Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Suqin Xia, a citizen of China, has lived unlawfully in the United States for over thirty years. She applied for adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident under 8 U.S.C. § 1255. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied her application, citing discretionary reasons. Xia then challenged the decision in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York under the Mandamus Act and the Administrative Procedure Act.The district court dismissed Xia's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, referencing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), which bars judicial review of any judgment regarding an application made under § 1255. The court concluded that the denial of Xia's application was a "judgment" under this statute, thus precluding judicial review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the denial of an application for adjustment of status under § 1255 is a "judgment" for purposes of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), regardless of whether it is issued by an immigration court or USCIS. Consequently, the court held that there was no jurisdiction to review Xia's claims, affirming the district court's dismissal of her complaint. View "Xia v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Zackaria Dahir Mohamed, a native of Somalia, entered the United States as a child refugee in 1998. He was later convicted of several offenses, including theft and assault with a dangerous weapon. In 2013, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him due to these convictions. An Immigration Judge (IJ) ordered his removal in 2018, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed his appeal. Mohamed then petitioned for review.The IJ initially found Mohamed removable for aggravated felony theft and crimes of violence. In 2020, the IJ ordered his removal to Somalia. Mohamed appealed to the BIA, which remanded the case to the IJ to assess Mohamed’s competency. On remand, Mohamed presented evidence of his mental health history, including a psychological evaluation by Dr. Jerry Kroll. The IJ ruled in 2021 that Mohamed was competent during the 2020 merits hearing, based on Dr. Kroll’s testimony and the IJ’s observations. The BIA dismissed Mohamed’s appeal on de novo review, leading to the current petition.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. Mohamed argued that the BIA’s affirmation of the IJ’s competency finding was unsupported by the record. The court noted that it has jurisdiction to review final agency removal orders but not factual findings related to criminal offenses. The court found that Mohamed’s competency determination was a factual finding, which is generally affirmed unless clearly erroneous. Mohamed’s claims were barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C).Even if Mohamed presented a legal or constitutional claim, the court found no fundamental procedural error or resulting prejudice. The IJ had considered all appropriate evidence, including Dr. Kroll’s testimony and Mohamed’s behavior during proceedings. The court concluded that there was no procedural error in holding a retroactive competency hearing. The petition for review was denied. View "Mohamed v. Bondi" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to the Department of Defense's (DoD) authority to impose time-in-service requirements for expedited naturalization of noncitizen servicemembers under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Historically, the DoD certified noncitizens' honorable service for naturalization without a time-in-service requirement. However, in 2017, the DoD issued a policy requiring a minimum of 180 days of active-duty service or one year for reservists before certifying honorable service. In 2020, a group of noncitizen servicemembers challenged this policy under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, finding the policy arbitrary and capricious, contrary to law, and that the DoD's role in certifying honorable service was purely ministerial. The court vacated the time-in-service requirement and enjoined the DoD from withholding certification based on the policy. The DoD appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. During the appeal, the DoD rescinded the challenged policy and did not introduce a replacement. The court determined that the case was moot due to the rescission of the policy and dismissed the appeal. The court also vacated the district court's judgment, finding no indication that the DoD rescinded the policy to evade review and emphasizing the need to clear the path for future litigation on the issue. View "Samma v. DOD" on Justia Law

Stefan Green, a South African citizen, applied for an R-1 visa to serve as a worship leader at Calvary Albuquerque, Inc., a non-profit church in New Mexico. His application was denied by a consular officer, leading Calvary to sue, alleging the denial violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The district court dismissed the suit, citing the consular nonreviewability doctrine, which generally prevents judicial review of consular officers' visa decisions.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico dismissed the case, ruling that RFRA did not authorize judicial review of the consular officer’s decision. The court also found that the consular officer provided a facially legitimate and bona fide reason for the visa denial, and Calvary did not plausibly allege bad faith. The district court denied Calvary’s motion for a preliminary injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Tenth Circuit held that RFRA does not expressly authorize judicial review of consular officers' visa decisions, thus upholding the consular nonreviewability doctrine. The court also concluded that even if RFRA claims could be considered under the constitutional claim exception, the consular officer provided a facially legitimate and bona fide reason for denying the visa, and Calvary did not plausibly allege bad faith. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Calvary Albuquerque v. Blinken" on Justia Law

A group of religious organizations employing nonimmigrant workers challenged a regulation by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) that precludes special immigrant religious workers from filing their applications for special immigrant worker status and permanent resident status concurrently. The plaintiffs argued that this regulation violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and the Administrative Procedures Act (APA).The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the APA claim as time-barred and granted summary judgment in favor of USCIS on the remaining claims. The court found that the regulation did not violate RFRA because it did not affect religious practice, and it did not violate the First Amendment because it was neutral and generally applicable. The court also ruled that the regulation did not violate the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses because it was based on the risk of fraud in the special immigrant religious worker program.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the plaintiffs had standing to bring their claims and that their APA claim was not time-barred due to the Supreme Court's decision in Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, which held that a plaintiff’s challenge to a final agency action does not accrue under the APA until the plaintiff is injured by the action. The court remanded the APA claim for further proceedings.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision on the RFRA and First Amendment claims, concluding that the regulation did not substantially burden the plaintiffs' religious exercise and was neutral and generally applicable. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the Establishment Clause claim, finding that the regulation did not overly burden the plaintiffs' religious practice. View "Society of the Divine Word v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services" on Justia Law

