Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

This case relates to the consent decree incorporating the Flores Agreement, a 1997 settlement agreement between the United States and a class of all minors subject to immigration detention. The Agreement established nationwide standards for the detention, release, and treatment of minors by U.S. immigration authorities. The Agreement, by its own terms, terminates after the government's publication of final regulations implementing the Agreement. In 2019, the government issued final regulations represented as implementing, and thus terminating, the Agreement. The district court then concluded that the new regulations, on the whole, were inconsistent with the Agreement, enjoining the regulations from taking effect and denying the government's motion to terminate the Agreement.The Ninth Circuit held that the provisions of the new regulations relating to unaccompanied minors are consistent with the Agreement except to the extent that they require ORR to place an unaccompanied minor in a secure facility if the minor is otherwise a danger to self or others and to the extent they require unaccompanied minors held in secure or staff-secure placements to request a hearing, rather than providing a hearing to those minors automatically unless they refuse one.The panel also held that some of the regulations regarding initial detention and custody of both unaccompanied and accompanied minors are consistent with the Agreement and may take effect. However, the remaining new regulations relating to accompanied minors depart from the Agreement in several important ways. Therefore, the panel affirmed the district court's order enjoining those regulations. The panel further held that the district court correctly concluded that the Agreement was not terminated by the adoption of the regulations. Finally, the panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the government's motion to terminate the Agreement, as the government has not demonstrated that changed circumstances, such as an increase in family migration, justify terminating the Agreement's protections. View "Flores v. Rosen" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review of a final order of removal issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing Petitioner's appeal from the decision of an immigration judge (IJ) denying Petitioner's request for withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3), holding that Petitioner was not entitled to relief.Petitioner, a native and citizen of Honduras, sought withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture and withholding of removal. The IJ denied the petition for withholding of removal, concluding that Petitioner failed to sustain his burden of showing that he was targeted on account of family membership, a protected ground. The BIA affirmed. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there was substantial evidence to support the BIA's decision because Petitioner failed to establish the required nexus between his treatment by the police and his membership in a particular social group - his immediate family. View "Ruiz Varela v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Okeres, U.S. citizens, are trying to get their eight-year-old son from Nigeria to the United States. They applied for a “certificate of identity,” which validates the identity of a person living abroad who purports to be a U.S. citizen but has not presented enough evidence of citizenship to obtain a passport, 8 U.S.C. 1503(b). They sued, asserting that, after their son finally received a travel document from the State Department, he has been prevented from boarding a flight to the U.S. because the Consulate General refused to verify the certificate’s authenticity with the airlines with which they had booked flights for their son.The district court dismissed the Okeres’ complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Okeres identified no legal authority compelling the Consulate General to verify the authenticity of the certificate to the airlines. None of the federal statutes the Okeres invoked confers jurisdiction. Nor do any of the provisions identified in the State Department’s Foreign Affairs Manual create individual rights or impose enforceable duties on a Consulate General when issuing a certificate of identity. The court stated that its decision was “most unsatisfying, for it is impossible to read the parties’ briefs without concluding that something else is going on here.” View "Okere v. United States" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner's challenge to an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying her applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT), holding that Petitioner was not entitled to relief on her claims.Specifically, the First Circuit held (1) the evidence in the record did not compel a finding that Petitioner was or will be persecuted because she was a Guatemalan woman, and therefore, Petitioner failed to establish that she was eligible for asylum; and (2) because Petitioner failed to establish her eligibility for asylum, her claims for withholding of removal and protection under the ACT necessarily failed to meet the more stringent standards. View "Pojoy-De Leon v. Barr" on Justia Law

In 2008, Homeland Security passed rules requiring that employers receive a favorable labor certification from Labor before obtaining a visa. Homeland Security and Labor jointly issued a new series of rules in 2015. Plaintiffs, a group of employers and associations whose members rely on H-2B visas, filed suit challenging Homeland Security's 2008 Rules and the joint 2015 Rules as exceeding the agencies' statutory authority.The Fourth Circuit held that there is standing to challenge the 2008 Rules but the challenge is time-barred; there is standing to challenge the 2015 Program and Wage Rules; and the 2015 Program and Wage Rules are valid exercises of Labor's implied delegation to rulemake as part of its duty as Homeland Security's chosen consulting agency. The court explained that this implied delegation is evident from the statutory circumstances in the Immigration and Nationality Act, including the requirement that Homeland Security engage in "consultation with appropriate agencies," the definition of H-2B, and Labor's rulemaking powers for similar visas. The court concluded that, while there are limits on which agencies Homeland Security can choose and on those agencies' ability to rulemake, Labor's 2015 Program and Wage Rules fall within both boundaries. View "Outdoor Amusement Business Association, Inc. v. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT), holding that Petitioner was not entitled to relief.After the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him Petitioner conceded removability but cross-applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under CAT. The immigration judge denied the petition, determining, as relevant to this appeal, that Petitioner suffered no persecution and that any alleged persecution was not caused by his membership in a particular social group. The BIA affirmed. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Petitioner's claim failed because he did not prove a nexus between the alleged persecution and a statutorily protected ground. View "Marquez-Paz v. Barr" on Justia Law

