Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Immigration Law
Lopez Troche v. Garland
The First Circuit vacated the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) that affirmed the denial of Appellant's application for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), holding that the BIA's affirmance of the immigration judge's (IJ) finding of adverse credibility did not hold up.After a hearing, the IJ issued an oral decision denying Appellant's claims, finding that Appellant was not a credible witness in terms of crucial aspects of his claim and his lack of credibility was ultimately fatal to his argument that he had suffered past persecution. The BIA affirmed. The First Circuit vacated the BIA's order, holding that the BIA's affirmance of the IJ's adverse credibility finding could not be sustained, and therefore, the BIA's rulings could also not be sustained. View "Lopez Troche v. Garland" on Justia Law
GEO Group, Inc., v. Newsom
California AB 32 phases out private detention facilities within the state. Because of fluctuations in immigration, ICE relies exclusively on private detention centers in California. AB 32 carves out exceptions for the state’s private detention centers. The United States and GEO, which operates private immigration detention centers, sued. The district court ruled largely in favor of California.The Ninth Circuit reversed. California is not simply exercising its traditional police powers, but rather impeding federal immigration policy. . Under the Supremacy Clause, state law must fall if it stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. The presumption against preemption does not apply to areas of exclusive federal regulation, such as the detention of immigrants. California did more than just exercise its traditional state police powers – it impeded the federal government’s immigration policy. Congress granted the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security broad discretion over immigrant detention, including the right to contract with private companies to operate detention facilities. AB 32 also discriminated against the federal government in violation of the intergovernmental immunity doctrine by requiring the federal government to close all its detention facilities, while not requiring California to close any of its private detention facilities until 2028. View "GEO Group, Inc., v. Newsom" on Justia Law
Berdiev v. Garland
Petitioner Tojiddin Berdiev faced immigration removal proceedings since 2007. After more than a decade of petitions, motions, and appeals, the Board of Immigration Appeals denied Berdiev’s untimely motion to reopen removal proceedings (Berdiev’s second motion), then denied Berdiev’s motion to reconsider. In each of its two orders, the Board held that: (1) Berdiev was not entitled to equitable tolling of his untimely motion to reopen; and (2) exercise of the Board’s sua sponte reopening authority was unwarranted. Berdiev argued to the Tenth Circuit that the Board abused its discretion in making the first determination and relied on an erroneous legal premise in making the second. On equitable tolling, the Court concluded the Board did not abuse its discretion. On the exercise of the Board’s sua sponte reopening authority, however, the Court concluded the Board at least partly relied on a legally erroneous rationale; the Court could not determine whether the Board would have reached the same outcome independently based solely on valid reasons. Accordingly, the Court granted Berdiev’s petitions for review, vacated the Board’s two orders solely as to the sua sponte reopening decision, and remanded to the Board to reconsider that decision. View "Berdiev v. Garland" on Justia Law
Texas v. United States
The Fifth Circuit granted in part and denied in part the United States' motion for a stay pending appeal of the district court's nationwide preliminary injunction preventing the United States from relying on immigration enforcement priorities outlined in memos from DHS and ICE. On Inauguration Day, January 20, 2021, the Acting Secretary of DHS issued a memo announcing that the Department would undergo a comprehensive review of enforcement policies, announcing DHS's interim enforcement priorities, and directing an immediate 100-day pause on removals. ICE issued a memo on February 18, 2021 that incorporates the same three interim priorities.The court did not see a strong justification for concluding that the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 detention statutes override the deep-rooted tradition of enforcement discretion when it comes to decisions that occur before detention, such as who should be subject to arrest, detainers, and removal proceedings. Therefore, the United States has shown a likelihood of prevailing on appeal to the extent the preliminary injunction prevents officials from relying on the memos' enforcement priorities for nondetention decisions. The court also concluded that the remaining factors also support a partial stay.The court stated that the injunction will go into effect to the extent it prevents DHS and ICE officials from relying on the memos to refuse to detain aliens described in 8 U.S.C. 1226(c)(1) against whom detainers have been lodged or aliens who fall under section 1231(a)(1)(A) because they have been ordered removed. The court stayed the injunction pending appeal in all other respects including the reporting requirements. View "Texas v. United States" on Justia Law
Ocean County Board of Commissioners v. Attorney General New Jersey
New Jersey Law Enforcement Directive 2018-6, states “that individuals are less likely to report a crime if they fear that the responding officer will turn them over to immigration authorities,” and barred counties and local law enforcement from assisting federal immigration authorities by providing any non-public personally-identifying information regarding any individual, providing access to state, county, or local law enforcement equipment, office space, database, or property not available to the general public, providing access to a detained individual for an interview, without the detainee's written consent, or providing notice of a detained individual’s upcoming release from custody. The Directive prohibited local law enforcement agencies and officials from entering “any agreement to exercise federal immigration authority pursuant to Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act” and required them to “notify a detained individual” when federal immigration authorities requested to interview the person, to have the person detained past his release date, or to be informed of the person’s upcoming release.The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of challenges to the Directive. For a federal law to preempt state law it must represent the exercise of a power conferred on Congress by the Constitution. Because the Constitution confers upon Congress the power to regulate individuals, not states, the federal law must be best read as one that regulates private actors, The cited federal laws, 8 U.S.C. 1373 and 1644, which regulate only state action, do not preempt the Directive. View "Ocean County Board of Commissioners v. Attorney General New Jersey" on Justia Law
Doe v. Tompkins
