Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan (the ACLU) filed a complaint against the Calhoun County Jail and Calhoun County Sheriff’s Office (the CCSO), alleging CCSO violated Michigan’s Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) when it denied the ACLU’s request for documents. The ACLU sought disclosure of all records related to the December 2018 detention of United States citizen Jilmar Benigno Ramos-Gomez. Ramos-Gomez’s three-day detention at the Calhoun County Correctional Facility occurred pursuant to an Intergovernmental Service Agreement executed between United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the jail. The CCSO denied the ACLU’s request, asserting that the requested records were exempt from disclosure under MCL 15.243(1)(d) because they related to an ICE detainee. The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal, finding the records at issue were exempt public records from disclosure under the statute. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, finding error in that court holding a federal regulation had the legal force of a federal statute; "federal regulation is not a federal statute." The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan v. Calhoun County" on Justia Law

Petitioner Kelly Gonzalez Aguilar was a transgender woman from Honduras. She came to the United States and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and deferral of removal. In support, Kelly claimed she had been persecuted by family, feared further persecution from pervasive discrimination and violence against transgender women in Honduras, and would likely be tortured if she returned to Honduras. In denying asylum, an immigration judge found no pattern or practice of persecution. Kelly appealed the denial of each application, and the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed the appeal. The dismissal led Kelly to petition for judicial review to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, which granted the petition. "On the asylum claim, any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to find a pattern or practice of persecution against transgender women in Honduras." View "Gonzalez Aguilar v. Garland" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review of a final order of removal issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), holding that the immigration judge (IJ) and BIA properly concluded that Petitioner's Massachusetts conviction for accessory after the fact rendered him removable as an aggravated felon.The U.S. Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Petitioner. An IJ held that Petitioner was removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) for having committed an aggravated felony, as defined under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43). As relevant to this appeal, the IJ held that Petitioner's Massachusetts accessory-after-the-fact conviction was categorically an offense relating to obstruction of justice and so was a proper ground for removal as an aggravated felony. The BIA denied Petitioner's appeal. The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding that the BIA did not err in determining that Petitioner's Massachusetts conviction rendered him ineligible for withholding of removal. View "Silva v. Garland" on Justia Law

The U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency (ICE) entered into a contract with the City of Holtville (City) to detain noncitizens at the Imperial Regional Detention Facility (Facility). The City did not own the Facility, so the City subcontracted its detention responsibilities to the Facility’s owner. The owner did not operate the facility, so the owner subcontracted its responsibilities (with ICE’s approval) to a private operator, real party in interest Management & Training Corporation (Operator). Petitioner Anna Von Herrmann served the Operator with a California Public Records Act (CPRA) request regarding the Facility. Operator refused to comply, reasoning it was not subject to the CPRA because it did not have a contract directly with the City, and, thus, the Facility was not one that “detains a noncitizen pursuant to a contract with a city.” Alternatively, Operator contended several CPRA exemptions applied. Petitioner sought a writ of mandate from the trial court compelling Operator to comply with the CPRA request, but the court agreed with Operator’s interpretation of California Civil Code section 1670.9(c) and denied the petition without reaching Operator’s CPRA exemption claims. The Court of Appeal agreed the trial court construed section 1670.9(c) too narrowly as applying the CPRA only to an entity that contracts directly with a city to detain noncitizens. "[T]he structure of section 1670.9 as a whole, indicate the Legislature intended for the CPRA to apply to immigration detention facilities on a facility-wide basis rather than an entity-specific basis." The Court issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order denying the petition and to enter a new order granting it, subject to resolution of Operator’s CPRA exemption claims. View "Von Herrmann v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The First Circuit granted in part one of Petitioner's petitions for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) ordering Petitioner removed, holding that remand was required.The same day the denial of Petitioner's I-751 petition to remove the conditions of his residency was issued, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated removal proceedings against Petitioner. Petitioner subsequently divorced his former wife and married anew. Petitioner's new wife filed an application for adjustment of Petitioner's status on the basis of their marriage and an I-751 waiver petition. Petitioner was subsequently indicted for kidnapping and two counts of sexual assault. The IJ granted Petitioner's application for adjustment of status. The BIA sustained the DHS's appeal and ordered Petitioner removed without acknowledging that Petitioner had a pending I-751 waiver. The First Circuit held (1) the BIA abused its discretion in denying Petitioner's motion to reconsider based on two clear-error-standard violations; and (2) remand was required for consideration of the effect, if any, of the final denial of the I-751 waiver on Petitioner's motions. View "Adeyanju v. Garland" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the ruling of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying Petitioner's application for asylum, withholding of removal, protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), and voluntary departure, holding that the BIA's determination was supported by substantial evidence.Petitioner, a native and citizen of Guatemala, was charged with removability. Petitioner conceded removability and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, protection under the CAT, and post-conclusion voluntary departure. The immigration judge (IJ) found that Petitioner's asylum claim failed on the merits and that Petitioner was not entitled to relief on his remaining arguments for relief. The BIA affirmed. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that substantial evidence supported the decisions of the IJ and the BIA. View "Lopez-Perez v. Garland" on Justia Law

