the Administrative Procedure Act, claiming it impeded their core activities and harmed their members.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia found that the plaintiffs had organizational standing but dismissed their claims on the merits, stating they failed to state a claim under the First Amendment or the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the plaintiffs did not adequately allege that a favorable decision would redress their claimed injuries. The court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they did not provide specific allegations showing that their partners and members would return to their prior use of social media or reconsider their willingness to travel to the United States if the policy were vacated. The court reversed the district court's determination that the plaintiffs had standing, vacated the remainder of the district court's order, and remanded the case for further proceedings, including whether the plaintiffs should be granted leave to amend their complaint. View "Doc Society v. Rubio" on Justia Law

N.S. was arrested for robbery and destruction of property and was released on his own recognizance by a Magistrate Judge. However, before he could leave the courthouse, U.S. Marshals detained him based on an ICE detainer. N.S. filed a class complaint alleging that the Marshals acted beyond their statutory authority by making a civil immigration arrest, violating the Administrative Procedure Act.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia certified the proposed class and granted N.S.'s request for a permanent injunction, prohibiting Marshal Dixon and his agents from arresting and detaining criminal defendants in the Superior Court for suspected civil immigration violations. The court held that the Marshals were not authorized to make civil immigration arrests as they had not undergone the required training. The court also found that the 2002 Order delegating authority to the Marshals lacked sufficient legal support.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Marshals were not authorized to make civil immigration arrests due to the lack of required training. However, the court found that the class-wide injunction issued by the district court was barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1), which prohibits lower courts from enjoining the operation of certain immigration provisions. The court vacated the injunction and remanded the case to the district court to reconsider the appropriate remedy. View "N.S. v. Dixon" on Justia Law

Fabian Grey, a Jamaican citizen and lawful permanent resident in the U.S., applied for naturalization in 2016. After delays in processing his application, Grey filed a lawsuit seeking a court order to declare him eligible for naturalization and to compel the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to naturalize him. He also sought documents from USCIS under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and amended his lawsuit to compel USCIS to produce those documents. The district court granted summary judgment to USCIS on both claims, allowing the agency to withhold or redact certain documents under FOIA’s law enforcement exemption and concluding that Grey was ineligible for naturalization due to lying under oath during his deposition.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina found that Grey had lied under oath about a 2016 criminal charge for misprision of a felony during his deposition. The court also determined that USCIS had appropriately responded to Grey’s FOIA request, producing substantial documentation and justifiably withholding or redacting certain documents. Grey appealed the district court’s rulings on both the FOIA and naturalization claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court agreed that USCIS was entitled to withhold certain information under FOIA’s law enforcement exemption and that Grey’s false testimony during his deposition disqualified him from demonstrating the good moral character required for naturalization. The court concluded that Grey was ineligible for citizenship and upheld the district court’s summary judgment in favor of USCIS. View "Grey v. Alfonso-Royals" on Justia Law

Lalakshi Kale and Gurusaday Dey, both Indian nationals, have resided in the United States since 2009 and sought to obtain legal permanent residence based on Kale's employment. They applied for adjustment of status with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) in 2022. Their applications were initially accepted because their priority dates were current. However, due to higher-than-expected demand, the final action date retrogressed, causing their applications to be held in abeyance under USCIS's adjudication hold policy until visa numbers become available.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which precludes judicial review of discretionary decisions by the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security. The district court also noted an alternative basis for dismissal under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) pursuant to 5 U.S.C § 701(a)(2).The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Fourth Circuit held that USCIS's adjudication hold policy is a discretionary action under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a), which grants the Attorney General the discretion to adjust the status of an alien and to prescribe regulations for such adjustments. The court found that this discretionary authority includes the implementation of the adjudication hold policy, thus falling under the jurisdiction-stripping provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). Consequently, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the challenge to USCIS's policy and affirmed the dismissal of the case. View "Kale v. Alfonso-Royals" on Justia Law