The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court granting Appellee's petition for a writ of habeas corpus and ordering the immigration judge (IJ) to conduct a new bond hearing, holding that the district court did not err in concluding that Appellee was entitled to a new hearing.Appellee was detained under 8 U.S.C. 1226(a) and was denied bond at a hearing before an IJ, who placed the burden on Appellee to prove he was neither a danger to the community nor a flight risk. Appellee subsequently petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his constitutional due process right required the government - not him - to bear the burden of proof at his bond hearing. The district court agreed and ordered the IJ to conduct a new bond hearing at which the government would bear the burden of proof. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Appellee was entitled to a new hearing before an IJ at which the government will bear the burden of proving either dangerousness or a flight risk in order to continue detaining Appellee. View "Doe v. Tompkins" on Justia Law
Texas v. Biden
In an action concerning the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP) created by the Secretary of DHS on December 20, 2018, and purportedly rescinded by DHS in a memorandum on June 1, 2021, the district court concluded that DHS's purported rescission of MPP violated, inter alia, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).After determining that the States' claims are justiciable, the Fifth Circuit denied the Government's motion for an emergency stay pending appeal of the district court's permanent injunction enjoining and restraining DHS from implementing or enforcing the June 1 Memorandum and ordering DHS to enforce and implement MPP in good faith. The court held that DHS failed to satisfy the four Nken stay factors. The court concluded that the Government is not likely to succeed on either its APA arguments or its 8 U.S.C. 1225 arguments, let alone that the Government is likely to succeed on both. Therefore, the Government has not come close to a strong showing that it is likely to succeed on the merits. In this case, the Secretary failed to consider several relevant factors and important aspects of the problem, including the States' legitimate interests, MPP's benefits, potential alternatives to MPP, and section 1225's implications. Furthermore, the Government's counterarguments are unpersuasive.The court also concluded that the Government has not shown that it will be irreparably injured absent a stay pending appeal; the States have suffered, and will continue to suffer, harms as a result of the termination of MPP; and the Government is also wrong to say that a stay would promote the public interest by preserving the separation of powers. Finally, the court rejected the Government's contention that a stay is warranted because the district court should have remanded without vacating the June 1 Memorandum or issuing an injunction. View "Texas v. Biden" on Justia Law
Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons
The First Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the district court granting Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus and ordering the immigration judge (IJ) to conduct a second bond hearing, holding that remand was required.Petitioner, who entered the United States without being admitted or paroled, was arrested and detained pending a determination of her removability. Petitioner was subsequently denied bond at a hearing in which the IJ placed the burden on Petitioner to prove that she was neither a danger to the community nor a flight risk. The district court ordered the IJ to conduct a second bond hearing at which the government bore the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner was either a danger or a flight risk. After a second hearing, the IJ released Petitioner on bond. The First Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the government need not prove a detainee's flight risk by clear and convincing evidence; and (2) the judgment is otherwise affirmed. View "Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons" on Justia Law
Bauer v. Elrich
The Montgomery County Council established the Emergency Assistance Relief Payment Program (EARP) in March 2020 to provide emergency cash assistance to County residents with incomes equal to or less than 50% of the federal poverty benchmark who were not eligible for federal or state pandemic relief. Although eligibility for EARP aid is not dependent on a person’s status as an undocumented immigrant, such individuals are eligible to receive EARP payments. To fund EARP, the County appropriated $10,000,000 from reserve funds to the County’s Department of Health and Human Services.
Taxpayers filed suit in Maryland state court, asserting that EARP violated 8 U.S.C. 1621(a), which, with few exceptions, generally prohibits undocumented persons from receiving state and local benefits. Recognizing that Section 1621 does not authorize private enforcement, the plaintiffs cited the Maryland common law doctrine of taxpayer standing, which “permits taxpayers to seek the aid of courts, exercising equity powers, to enjoin illegal and ultra vires acts of [Maryland] public officials where those acts are reasonably likely to result in pecuniary loss to the taxpayer.” The case was removed to federal court based on federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. 1331. The court granted the County summary judgment. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Congress has declined to authorize private parties to enforce Section 1621, a legislative decision that cannot be circumvented by invocation of a state’s law of taxpayer standing. View "Bauer v. Elrich" on Justia Law
Ocean County Board of Commissioners v. Attorney General of New Jersey
The New Jersey Attorney General issued Law Enforcement Directive 2018-6, the Immigrant Trust Directive. Concluding “that individuals are less likely to report a crime if they fear that the responding officer will turn them over to immigration authorities,” the Directive barred counties and local law enforcement from assisting federal immigration authorities by providing any non-public personally-identifying information regarding any individual; providing access to any state, county, or local law enforcement equipment, office space, database, or property not available to the general public; providing access to a detained individual for an interview unless the detainee signs a written consent; or providing notice of a detained individual’s upcoming release from custody. The Directive prohibited “any agreement to exercise federal immigration authority” and required local law enforcement to “notify a detained individual” when federal immigration authorities requested to interview the person, to have the person detained past his release date, or to be informed of the person’s upcoming release.Plaintiffs cited 8 U.S.C. 1373 and 1644, which bar government officials and entities from prohibiting or restricting, any government entity or official from sending to, or receiving from federal immigration authorities “information regarding the citizenship or immigration status . . . of any individual.” The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Federal law does not preempt the Directive; every form of preemption is based on a federal law that regulates the conduct of private actors, not the states. View "Ocean County Board of Commissioners v. Attorney General of New Jersey" on Justia Law