The First Circuit dismissed Petitioner's petition for review of a final administrative removal order (FARO) issued against her in 2018 by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), holding that this Court lacked jurisdiction over the petition.The DHS issued a FARO against Petitioner stating that she was removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) because she had been convicted of an aggravated felony as defined in 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(K). While Petitioner's petition for review of the FARO was still pending the DHS issued a notice to appear for separate removal proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1229a based on Petitioner's extended presence in the United States after her visa had expired. The DHS subsequently canceled the FARO. The First Circuit dismissed Petitioner's petition for review, holding that in the wake of the government's purported cancellation of Petitioner's FARO, the cancellation will result in there being no final removal order against Petitioner at the present time. View "Xu v. Garland" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied in part Petitioner's petition for judicial review and remanded this immigration case to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) for further consideration, holding that remand was required for consideration of an argument Petitioner raised before the BIA but the BIA did not address.The BIA in this case affirmed an immigration judge's (IJ) decision denying Petitioner asylum relief, withholding of removal under Immigration and Nationality Act, protection pursuant to the Convention Against Torture Act, and ordering her removed. Petitioner filed a petition for review. The First Circuit remanded the case, holding (1) because the BIA did not address Petitioner's argument that the record evidence supported Petitioner's membership in a particular social group, that of Salvadoran female small business owners, remand was required for such consideration; and (2) this Court lacked jurisdiction to hear Petitioner's second claim. View "Gomez-Abrego v. Garland" on Justia Law

This action involved a request for documents under Michigan’s Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Plaintiff, the American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan (the ACLU), submitted a FOIA request to defendant, the Calhoun County Sheriff’s Office (the CCSO), seeking disclosure of all records related to the December 2018 detention of United States citizen Jilmar Benigno Ramos-Gomez. Ramos-Gomez’s three-day detention at the Calhoun County Correctional Facility occurred pursuant to an Intergovernmental Service Agreement (IGSA) executed between United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the jail. The CCSO denied the ACLU’s request, asserting that the requested records were exempt from disclosure under MCL 15.243(1)(d) because they related to an ICE detainee. The issue this case presented for the Michigan Supreme Court's review centered on whether a federal regulation with a nondisclosure component, 8 CFR 236.6 (2021), could be the basis for exempting public records from disclosure under MCL 15.243(1)(d). The Supreme Court held that it could not, "for the simple reason that a regulation is not a statute." The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ holding to the contrary, and the Court overruled Soave v. Dep’t of Ed, and Mich Council of Trout Unlimited v. Dep’t of Military Affairs, as to their erroneous interpretations of MCL 15.243(1)(d). The case was remanded back to the Calhoun Circuit Court for further proceedings. View "American Civil Liberties Union Of Michigan v. Calhoun County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied a petition for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) that affirmed the denial of Appellant's application for adjustment of status on statutory and federal constitutional grounds, holding that there was no error.Appellant conceded removability but sought to remain in the country by applying for adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. 1255(a). An immigration judge denied Appellant's application for adjustment of status, concluding that Appellant had not met his burden of showing that he merited a favorable exercise of discretion. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit denied Appellant's petition for review, holding that Appellant's claims on appeal were without merit. View "Thomas v. Garland" on Justia Law