Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit granted in part and denied in part Petitioner's petition for review of the decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) determining that Petitioner's previous conviction constituted a "particularly serious crime" making him ineligible for withholding of removal and denying his application for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), holding that the BIA erred in part.The lower agencies found that Petitioner's conviction for possession of oxycodone with intent to distribute in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, 32A(a) was a particularly serious crime rendering him ineligible for withholding of removal and denied his application for deferral of removal under the CAT. The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review insofar as he sought CAT relief but granted the petition in part because the immigration judge informed Petitioner that he was eligible for potential relief only under the CAT and treated Petitioner's conviction for drug trafficking as if it were a per se bar to withholding of removal. The First Circuit remanded the case to the BIA with instructions to give Petitioner a new hearing to determine whether he was entitled to withholding of removal. View "De Carvalho v. Garland" on Justia Law

The First Circuit dismissed one of the claims in Petitioner's petition for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing Petitioner's challenges to the denial of his asylum and withholding of removal claims and denied the others, holding that Petitioner was not entitled to relief.An immigration judge denied Petitioner's applications for asylum, withholding of removal, cancellation of removal, protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture and voluntary departure. The BIA dismissed Petitioner's appeal. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) this Court lacked jurisdiction to consider Petitioner's first claim on appeal because Petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies; (2) the BIA's decision on Petitioner's political opinion claim was supported by substantial evidence; and (3) Petitioner's withholding of removal claim failed because his asylum claim failed. View "Gomes v. Garland" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied the petition for judicial review sought by Petitioner in this case and upheld the order of removal against him, holding that the Agency's denial of asylum and other relief was supported by substantial evidence in the record.Petitioner conceded removability and cross-appleid for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. An immigration judge (IJ) denied Petitioner's application for relief and ordered him removed to Rwanda. The Board of Immigration Appeals upheld the IJ's decision, ruling that the IJ's adverse credibility determination was not clearly erroneous. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the denial of Petitioner's claim for asylum was supported by substantial evidence, ending this Court's inquiry. View "Mashilingi v. Garland" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the judgment of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing Appellant's appeal from a decision of an immigration judge (IJ) ordering him removed from the United States, holding that the BIA failed to address Appellant's request to apply equitable tolling in assessing whether her appeal was timely.Appellant, a native and citizen of Jamaica, applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture. The IJ denied Appellant's requests for relief and ordered her removed to Jamaica. In the midst of the newly-announced health emergency occasioned by the COVID-19 pandemic, Appellant missed the deadline to appeal the IJ's removal order. The BIA summarily dismissed Appellant's appeal as untimely. The First Circuit vacated the BIA's order of dismissal, holding that the BIA erred by failing to consider Appellant's request for equitable tolling in deciding whether her appeal was timely. View "James v. Garland" on Justia Law

In April 2020, the district court entered a preliminary injunction and provisionally certified nationwide subclasses of ICE detainees with risk factors or disabilities placing them at heightened risk of severe illness and death from COVID-19. The court found that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on claims of deliberate indifference to the medical needs of detainees, punitive conditions of confinement, and violation of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794. The preliminary injunction imposed a broad range of obligations on the federal government.The Ninth Circuit reversed, stating that neither the facts nor the law supported a judicial intervention of this magnitude. The plaintiffs did not make a clear showing that ICE acted with deliberate indifference to medical needs or in reckless disregard of health risks. If a particular condition or restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, alone, amount to punishment; there was a legitimate governmental objective here, ICE was holding detainees because they were suspected of having violated the immigration laws or were otherwise removable. ICE’s national directives did not create excessive conditions of “punishment.” Rejecting the Rehabilitation Act claim, the court stated that the plaintiffs at most demonstrated that they were subjected to inadequate national policies; they did not show they were treated differently from other detainees “solely by reason” of their disabilities. View "Fraihat v. United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) that affirmed the denial of Appellant's application for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), holding that the BIA's affirmance of the immigration judge's (IJ) finding of adverse credibility did not hold up.After a hearing, the IJ issued an oral decision denying Appellant's claims, finding that Appellant was not a credible witness in terms of crucial aspects of his claim and his lack of credibility was ultimately fatal to his argument that he had suffered past persecution. The BIA affirmed. The First Circuit vacated the BIA's order, holding that the BIA's affirmance of the IJ's adverse credibility finding could not be sustained, and therefore, the BIA's rulings could also not be sustained. View "Lopez Troche v. Garland" on Justia Law