Krishna Kishore Geda and Chaya Durga Sruthi Keerthi Nunna, married Indian nationals residing in the U.S. on employment-based nonimmigrant visas, filed I-485 applications for adjustment of status to lawful permanent residents. After waiting nearly eight years, they were informed that their applications were on hold due to the unavailability of the required immigrant visa. Frustrated by the delay, they sued the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and its Director, claiming unlawful withholding and unreasonable delay under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissed their claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, stating that the Adjudication Hold Policy is a discretionary decision shielded from judicial review under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The Third Circuit held that the decision to delay adjudication of the Gedas' applications under the Adjudication Hold Policy is a discretionary action specified under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a), which grants the Secretary of Homeland Security broad discretion over the adjustment of status process. Consequently, the court found that it lacked jurisdiction to review the claims under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which precludes judicial review of discretionary decisions by the Secretary of Homeland Security. The court concluded that only the executive and legislative branches could provide the relief sought by the Gedas. View "Geda v. Director United States Citizenship and Immigration" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program by several states, led by Texas. DACA, established in 2012, allows certain undocumented immigrants who arrived as children to receive a renewable two-year period of deferred action from deportation and eligibility for work authorization. The plaintiffs argue that DACA is procedurally and substantively unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas initially ruled in 2021 that Texas had standing to challenge DACA and that the program was unlawful. The court vacated the program but stayed the vacatur for existing DACA recipients. In 2022, the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and remanded the case, noting that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had issued a Final Rule to address procedural defects. On remand, the district court found the Final Rule substantively unlawful and vacated it, maintaining the stay for existing recipients.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Texas has standing to challenge DACA based on the financial burden imposed by the presence of DACA recipients. The court also found that the Final Rule is substantively unlawful as it conflicts with the INA. The court affirmed the district court's judgment but modified the remedial order to limit the injunction to Texas and to sever the forbearance provisions from the work authorization provisions of the Final Rule. The court also maintained the stay for existing DACA recipients pending further appeal. View "Texas v. United States" on Justia Law

Broadgate, Inc. employed an H-1B visa holder who filed a complaint with the Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division in February 2018, alleging that Broadgate had not paid him the full wages required by the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Division’s investigation substantiated the claim and found additional violations, including failure to post required workplace notices. Consequently, the Division issued a determination letter in December 2018, finding Broadgate had willfully violated the Act, barring it from the H-1B program for two years, requiring payment of back wages, and assessing a civil penalty.Broadgate sought review before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), challenging only the determination regarding the workplace notices. The ALJ agreed with Broadgate, vacating the determination. However, the Department’s Administrative Review Board reversed this decision. On remand, Broadgate argued that the Division exceeded its authority by investigating violations not alleged in the original complaint. The ALJ rejected this argument, and the Review Board and the district court affirmed the Director’s imposition of fines and penalties.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. Broadgate argued that the District Director lacked authority to issue the determination letter and that the Wage and Hour Division exceeded its authority by investigating the notice violations. The court held that the presumption of regularity applied, meaning the Director’s issuance of the letter was presumptive proof of her authority. The court also found that the Division was entitled to investigate the notice violations discovered during the investigation of the wage complaint. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, rejecting Broadgate’s arguments. View "Broadgate, Inc v. Su" on Justia Law

King County, Washington, issued Executive Order PFC-7-1-EO, which directed county officials to ensure that future leases at Boeing Field prohibit fixed base operators (FBOs) from servicing U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) charter flights. This order was based on the county's disagreement with federal immigration policies. Following the issuance of the order, all three FBOs at Boeing Field ceased servicing ICE flights, forcing ICE to relocate its operations to Yakima Air Terminal, which increased operational costs and security concerns.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granted summary judgment for the United States, finding that the Executive Order violated both the Supremacy Clause’s intergovernmental immunity doctrine and a World War II-era contract reconveying Boeing Field to King County. The district court concluded that the Executive Order discriminated against the federal government and its contractors and breached the Instrument of Transfer, which required King County to allow the United States nonexclusive use of the landing area at Boeing Field.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the United States had Article III standing to bring the suit, as it had suffered concrete and particularized injuries due to the increased operational costs and imminent risk of future injury from the Executive Order. The court also found that the United States’ claims were ripe for adjudication.The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Executive Order violated the Instrument of Transfer by preventing ICE from using Boeing Field, thus breaching the contractual right of the United States to use the airport. Additionally, the court held that the Executive Order violated the intergovernmental immunity doctrine by improperly regulating federal operations and discriminating against the federal government and its contractors. The court rejected King County’s defenses, including the anti-commandeering and market participant doctrines. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "USA V. KING COUNTY" on Justia Law

The State of Texas placed a concertina wire fence along part of the border with Mexico in the Eagle Pass area to deter illegal crossings. The United States Border Patrol agents cut the wire multiple times, claiming it was necessary to fulfill their duty of patrolling the border to prevent illegal entry. Texas sued for an injunction, arguing that the Border Patrol was needlessly cutting the wire. The district court found that the Border Patrol was not hampered by the wire and had breached it numerous times without apparent purpose other than to allow migrants easier entrance. However, the court denied the injunction, citing the United States' sovereign immunity against Texas's claims.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas initially denied Texas's request for a preliminary injunction, despite agreeing with Texas on the facts. The court believed that the United States retained sovereign immunity. A motions panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit disagreed and granted a temporary injunction pending appeal. The United States sought relief in the Supreme Court, which vacated the injunction without providing reasons. The case was remanded to the district court to investigate events in Shelby Park, where Texas's actions were alleged to have obstructed Border Patrol operations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that Texas is entitled to a preliminary injunction. The court held that the United States waived sovereign immunity as to Texas's state law claims under § 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act. The court also rejected the United States' arguments that the injunction was barred by intergovernmental immunity and the Immigration and Nationality Act. The court found that Texas satisfied the injunction factors from Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment and granted Texas's request for a preliminary injunction, with modifications based on the district court's supplemental fact findings. View "Texas v. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law