Ryan Castaneira, a U.S. citizen, filed a Form I-130 petition to obtain permanent residency for his spouse, a Mexican national. USCIS issued a Notice of Intent to Deny the petition due to Castaneira's prior convictions in Georgia for crimes that appeared to qualify as "specified offenses against a minor" under the Adam Walsh Act. Castaneira argued that his convictions involved an undercover officer, not a minor, and thus should not be considered offenses against a minor. He also challenged the agency's use of the "beyond any reasonable doubt" standard to prove he posed no risk to his spouse.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed Castaneira's claims. The court held that his prior convictions fell within the statutory definition of "specified offense against a minor" and that the Adam Walsh Act's grant of "sole and unreviewable discretion" to USCIS precluded judicial review of the evidentiary standard applied by the agency. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the standard of proof used by USCIS in making the no-risk determination.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the District Court's ruling in part, agreeing that Castaneira's prior convictions were covered by the Adam Walsh Act. However, the appellate court vacated the District Court's jurisdictional ruling regarding the evidentiary standard. The court held that while USCIS's ultimate no-risk determinations are unreviewable, challenges to the agency's departure from its own binding precedent, such as the standard of proof, are reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act. The case was remanded for further proceedings to determine whether USCIS violated its own precedent by applying the "beyond any reasonable doubt" standard. View "Castaneira v. Noem" on Justia Law

Judith Jeltsje Pietersen, a Dutch citizen, and her fiancé, Daniel Gerhard Brown, an American citizen, sought to obtain a visa for Pietersen to enter the United States so they could marry. Pietersen had previously traveled to the U.S. under the Visa Waiver Program but was denied entry in February 2020 by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) for alleged unlawful employment. Pietersen and Brown applied for a K-1 visa, but consular officers denied the applications, citing willful misrepresentation of a material fact under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i).The appellants filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the U.S. Department of State, challenging the visa denials and the guidance in the State Department's Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM). They argued that the consular officers failed to properly review Pietersen’s applications and that the "reason to believe" standard used to determine inadmissibility was contrary to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The District Court dismissed the complaint, holding that the consular nonreviewability doctrine barred the claims and that the claims were otherwise meritless.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and remanded the case. The court held that the consular nonreviewability doctrine did not bar the appellants' Administrative Procedure Act (APA) claim for prospective relief. The court expressed doubts about the viability of the State Department's "reason to believe" standard and vacated the District Court’s alternative holding based on 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g). The case was remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the INA authorizes the challenged FAM guidance. View "Pietersen v. United States Department of State" on Justia Law

The Texas Attorney General alleged that Annunciation House, a nonprofit organization in El Paso, was unlawfully harboring illegal aliens. The Attorney General sought to examine the organization's records and initiate quo warranto proceedings, which could lead to the revocation of its charter. Annunciation House, which provides shelter to immigrants and refugees, was served with a records request by state officials, who demanded immediate compliance. Annunciation House sought legal relief, arguing that the request violated its constitutional rights.The 205th Judicial District Court in El Paso County granted a temporary restraining order and later a temporary injunction against the Attorney General's records request. The court also denied the Attorney General's motion for leave to file a quo warranto action, ruling that the statutes authorizing the records request were unconstitutional and that the allegations of harboring illegal aliens did not constitute a valid basis for quo warranto. The court further held that the statutes were preempted by federal law and violated the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case on direct appeal. The court held that the trial court erred in its constitutional rulings and that the Attorney General has the constitutional authority to file a quo warranto action. The court emphasized that it was too early to express a view on the merits of the underlying issues and that the usual litigation process should unfold. The court also held that the statutes authorizing the records request were not facially unconstitutional and that the trial court's injunction against the Attorney General's records request was improper. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "PAXTON v. ANNUNCIATION HOUSE, INC." on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to a Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) rule that authorized state licenses for two residential facilities where the federal government detained mothers and children after their illegal entry into the United States. The plaintiffs, including detained mothers and Grassroots Leadership, Inc., sought to prohibit the detention of children at these facilities, arguing that the rule was invalid under state law. However, by the time the case reached the court of appeals, all the mothers and children had been released from the facilities.The trial court denied the pleas to the jurisdiction filed by the department and the facility operators, eventually ruling in favor of the plaintiffs by declaring the rule invalid and enjoining the department from granting licenses under it. The Third Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that their claims were moot since they were no longer detained. However, the court of appeals proceeded to address the merits of the case by invoking the "public-interest exception" to mootness and held the rule invalid under the Administrative Procedure Act.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that Texas courts are not constitutionally authorized to adjudicate moot cases, even if they raise questions of considerable public importance. The court emphasized that mootness is a constitutional limitation on judicial power, and there is no "public-interest exception" to mootness in Texas. Consequently, the court reversed the court of appeals' judgment regarding its jurisdiction, vacated the judgment on the merits, and dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES v. GRASSROOTS LEADERSHIP, INC" on Justia Law