California AB 32 phases out private detention facilities within the state. Because of fluctuations in immigration, ICE relies exclusively on private detention centers in California. AB 32 carves out exceptions for the state’s private detention centers. The United States and GEO, which operates private immigration detention centers, sued. The district court ruled largely in favor of California.The Ninth Circuit reversed. California is not simply exercising its traditional police powers, but rather impeding federal immigration policy. . Under the Supremacy Clause, state law must fall if it stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. The presumption against preemption does not apply to areas of exclusive federal regulation, such as the detention of immigrants. California did more than just exercise its traditional state police powers – it impeded the federal government’s immigration policy. Congress granted the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security broad discretion over immigrant detention, including the right to contract with private companies to operate detention facilities. AB 32 also discriminated against the federal government in violation of the intergovernmental immunity doctrine by requiring the federal government to close all its detention facilities, while not requiring California to close any of its private detention facilities until 2028. View "GEO Group, Inc., v. Newsom" on Justia Law

Petitioner Tojiddin Berdiev faced immigration removal proceedings since 2007. After more than a decade of petitions, motions, and appeals, the Board of Immigration Appeals denied Berdiev’s untimely motion to reopen removal proceedings (Berdiev’s second motion), then denied Berdiev’s motion to reconsider. In each of its two orders, the Board held that: (1) Berdiev was not entitled to equitable tolling of his untimely motion to reopen; and (2) exercise of the Board’s sua sponte reopening authority was unwarranted. Berdiev argued to the Tenth Circuit that the Board abused its discretion in making the first determination and relied on an erroneous legal premise in making the second. On equitable tolling, the Court concluded the Board did not abuse its discretion. On the exercise of the Board’s sua sponte reopening authority, however, the Court concluded the Board at least partly relied on a legally erroneous rationale; the Court could not determine whether the Board would have reached the same outcome independently based solely on valid reasons. Accordingly, the Court granted Berdiev’s petitions for review, vacated the Board’s two orders solely as to the sua sponte reopening decision, and remanded to the Board to reconsider that decision. View "Berdiev v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit granted in part and denied in part the United States' motion for a stay pending appeal of the district court's nationwide preliminary injunction preventing the United States from relying on immigration enforcement priorities outlined in memos from DHS and ICE. On Inauguration Day, January 20, 2021, the Acting Secretary of DHS issued a memo announcing that the Department would undergo a comprehensive review of enforcement policies, announcing DHS's interim enforcement priorities, and directing an immediate 100-day pause on removals. ICE issued a memo on February 18, 2021 that incorporates the same three interim priorities.The court did not see a strong justification for concluding that the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 detention statutes override the deep-rooted tradition of enforcement discretion when it comes to decisions that occur before detention, such as who should be subject to arrest, detainers, and removal proceedings. Therefore, the United States has shown a likelihood of prevailing on appeal to the extent the preliminary injunction prevents officials from relying on the memos' enforcement priorities for nondetention decisions. The court also concluded that the remaining factors also support a partial stay.The court stated that the injunction will go into effect to the extent it prevents DHS and ICE officials from relying on the memos to refuse to detain aliens described in 8 U.S.C. 1226(c)(1) against whom detainers have been lodged or aliens who fall under section 1231(a)(1)(A) because they have been ordered removed. The court stayed the injunction pending appeal in all other respects including the reporting requirements. View "Texas v. United States" on Justia Law

New Jersey Law Enforcement Directive 2018-6, states “that individuals are less likely to report a crime if they fear that the responding officer will turn them over to immigration authorities,” and barred counties and local law enforcement from assisting federal immigration authorities by providing any non-public personally-identifying information regarding any individual, providing access to state, county, or local law enforcement equipment, office space, database, or property not available to the general public, providing access to a detained individual for an interview, without the detainee's written consent, or providing notice of a detained individual’s upcoming release from custody. The Directive prohibited local law enforcement agencies and officials from entering “any agreement to exercise federal immigration authority pursuant to Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act” and required them to “notify a detained individual” when federal immigration authorities requested to interview the person, to have the person detained past his release date, or to be informed of the person’s upcoming release.The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of challenges to the Directive. For a federal law to preempt state law it must represent the exercise of a power conferred on Congress by the Constitution. Because the Constitution confers upon Congress the power to regulate individuals, not states, the federal law must be best read as one that regulates private actors, The cited federal laws, 8 U.S.C. 1373 and 1644, which regulate only state action, do not preempt the Directive. View "Ocean County Board of Commissioners v. Attorney General New Jersey" on Justia Law