Every 10 years, the U.S. undertakes an “Enumeration” of its population “in such Manner” as Congress “shall by Law direct.” The Secretary of Commerce must “take a decennial census of population . . . in such form and content as he may determine,” 13 U.S.C. 141(a), and report to the President, who must transmit to Congress a “statement showing the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed, as ascertained” under the census, 2 U.S.C. 2a(a), applying the “method of equal proportions” formula to the population counts to calculate the number of House seats for each state.In July 2020, the President issued a memorandum to the Secretary, announcing a policy of excluding from the apportionment base aliens who are not in lawful immigration status. The President ordered the Secretary “to provide information permitting the President, to the extent practicable, to exercise the President’s discretion to carry out the policy.”The Supreme Court vacated an injunction, prohibiting the Secretary from including the information needed to implement the President’s memorandum and directed dismissal of the lawsuits for lack of jurisdiction. The threatened impact of an unlawful apportionment on congressional representation and federal funding does not establish a “legally cognizable injury.” Any chilling effect from the memorandum dissipated upon the conclusion of the census. The Secretary has not altered census operations in a concrete manner that will predictably change the count. Any prediction of how the Executive Branch might eventually implement the general statement of policy is conjecture. It is unclear how many aliens have administrative records that would allow the Secretary to avoid impermissible estimation; whether the Census Bureau can timely match its records to census data; and to what extent the President might direct the Secretary to “reform the census” to implement his general policy. The plaintiffs suffer no concrete harm from the challenged policy, which does not require them “to do anything or to refrain from doing anything.” View "Trump v. New York" on Justia Law

The First Circuit dismissed Appellant's appeal of the order of the district court dismissing Appellant's complaint seeking an order compelling the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) to rescind and reissue an order of removal it affirmed in 2013 and later refused to reopen, holding that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.In 2013, the BIA affirmed an order authorizing the removal of Appellant to his country of origin. Appellant filed a motion to reopen his removal proceedings, which the BIA denied. Appellant then commenced this action in the United States District Court against officials of the Department of Justice claiming a right of action under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and any statutes providing for habeas corpus. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The First Circuit dismissed Appellant's appeal, holding that Appellant's APA claim and habeas claim both arose from his removal proceedings and that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over those claims. View "Gicharu v. Carr" on Justia Law

Ghanian native and citizen, petitioner Joachim Addo appealed when his application for asylum was denied by an immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals. Petitioner was the son of the chief of the Challa tribe. For several years the Challa have been in a land dispute with another tribe, the Atwode. The Atwode tribe was larger than the Challa, but the Challa controlled more land in the Nkwanta district, and in the past they often leased land to the Atwode. Starting in 2005 the Atwode began violating the lease terms and customs. Petitioner’s father instructed the Challa to stop leasing land to the Atwode, and he took the Atwode to court over the land disputes, winning every case. The Atwode responded with violence against the Challa and vowed to eliminate Petitioner’s father and family. This led to several violent incidents perpetrated by the Atwode against Petitioner and other members of his family. Shortly after these attacks, Petitioner and his father agreed that, for his own safety, Petitioner would relinquish his position as heir-apparent to the Challa chiefdom and would move from Nkwanta to Accra, the capital of Ghana. But this did not stop the Atwode, and harassment continued. In January 2017 Petitioner entered the United States. He expressed a fear of returning to Ghana and was granted a credible-fear interview. An asylum officer determined that Petitioner was credible and referred his case to adjudication. At a hearing in June 2017 the IJ determined that Petitioner was removable. Petitioner indicated, however, that he wished to apply for asylum, so the IJ scheduled a hearing to consider the asylum claim. Petitioner filed an application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. In the briefs on his petition for review by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, Petitioner challenged the denial of asylum and withholding of removal, arguing that substantial evidence did not support the BIA’s determination that he could successfully avoid future persecution by relocating within Ghana. The Court agreed with Petitioner that the decision on his ability to safely relocate was unsupported by substantial evidence. The petition was granted and the matter remanded to the BIA for further proceedings. View "Addo v. Barr" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a mandamus action in the district court, seeking an order to compel USCIS officials to travel to federal prison in order to administer the oath of citizenship to him. Plaintiff alleged that USCIS unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed the administration of his oath under section 706(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claim under 28 U.S.C. 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim for relief and denial of his subsequent motion for reconsideration. Contrary to defendant's contention, the district court did consider defendant's APA claim before dismissing it. The district court dismissed after determining that his section 706(1) claim could not proceed. The court explained that when plaintiff appears before USCIS officials, they must administer the oath to him. But the manner in which USCIS administers the oath, including where within the United States that administration occurs, is left to the agency's discretion. In this case, plaintiff cannot show a clear right to relief and thus he is not entitled to a writ of mandamus. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff leave to amend the complaint. View "Mendoza-Tarango v. Flores" on Justia Law